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सं. 39] नई दिल्ली, सितम्बर 23—सितम्बर 29, 2007, शनिवार/आश्विन 1—आश्विन 7, 1929
No. 39] NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 23—SEPTEMBER 29, 2007, SATURDAY/ASVINA 1—ASVINA 7, 1929

इस भाग में भिन्न पृष्ठ संख्या दी जाती है जिससे कि यह पृथक संकलन के रूप में रखा जा सके
Separate Paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation

भाग II—खण्ड 3—उप-खण्ड (ii)
PART II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii)

भारत सरकार के मंत्रालयों (रक्षा मंत्रालय को छोड़कर) द्वारा जारी किए गए संविधिक आदेश और अधिसूचनाएँ
Statutory Orders and Notifications Issued by the Ministries of the Government of India
(Other than the Ministry of Defence)

कार्मिक, लोक शिकायत तथा पेंशन मंत्रालय
(कार्मिक और प्रशिक्षण विभाग)
नई दिल्ली, 20 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2753.—केंद्रीय सरकार, एतद्वारा दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना अधिनियम, 1946 (1946 का अधिनियम सं. 25) की धारा 6 के साथ पठित धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए आंध्र प्रदेश राज्य सरकार, गृह (एस.सी.ए.) विभाग के दिनांक 2 जुलाई, 2007 की अधिसूचना सं. जीओएमएस नं. 149 द्वारा प्राप्त सहमति से दिनांक 18-5-2007 को हुए मक्का मस्जिद-बम विस्फोट के मामले में हुसैनी आलम पुलिस स्टेशन, हैदराबाद सिटी द्वारा भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 120-बी, विस्फोटक पदार्थ अधिनियम की धारा 4 और 5 और विधिविरुद्ध क्रियाकलाप (निवारण) अधिनियम, 1967 की धारा 10 और 12, संपठित धारा 511 भारतीय दंड संहिता के अधीन दर्ज मामला सं. 107/07 तथा उपर्युक्त अपराध से संबंधित अथवा संसक्त प्रयत्नों, दुष्प्रेरणों और षड़यंत्रों तथा उसी संज्ववहार के अनुक्रम में किए गए अथवा उन्हीं तथ्यों से उद्भूत किन्हीं अन्य अपराधों का अन्वेषण करने के लिए दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना के सदस्यों की शक्तियों और अधिकारिता का विस्तार सम्पूर्ण आंध्र प्रदेश राज्य पर करती है।

[सं 228/32/2007-एवीडी-II]
चंद्र प्रकाश, अवर सचिव

3855GI/2007

MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES
AND PENSIONS

(Department of Personnel and Training)

New Delhi, the 20th September, 2007

S.O. 2753.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Act No. 25 of 1946), the Central Government with the consent of State Government of Andhra Pradesh, Home (S.C.A.) Department vide Notification No. G.O. Ms. No. 149, dated 2nd July, 2007, hereby extends the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh for the investigation into the case of Macca Masjid Bomb Explosion occurred on 18-5-2007 in Cr. No. 107/07 u/s 120-B IPC, Sections 4 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act and Sections 10 and 12 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 read with 511 IPC registered by Hussaini Alam Police Station of Hyderabad City and attempts, abetments and conspiracies in relation to or in connection with the said transactions and other transactions committed in the course of the same transaction or arising out of the same fact or facts.

[No. 228/32/2007-AVD-II]

CHANDRA PRAKASH, Under Secy.

(7939)

नई दिल्ली, 20 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2754.—केंद्रीय सरकार, एतद्वारा दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना अधिनियम, 1946 (1946 का अधिनियम सं. 25) की धारा 6 के साथ पठित धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मेघालय राज्य सरकार के राजनीति विभाग की अधिसूचना ज्ञापन सं. पोल., 93/2007/14 ए. दिनांक, शिलांग 1 मई, 2007 द्वारा प्राप्त सहमति से लुम्दिंगीरी पुलिस स्टेशन शिलांग, मेघालय में पंजीकृत मामला सं. 96(8)/2006 में भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 364(ए)/34 के अधीन दंडनीय अपराधों तथा उक्त अपराध से संबंधित अथवा संसक्त प्रयत्न, दुष्प्रेरण और षड्यंत्र तथा उसी संव्यवहार के अनुक्रम में किए गए अथवा उन्हीं तथ्यों से उद्भूत किसी अन्य अपराधों का अन्वेषण करने के लिए दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना के सदस्यों की शक्तियों और अधिकारिता का विस्तार सम्पूर्ण मेघालय राज्य पर करती है।

[सं. 228/28/2007-एवीडी-II]

चंद्र प्रकाश, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 20th September 2007

S.O. 2754.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 read with Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Act No. 25 of 1946), the Central Government with the consent of State Government of Meghalaya vide Political Department Notification Memo No. POL. 93/2007/14-A dated, Shillong, the 1st May, 2007, hereby extends the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to the whole of the State of Meghalaya for investigation of offences punishable under section 364(a)/34 IPC, arising out of case No. 96(8)/2006 registered at Lumdingiri Police Station Shillong, Meghalaya and Attempt, abetment and conspiracy in relation, to or in connection with the said offences, and any other offences committed in the course of the same transaction or arising out of the same facts.

[No. 228/28/2007-AVD-II]

CHANDRA PRAKASH, Under Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 20 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2755.—केंद्रीय सरकार, एतद्वारा दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना अधिनियम, 1946 (1946 का अधिनियम सं. 25) की धारा 6 के साथ पठित धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए कर्नाटक राज्य सरकार की अधिसूचना सं. एचडी 91/पीसीआर 2006, दिनांक 22 जून, 2006 और तमिलनाडु राज्य सरकार की अधिसूचना सं. जी.ओ. एम.एस. सं. 1257, दिनांक 29-12-2006 द्वारा प्राप्त सहमति से श्री पी. एम. सुंदरम, मैसर्स फैशन सिकोटैक्स प्रा. लि. के चेयरमैन एंड मैनेजिंग डायरेक्टर, श्री एस. रमेश, मैसर्स फैशन सिकोटैक्स प्रा. लि. के गारन्टर और अन्य अज्ञात व्यक्तियों एवं किन्हीं अन्य लोकसेवकों अथवा व्यक्तियों के विरुद्ध जुलाई, 1999, मार्च, 2002 की अवधि के दौरान स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इंडिया, वाणिज्यिक शाखा, कोयम्बटूर को कपटपूर्ण ढंग से 853 लाख रुपए से अधिक की अनुचित हानि पहुंचाने के लिए भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 120-बी सपठित धारा 420, 465, 467, 468 और 471 के अधीन दंडनीय अपराधों तथा तत्संबंधी सारभूत अपराधों और उक्त अपराधों से संबंधित तथा उसी संव्यवहार के अनुक्रम में

किए गए अथवा उन्हीं तथ्यों से उद्भूत किसी अन्य अपराध अथवा अपराधों का अन्वेषण करने के लिए दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना के सदस्यों की शक्तियों और अधिकारिता का विस्तार सम्पूर्ण कर्नाटक और तमिलनाडु राज्य पर करती है।

[सं. 228/37/2006-एवीडी-II]

चंद्र प्रकाश, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 20th September, 2007

S.O. 2755.—In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 5 read with section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Act No. 25 of 1946) the Central Government with the consent of State Government of Karnataka vide notification No. HD 91/PCR 2006, dated 22nd June 2006 and State Government of Tamil Nadu vide notification No. G.O. Ms. No. 1257, dated 29-12-2006 hereby extends the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to the whole of the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu for investigation of offences punishable under Section 120-B r/w 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and substantive offences thereof against Shri P.M. Sundaram, Chairman and Managing Director of M/s. Fashion Syncotex Pvt. Ltd., Shri S. Ramesh, Guarantor of M/s. Fashion Syncotex Pvt. Ltd., and unknown others for fraudulently causing a wrongful loss of more than Rs. 853 lakhs to State Bank of India, Commercial Branch, Coimbatore during the period July, 1999-March, 2002, and any other public servants or persons, in relation, to or in connection with the said offences, and any other offences committed in the course of the same transaction or arising out of the same facts.

[No. 228/37/2006-AVD-II]

CHANDRA PRAKASH, Under Secy.

वित्त मंत्रालय

(वित्तीय सेवाएं विभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 18 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2756.—बैंककारी विनियमन अधिनियम, 1949 (1949 का 10) की धारा 53 द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, भारत सरकार, भारतीय रिजर्व बैंक की सिफारिश पर, एतद्वारा घोषणा करती है कि उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 19(2) के उपबंध बैंक ऑफ बड़ौदा पर उस सीमा तक लागू नहीं होंगे, जहां तक उनका संबंध "बॉब म्युचुअल फंड" के विद्यमान न्यासी मंडल को प्रतिस्थापित करने के लिए कम्पनी अधिनियम, 1956 के अधीन गठित की जाने वाली न्यासी कम्पनी की इक्विटी शेयर के 30 प्रतिशत से अधिक की इसकी शेयरधारिता से है।

[फा. सं. 7/27/2007-बीओए]

डी. पी. भारद्वाज, अवर सचिव

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

(Department of Financial Services)

New Delhi, the 18th September, 2007

S.O. 2756.—In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 53 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), the Government of India, on the recommendations of Reserve Bank of India, hereby declares that the provisions of Section 19(2) of the said Act shall not apply to Bank of

Baroda in so far as it holds more than 30% shares in the equity of the Trustee Company to be formed under the Companies Act, 1956 for replacing the present Board of Trustees of "BOB Mutual Fund".

[F.No. 7/27/2007-BOA]

D.P. BHARDWAJ, Under Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 19 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2757.—वित्तीय आस्तियों का प्रतिभूतिकरण एवं पुनर्गठन तथा प्रतिभूति हित का प्रवर्तन अधिनियम, 2002 (2002 का 54) की धारा 2 की उप-धारा (1) के खण्ड (ड) के उप-खण्ड (iv) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केन्द्र सरकार, एतद्वारा "इंडियाबुल्स हाउसिंग फाइनेंस लिमिटेड", जिसका पंजीकृत कार्यालय एफ-60, मल्होत्रा भवन, द्वितीय तल, कर्नाट प्लेस, नई दिल्ली-110001 में है, को उक्त अधिनियम के प्रयोजनों के लिए "वित्तीय संस्था" के रूप में विनिर्दिष्ट करती है।

[फा. सं. 1/1/2006-बीओ-1]

जी. बी. सिंह, उप सचिव

New Delhi, the 19th September, 2007

S.O. 2757.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (iv) of clause (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), the Central Government hereby specifies the "Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd.", having its registered office at F-60, Malhotra Building, IInd Floor, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110001 as 'financial institution' for the purposes of the said Act.

[F.No. 1/1/2006-BO-I]

G. B. SINGH, Dy. Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 19 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2758.—राष्ट्रीयकृत बैंक (प्रबन्ध एवं प्रकीर्ण उपबंध) स्कीम, 1970 के खण्ड 9 के उप-खण्ड (2) (क) के साथ पठित बैंककारी कंपनी (उपक्रमों का अर्जन एवं अंतरण) अधिनियम, 1970 की धारा 9 की उप-धारा (3) के खण्ड (ड) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केन्द्रीय सरकार, एतद्वारा श्री मधुकरराव जी. शिंदे, विशेष सहायक, देना बैंक, हमीदिया रोड, भोपाल को देना बैंक के निदेशक बोर्ड में कर्मकार कर्मचारी निदेशक के रूप में नियुक्त करती है। वे अपनी नियुक्ति की तारीख से अधिवर्षिता की आयु अर्थात् 28-2-2010 तक या उनके उत्तराधिकारी की विधिवत नियुक्ति होने तक या उनके देना बैंक के कर्मकार कर्मचारी बने रहने तक या अगला आदेश होने तक, जो भी पहले हो, इस पद पर बने रहेंगे।

[फा. सं. 15/6/2006-आईआर]

राजेन्द्र सूद, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 19th September, 2007

S.O. 2758.—In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (e) of the Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 read with Sub-clause (2)(a) of Clause 9 of the Nationalized Banks (Management and Miscellaneous Provisions) Scheme, 1970, the Central Government hereby appoints Shri Madhukarrao G. Shinde, Special Assistant Dena Bank, Hamidia Road, Bhopal as Workmen Employee Director on the Board of Directors of Dena Bank. He will hold office from the date of his appointment till he attains

the age of superannuation i.e. 28-2-2010 or until his successor is duly appointed or till he ceases to be a workman employee of Dena Bank or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

[F.No. 15/6/2006-IR]

RAJINDER SOOD, Under Secy.

(आर्थिक कार्य विभाग)

(बैंकिंग प्रभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 19 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2759.—भारतीय निर्यात-आयात बैंक अधिनियम, 1981 (1981 का 28) की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (1) के खण्ड (ड) के उप-खण्ड (झ) के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार, एतद्वारा श्री अरविन्द विरमानी, मुख्य आर्थिक सलाहकार, आर्थिक कार्य विभाग, वित्त मंत्रालय, नई दिल्ली को श्री अशोक के. लाहिड़ी के स्थान पर भारतीय निर्यात-आयात बैंक के निदेशक बोर्ड में निदेशक के रूप में नामित करती है।

[फा. सं. 24/27/2001-आईएफ-1]

एम. साहू, अवर सचिव

(Department of Economic Affairs)

(Banking Division)

New Delhi, the 19th September, 2007

S.O. 2759.—In pursuance of sub-clause (i) of clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Export Import Bank of India Act, 1981 (28 of 1981), Central Government hereby nominates Shri Arvind Virmani, Chief Economic Adviser, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi as a Director on the Board of Directors of Export Import Bank of India vice Shri Ashok K. Lahiri.

[F.No. 24/27/2001-IF-1]

M. SAHU, Under Secy.

(राजस्व विभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 20 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2760.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, राजभाषा (संघ के शासकीय प्रयोजनों के लिए प्रयोग) नियम, 1976 के नियम 10 के उपनियम (4) के अनुसरण में राजस्व विभाग के अधीन केन्द्रीय उत्पाद एवं सीमा शुल्क बोर्ड के निम्नलिखित क्षेत्रीय कार्यालयों को, जिनके 80 प्रतिशत कर्मचारीवृंद ने हिन्दी का कार्यसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर लिया है, अधिसूचित करती है :—

1. प्रचार एवं जनसंपर्क निदेशालय, नई दिल्ली।
2. मुख्य आयुक्त का कार्यालय, केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर, लखनऊ।
3. आयुक्त का कार्यालय, केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर, लखनऊ।
4. केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर मंडल कार्यालय प्रथम, लखनऊ।
5. केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर मंडल कार्यालय द्वितीय, लखनऊ।
6. केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर मंडल कार्यालय, रायबरेली।
7. केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर मंडल कार्यालय, सीतापुर।
8. केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर मंडल कार्यालय, फर्रुखाबाद।
9. केन्द्रीय उत्पाद शुल्क, सीमा शुल्क एवं सेवाकर मंडल कार्यालय, अलीगढ़।

[फा. सं. 11013(01)2005-हिन्दी-2]

मधु शर्मा, निदेशक (रा.भा.)

(Department of Revenue)

New Delhi, the 20th September, 2007

S.O. 2760.—In pursuance of sub-rule (4) of rule 10 of the Official Language (Use for Official purposes of the Union) Rules, 1976 the Central Government hereby notifies the following offices under the Central Board of Excise & Customs, Department of Revenue, the 80% staff whereof have acquired the working knowledge of Hindi.

1. Directorate of Publicity and Public Relations, New Delhi.
2. Office of the Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Lucknow.
3. Office of the Commissioner, Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Lucknow.
4. Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Division Office-I, Lucknow.
5. Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Division Office-II, Lucknow.
6. Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Division Office, Raebareilly.
7. Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Division Office, Sitapur.
8. Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Division Office, Farrukhabad.
9. Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Division Office, Aligarh.

[F. No. 11013(01)2005-Hindi-2]

MADHU SHARMA, Director (OL)

वाणिज्य और उद्योग मंत्रालय

(वाणिज्य विभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 13 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2761.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, निर्यात (क्वालिटी नियंत्रण और निरीक्षण) अधिनियम, 1963 (1963 का 22) की धारा 7 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, और निर्यात (क्वालिटी नियंत्रण और निरीक्षण) नियम, 1964 के नियम 12 के उपनियम (2) के अनुसरण में मैसर्स कल्याणी लेबोरेट्रीज, बोमीखल, प्लॉट नं. 1867, दुर्गा मंडप के निकट, भुवनेश्वर-751010, उड़ीसा, राजपत्र में इस अधिसूचना के प्रकाशन की तारीख से तीन वर्ष की अवधि के लिए भारत सरकार के वाणिज्य मंत्रालय की अधिसूचना सं. का.आ. 3975 तारीख 20 दिसम्बर, 1965 से उपाबद्ध अनुसूची में यथाविनिर्दिष्ट खनिज और अयस्क समूह-I अर्थात् लोह अयस्क तथा मैंगनीज अयस्क का निर्यात से पूर्व निम्नलिखित शर्तों के अधीन उक्त खनिजों और अयस्कों का

भुवनेश्वर में निरीक्षण करने के लिए एक अधिकरण के रूप में मान्यता देती है, अर्थात्:—

- (i) मैसर्स कल्याणी लेबोरेट्रीज, भुवनेश्वर खनिज और अयस्क समूह-I निर्यात (निरीक्षण) नियम, 1965 के नियम 4 के अधीन निरीक्षण का प्रमाण-पत्र देने के लिए उनके द्वारा अपनाई गई निरीक्षण पद्धति की जांच करने के लिए, इस निमित्त निर्यात निरीक्षण परिषद् द्वारा नामनिर्दिष्ट अधिकारियों को पर्याप्त सुविधाएं देगी,
- (ii) मैसर्स कल्याणी लेबोरेट्रीज, भुवनेश्वर इस अधिसूचना के अधीन अपने कृत्यों के पालन में निदेशक (निरीक्षण एवं क्वालिटी नियंत्रण), निर्यात निरीक्षण परिषद् द्वारा समय-समय पर लिखित में दिए गए निर्देशों से आबद्ध होंगे।

[फाईल सं. 5/9/2007-ईआई एंड ईपी]

वी.के. गाबा, उप सचिव

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

(Department of Commerce)

New Delhi, the 13th September, 2007

S.O. 2761.—In exercise of the powers conferred by the sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1963 (22 of 1963), and in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of rule 12 of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Rule, 1964, the Central Government hereby recognises M/s. Kalyani Laboratories, Bomikhal, Plot No. 1867, Near Durga Mandap, Bhubaneswar-751010, Orissa, as an agency for a period of three years with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette, for inspection of Minerals and Ores (Group-I), namely, Iron Ore & Manganese Ore, as specified in the Schedule annexed to the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce number S.O. 3975 dated the 20th December, 1965, prior to the export, of the said Minerals and Ores at Bhubaneswar subject to the following conditions, namely:—

- (i) that M/s. Kalyani Laboratories, Bhubaneswar shall give adequate facilities to the officers nominated by the Export Inspection Council in this behalf to examine the method of inspection followed by them in granting the certificate of inspection under rule 4 of the Export of Minerals and Ores Group-I (Inspection) Rules, 1965;
- (ii) that M/s. Kalyani Laboratories, Bhubaneswar in the performance of their function under this notification shall be bound by such directives as the Director (Inspection and Quality Control), Export Inspection Council may give, in writing, from time to time.

[File No. 5/9/2007-EI&EP]

V. K. GAUBA, Dy. Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 13 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2762—केन्द्रीय सरकार, निर्यात (क्वालिटी नियंत्रण और निरीक्षण) अधिनियम, 1963 (1963 का 22) की धारा 7 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, और निर्यात (क्वालिटी नियंत्रण और निरीक्षण) नियम, 1964 के नियम 12 के उप-नियम (2) के अनुसरण में मैसर्स मित्रा एस.के. प्राइवेट लि. एमडीएल यार्ड, एनएमपीटी, पेराम्बूर, मैंगलौर-575010 को, राजपत्र में इस अधिसूचना के प्रकाशन की तारीख से तीन वर्ष की अवधि के लिए भारत सरकार के वाणिज्य मंत्रालय की अधिसूचना सं. का.आ. 3975 तारीख 20 दिसम्बर, 1965 से उपाबद्ध अनुसूची में यथाविनिर्दिष्ट खनिज और अयस्क समूह-I अर्थात् लौह अयस्क का निर्यात से पूर्व निम्नलिखित शर्तों के अधीन उक्त खनिजों और अयस्कों का मैंगलौर में निरीक्षण करने के लिए एक अधिकरण के रूप में मान्यता देती है, अर्थात् :—

- (i) मैसर्स मित्रा एस.के. प्राइवेट लि., मैंगलौर खनिज और अयस्क समूह-I निर्यात (निरीक्षण) नियम, 1965 के नियम 4 के अधीन निरीक्षण का प्रमाण-पत्र देने के लिए उनके द्वारा अपनाई गई निरीक्षण पद्धति की जांच करने के लिए, इस निमित्त निर्यात निरीक्षण परिषद् द्वारा नामनिर्दिष्ट अधिकारियों को पर्याप्त सुविधाएं देगी,
- (ii) मैसर्स मित्रा एस.के. प्राइवेट लि., मैंगलौर इस अधिसूचना के अधीन अपने कृत्यों के पालन में निदेशक (निरीक्षण एवं क्वालिटी नियंत्रण), निर्यात निरीक्षण परिषद् द्वारा समय-समय पर लिखित में दिए गए निर्देशों से आबद्ध होंगे।

[फा. सं. 5/10/2007-ईआई एंड ईपी]

वी.के. गाबा, उपसचिव

New Delhi, the 13th September, 2007

S.O. 2762—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1963 (22 of 1963), and in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of rule 12 of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Rule, 1964, the Central Government hereby recognises M/s. Mitra S.K. Private Ltd., MDL Yard, NMPT, Perambur, Mangalore-575 010, as an agency for a period of three years with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette, for inspection of Minerals and Ores (Group-I), namely, Iron Ore as specified in the Schedule annexed to the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce number S.O. 3975 dated the 20th December, 1965, prior to the export, of the said Minerals and Ores at Mangalore, subject to the following conditions, namely :—

- (i) that M/s. Mitra S.K. Private Ltd., Mangalore shall give adequate facilities to the officers nominated by the Export Inspection Council in this behalf to examine the method of inspection followed by them in granting the certificate of inspection under rule 4 of the Export of Minerals and Ores-Group I (Inspection) Rules, 1965;

- (ii) that M/s. Mitra S.K. Private Ltd., Mangalore in the performance of their function under this notification shall be bound by such directives as the Director (Inspection and Quality Control), Export Inspection Council may give, in writing, from time to time.

[F. No. 5/10/2007-EI&EP]

V. K. GAUBA, Dy. Secy.

नई दिल्ली 13 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2763—केन्द्रीय सरकार, निर्यात (क्वालिटी नियंत्रण और निरीक्षण) अधिनियम, 1963 (1963 का 22) की धारा 7 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, और निर्यात (क्वालिटी नियंत्रण और निरीक्षण) नियम, 1964 के नियम 12 के उप-नियम (2) के अनुसरण में मैसर्स इन्सपेक्टोरेट ग्रीप्थ इंडिया प्राइवेट लि. '488' खजानचक, प्रथम तल, हाल्दिया-721 602, जिला मिदनापुर, पश्चिम बंगाल को राजपत्र में इस अधिसूचना के प्रकाशन की तारीख से तीन वर्ष की अवधि के लिए भारत सरकार के वाणिज्य मंत्रालय की अधिसूचना सं. का.आ. 3975 तारीख 20 दिसम्बर, 1965 और का.आ. 3978 तारीख 20 दिसम्बर, 1965 के साथ उपाबद्ध अनुसूची में यथाविनिर्दिष्ट खनिज और अयस्क (समूह-I) अर्थात् लौह अयस्क मैंगनीज अयस्क, फैरो मैंगनीज, फैरो मैंगनीज स्लेग, सहित बॉक्साइट जिसके अंतर्गत केलसिड बॉक्साइट भी हैं, और (समूह-II) अर्थात् मैंगनीज डाइआक्साइड, क्रोम अयस्क जिसके अंतर्गत क्रोम तत्व भी हैं का निर्यात से पूर्व निम्नलिखित शर्तों के अधीन हाल्दिया में उक्त खनिजों और अयस्कों का निरीक्षण करने के लिए एक अधिकरण के रूप में मान्यता देती है, अर्थात् :—

- (i) मैसर्स इन्सपेक्टोरेट ग्रीप्थ इंडिया प्राइवेट लि., हाल्दिया खनिज और अयस्क समूह-I का निर्यात (निरीक्षण) नियम, 1965 तथा खनिज और अयस्क समूह-II निर्यात (निरीक्षण) नियम, 1965 के नियम 4 के अधीन निरीक्षण का प्रमाण-पत्र देने के लिए उनके द्वारा अपनाई गई निरीक्षण की पद्धति की जांच करने के लिए, इस निमित्त निर्यात निरीक्षण परिषद् द्वारा नामनिर्दिष्ट अधिकारियों को पर्याप्त सुविधाएं देगी,
- (ii) मैसर्स इन्सपेक्टोरेट ग्रीप्थ इंडिया प्राइवेट लि., हाल्दिया इस अधिसूचना के अधीन अपने कृत्यों के पालन में निदेशक (निरीक्षण और क्वालिटी नियंत्रण), निर्यात निरीक्षण परिषद् द्वारा समय-समय पर लिखित में दिए गए निर्देशों से आबद्ध होंगे।

[फा. सं. 5/11/2007-ईआई एंड ईपी]

वी.के. गाबा, उपसचिव

New Delhi, the 13th September, 2007

S.O. 2763—In exercise of the powers conferred by the sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1963 (22 of 1963), and in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of rule 12 of the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Rule, 1964, the Central Government hereby recognises M/s Inspectorate Griffith India

Pvt. Ltd., 488, Khajanchak, 1st Floor, Haldia-721 602, Dist. Midnapore, West Bengal, as an agency for a period of three years with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Official Gazette, for inspection of Minerals and Ores (Group-I), namely, Iron Ore Manganese Ore, Ferro Manganese including Ferro manganese slag, Bauxite including Calcined Bauxite; and (Group-II), namely, Manganese Dioxide, Chrome Ore including Chrome concentrates, as specified in the Schedules annexed to the notifications of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce numbers S.O. 3975 dated the 20th December, 1965 and S. O. 3978 dated the 20th December, 1965, prior to the export, of the said Minerals and Ores at Haldia, subject to the following conditions, namely :—

(i) that M/s. Inspectorate Griffith India Pvt. Ltd.,

Haldia shall give adequate facilities to the officers nominated by the Export Inspection Council in this behalf to examine the method of inspection followed by them in granting the certificate of inspection under rule 4 of the Export of Minerals and Ores-Group I (Inspection) Rules, 1965 and the export of Minerals and Ores-Group II (Inspection) Rules, 1965;

(ii) that M/s. Inspectorate Griffith India Pvt. Ltd., Haldia in the performance of their function under this notification shall be bound by such directives as the Director (Inspection and Quality Control), Export Inspection Council may give, in writing, from time to time.

[F. No. 5/11/2007-EI&EP]

V.K. GAUBA, Dy. Secy.

विद्युत मंत्रालय

नई, दिल्ली 12 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2764.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, सरकारी स्थान (अप्राधिकृत अधिभोगियों की बेदखली) अधिनियम, 1971 (1971 का 40) की धारा 3 द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, भारत सरकार के विद्युत मंत्रालय, की अधिसूचना सं.का.आ. 1250 तारीख 27-4-2007 जो भारत के राजपत्र में 29 मई, 2004 को प्रकाशित हुई थी, को अधिकांश करते हुए नीचे की सारणी के स्तंभ (1) में उल्लिखित नेशनल हाइड्रो इलैक्ट्रिक पावर कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड (एनएचपीसी) के अधिकारी को, जो सरकार के राजपत्रित अधिकारी के समतुल्य पंक्ति के अधिकारी हैं, उक्त अधिनियम के प्रयोजनों के लिए संपदा अधिकांश नियुक्त करती है जो उक्त सारणी के स्तंभ (2) में विनिर्दिष्ट अपनी अधिकारिता की सीमा में उसके स्तंभ (4) में विनिर्दिष्ट सरकारी स्थानों की प्रवर्गों के बाबत; उक्त अधिनियम द्वारा या उसके संपदा अधिकारी को प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करेगा और अधिरोपित कर्तव्यों का पालन करेगा।

सारणी

अधिकारी का पद नाम	अधिकारिता की स्थानीय सीमाएं	ग्राम और तहसील का नाम	सरकारी स्थानों के प्रवर्ग
ज्येष्ठ प्रबंधक/प्रबंधक (सिविल)	सिम्बल्यू, खैरी, संजपाई, बगगी, संजप, जंदेरा, शेरपुर, ओरूमोड़, चांवड़ा, छैनामोड़, गांधीयार, देवीदेहरा, बोंखरी मोड़ बनीखेत, डलहौजी, संडला और सभी अन्य परियोजना क्षेत्र।	चामेरा जिले की दोनों तहसीलों के अंतर्गत आने वाले परियोजना क्षेत्र; (1) ग्राम सिम्बल्यू; डाकखाना खैरी, तहसील डलहौजी जिला चंबा (हिमाचल प्रदेश) (2) तहसील-सलूनी जिला-चंबा (हिमाचल प्रदेश)	हिमाचल प्रदेश राज्य में जिला चंबा के खैरी स्थित चामेरा पावर स्टेशन स्टेज-1 के परिसर जिसके अंतर्गत सिकवारू/सुविधा गैर आवासीय/सुविधा/भवन या दुकान या भंडार सड़कें या संरचनाएं पावर हाउस के संस्थान; बांध, सर्ज शाफ्ट, टेल रेस सुरंग आदि भी हैं।

[फा. सं. 16/16/97-डी.ओ.(एनएचपीसी)]

संजय चड्ढा, निदेशक

MINISTRY OF POWER

New Delhi, the 12th September, 2007

S.O. 2764.—In exercise of the power conferred by the Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (40 of 1971), and in supersession of the notification of Government of India in the Ministry of Power, number S.O. 1250 dated 27-4-2007 published in the Gazette of India dated 29th May, 2004, the Central Government hereby appoints the officer of National Hydro-electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NHPC) mentioned in column (1) of the Table below, being officer equivalent to the rank of Gazetted Officer of the Government, to be Estate Officer for the purpose of the said Act who shall exercise the power conferred and perform the duties imposed on Estate Officers by or under said Act, within the limit of his jurisdiction specified in column (2) of the said Table in respect of categories of public premises specified in column (4) thereof.

TABLE

Designation of the Officer	Local Limits of Jurisdiction	Name of Village, Tehsil, District	Categories of public premises
Senior Manager/Manager (Civil)	Simbule, Khairi, Sanjpoi, Baggi, Sanjp, Jandrera, Sherpur, Orumorh, Chowrah, Chhānamorh, Gandhiar, Devidehra, Bonkhrimorh, Banikhet, Dalhousie, Sundla and all other project area.	Project areas falls in Two Tehsils of Chamera District; (1) Village Simbleu, P.O. Khairi, Tehsil Dalhousie, District Chamba (Himachal Pradesh) (2) Tehsil Salooni, District Chamba (Himachal Pradesh)	Premises including residential/non-residential accommodation/buildings or shops or stores/roads or structures installations of Power House, Dam, Surge Shaft, Tail Race Tunnel etc. belonging to Chamera Power Station Stage-1, Khairi, District-Chamba in Himachal Pradesh State.

[File. No. 16/16/97-DO(NHPC)]

SANJAY CHADHA, Director

सांख्यिकी और कार्यक्रम कार्यान्वयन मंत्रालय

नई दिल्ली, 17 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2765.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, राजभाषा (संघ के शासकीय प्रयोजनों के लिए प्रयोग) नियम, 1976 के नियम 10 के उप-नियम (4) के अनुसरण में, सांख्यिकी और कार्यक्रम कार्यान्वयन मंत्रालय के निम्नलिखित कार्यालय को, जिसके 80 प्रतिशत कर्मचारियों ने हिंदी का कार्यसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर लिया है, भारत के राजपत्र में अधिसूचित करती है :—

सर्वेक्षण अभिकल्प एवं अनुसंधान प्रभाग, राष्ट्रीय प्रतिदर्श सर्वेक्षण संगठन, कोलकाता ।

[संख्या ई-11011/2/2006-हिंदी]

अरुण कुमार सक्सेना, संयुक्त सचिव

MINISTRY OF STATISTICS AND PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

New Delhi, the 17th September, 2007

S.O. 2765.—In pursuance of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 of the Official Language (use for official purposes of the Union) Rules, 1976, the Central Government hereby notify the following office of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation in the Gazette of India where 80 per cent of the staff has acquired the working knowledge of Hindi.

Survey, Design and Research Division, National Sample Survey Organisation, Kolkata.

[No. E-11011/2/2006-Hindi]

A. K. SAXENA, Jt. Secy.

सूचना और प्रसारण मंत्रालय

नई दिल्ली, 20 जुलाई, 2007

का.आ. 2766.—इस मंत्रालय के दिनांक 11 जुलाई, 2007 की समसंख्यक अधिसूचना के अनुक्रम में और चलचित्र (प्रमाणन) नियम, 1983 के नियम 7 तथा 8 के साथ पठित चलचित्र अधिनियम, 1952 (1952 का 37) की धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1)

द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केन्द्र सरकार निम्नलिखित व्यक्तियों को तत्काल प्रभाव से दो वर्षों की अवधि के लिए या अगले आदेशों तक, जो भी पहले हो, केन्द्रीय फिल्म प्रमाणन बोर्ड के बंगलौर सलाहकार पैनल के सदस्यों के रूप में नियुक्त करती है :—

- (1) श्री के. बी. लिंगराज
- (2) श्री बी. के. उर्स
- (3) श्री के. ए. वैद्यनाथ
- (4) श्री जी. दयानंदा

[फा. सं. 809/5/2007-एफ (सी)]

संगीता सिंह, निदेशक (फिल्म)

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING

New Delhi, the 20th July, 2007

S.O. 2766.—In continuation of this Ministry's Notification of even number dated 11th July, 2007 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) read with rules 7 and 8 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983 the Central Government is pleased to appoint the following as members of the Bangalore Advisory Panel of the Central Board of Film Certification with immediate effect for a period of two years or until further orders, whichever is earlier :

- (1) Shri K. B. Lingraj
- (2) Shri V. K. Urs
- (3) Shri K. N. Vaidyanath
- (4) Shri G. Dayananda

[F. No. 809/5/2007-F(C)]

SANGEETA SINGH, Director (Films)

नई दिल्ली, 22 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2767.—इस मंत्रालय की दिनांक 15-06-2005 की समसंख्यक अधिसूचना के अनुक्रम में और चलचित्र (प्रमाणन) नियमावली, 1983 के नियम 7 और 8 के साथ पठित चलचित्र अधिनियम, 1952 (1952 का 37) की धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1)

द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केंद्र सरकार, केंद्रीय फिल्म प्रमाणन बोर्ड के तिरुवनंतपुरम सलाहकार पैनल के सदस्यों के कार्यकाल को दिनांक 15-06-2007 से 10-07-2007 तक की अवधि के लिए बढ़ाती है।

[फा. सं. 809/9/2004-एफ (सी)]

संगीता सिंह, निदेशक (फिल्म)

New Delhi, the 22nd August, 2007

S.O. 2767.—In continuation of this Ministry's notification of even number dated 15-06-2005 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) read with rules 7 and 8 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983, the Central Government is pleased to extend the term of the members of the Thiruvananthapuram Advisory Panel of the Central Board of Film Certification for the period from 15-06-2007 to 10-07-2007.

[F. No. 809/9/2004-F(C)]

SANGEETA SINGH, Director (Films)

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2768.—इस मंत्रालय के दिनांक 31 मई, 2007 की समसंख्यक अधिसूचना के अनुक्रम में और चलचित्र (प्रमाणन) नियम, 1983 के नियम 7 तथा 8 के साथ पठित चलचित्र अधिनियम, 1952 (1952 का 37) की धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केंद्र सरकार निम्नलिखित व्यक्तियों को तत्काल प्रभाव से दो वर्षों की अवधि के लिए अथवा अगले आदेशों तक, जो भी पहले हो, केंद्रीय फिल्म प्रमाणन बोर्ड के हैदराबाद सलाहकार पैनल के सदस्यों के रूप में नियुक्त करती है :

1. श्री एम. मधुमोहन यादव,
मकान नं. 20-1-587,
गोल्लाकिडिकी, पुराना पुल, हैदराबाद।
2. डॉ. (श्रीमती) भट्ट सुशीला,
79/2 आर टी, म्यूनीसिपल कॉलोनी,
मालकपेट, हैदराबाद-500036
3. श्री जी. चन्द्रशेखर राव,
एम आर सी भवन, रोड नं. 6,
मकान नं. 42, नजदीक अपोलो अस्पताल,
फिल्म नगर, हैदराबाद।

[फा. सं. 809/1/2007-एफ (सी)]

संगीता सिंह, निदेशक (फिल्म)

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2768.—In continuation of this Ministry's Notification of even number dated 31st May, 2007 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) read with rules 7 and 8 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983, the Central Government is pleased to appoint the following persons as members of the Hyderabad Advisory Panel of the Central Board of Film Certification with immediate effect for a period of two years or until further orders, whichever is earlier :

(i) Shri M. Madhumohan Yadav,
H. No. 20-1-587, Gollakidiki,
Puranapul, Hyderabad.

(ii) Dr. (Smt.) Bhattu Susheela,
79/2RT, Municipal Colony,
Malakpet, Hyderabad-500036.

(iii) Shri G. Chandra Sekhar Rao,
MRC Building, Road No. 6, House No. 42,
Near Apollo Hospital, Film Nagar,
Hyderabad.

[F. No. 809/1/2007-F(C)]

SANGEETA SINGH, Director (Films)

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2769.—इस मंत्रालय के दिनांक 11-07-2007 की समसंख्यक अधिसूचना के अनुक्रम में और चलचित्र (प्रमाणन) नियम, 1983 के नियम 7 तथा 8 के साथ पठित चलचित्र अधिनियम, 1952 (1952 का 37) की धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केंद्र सरकार निम्नलिखित व्यक्तियों को तत्काल प्रभाव से दो वर्षों की अवधि के लिए अथवा अगले आदेशों तक, जो भी पहले हो, केंद्रीय फिल्म प्रमाणन बोर्ड के बंगलौर सलाहकार पैनल के सदस्यों के रूप में नियुक्त करती है :

1. श्रीमती शारदा नायक,
विवेक अपार्टमेंट,
70/1, वाणी, विलास (एन) रोड,
बसावानागुडी, बंगलौर-560004
2. श्रीमती एन.एस. रत्ना प्रभा,
33-डी, बी.जी. रेलवे क्वार्टर,
बंगलौर-560023.

[फा. सं. 809/5/2007-एफ (सी)]

संगीता सिंह, निदेशक (फिल्म)

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2769.—In continuation of this Ministry's Notification of even number dated 11-02-2007 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) read with rules 7 and 8 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983, the Central Government is pleased to appoint the following persons as members of the Bangalore Advisory Panel of the Central Board of Film Certification with immediate effect for a period of two years or until further orders, whichever is earlier :

(i) Smt. Sharda Naik,
Vivek Apartment, No. 70/1,
Vani Vilas (N) Road,
Basavanagudi, Bangalore-560 004.

(ii) Smt. N. S. Rathna Prabha,
33-D, B.G. Railway Quarters,
Bangalore-560 023.

[F. No. 809/5/2007-F(C)]

SANGEETA SINGH, Director (Films)

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2770.—इस मंत्रालय के दिनांक 29-03-2007 की समसंख्यक अधिसूचना के अनुक्रम में और चलचित्र (प्रमाणन) नियम, 1983 के नियम 7 तथा 8 के साथ पठित चलचित्र अधिनियम, 1952 (1952 का 37) की धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केन्द्र सरकार, तत्काल प्रभाव से दो वर्षों की अवधि के लिए अथवा अगले आदेशों तक, जो भी पहले हो, केंद्रीय फिल्म प्रमाणन बोर्ड के चेन्नई सलाहकार पैनल की सदस्य के रूप में सुश्री एम. पी. बाला मीरा, 1, कल्लूकरण स्ट्रीट, मायलापुर, चेन्नई-600004 को नियुक्त करती है।

[फा. सं. 809/2/2007-एफ (सी)]

संगीता सिंह, निदेशक (फिल्म)

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2770.—In continuation of this Ministry's Notification of even number dated 29-03-2007 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) read with rules 7 and 8 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983 the Central Government is pleased to appoint Ms. M. P. Bala Meera, No. 1, Kullukaran Street, Mylapore, Chennai-600004 as a member of the Chennai Advisory Panel of the Central Board of Film Certification with immediate effect for a period of two years or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

[F. No. 809/2/2007-F(C)]

SANGEETA SINGH, Director (Films)

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2771.—इस मंत्रालय के दिनांक 06-08-2007 की समसंख्यक अधिसूचना के अनुक्रम में और चलचित्र (प्रमाणन) नियम, 1983 के नियम 7 तथा 8 के साथ पठित चलचित्र अधिनियम, 1952 (1952 का 37) की धारा 5 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केन्द्र सरकार, को तत्काल प्रभाव से दो वर्षों की अवधि के लिए अथवा अगले आदेशों तक, जो भी पहले हो, केंद्रीय फिल्म प्रमाणन बोर्ड के मुंबई सलाहकार पैनल की सदस्य के रूप में श्री कीर्ति एम. रावल, 128/1022, मोतीलाल नगर नं. 1, डी. बी. मोरे रोड, गोरेगांव (प.), मुंबई-400104 को नियुक्त करती है।

[फा. संख्या 809/4/2007-एफ (सी)]

संगीता सिंह, निदेशक (फिल्म)

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2771.—In continuation of this Ministry's Notification of even number dated 06-08-2007 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952) read with rules 7 and 8 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983 the Central Government is pleased to appoint Shri Kirti M. Rawal, 128/1022, Motilal Nagar No. 1, D. B. More Road, Goregaon (W), Mumbai-400104 as member of the Mumbai Advisory Panel of the Central Board of Film Certification with immediate effect for a period of two years or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

[F. No. 809/4/2007-F(C)]

SANGEETA SINGH, Director (Films)

रसायन एवं उर्वरक मंत्रालय

(उर्वरक विभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 19 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2772.—केंद्रीय सरकार, राजभाषा 'संघ के शासकीय प्रयोजनों के लिए प्रयोग' नियम, 1976 के नियम 10 के उप-नियम (4) के अनुसरण में रसायन और उर्वरक मंत्रालय, उर्वरक विभाग के प्रशासनिक नियंत्रणाधीन सहकारी समिति कृषक भारती कोओपरेटिव लि. (कृभको) के निम्नलिखित कार्यालयों जिनके शत-प्रतिशत कर्मचारियों ने हिन्दी का कार्यसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर लिया है, को अधिसूचित करती है:

1. कृभको, क्षेत्रीय कार्यालय, औरंगाबाद
2. कृभको, क्षेत्रीय कार्यालय, नागपुर
3. कृभको, क्षेत्रीय कार्यालय, नासिक

[सं. ई-11011/1/2006-हिन्दी]

विजय छिब्वर, संयुक्त सचिव

MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS AND FERTILIZERS

(Department of Fertilizers)

New Delhi, the 19th September, 2007

S.O. 2772.—In pursuance of sub-Rule (4) of the Rule 10 of the Official Language 'Use for official purposes of the Union' Rule, 1976 the Central Govt. hereby notifies the following offices of Krishak Bharati Co-operative Limited (Kribhco) a Co-operative under the Administrative Control of the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Department of Fertilizers, whereof 100% staff have acquired the working knowledge of Hindi :

1. Kribhco, Regional Office, Aurangabad
2. Kribhco, Regional Office, Nagpur
3. Kribhco, Regional Office, Nasik

[No. E-11011/1/2006-Hindi]

VIJAY CHHIBBER, Jt. Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 19 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2773.—केंद्रीय सरकार, राजभाषा 'संघ के शासकीय प्रयोजनों के लिए प्रयोग' नियम, 1976 के नियम 10 के उप-नियम (4) के अनुसरण में रसायन और उर्वरक मंत्रालय, उर्वरक विभाग के प्रशासनिक नियंत्रणाधीन सहकारी समिति कृषक भारती कोओपरेटिव लि. (कृभको) के निम्नलिखित कार्यालयों जिनके शत-प्रतिशत कर्मचारियों ने हिन्दी का कार्यसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर लिया है, को अधिसूचित करती है:

1. कृभको, क्षेत्रीय कार्यालय, औरंगाबाद
2. कृभको, क्षेत्रीय कार्यालय, नागपुर
3. कृभको, क्षेत्रीय कार्यालय, नासिक

[सं. ई-11011/1/2006-हिन्दी]

विजय छिब्वर, संयुक्त सचिव

New Delhi, the 19th September, 2007

S.O. 2773.—In pursuance of sub-Rule (4) of the Rule 10 of the Official Language 'Use for official purposes of the Union' Rule, 1976 the Central Govt. hereby notifies the following offices of Krishak Bharati Co-operative Limited (Kribhco) a Co-operative under the Administrative Control of the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Department of Fertilizers, whereof 100% staff have acquired the working knowledge of Hindi :

1. Kribhco, Regional Office, Aurangabad .
2. Kribhco, Regional Office, Nagpur
3. Kribhco, Regional Office, Nasik

[No. E-11011/1/2006-Hindi]

VIJAY CHHIBBER, Jt. Secy.

कृषि मंत्रालय

(कृषि एवं सहकारिता विभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 17 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2774.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, राजभाषा 'संघ के शासकीय प्रयोजनों के लिए प्रयोग' नियम, 1976 के नियम 10 के उप-नियम (4) के अनुसरण में कृषि एवं सहकारिता विभाग, कृषि मंत्रालय के प्रशासनिक नियंत्रणाधीन वनस्पति संरक्षण, संगरोध एवं संग्रह निदेशालय, फरीदाबाद के निम्नलिखित क्षेत्रीय कार्यालयों को जिसके 80 प्रतिशत कर्मचारीवृन्दि ने हिन्दी का कार्यसाधक ज्ञान प्राप्त कर लिया है, अधिसूचित करती है :-

1. वरस्पति संगरोध केन्द्र,
बेंगलूर एयर कार्गो कॉम्प्लैक्स (निर्यात),
द्वितीय तल, एम.एस.आई.एल. बिल्डिंग,
एयरपोर्ट विकास रोड,
बंगलूर-560 017
2. वनस्पति संगरोध केन्द्र,
एन.यू.-10, बी-80, शक्ति नगर,
कांडला (गुजरात)-370201

[सं. 3-6/2004-हिन्दी नीति]

के. एन. कुमार, संयुक्त सचिव

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

(Department of Agriculture and Co-operation)

New Delhi, the 17th September, 2007

S.O. 2774.—In pursuance of sub-Rule (4) of the Rule 10 of the Official Language (Use for official purposes of the Union) Rule, 1976, the Central Government hereby notifies the following offices of the Directorate of Plant Protection Quarantine and Storage, Faridabad, under the Administrative Control of the Department of Agriculture and Co-operation, Ministry of Agriculture, 80% staff whereof have acquired the working knowledge of Hindi :-

1. Plant Quarantine Station,
Bangalore Air Cargo Complex (Exports),
2nd Floor, M.S.I.L. Building,
Airport Exit Road, Bangalore-560 017
2. Plant Quarantine Station,
N. U.-10, B-80, Shakti Nagar,
Kandla, (Gujarat)-370 201

[No. 3-6/2004-Hindi Neeti]

K. N. KUMAR, Jt. Secy.

कारपोरेट कार्य मंत्रालय

नई दिल्ली, 3 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2775.—केन्द्रीय सरकार, राजभाषा (संघ के शासकीय प्रयोजनों के लिए प्रयोग) नियम, 1976 के नियम 10 के उप-नियम (4) के अनुसरण में कारपोरेट कार्य मंत्रालय के निम्नलिखित तीन कार्यालयों में हिन्दी का कार्यसाधक ज्ञान रखने वाले कर्मचारियों की संख्या 80 प्रतिशत से अधिक हो जाने के फलस्वरूप उन्हें एतद्द्वारा अधिसूचित करती है :-

1. कम्पनी रजिस्ट्रार, पुणे
2. भारतीय प्रतिस्पर्धा आयोग, नई दिल्ली
3. गंभीर धोखाधड़ी जांच-पड़ताल कार्यालय, नई दिल्ली ।

[सं. ई-12018/1/2006-हिन्दी]

सविता प्रभाकर, उपसचिव

MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS

New Delhi, the 3rd September, 2007

S.O. 2775.—In pursuance of sub-Rule (4) of the Rule 10 of the Official Language (Use for official purposes of the Union) Rule, 1976 the Central Government hereby notifies the following three offices of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, whereof more than 80% employees have acquired working knowledge of Hindi :-

1. Registrar of Companies, Pune.
2. Competition Commission of India, New Delhi
3. Serious Fraud Investigation Office, New Delhi.

[No. E-12018/1/2006-Hindi]

SAVITA PRABHAKAR, Dy. Secy.

मानव संसाधन विकास मंत्रालय

(उच्चतर शिक्षा विभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2776.—ऑरोविले प्रतिष्ठान अधिनियम, 1988 (1988 का 54) की धारा 12 के साथ पठित धारा 11 द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, केन्द्र सरकार, एतद्द्वारा, श्री डी. पी. चट्टोपाध्याय, जिन्होंने ऑरोविले प्रतिष्ठान के शासी बोर्ड की सदस्यता से इस्तीफा दे दिया है, के स्थान पर निम्नलिखित व्यक्ति को ऑरोविले प्रतिष्ठान के शासी बोर्ड, जिसका गठन दिनांक 6-9-2004 की समसंख्यक अधिसूचना के जरिए किया गया था, के एक सदस्य के रूप में मनोनीत करती है :-

श्रीमती अमीता मेहरा,

द प्रेजेंस, सेक्टर 23, हुडा, गुडगांव-122017

(हरियाणा), दूरभाष : 0124-2367134

[सं. 27-50/2002-यू.यू.]

केशव देसिराजू, संयुक्त सचिव

MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

(Department of Higher Education)

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2776.—In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 11 read with Section 12 of the Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 (54 of 1988), the Central Government hereby nominates, for the remaining term of the Board, i.e., up to 5th September, 2008, the following person as member of Governing Board of the Auroville Foundation, constituted vide Notification of even number dated 6-9-2004, in place of Shri D.P. Chattopadhyaya, who has resigned from the Board :

Smt. Ameeta Mehra

The Presence, Sector 23, HUDA,

Gurgaon 122017, (Haryana)

Telephone No. 0124-2367134

[No. 27-50/2002-UU]

KESHAV DESIRAJU, Jt. Secy.

उपभोक्ता मामले, खाद्य और सार्वजनिक वितरण मंत्रालय

(उपभोक्ता मामले विभाग)

नई दिल्ली, 31 अगस्त, 2007

का. आ. 2777.—केन्द्रीय सरकार का, विहित प्राधिकारी द्वारा उसे प्रस्तुत रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् यह समाधान हो गया है कि उक्त रिपोर्ट में वर्णित मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) बाट और माप मानक अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 60) तथा बाट और माप मानक (मॉडलों का अनुमोदन) नियम, 1987 के उपबंधों के अनुरूप है और इस बात की संभावना है कि लगातार प्रयोग की अवधि में भी उक्त मॉडल यथार्थता बनाए रखेगा और विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में उपयुक्त सेवा प्रदान करता रहेगा;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (7) और उप-धारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मैसर्स ए एण्ड डी कंपनी लि., 3-23-14 हिगाशीलकेबुकुरो, तोशिमामा-कू, टोक्यो-170-0013, जापान द्वारा विनिर्मित और मैसर्स एवन वेइंग सिस्टम्स लि., 15, बी विंग, कमल कुज, मेधा एच एस जी सोसायटी एस वी रोड, अंधेरी (वेस्ट), मुंबई-400058 बिक्री के पहले अथवा पश्चात् बिना किसी बदलाव के भारत में विपणित विशेष यथार्थता (यथार्थता वर्ग-1) वाले 'जीएच-252' शृंखला के अंकक सूचन सहित अस्वचालित तोलन उपकरण (टेबल टॉप प्रकार) के मॉडल का, जिसके ब्रांड का नाम 'ए एण्ड डी कंपनी लिमिटेड' है (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त मॉडल कहा गया है) और जिसे अनुमोदन चिह्न आई एन डी/13/07/143 समनुदेशित किया गया है, अनुमोदन प्रमाण-पत्र जारी और प्रकाशित करती है।



उक्त मॉडल एक इलैक्ट्रोमैग्नेटिक फोर्स कम्पनसेशन प्रिंसीपल आधारित अस्वचालित (टेबल टॉप प्रकार) तोलन उपकरण है। इसकी अधिकतम क्षमता 250 ग्राम और न्यूनतम क्षमता 100 मि. ग्राम है। सत्यापन मापमान अन्तराल (ई) का मान 1 मि. ग्रा. है। तथा उपकरण की रीडिबिलिटी "डी" का मान 100 ग्रा./250 ग्रा. क्षमता के अनुसार 0.01/0.1 मि.ग्रा. है। इसमें एक आधेयतुलन युक्ति है जिसका शत प्रतिशत व्यकलनात्मक धारित आधेयतुलन प्रभाव है। लिक्विड क्रिस्टल डायोड (एल सी डी) प्रदर्श तोलन परिणाम उपदर्शित करता है। उपकरण 230 वोल्ट, 50 हर्ट्ज प्रत्यावर्ती धारा विद्युत प्रदाय पर कार्य करता है।

स्ट्रॉम्पिंग प्लेट के मुद्रांकन के अतिरिक्त मशीन को कपटपूर्ण व्यवहारों के लिए खोलने से रोकने के लिए भी सीलबन्द भी किया जाएगा और मॉडल को बिक्री से पहले या बाद में उसकी सामग्री, यथार्थता, डिजाइन, सर्किट डायग्राम निष्पादन सिद्धांत आदि की शर्तों पर परिवर्तित नहीं किया जाएगा।

और, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (12) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, यह घोषणा करती है कि उक्त मॉडल के अनुमोदन के इस प्रमाण-पत्र के अंतर्गत उसी विनिर्माता द्वारा उसी सिद्धांत, डिजाइन के अनुसार और उसी सामग्री से, जिससे अनुमोदित, मॉडल का निर्माण किया गया है, विनिर्मित उसी शृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो विनिर्मित उसी शृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो 1 मि. ग्रा. या उससे अधिक के "ई" मान के लिए 50,000 तक अथवा उससे अधिक की रेंज में सत्यापन मान सहित 50 किलो ग्राम तक की अधिकतम क्षमता वाले हैं और "ई" मान 1×10^{-5} , 2×10^{-5} या 5×10^{-5} , के हैं, जो धनात्मक या ऋणात्मक पूर्णांक या शून्य के समतुल्य हैं।

[फा. सं. डब्ल्यू एम-21(223)/2006]

आर. माथुरबूधम, निदेशक, विधिक माप विज्ञान

MINISTRY OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FOOD AND PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION

(DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS)

New Delhi, the 31st August, 2007

S.O. 2777.—Whereas, the Central Government, after considering the report submitted to it by the prescribed authority, is satisfied that the model described in the said report (see the figure given below) is in conformity with the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (60 of 1976) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Approval of Models) Rules, 1987 and the said model is likely to maintain its accuracy over periods of sustained use and to render accurate service under varied conditions;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby issues and publishes the certificate of approval of the model of non-automatic (Table top type) weighing instrument with digital indication "GH 252" series of Special accuracy (Accuracy class-I) and with brand name "A & D Company Limited" (hereinafter referred to as the said model), manufactured by M/s. A & D Comapny Limited 3-23-14 Higashikebukuro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 170 0013, Japan and Marketed in India without any alteration before or after sale by M/s Avon Weighing Systems Ltd., 15, 'B' Wing, Kamal Kunj, Megha HSG Soc., S.V. Road, Andheri (W), Mumbai-400058 and which is assigned the approval mark IND/13/07/143;



The said model is an Electro Magnetic Force Compensation based non-automatic weighing instrument (Table top type) with a maximum capacity of 250g and minimum capacity of 100 mg. The verification scale interval (e) is 1 mg. The readability of the instrument (d) is 0.01/0.1mg. corresponding to capacity 100g./250g. It has a tare device with 100 per cent subtractive retained tare effect. The Liquid Crystal Dispo (LCD)/Display indicates the weighing result. The instrument operates on 230 Volts, 50 Hertz alternative current power supply.

In addition to sealing the stamping plate, sealing shall also be done to prevent the opening of the machine for fraudulent practices and model shall not be changed in terms, of its material, accuracy, design, circuit diagram, working principle, etc. before or after sale.

Further, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (12) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby declares that this certificate of approval of the said model shall also cover the weighing instruments of similar make, accuracy and performance of same series with maximum capacity up to 50kg and with number of verification scale interval (n) Equal to or more than 50,000 accuracy for 'e' value of 1mg. or more and with 'e' value of 1×10^k , 2×10^k or 5×10^k , k being a positive or negative whole number or equal to zero manufactured by the same manufacturer in accordance with the same principle, design and with the same materials with which, the said approved model has been manufactured.

[F. No. WM-21(223)/2006]


R. MATHURBOOTHAM, Director of Legal Metrology

नई दिल्ली, 11 सितम्बर, 2007

का. आ. 2778.—केन्द्रीय सरकार का, विहित प्राधिकारी द्वारा उसे प्रस्तुत रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् यह समाधान हो गया है कि उक्त रिपोर्ट में वर्णित मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) बाट तथा माप मानक अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 60) और बाट तथा माप मानक (मॉडलों का अनुमोदन) नियम, 1987 के उपबंधों के अनुरूप है और इस बात की संभावना है कि लगातार प्रयोग की अवधि में भी उक्त मॉडल यथार्थता बनाए रखेगा और विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में उपयुक्त सेवा प्रदान करता रहेगा;

अंतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (7) और उप-धारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मैसर्स हाई टेक वेईंग स्केल्स, सी/ओ श्री लक्ष्मी नारायण स्टोर, बलिचक साही, जटनी, भुवनेश्वर-752050, उड़ीसा द्वारा विनिर्मित मध्यम यथार्थता वर्ग (यथार्थता वर्ग-III) वाले 'एलएनटी' श्रृंखला के अंकक सूचक सहित अस्वचालित तोलन उपकरण (टेबलटॉप प्रकार) के मॉडल का, जिसके ब्राण्ड का नाम 'हाई टेक' है (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त मॉडल कहा गया है) और जिसे अनुमोदन चिह्न आई एन डी/09/07/85 समनुदेशित किया गया है, अनुमोदन प्रमाण-पत्र जारी और प्रकाशित करती है।

उक्त मॉडल एक विकृत गैज प्रकार का भार सैल आधारित तोलन अस्वचालिक तोलन (टेबलटॉप प्रकार) है। इसकी अधिकतम क्षमता 30 किलो ग्राम और न्यूनतम क्षमता 100 ग्राम है। इसका सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल 5 ग्रा. है। इसमें एक आधेयतुलन युक्ति है जिसका शत प्रतिशत व्यकलनात्मक धारित आधेयतुलन प्रभाव है। लाईट इमिटिंग डायोड तोलन परिणाम उपदर्शित करता है। उपकरण 230 वोल्ट और 50 हर्ट्ज प्रत्यावर्ती धारा विद्युत पर कार्य करता है। स्ट्याम्पिंग प्लेट को सील करने के अतिरिक्त मशीन को कपटपूर्ण व्यवहारों के लिए खोले जाने से रोकने के लिए भी सीलबन्द किया जाएगा और मॉडल को बिक्री के पूर्व या उपरांत इसके सामग्री, यथार्थता, डिजाइन, सर्किट डायग्राम, वर्किंग सिद्धान्त आदि के रूप में कोई परिवर्तन न किया जा सके।



और केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 (12) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, यह घोषणा करती है कि उक्त मॉडल के अनुमोदन के इस प्रमाण-पत्र के अंतर्गत उसी विनिर्माता द्वारा उसी सिद्धान्त, डिजाइन के अनुसार और उसी सामग्री से, जिससे उक्त अनुमोदित मॉडल का विनिर्माण किया गया है, विनिर्मित उसी श्रृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो 100 मि. ग्रा. से 2 ग्राम के "ई" मान के लिए 100 से 10,000 तक की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) और 5 ग्राम या उससे अधिक के "ई" मान के लिए 500 से 10,000 की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) सहित 50 किलोग्राम तक की अधिकतम क्षमता वाले हैं और "ई" मान 1×10^3 , 2×10^3 या 5×10^3 , के हैं, जो धनात्मक या ऋणात्मक पूर्णांक या शून्य के समतुल्य हैं।

[फा. सं. डब्ल्यू एम-21(225)/2006]


आर. माथुरबूथम, निदेशक, विधिक माप विज्ञान

New Delhi, the 11th September, 2007

S.O. 2778.—Whereas the Central Government, after considering the report submitted to it by the prescribed authority, is satisfied that the Model described in the said report (see the figure given below) is in conformity with the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (60 of 1976) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Approval of Models) Rules, 1987 and the said model is likely to maintain its accuracy over periods of sustained use and to render accurate service under varied conditions;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby issues and publishes the certificate of approval of the model of non-automatic weighing instrument (Table Top type) with digital indication of “LNT” series of medium accuracy (accuracy class-III) and with brand name “HI-TECH” (herein referred to as the said model), manufactured by M/s Hi-tech weighing Scales, C/o Shree Laxmi Narayan Store, Balichhak Sahi, Jatni, Bhubneshwar-752 050, Orissa and which is assigned the approval mark IND/09/07/85 ;

The said model is a strain gauge type load cell based weighing instrument with a maximum capacity of 30 kg and minimum capacity of 100g. The verification scale interval (e) is 5g. It has a tare device with a 100 per cent subtractive retained tare effect. The light emitting diode (LED) display indicates the weighing result. The instrument operates on 230 Volts and 50-Hertz alternate current power supply. In addition to sealing the stamping plate, sealing shall also be done to prevent the opening of the machine for fraudulent practices and model shall not be changed in terms in of its material, accuracy, design, circuit diagram, working principle, etc. before or after sale.



Further in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (12) of the Section 36 of the said Act the Central Government hereby declares that this certificate of approval of the said model shall also cover the weighing instruments of similar make and performance of same series with maximum capacity up to 50 kg and with the number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 100 to 10,000 for ‘e’ value between 100 mg to 2g and with number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 500 to 10,000 for ‘e’ value of 5g or more and ‘e’ value of the form 1×10^k , 2×10^k or 5×10^k , k being a positive or negative whole number or equal to zero manufactured by the same manufacturer in accordance with the same principle, design and with the same materials with which, the said approved model has been manufactured.

[F. No. WM-21(225)/2006]


R. MATHURBOOTHAM, Director of Legal Metrology

नई दिल्ली, 11 सितम्बर, 2007

का. आ. 2779.—केन्द्रीय सरकार का, विहित प्राधिकारी द्वारा उसे प्रस्तुत रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् यह समाधान हो गया है कि उक्त रिपोर्ट में वर्णित मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) बाट तथा माप मानक अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 60) और बाट तथा माप मानक (मॉडलों का अनुमोदन) नियम, 1987 के उपबंधों के अनुरूप है और इस बात की संभावना है कि लगातार प्रयोग की अवधि में भी उक्त मॉडल यथार्थता बनाए रखेगा और विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में उपयुक्त सेवा प्रदान करता रहेगा;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (7) और उप-धारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मैसर्स हाई टेक वेईंग स्केल्स, सी/ओ श्री लक्ष्मी नारायण स्टोर, बलिचक साही, जटनी, भुवनेश्वर-752050, उड़ीसा द्वारा विनिर्मित मध्यम यथार्थता वर्ग (यथार्थता वर्ग-III) वाले 'एलएनपी' श्रृंखला के अंकक सूचक सहित अस्वचालित तोलन उपकरण (प्लेटफार्म प्रकार) के मॉडल का, जिसके ब्राण्ड का नाम 'हाई टेक' है (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त मॉडल कहा गया है) और जिसे अनुमोदन चिह्न आई एन डी/09/07/86 समनुदेशित किया गया है, अनुमोदन प्रमाण-पत्र जारी और प्रकाशित करती है।

उक्त मॉडल एक विकृत गेज प्रकार का भार सैल आधारित तोलन अस्वचालित तोलन (प्लेटफार्म प्रकार) है। इसकी अधिकतम क्षमता 60 किलोग्राम और न्यूनतम क्षमता 200 ग्राम है। इसका सत्यापन मापमान अन्तराल 10 ग्रा. है। इसमें एक आधेयतुलन युक्ति है जिसका शत प्रतिशत व्यकलनात्मक धारित आधेयतुलन प्रभाव है। लाईट इमिटिंग डायोड तोलन परिणाम उपदर्शित करता है। उपकरण 230 वोल्ट और 50 हर्ट्ज प्रत्यावर्ती धारा विद्युत पर कार्य करता है। स्टैम्पिंग प्लेट को सील करने के अतिरिक्त मशीन को कपटपूर्ण व्यवहारों के लिए खोले जाने से रोकने के लिए भी सीलबन्द किया जाएगा और मॉडल को बिक्री के पूर्व या उपरांत इसके सामग्री, यथार्थता, डिजाइन, सर्किट डायग्राम, वर्किंग सिद्धान्त आदि के रूप में कोई परिवर्तन न किया जा सके।



और, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 (12) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए यह घोषणा करती है कि उक्त मॉडल के अनुमोदन के इस प्रमाण पत्र के अंतर्गत उसी विनिर्माता द्वारा उसी सिद्धान्त, डिजाइन के अनुसार और उसी सामग्री से, जिससे उक्त अनुमोदित मॉडल विनिर्माण किया गया है, विनिर्मित उसी श्रृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो 100 मि. ग्रा. से 2 ग्राम के 'ई' मान के लिए 100 से 10,000 तक की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) और 5 ग्राम या उससे अधिक के 'ई' मान के लिए 500 से 10,000 की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन सहित 50 किलोग्राम से अधिक और 5000 किलोग्राम तक की अधिकतम क्षमता वाले हैं और 'ई' मान 1×10^{-3} , 2×10^{-3} या 5×10^{-3} के हैं, जो घनात्मक या ऋणात्मक पूर्णांक या शून्य के समतुल्य हैं।

[फा. सं. डब्ल्यू एम-21(225)/2006]


आर. माधुरबूथम, निदेशक, विधिक माप विज्ञान

New Delhi, the 11th September, 2007

S.O. 2779.—Whereas the Central Government, after considering the report submitted to it by the prescribed authority, is satisfied that the Model described in the said report (see the figure given below) is in conformity with the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (60 of 1976) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Approval of Models) Rules, 1987 and the said model is likely to maintain its accuracy over periods of sustained use and to render accurate service under varied conditions;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby issues and publishes the certificate of approval of the model of non-automatic weighing instrument (Platform type) with digital indication of "LNP" series of medium accuracy (accuracy class-III) and with brand name "HI-TECH" (herein referred to as the said model), manufactured by M/s. Hi-tech Weighing Scales, C/o. Shree Laxmi Narayan Store, Balichhak Sahi, Jatni, Bhubneshwar-752 050, Orissa and which is assigned the approval mark IND/09/07/86 ;

The said model is a strain gauge type load cell based weighing instrument with a maximum capacity of 60 kg. and minimum capacity of 200 g. The verification scale interval (e) is 10 g. It has a tare device with a 100 percent subtractive retained tare effect. The light emitting diode (LED) display indicates the weighing result. The instrument operates on 230 Volts and 50-Hertz alternate current power supply. In addition to sealing the stamping plate, sealing shall also be done to prevent the opening of the machine for fraudulent practices and model shall not be changed in terms of its material, accuracy, design, circuit diagram, working principle, etc. before or after sale.



Further in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (12) of the Section 36 of the said Act the Central Government hereby declares that this certificate of approval of the said model shall also cover the weighing instruments of similar make and performance of same series with maximum capacity above 50 kg. and upto 5000 kg. and with the number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 100 to 10000 for 'e' value between 100 mg. to 2g. and with number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 500 to 10000 for 'e' value of 5g or more and 'e' value of the form 1×10^k , 2×10^k or 5×10^k , k being a positive or negative whole number or equal to zero, manufactured by the same manufacture, in accordance with the same principle, design and with the same materials with which, the said approved model has been manufactured.

[F. No. WM-21(225)/2006]


R. MATHURBOOTHAM, Director of Legal Metrology

नई दिल्ली, 11 सितम्बर, 2007

का. आ. 2780.—केन्द्रीय सरकार का, विहित प्राधिकारी द्वारा उसे प्रस्तुत रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् यह समाधान हो गया है कि उक्त रिपोर्ट में वर्णित मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) बाट तथा माप मानक अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 60) और बाट तथा माप मानक (मॉडलों का अनुमोदन) नियम, 1987 के उपबंधों के अनुरूप है और इस बात की संभावना है कि लगातार प्रयोग की अवधि में भी उक्त मॉडल यथार्थता बनाए रखेगा और विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में उपयुक्त सेवा प्रदान करता रहेगा;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (7) और उप-धारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मैसर्स हाई टेक वेईंग स्केल्स, सी/ओ श्री लक्ष्मी नारायण स्टोर, बलिचक साही, जटनी, भुवनेश्वर-752050, उड़ीसा द्वारा विनिर्मित उच्च यथार्थता वर्ग (यथार्थता वर्ग-II) वाले 'एलएनजे' शृंखला के अंकक सूचक सहित अस्वचालित तोलन उपकरण (टेबल टॉप प्रकार) के मॉडल का, जिसके ब्राण्ड का नाम 'हाई टेक' है (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त मॉडल कहा गया है) और जिसे अनुमोदन चिह्न आई एन डी/09/07/84 समनुदेशित किया गया है, अनुमोदन प्रमाण-पत्र जारी और प्रकाशित करती है।

उक्त मॉडल एक विकृत गैज प्रकार का भार सैल आधारित तोलन अस्वचालित तोलन (टेबल टॉप प्रकार) उपकरण है। इसकी अधिकतम क्षमता 10 किलो ग्राम और न्यूनतम क्षमता 50 ग्राम है। इसका सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल 1 ग्रा. है। इसमें एक आधेयतुलन युक्ति है जिसका शत प्रतिशत व्यवकलनात्मक धारित आधेयतुलन प्रभाव है। लाईट इमिटिंग डायोड तोलन परिणाम उपदर्शित करता है। उपकरण 230 वोल्ट और 50 हर्ट्ज प्रत्यावर्ती धारा विद्युत पर कार्य करता है। स्टाम्पिंग प्लेट को सील करने के अतिरिक्त मशीन को कपटपूर्ण व्यवहारों के लिए खोले जाने से रोकने के लिए भी सीलबन्द किया जाएगा और मॉडल को बिक्री के पूर्व या उपरान्त इसके सामग्री, यथार्थता, डिजाइन, सर्किट डायग्राम, वर्किंग सिद्धान्त आदि के रूप में कोई परिवर्तन न किया जा सके।



और, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 (12) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, यह घोषणा करती है कि उक्त मॉडल के अनुमोदन के इस प्रमाण-पत्र के अंतर्गत उसी विनिर्माता द्वारा उसी सिद्धान्त, डिजाइन के अनुसार और उसी सामग्री से, जिससे उक्त अनुमोदित मॉडल विनिर्माण किया गया है, विनिर्मित उसी शृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो 1 मि. ग्रा. से 50 मि. ग्रा. के "ई" मान के लिए 100 से 50,000 तक की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) और 100 मि. ग्रा. या उससे अधिक के "ई" मान के लिए 5,000 से 50,000 की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) सहित 50 किलोग्राम तक की अधिकतम क्षमता वाले हैं और "ई" मान 1×10^3 , 2×10^3 या 5×10^3 के हैं, जो धनात्मक या ऋणात्मक पूर्णांक या शून्य के समतुल्य हैं।

[फा. सं. डब्ल्यू एम-21(225)/2006]


आर. माथुरबूधम, निदेशक, विधिक माप विज्ञान

New Delhi, the 11th September, 2007

S.O. 2780.—Whereas the Central Government, after considering the report submitted to it by the prescribed authority, is satisfied that the Model described in the said report (see the figure given below) is in conformity with the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (60 of 1976) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Approval of Models) Rules, 1987 and the said model is likely to maintain its accuracy over periods of sustained use and to render accurate service under varied conditions;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby issues and publishes the certificate of approval of the model of non-automatic weighing instrument (Table Top type) with digital indication of "LNJ" series of high accuracy (accuracy class-II) and with brand name "HI-TECH" (herein referred to as the said model), manufactured by M/s Hi-tech Weighing Scales, C/o. Shree Laxmi Narayan Store, Balichhak Sahi, Jatni, Bhubneshwar-752 050, Orissa and which is assigned the approval mark IND/09/07/84 ;

The said model is a strain gauge type load cell based weighing instrument with a maximum capacity of 10 kg and minimum capacity of 50 g. The verification scale interval (e) is 1 g. It has a tare device with a 100 percent subtractive retained tare effect. The light emitting diode (LED) display indicates the weighing result. The instrument operates on 230Volts and 50-Hertz alternate current power supply. In addition to sealing the stamping plate, sealing shall also be done to prevent the opening of the machine for fraudulent practices and model shall not be changed in terms of its material, accuracy, design, circuit diagram, working principle, etc. before or after sale.



Further in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (12) of the section 36 of the said Act the Central Government hereby declares that this certificate of approval of the said Model shall also cover the weighing instruments of similar make and performance of same series with maximum capacity upto 50 kg and with the number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 100 to 50000 for 'e' value of 1mg. to 50 mg and with verification scale interval (n) in the range of 500 to 50000 for 'e' value of 100mg or more and 'c' value of the form 1×10^k , 2×10^k or 5×10^k , k being a positive or negative whole number or equal to zero, manufactured by the same manufacturer in accordance with the same principle, design and with the same materials with which, the said approved model has been manufactured.

[F. No. WM-21(225)/2006]


R. MATHURBOOTHAM, Director of Legal Metrology

नई दिल्ली, 11 सितम्बर, 2007

का. आ. 2781.—केन्द्रीय सरकार का, विहित प्राधिकारी द्वारा उसे प्रस्तुत रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् यह समाधान हो गया है कि उक्त रिपोर्ट में वर्णित मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) बाट तथा माप मानक अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 60) और बाट तथा माप मानक (मॉडलों का अनुमोदन) नियम, 1987 के उपबंधों के अनुरूप है और इस बात की संभावना है कि लगातार प्रयोग की अवधि में भी उक्त मॉडल यथार्थता बनाए रखेगा और विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में उपयुक्त सेवा प्रदान करता रहेगा;

अतः अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (7) और उप-धारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मैसर्स मैटलर टोलेडो इण्डिया प्राइवेट लिमिटेड, अमर हिल्स, साकी विहार रोड, पवई, मुंबई-400072, महाराष्ट्र द्वारा विनिर्मित मध्यम यथार्थता वर्ग (यथार्थता वर्ग-III) वाले 'दीवा-एस' शृंखला के अंकक सूचक सहित अस्वचालित तोलन उपकरण (टेबल टॉप प्रकार) के मॉडल का, जिसके ब्राण्ड का नाम 'मैटलर टोलेडो' है (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त मॉडल कहा गया है) और जिसे अनुमोदन चिह्न आई एन डी/09/07/86 समनुदेशित किया गया है, अनुमोदन प्रमाण-पत्र जारी और प्रकाशित करती है।

उक्त मॉडल एक विकृत गैज प्रकार का भार सैल आधारित तोलन अस्वचालित तोलन (टेबल टॉप प्रकार) है। इसकी अधिकतम क्षमता 15 किलो ग्राम और न्यूनतम क्षमता 40 ग्राम है। इसके साथ स्कैनर भी मुहैया कराया गया है। इसका सत्यापन मापमान अन्तराल 6 किलोग्राम तक 2 ग्राम और उससे अधिक 5 ग्रा. है। इसमें एक आधेयतुलन युक्ति है जिसका शत प्रतिशत व्यवक्लनात्मक धारित आधेयतुलन प्रभाव है। लाईट इमिटिंग डायोड तोलन परिणाम उपदर्शित करता है। उपकरण 230 वोल्ट और 50 हर्ट्ज प्रत्यावर्ती धारा विद्युत पर कार्य करता है। स्टाम्पिंग प्लेट को सील करने के अतिरिक्त मशीन को कपटपूर्ण व्यवहारों के लिए खोले जाने से रोकने के लिए भी सीलबंद किया जाएगा और मॉडल को बिक्री के पूर्व या उपरांत इसके सामग्री, यथार्थता, डिजाइन, सर्किट डायग्राम, वर्किंग सिद्धान्त आदि के रूप में कोई परिवर्तन न किया जा सके।



और, केन्द्रीय सरकार उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (12) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए यह घोषणा करती है कि उक्त मॉडल के अनुमोदन के इस प्रमाण-पत्र के अंतर्गत उसी विनिर्माता द्वारा उसी सिद्धान्त, डिजाइन के अनुसार और उसी सामग्री से, जिससे उक्त अनुमोदित, मॉडल का विनिर्माण किया गया है, विनिर्मित उसी शृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो 100 मि. ग्रा. से 2 ग्राम के "ई" मान के लिए 100 से 10,000 तक की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) और 5 ग्राम या उससे अधिक के "ई" मान के लिए 500 से 10,000 की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) सहित 50 किलोग्राम तक की अधिकतम क्षमता वाले हैं और 'ई' मान $1 \times 10^*$, $2 \times 10^*$ या $5 \times 10^*$, के हैं, जो धनात्मक या ऋणात्मक पूर्णांक या शून्य के समतुल्य हैं।

[फा. सं. डब्ल्यू एम-21(162)/2006]


आर. माथुरबूथम, निदेशक, विधिक माप विज्ञान

New Delhi, the 11th September, 2007

S.O. 2781.—Whereas the Central Government, after considering the report submitted to it by the prescribed authority, is satisfied that the Model described in the said report (see the figure given below) is in conformity with the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (60 of 1976) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Approval of Models) Rules, 1987 and the said model is likely to maintain its accuracy over periods of sustained use and to render accurate service under varied conditions;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby issues and publishes the certificate of approval of the model of non-automatic weighing instrument (Table Top type) with digital indication of "DIVA-S" series of medium accuracy (accuracy class-III) and with brand name "Mettler Toledo" (herein referred to as the said model), manufactured by M/s. Mettler-Toledo India Private Limited, Amar Hills, Saki Vihar Road, Powai, Mumbai-400072 and which is assigned the approval mark IND/09/07/66 ;

The said model is a strain gauge type load cell based weighing instrument with a maximum capacity of 15 kg and minimum capacity of 40g. It is also provided with scanner. The verification scale interval (e) is 2g up to 6 kg and 5g above it. It has a tare device with a 100 per cent subtractive retained tare effect. The liquid Crystal Display (LCD) display indicates the weighing result. The instrument operates on 230 Volts and 50 Hertz alternate current power supply. In addition to sealing the stamping plate, sealing shall also be done to prevent the opening of the machine for fraudulent practices and model shall not be changed in terms of its material, accuracy, design, circuit diagram, working principle, etc. before or after sale.



Further, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (12) of the Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby declares that this certificate of approval of the said model shall also cover the weighing instruments of similar make and performance of same series with maximum capacity up to 50 kg and with number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 100 to 10000 for 'e' value between 100 mg to 2g and with number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 500 to 10000 for 'e' value of 5g or more and 'e' value of the form 1×10^k , 2×10^k or 5×10^k , k being a positive or negative whole number or equal to zero manufactured by the same manufacturer in accordance with the same principle, design and with the same materials with which, the said approved model has been manufactured.

[F. No. WM-21(162)/2006]


R. MATHURBOOTHAM, Director of Legal Metrology

नई दिल्ली, 11 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2782.—केन्द्रीय सरकार का, विहित प्राधिकारी द्वारा उसे प्रस्तुत रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् यह समाधान हो गया है कि उक्त रिपोर्ट में वर्णित मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) बाट तथा माप मानक अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 60) और बाट तथा माप मानक (मॉडलों का अनुमोदन) नियम, 1987 के उपबंधों के अनुरूप है और इस बात की संभावना है कि लगातार प्रयोग की अवधि में भी उक्त मॉडल यथार्थता बनाए रखेगा और विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में उपयुक्त सेवा प्रदान करता रहेगा;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (7) और उप-धारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मैसर्स मैटलर टोलेडो इण्डिया प्राइवेट लिमिटेड, अमर हिंसा, साकी विहार रोड, पवई, मुंबई, 400072, महाराष्ट्र द्वारा विनिर्मित मध्यम यथार्थता वर्ग (यथार्थता वर्ग-III) वाले “दीवा” शृंखला के अंकक सूचक सहित, अस्वचालित तोलन उपकरण (टेबलटॉप प्रकार) के मॉडल का, जिसके ब्रांड का नाम “मैटलर टोलेडो” है (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त मॉडल कहा गया है) और जिसे अनुमोदन चिह्न आई एन डी/09/07/67 समनुदेशित किया गया है, अनुमोदन प्रमाण-पत्र जारी और प्रकाशित करती है।

उक्त मॉडल एक विकृत गैज प्रकार का भार सैल आधारित तोलन अस्वचालित तोलन (टेबलटॉप प्रकार) उपकरण है। इसकी अधिकतम क्षमता 15 किलोग्राम और न्यूनतम क्षमता 40 ग्राम है। इसका सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल 6 किलोग्राम तक 2 ग्राम और उससे अधिक 5 ग्राम है। इसमें एक आधेयतुलन युक्ति है जिसका शत प्रतिशत व्यवकलनात्मक धारित आधेयतुलन प्रभाव है। लाईट इमिटिंग डायोड तोलन परिणाम उपदर्शित करता है। उपकरण 230 वोल्ट और 50 हर्ट्ज प्रत्यावर्ती धारा विद्युत प्रदाय पर कार्य करता है। स्टाम्पिंग प्लेट को सील करने के अतिरिक्त मशीन को कपटपूर्ण व्यवहारों के लिए खोले जाने से रोकने के लिए भी सीलबंद किया जाएगा और मॉडल को बिक्री के पूर्व या उपरांत इसके सामग्री, यथार्थता, डिजाइन, सर्किट डायग्राम, वर्किंग सिद्धान्त आदि के रूप में कोई परिवर्तन न किया जा सके।



और, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (12) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए यह घोषणा करती है कि उक्त मॉडल के अनुमोदन के इस प्रमाण-पत्र के अंतर्गत उसी विनिर्माता द्वारा उसी सिद्धान्त, डिजाइन के अनुसार और उसी सामग्री से, जिससे उक्त अनुमोदित मॉडल का विनिर्माण किया गया है, विनिर्मित उसी शृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो 100 मि.ग्रा. से 2 ग्रा. के “ई” मान के लिए 100 से 10,000 तक की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) और 5 ग्रा. या उससे अधिक के “ई” मान के लिए 500 से 10,000 की रेंज में सत्यापन मापमान अंतराल (एन) सहित 50 किलोग्राम तक की अधिकतम क्षमता वाले हैं और “ई” मान $1 \times 10^*$, $2 \times 10^*$ या $5 \times 10^*$, के हैं, जो धनात्मक या ऋणात्मक पूर्णांक या शून्य के समतुल्य हैं।

[फा. सं. डब्ल्यू एम-21(162)/2006]


आर. माथुरबूधम, निदेशक, विधिक माप विज्ञान

New Delhi, the 11th September, 2007

S.O. 2782.—Whereas the Central Government, after considering the report submitted to it by the prescribed authority, is satisfied that the Model described in the said report (see the figure given below) is in conformity with the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (60 of 1976) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Approval of Models) Rules, 1987 and the said Model is likely to maintain its accuracy over periods of sustained use and to render accurate service under varied conditions;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby issues and publishes the certificate of approval of the Model of non-automatic weighing instrument (Table Top type) with digital indication of "DIVA" series of medium accuracy (Accuracy class III) and with brand name "Mettler Toledo" (herein referred to as the said Model), manufactured by M/s. Mettler-Toledo India Private Limited, Amar Hills, Saki Vihar Road, Powai, Mumbai-400072 and which is assigned the approval mark IND/09/07/67;

The said Model is a strain gauge type load cell based weighing instrument with a maximum capacity of 15 kg and minimum capacity of 40g. The verification scale interval (e) is 2g up to 6 kg and 5g above it. It has a tare device with a 100 per cent subtractive retained tare effect. The Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) display indicates the weighing result. The instrument operates on 230 Volts and 50 Hertz alternate current power supply. In addition to sealing the stamping plate, sealing shall also be done to prevent the opening of the machine for fraudulent practices and Model shall not be changed in terms of its material, accuracy, design, circuit diagram, working principle, etc. before or after sale.



Further, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (12) of the Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby declares that this certificate of approval of the said Model shall also cover the weighing instruments of similar make and performance of same series with maximum capacity up to 50 kg and with number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 100 to 10,000 for 'e' value between 100mg to 2g and with number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 500 to 10,000 for 'e' value of 5g or more and 'e' value of the form 1×10^k , 2×10^k or 5×10^k , k being a positive or negative whole number or equal to zero, manufactured by the same manufacturer in accordance with the same principle, design and with the same material with which, the said approved Model has been manufactured.



[F. No. WM-21(162)/2006]
R. MATHURBOOTHAM, Director of Legal Metrology

नई दिल्ली, 12 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2783.-केन्द्रीय सरकार का, विहित प्राधिकारी द्वारा उसे प्रस्तुत रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् यह समाधान हो गया है कि उक्त रिपोर्ट में वर्णित मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) बाट और माप मानक अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 60) तथा बाट और माप मानक (मॉडलों का अनुमोदन) नियम, 1987 के उपबंधों के अनुरूप है और इस बात की संभावना है कि लगातार प्रयोग की अवधि में भी उक्त मॉडल यथार्थता बनाए रखेगा और विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में उपयुक्त सेवा प्रदान करता रहेगा;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (7) और उप-धारा (8) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए मैसर्स सावरकुंडला वेइंग सिस्टम, स्टेशन रोड, रायपुर, छत्तीसगढ़-492009 द्वारा विनिर्मित मध्यम यथार्थता (यथार्थता वर्ग-III) वाले "एस के डब्ल्यू" श्रृंखला के अंकक सूचन सहित, अस्वचालित तोलन उपकरण (वेब्रिज प्रकार) के मॉडल का, जिसके ब्रांड का नाम "श्री अक्षर" है (जिसे इसमें इसके पश्चात् उक्त मॉडल कहा गया है) और जिसे अनुमोदन चिह्न आई एन डी/09/2007/65 समनुदेशित किया गया है, अनुमोदन प्रमाणपत्र जारी और प्रकाशित करती है।

उक्त मॉडल (नीचे दी गई आकृति देखें) एक विकृत गेज अपरूपण तुलादण्ड प्रकार का भार सेल आधारित तोलन उपकरण है। इसकी अधिकतम क्षमता 30000 किलोग्राम और न्यूनतम क्षमता 100 कि.ग्राम है। सत्यापन मापमान अन्तराल (ई) 5 किलोग्राम है। इसमें एक आद्येयतुलन युक्ति है जिसका शत प्रतिशत व्यकलनात्मक धारित आधेयतुलन प्रभाव है। प्रकाश उत्सर्जक डायोड (एल ई डी) प्रदर्श तोलन परिणाम उपदर्शित करता है। उपकरण 230 वोल्ट और 50 हर्ट्ज प्रत्यावर्ती धारा विद्युत प्रदाय पर कार्य करता है। स्टाम्पिंग प्लेट के मुद्रांकन के अतिरिक्त मशीन को कपटपूर्ण व्यवहारों के लिए खोलने से रोकने के लिए सीलबंद भी किया जाएगा और मॉडल को बिक्री से पहले या बाद में उसकी सामग्री, यथार्थता, डिजाइन, सर्किट डायग्राम कार्यकारी सिद्धांत आदि की शर्तों के संबंध में परिवर्तित नहीं किया जाएगा।



और, केन्द्रीय सरकार, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 36 की उप-धारा (12) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, यह घोषणा करती है कि उक्त मॉडल के अनुमोदन के इस प्रमाणपत्र के अंतर्गत उसी विनिर्माता द्वारा उसी सिद्धांत, डिजाइन के अनुसार और उसी सामग्री से, जिससे उक्त अनुमोदित मॉडल का निर्माण किया गया है, विनिर्मित उसी श्रृंखला के वैसे ही मेक, यथार्थता और कार्यपालन के तोलन उपकरण भी होंगे जो 5 ग्रा. या उससे अधिक "ई" मान के लिए 500 से 10,000 तक की रेंज में सत्यापन अंतराल (एन) सहित 5000 कि.ग्रा. से अधिक और 100 टन तक की अधिकतम क्षमता वाले हैं और "ई" मान 1×10^3 , 2×10^3 या 5×10^3 , के हैं, जो धनात्मक या ऋणात्मक पूर्णांक या शून्य के समतुल्य हैं।

[फा. सं. डब्ल्यू एम-21(239)/2006]



आर. माधुरबूथम, निदेशक, विधिक माप विज्ञान

New Delhi, the 12th September, 2007

S.O. 2783.—Whereas the Central Government, after considering the report submitted to it by the prescribed authority, is satisfied that the Model described in the said report (see the figure given below) is in conformity with the provisions of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 (60 of 1976) and the Standards of Weights and Measures (Approval of Models) Rules, 1987 and the said Model is likely to maintain its accuracy over periods of sustained use and to render accurate service under varied conditions;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (7) and (8) of Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby issues and publishes the certificate of approval of the Model of non-automatic weighing instrument (Weight bridge type) with digital indication of "SKW" series of medium accuracy (Accuracy class III) and with brand name "SHRI AKSHAR" (herein referred to as the said Model), manufactured by M/s. Savarkundla Weighing System, Station Road, Raipur, Chattisgarh-492009 and which is assigned the approval mark IND/09/07/65;

The said Model is a load cell based weighing instrument with a maximum capacity of 30000 kg. and minimum capacity of 100kg. The verification scale interval (e) is 5kg. It has a tare device with a 100 per cent subtractive retained tare effect. The light emitting diode (LED) display indicates the weighing result. The instrument operates on 230 Volts and 50 Hertz alternate current power supply. In addition to sealing the stamping plate, sealing shall also be done to prevent the opening of the machine for fraudulent practices and Model shall not be changed in terms of its material, accuracy, design, circuit diagram, working principle etc. before or after sale.



Further, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (12) of the Section 36 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby declares that this certificate of approval of the said Model shall also cover the weighing instrument of similar make and performance of same series with maximum capacity between 5000kg. and up to 100 tonne and with number of verification scale interval (n) in the range of 500 to 10,000 for 'e' value of 5g. or more and 'e' value of the form 1×10^k , 2×10^k or 5×10^k , k being a positive or negative whole number or equal to zero, manufactured by the same manufacturer in accordance with the same principle, design and with the same materials with which, the said approved Model has been manufactured.

[F. No. WM-21(239)/2006]
R. MATHURBOOTHAM, Director of Legal Metrology

भारतीय मानक ब्यूरो

नई दिल्ली, 20 सितम्बर, 2007

का. आ. 2784.—भारतीय मानक ब्यूरो नियम, 1987 के नियम 7 के उप नियम (1) के खंड (ख) के अनुसरण में भारतीय मानक ब्यूरो एतद्द्वारा अधिसूचित करता है कि जिन भारतीय मानकों के विवरण नीचे अनुसूची में दिए गए हैं वे स्थापित हो गए हैं :—

अनुसूची

क्रम सं.	स्थापित भारतीय मानक (कों) की संख्या, वर्ष और शीर्षक	नये भारतीय मानक द्वारा अतिक्रमित भारतीय मानक अथवा मानकों, यदि कोई हो, की संख्या और वर्ष	स्थापित तिथि
1	2	3	4
1.	आई एस 15727 (भाग 1) : 2007 आई एस ओ 12952-1 : 1998 वस्त्रादि-बिस्तरों का ज्वलन व्यवहार भाग 1 सुलगती सिगरेट द्वारा ज्वलनशीलता ज्ञात करने की सामान्य पद्धतियाँ	—	सितम्बर, 2007
2.	आई एस 15727 (भाग 2) : 2007 आई एस ओ 12952-2 : 1998 वस्त्रादि-बिस्तरों का ज्वलन व्यवहार भाग 1 सुलगती सिगरेट द्वारा ज्वलनशीलता ज्ञात करने की विशेष पद्धतियाँ	—	सितम्बर, 2007
3.	आई एस 15727 (भाग 3) : 2007 आई एस ओ 12952-3 : 1998 वस्त्रादि-बिस्तरों का ज्वलन व्यवहार भाग 3 छोटी खुली ज्वाला में ज्वलनशीलता ज्ञात करने की सामान्य पद्धतियाँ	—	सितम्बर, 2007
4.	आई एस 15727 (भाग 4) : 2007 आई एस ओ 12952-4 : 1998 वस्त्रादि-बिस्तरों का ज्वलन व्यवहार भाग 4 सुलगती सिगरेट द्वारा ज्वलनशीलता ज्ञात करने की विशेष पद्धतियाँ	—	सितम्बर, 2007
5.	आई एस 15758 (भाग 1) : 2007 आई एस ओ 9151 : 1995 वस्त्रादि-सुरक्षा वस्त्र भाग 1 लौ के संपर्क पर उष्मा के संचारण की विधि ज्ञात करना	—	सितम्बर, 2007
6.	आई एस 15758 (भाग 2) : 2007 आई एस ओ 6942 : 2002 वस्त्रादि-सुरक्षा वस्त्र भाग 2 विकरण उष्मा के स्रोत से संपर्क पर वस्त्रादि सामग्री का आंकलन	—	सितम्बर, 2007
7.	आई एस 15758 (भाग 4) : 2007 आई एस ओ 15025 : 2000 वस्त्रादि-सुरक्षा वस्त्र भाग 4 सीमित ज्वाला फैलाव के जाँचने की पद्धति	—	सितम्बर, 2007
8.	आई एस 15758 (भाग 5) : 2007 आई एस ओ 9185 : 1990 वस्त्रादि-सुरक्षा वस्त्र भाग 5 पिघलते धातु के छींटों के प्रति प्रतिरोध ज्ञात करना	—	सितम्बर, 2007
9.	आई एस 15760 (भाग 2) : 2007 आई एस ओ 11677-2 : 1994 वस्त्रादि मशीनरी और सहायकांग-खुले सिरे की लूप के सपाट इस्पात हिल्ड के प्रमुख आयाम भाग 2 जे-आकार के सिरा लूप	—	सितम्बर, 2007

1	2	3	4
10.	आई एस 15760 (भाग 3) : 2007 आई एस ओ 11677-3 : 1995 वस्त्रादि मशीनरी और सहायकांग-खुले सिरे की लूप के सपाट इस्पात हिल्ड के प्रमुख आयाम भाग 3 सी- और जे-आकार के सिरे लूप के लिए छड़	आई एस 10626 : 1983 का अधिक्रमण करते हुए	सितम्बर, 2007
11.	आई एस 15761 (भाग 2) : 2007 आई एस ओ 96-2 : 1992 वस्त्रादि मशीनरी और सहायकांग-रिंग स्पिनिंग और रिंग डबलिंग फ्रेम के लिए रिंग और ट्रेक्टर भाग 2 एच जैड सी एच-, एच जैड-, जे-रिंग और उनके उपयुक्त ट्रेक्टर	आई एस 5138 : 1981 का अधिक्रमण करते हुए	सितम्बर, 2007

इन भारतीय मानकों की प्रतियाँ भारतीय मानक ब्यूरो, मानक भवन, 9 बहादुर शाह जफर मार्ग, नई दिल्ली-110002, क्षेत्रीय कार्यालयों : नई दिल्ली, कोलकाता, चण्डीगढ़, चेन्नई, मुम्बई तथा शाखा कार्यालयों : अहमदाबाद, बंगलौर, भोपाल, भुवनेश्वर, कोयम्बतूर, गुवाहाटी, हैदराबाद, जयपुर, कानपुर, नागपुर, पटना, पूणे तथा तिरुवनन्तापुरम में बिक्री हेतु उपलब्ध हैं।

[संदर्भ : टीएक्सडी/जी-25]

एम. एस. वर्मा, निदेशक एवं प्रमुख (टीएक्सडी)

BUREAU OF INDIAN STANDARDS

New Delhi, the 20th September, 2007

S.O. 2784.—In pursuance of clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rules (1) of Rule 7 of the Bureau of Indian Standards Rules, 1987, the Bureau of Indian Standards, hereby notifies that the Indian Standards, particulars of which are given in the Schedule hereto annexed have been established on the date indicated against each :—

SCHEDULE

Sl. No. & Year of the No. Indian Standards Established	No. & Year of Indian Standards, if any Superseded by the New Indian Standard	Date of Established
(1) (2)	(3)	(4)
1. IS 15727 (Part 1): 2007/ISO 12952-1: 1998 Textiles— Burning behaviour of bedding items Part 1 General test methods for the ignitability by a smouldering cigarette	—	September, 2007
2. IS 15727 (Part 2): 2007/ISO 12952-2: 1998 Textiles— Burning behaviour of bedding items Part 2 Specific test methods for the ignitability by a smouldering cigarette	—	September, 2007
3. IS 15727 (Part 3): 2007/ISO 12952-3: 1998 Textiles— Burning behaviour of bedding items Part 3 General test methods for the ignitability by a small open flame	—	September, 2007
4. IS 15727 (Part 4): 2007/ISO 12952-4: 1998 Textiles— Burning behaviour of bedding items Part 4 Specific test methods for the ignitability by a small open flame	—	September, 2007
5. IS 15758 (Part 1): 2007/ISO 9151: 1995 Textiles— Protective clothing Part 1 Method of determining of heat transmission on exposure to flame	—	September, 2007

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
6.	IS 15758 (Part 2): 2007/ISO 6942: 2002 Textiles— Protective clothing Part 2 Assessment of material assemblies when exposed to source of radiant heat	—	September, 2007
7.	IS 15758 (Part 4): 2007/ISO 15025: 2002 Textiles— Protective clothing Part 4 Test Method for limited flame spread	—	September, 2007
8.	IS 15758 (Part 5): 2007/ISO 9185: 1990 Textiles— Protective clothing Part 5 Assessment of resistance of materials to molten metal splash	—	September, 2007
9.	IS 15760 (Part 2): 2007/ISO 11677-2: 1994 Textiles machinery and accessories—Main dimensions of flat steel healds with open end loops—Part 2 J-shaped end loops	—	September, 2007
10.	IS 15760 (Part 3): 2007/ISO 11677-3: 1995 Textile— machinery and accessories—1983 Main dimensions of flat steel healds with open end loops—Part 3 Carrying rods for healds with C and J-shaped end loops	Superseding IS 10626	September, 2007
11.	IS 15761 (Part 2): 2007/ISO 96-2: 1992 Textiles— machinery and accessories—Rings and travellers for ring spinning and ring doubling frames Part 2 HZCH-, HZ- and J-rings and their appropriate travellers.	Superseding IS 5138: 1981	September, 2007

Copy of these Standards are available for sale with the Bureau of Indian Standards, Manak Bhavan, 9 Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi-110 002 and Regional Offices: New Delhi, Kolkatta, Chandigarh, Chennai, Mumbai and also Branch Offices: Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Bhopal, Bhubaneswar, Coimbatore, Guwahati, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Kanpur, Nagpur, Patna, Pune, Thiruvananthapuram.

[Ref: TXD/G-25]

M.S. VERMA, Director & Head (Textiles)

पेट्रोलियम और प्राकृतिक गैस मंत्रालय

नई दिल्ली, 19 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2785.—केन्द्रीय सरकार को लोकहित में यह आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है कि राजस्थान राज्य में इब्राहिमपुर-धौलपुर पाइपलाइन परियोजना अंतर्गत गेल (इण्डिया) लिमिटेड द्वारा प्राकृतिक गैस के परिवहन के लिए एक पाइपलाइन बिछाई जानी चाहिए;

और केन्द्रीय सरकार को उक्त पाइपलाइन बिछाने के प्रयोजन के लिए यह आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है कि उस भूमि में, जिसमें उक्त पाइपलाइन बिछाए जाने का प्रस्ताव है और जो इस अधिसूचना से संलग्न अनुसूची में वर्णित है, उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन किया जाए;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, पेट्रोलियम और खनिज पाइपलाइन (भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन) अधिनियम, 1962 (1962 का 50) की धारा 3 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उस भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन करने के अपने आशय की घोषणा करती है;

कोई व्यक्ति, जो उक्त अनुसूची में वर्णित भूमि में हितबद्ध है, उस तारीख से जिसको उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 3 की उपधारा (1)

के अधीन भारत के राजपत्र में यथा प्रकाशित इस अधिसूचना की प्रतियाँ साधारण जनता को उपलब्ध करा दी जाती हैं, इक्कीस दिन के भीतर, भूमि के नीचे पाइपलाइन बिछाए जाने के संबंध में, श्री एस. सी. जैन, सक्षम प्राधिकारी, गेल (इण्डिया) लिमिटेड, चतुर्थ तल, क्रिस्टल मॉल, ए-3, सवाई जय सिंह राजमार्ग, बनीपार्क, जयपुर-302016 (राजस्थान) को लिखित रूप में आक्षेप भेज सकेगा।

अनुसूची

जिला	तहसील	गाँव	सर्वे न. आर.ओ.यू. अर्जित करने के लिए क्षेत्रफल (हैक्ट. में)	
1	2	3	4	5
धौलपुर	बाड़ी	बटेश्वरकलाँ	153	0.0030
			152	0.0040
			100	0.0300
			101	0.0440

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
धौलपुर	बाड़ी	बटेश्वरकलां	151	0.0060	धौलपुर	बाड़ी	पुरा उलावटी	467	0.0162
			194	0.0100				योग	0.0162
			195	0.0580			बखुपुरा	44	0.0248
			112	0.0270				49	0.0230
			107	0.0030				53	0.0450
			106	0.0250				144	0.0100
			105	0.0330				145	0.0125
			183/296	0.3590				146	0.0225
			183/297	0.0250				योग	0.1378
			183/366	0.1080					
			योग	0.7350			कुरी का पूरा	1628/4020	0.0648
	कुहावनी		92	0.0075				योग	0.0648
			90	0.0075			अफगनपुर	2301	0.0418
			88	0.0400				2296	0.0100
			501	0.0050				2295	0.0200
			योग	0.0600				2245	0.0486
	गढ़ी खिराना		583	0.0150				2240	0.0020
			598	0.0300				2237	0.0100
			599	0.0150				2238	0.0204
			603	0.1050				2230	0.0400
			602	0.0100				2213	0.0200
			1018	0.0132				2206	0.0082
			597	0.0108				योग	0.2210
			योग	0.1990			ध्वजपुरा	2215	0.1890
	रानपुर		170	0.1892				2216	0.0810
			178	0.0540				योग	0.2700
			योग	0.2432			मरहोली	14	0.0140
	अलीगढ़		596	0.0350				17	0.0080
			883	0.0600				21	0.0478
			884	0.0100				22	0.0532
			890	0.0900				23	0.0060
			891	0.0200				28	0.00770
			880	0.0300				40	0.0760
			878	0.0398				योग	0.2820
			876	0.0370			अरुआ	400	0.0130
			874	0.0398				399	0.0146
			योग	0.3616				योग	0.0276
	जरारी घेंसुआ		1040	0.0100			पूठपुरा	30 मौन	0.3348
			1032	0.1210				योग	0.3348
			1031	0.0100					
			योग	0.1410			सरानी	1345	0.1188
	लखेपुरा		70	0.0500				योग	0.1188
			67	0.0278				405	0.0100
			65	0.0676				योग	0.0100
			योग	0.1454					

1	2	3	4	5	District	Tahsil	Village	Survey No.	Area to be acquired for R.O.U. (in Hect.)
1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
धौलपुर	धौलपुर	बसई सामंता	528	0.0700	Dholpur	Badi	Bateshwarkala	153	0.0030
			531	0.0584				152	0.0040
			573	0.0300				100	0.0300
			584	0.0980				101	0.0440
			606	0.1584				151	0.0060
			605	0.0450				194	0.0100
			604	0.0160				195	0.0580
			566/2	0.0702				112	0.0270
			योग	0.5460				107	0.0030
								106	0.0250
								105	0.0330
								183/296	0.3590
								183/297	0.0250
								183/366	0.1080
			योग	0.0448				Total	0.7350
		सुरजपुरा	248	0.0100	Dholpur	Badi	Bateshwarkala	92	0.0075
			247	0.0208				90	0.0075
			312	0.0040				88	0.0400
			316	0.0100				501	0.0050
			योग	0.0486				Total	0.0600
		नरपुरा	712	0.3618				583	0.0150
			719	0.1188				598	0.0300
			योग	0.4806				599	0.0150
								603	0.1050
								602	0.0100
								1018	0.0132
								597	0.0108
								Total	0.1990
								170	0.1892
								178	0.0540
								Total	0.2432
					Dholpur	Badi	Bateshwarkala	596	0.0350
								883	0.0600
								884	0.0100
								890	0.0900
								891	0.0200
								880	0.0300
								878	0.0398
								876	0.0370
								874	0.0398
								Total	0.3616
								1040	0.0100
								1032	0.1210
								1031	0.0100
								Total	0.1410

[फा. सं. एल-14014/9/07/जी.पी.]

एस. बी. मण्डल, अवर सचिव

MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS

New Delhi, the 19th September 2007

S. O. 2785.—Whereas it appears to the Central Government that it is necessary in the public interest that for the transportation of natural gas through Ibrahimpur Dholpur pipeline project in the State of Rajasthan, a pipeline should be laid by GAIL (India) Limited;

And, whereas it appears to the Central Government that for the purpose of laying the said pipeline, it is necessary to acquire the Right of User in the land under which the said pipeline is proposed to be laid and which is described in the Schedule annexed to this notification;

Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, the Central Government hereby declares its intention to acquire the right of user therein;

Any person interested in the land described in the said Schedule may, within twenty one days from the date on which the copies of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act, as published in the Gazette of India are made available to the general public, object in writing to the laying of the pipeline under the land to Shri S. C. Jain, Competent authority, GAIL (India) Limited, 4th Floor, Crystal Mall, A-3, Sawai Jai Singh Highway, Banipark, Jaipur-302016 (Rajasthan).

1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Dholpur	Badi	Lakhepura	70	0.0500	Dholpur	Badi	Marhali	23	0.0060
			67	0.0278				28	0.0770
			65	0.0676				40	0.0760
			Total	0.1454				Total	0.2820
		Pura Ulawati	467	0.0162			Arrua	400	0.0130
			Total	0.0162				399	0.0146
		Bakhtupura	44	0.0248				Total	0.0276
			49	0.0230		Dholpur	Puthpura	301 M	0.3348
			53	0.0450				Total	0.3348
			144	0.0100		Dholpur	Srani	1345	0.1188
			145	0.0125				Total	0.1188
			146	0.0225					
			Total	0.1378					
		Kuri Ka Pura	1628/4020	0.0648		Dholpur	Bhilganwa	405	0.0100
			Total	0.0648				Total	0.0100
		Afjalpur	2301	0.0418		Dholpur	Basai Samanta	528	0.0700
			2296	0.0100				531	0.0584
			2295	0.0200				573	0.0300
			2245	0.0486				584	0.0980
			2240	0.0020				606	0.1584
			2237	0.0100				605	0.0450
			2238	0.0204				604	0.0160
			2230	0.0400				566/2	0.0702
			2213	0.0200				Total	0.5460
			2206	0.0082		Dholpur	Surajpura	248	0.0100
			Total	0.2210				247	0.0208
		Dhwazpura	2215	0.1890				312	0.0040
			2216	0.0810				316	0.0100
			Total	0.2700				Total	0.0448
		Marholi	14	0.0140		Dholpur	Narpura	712	0.3618
			17	0.0080				719	0.1188
			21	0.0478				Total	0.4806
			22	0.0532					

[F. No. L-14014/9/07-G.P.]
S. B. MANDAL, Under Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 24 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2786.—केन्द्रीय सरकार को ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि लोकहित में यह आवश्यक है कि हरियाणा राज्य में पानीपत से पंजाब राज्य के नाभा होते हुए पंजाब राज्य के जालंधर तक लिक्विफाइड पेट्रोलियम गैस के परिवहन के लिए इंडियन ऑयल कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड द्वारा एक पाइपलाइन बिछाई जानी चाहिए;

और केन्द्रीय सरकार को ऐसी पाइपलाइन बिछाने के प्रयोजन के लिए यह आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है कि उस भूमि में, जिसके भीतर उक्त पाइपलाइन बिछाई जाने का प्रस्ताव है और जो इस अधिसूचना से संलग्न अनुसूची में वर्णित है, उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन किया जाए;

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, पेट्रोलियम और खनिज पाइपलाइन्स (भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन) अधिनियम, 1962 (1962 का 50) की धारा 3 की उपधारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन करने के अपने आशय की घोषणा करती है;

कोई व्यक्ति, जो उक्त अनुसूची में वर्णित भूमि में हितबद्ध है, उस तारीख से जिसको, भारत के राजपत्र में यथा प्रकाशित इस अधिसूचना की प्रतियाँ साधारण जनता को उपलब्ध करा दी जाती हैं, इक्कीस दिन के भीतर, भूमि के भीतर पाइपलाइन बिछाए जाने के लिए

उपयोग के अधिकार के अर्जन के लिए, श्री गगनदीप सिंह, सक्षम प्राधिकारी (पंजाब), इण्डियन ऑयल कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड, मकान नं. 23, खुखरेन कालोनी, खालसा स्कूल रोड, खन्ना, लुधियाना, पंजाब, को लिखित रूप में आक्षेप भेज सकेगा।

अनुसूची

जिला	तहसील	गाँव	हदबस्त संख्या	मुस्तौल संख्या	खसरा/ किला संख्या	क्षेत्रफल		
						हेक्टेयर	एयर	वर्गमीटर
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
संगरूर	संगरूर	1. मुंशीवाला	29	—	1553-1554/1338/326	00	16	02
		2. नदामपुर	35	—	1766/384	00	17	28
		3. बिम्बड़ी	22	—	564/444	00	07	17
				—	565/444	00	08	43
पटियाला	नाभा	1. रामगढ़	195	50	15/3	00	00	51
				—	107	00	00	76
		2. बौरा कलां	202	—	1097	00	01	69
		3. उधा	211	—	54	00	01	01
		4. बाबरपुर	107	—	627	00	01	26
		5. पाहलियां कलां	95	—	679/410	00	07	17
फतेहगढ़ साहेब	अमलोह	1. रायपुर चौबदारं	88	21	2	00	06	07
					8	00	00	25
					9/1	00	01	01
					9/2	00	09	87
					10/2	00	02	02
					11	00	03	29
					12	00	08	60
					13	00	08	85
					18/1	00	06	58
					18/2	00	03	29
					19	00	10	62
					22	00	00	51
					23	00	00	51
लुधियाना	खन्ना	1. रोहनु कलां	264	—	317	00	05	31
				—	320	00	04	30
		2. कोटला ढक	245	—	79	00	01	77
				—	139	00	01	26
				—	434	00	01	26
		3. देहरू	164	55	21	00	00	76
लुधियाना	समराला	1. भरथला	89	4	18	00	15	18
		2. गढ़ी तरखाना	79	—	397	00	01	77

[फा. सं. आर-25011/13/2007-ओ.आर.-I]

एस. के. चितकारा, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 24th September, 2007

S.O. 2786.—Whereas it appears to the Central Government that it is necessary in the public interest that for the transportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas from Panipat in the State of Haryana to Jalandhar in the State of Punjab via Nabha in the State of Punjab, a pipeline should be laid by the Indian Oil Corporation Limited;

And, whereas, it appears to the Central Government that for the purpose of laying the said pipeline, it is necessary to acquire the right of user in the land under which the said pipeline is proposed to be laid, and which is described in the Schedule annexed to this notification;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962), the Central Government hereby declares its intention to acquire the right of user therein;

Any person interested in the land described in the said Schedule may, within twenty one days from the date on which the copies of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act, as published in the Gazette of India are made available to the general public, object in writing to the acquisition of the right of user therein for laying of the pipeline under the land, to Shri Gagandeep Singh, Competent Authority (Punjab), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, H. No. 23, Khukhrain Colony, Khalsa School Road, Khanna, Ludhiana, Punjab.

SCHEDULE

District	Tehsil	Village	Hadbast No.	Mushtil No.	Khasra/Killa No.	Area		
						Hectare	Are	Square Metre
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Sangrur	Sangrur	1. Munshiwalla	29	—	1553-1554/1338/326	00	16	02
		2. Nadampur	35	—	1766/384	00	17	28
		3. Bimbri	22	—	564/444	00	07	17
					565/444	00	08	43
Patiala	Nabha	1. Ramgarh	195	50	15/3	00	00	51
				—	107	00	00	76
		2. Bauran Kalan	202	—	1097	00	01	69
		3. Udha	211	—	54	00	01	01
		4. Baberpur	107	—	627	00	01	26
		5. Phalian Kalan	95	—	679/410	00	07	17
Fatehgarh Sahib	Amlah	1. Raipur	88	21	2	00	06	07
		Chaubdaran			8	00	00	25
					9/1	00	01	01
					9/2	00	09	87
					10/2	00	02	02
					11	00	03	29
					12	00	08	60
					13	00	08	85
					18/1	00	06	58
					18/2	00	03	29
					19	00	10	62
					22	00	00	51
					23	00	00	51
Ludhiana	Khanna	1. Rohano Kalan	264	—	317	00	05	31
				—	320	00	04	30
		2. Kotla Dhak	245	—	79	00	01	77
				—	139	00	01	26
				—	434	00	01	26
		3. Deheru	164	55	21	00	00	76
Ludhiana	Samrala	1. Bharchhala	89	4	18	00	15	18
		2. Garhi Tarkhana	79	—	397	00	01	77

[F. No. R-25011/13/2007-OR-I]

S. K. CHITKARA, Under Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 27 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2787.—केंद्रीय सरकार ने पेट्रोलियम और प्राकृतिक गैस मंत्रालय के का.आ. 3806 दिनांक 18-9-2006 और का.आ. 972 दिनांक 02-04-2007 द्वारा पेट्रोलियम और खनिज पाइपलाइन्स (भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन) अधिनियम, 1962 (1962 का 50) (जिसे उसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा जायेगा) की धारा 3(1) के अधीन अधिसूचना प्रकाशित कर, दादरी (उत्तर प्रदेश राज्य) से पानीपत (हरियाणा राज्य) तक, प्राकृतिक गैस के परिवहन के लिए इंडियन ऑयल कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड द्वारा "आर-एलएनजी स्पर पाइपलाइन" के संबंध में उक्त अधिसूचना से संलग्न अनुसूची में निर्दिष्ट तहसील बड़ौत जिला बागपत (उत्तर प्रदेश राज्य) की भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार के अर्जन के अपने आशय की घोषणा की थी।

और, उक्त अधिसूचना की प्रतियां जनता को क्रमशः दिनांक 25-11-2006 या उससे पूर्व और 22-6-2007 या उससे पूर्व उपलब्ध करा दी गई थीं।

और, सक्षम प्राधिकारी को जनता से कोई आक्षेप प्राप्त नहीं हुए।

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (1) के अनुसरण में सक्षम प्राधिकारी ने केंद्रीय सरकार को अपनी रिपोर्ट दे दी है।

और, केंद्रीय सरकार ने उक्त रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् इस अधिसूचना से उपाबद्ध अनुसूची में उपयोग का अधिकार अर्जित करने का विनिश्चय किया है।

अतः, अब, केंद्रीय सरकार उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए घोषणा करती है कि इस अधिसूचना से उपाबद्ध अनुसूची में विनिर्दिष्ट भूमि में पाइपलाइन बिछाने के उपयोग का अधिकार अर्जित किया जाता है।

और, केंद्रीय सरकार उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (4) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए यह निर्देश देती है कि उक्त भूमि में उपयोग का अधिकार केंद्रीय सरकार में निहित होने की बजाय सभी विल्लंगमों से मुक्त होकर इंडियन ऑयल कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड में निहित होगा।

अनुसूची

तहसील : बड़ौत	जिला : बागपत	राज्य : उत्तर प्रदेश			
गांव का नाम	खसरा संख्या	क्षेत्रफल			
		हेक्टेयर	एयर	वर्गमीटर	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
1. जागोस खादर	165	0	00	60	
	164	0	00	82	
	162	0	01	33	
	160	0	00	54	

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	158	0	00	57
	153/195	0	02	44
	153/187	0	00	77
	81	0	00	41
	50	0	04	32
	86	0	02	12
	162/188	0	01	00

[फा. सं. एल-14014/30/2006/जी.पी.]

एस. बी. मण्डल, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 27th September, 2007

S.O. 2787.—Whereas by notification of Government of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas published in the Gazette of India vide number S.O. 3806 dated the 18th September, 2006 and S.O. 972 dated the 2nd April, 2007 issued under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of user in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962), (herein after referred to as the said Act), the Central Government declared its intension to acquire the Right of User in the land specified in the schedule appended to this notification for the purpose of laying pipelines for the transportation of Natural Gas from Dadri in the state of Uttar Pradesh to Panipat in the State of Haryana by the Indian Oil Corporation Limited for implementing the "R-LNG Spur pipeline from Dadri to Panipat" in Tehsil Baraut, District Baghpat, in Uttar Pradesh State;

And whereas, copies of the said gazette notification were made available to the public on or before 25-11-2006 and on or before 22-6-2007 respectively.

And whereas no objections were received from the public.

And whereas the Competent Authority has under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the said Act, submitted his report to the Central Government.

And whereas the Central Government after considering the said report is satisfied that the Right of User in the land specified in the Schedule appended to this notification acquired;

Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby declares that the Right of User in the land specified in the schedule appended to this notification is acquired;

And further in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby directs that the Right of Users in the said land shall instead of vesting in the Central Government, vest from the date of publication of this declaration in the Indian Oil Corporation Limited free from all encumbrances.

SCHEDULE

Tehsil : Baraut District : Baghpat State : Uttar Pradesh

Name of Village	Khasra No.	Area		
		Hectare	Are	Square Meter
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Jagos Khadar	165	0	00	60
	164	0	00	82
	162	0	01	33
	160	0	00	54
	158	0	00	57
	153/195	0	02	44
	153/187	0	00	77
	81	0	00	41
	50	0	04	32
	86	0	02	12
	162/188	0	01	00

[F.No.L-14014/30/2006-G.P.]

S. B. MANDAL, Under Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 27 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2788.—केन्द्रीय सरकार ने पेट्रोलियम और प्राकृतिक गैस मंत्रालय के का.आ. 3807 दिनांक 18-9-2006 और का.आ. 969 दिनांक 2-4-2007 द्वारा पेट्रोलियम और खनिज पाइपलाइन्स (भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन) अधिनियम, 1962 (1962 का 50) (जिसे उसके पश्चात् उक्त अधिनियम कहा जायेगा) की धारा 3(1) के अधीन अधिसूचना प्रकाशित कर, दादरी (उत्तर प्रदेश राज्य) से पानीपत (हरियाणा राज्य) तक, प्राकृतिक गैस के परिवहन के लिए इंडियन ऑयल कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड द्वारा “आर-एलएनजी स्पर पाइपलाइन” के संबंध में उक्त अधिसूचना से संलग्न अनुसूची में निर्दिष्ट तहसील खेकड़ा, जिला बागपत (उत्तर प्रदेश राज्य) की भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार के अर्जन के अपने आशय की घोषणा की थी।

और, उक्त अधिसूचना की प्रतियां जनता को क्रमशः दिनांक 25-11-2006 या उससे पूर्व और 22-6-2007 या उससे पूर्व उपलब्ध करा दी गई थीं।

और, सक्षम प्राधिकारी को जनता से कोई आक्षेप प्राप्त नहीं हुए।

और, उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (1) के अनुसरण में सक्षम प्राधिकारी ने केन्द्रीय सरकार को अपनी रिपोर्ट दे दी है।

और, केन्द्रीय सरकार ने उक्त रिपोर्ट पर विचार करने के पश्चात् इस अधिसूचना से उपाबद्ध अनुसूची में उपयोग का अधिकार अर्जित करने का विनिश्चय किया है।

अतः, अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए घोषणा करती है कि इस अधिसूचना से उपाबद्ध अनुसूची में विनिर्दिष्ट भूमि में पाइपलाइन बिछाने के उपयोग का अधिकार अर्जित किया जाता है।

और, केन्द्रीय सरकार उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (4) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए यह निर्देश देती है कि उक्त भूमि में उपयोग का अधिकार केन्द्रीय सरकार में निहित होने की बजाय सभी विल्लंगमों से मुक्त होकर इंडियन ऑयल कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड में निहित होगा।

अनुसूची

तहसील : खेकड़ा जिला : बागपत राज्य : उत्तर प्रदेश				
गांव का नाम	खसरा संख्या	क्षेत्रफल		
		हेक्टेयर	एयर	वर्गमीटर
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. खैला	109	0	01	86
	110	0	01	43
	83	0	00	36

[फा. सं. एल-14014/30/2006-जी.पी.]

एस. बी. मण्डल, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 27th September, 2007

S.O. 2788.—Whereas by notification of Government of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas published in the Gazette of India vide number S.O. 3807 dated the 18th September 2006 and S.O. 969 dated the 2nd April 2007 issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962), (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the Central Government declared its intension to acquire the Right of User in the land specified in the schedule appended to this notification for the purpose of laying pipeline for the transportation of natural Gas from Dadri in the state of Uttar Pradesh to Panipat in the State of Haryana by the Indian Oil Corporation Limited for implementing the “R-LNG Spur pipeline from Dadri to Panipat” in Tehsil Khakra, District Baghpat, in Uttar Pradesh State;

And, whereas, copies of the said gazette notification were made available to the public on or before 25-11-2006 and on or before 22-6-2007 respectively.

And, whereas, no objections were received by the Competent Authority.

And, whereas, the Competent Authority has under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the said Act, submitted his report to the Central Government.

And, whereas, the Central Government after considering the said report is satisfied that the Right of User in the land specified in the Schedule appended to this notification should be acquired;

Now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby declares that the Right of User in the land specified in the schedule appended to this notification is acquired;

And further in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby directs that the Right of Users in the said land shall instead of vesting in the Central Government, vest from the date of publication of this declaration in the Indian Oil Corporation limited free from all encumbrances.

SCHEDULE

Tehsil : Khekra District : Baghpat State : Uttar Pradesh

Name of Village	Khasra No.	Area		
		Hectare	Are	Square Meter
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Khaila	109	0	01	86
	110	0	01	43
	83	0	00	36

[F.No. L-14014/30/2006-G.P.]

S. B. MANDAL, Under Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 24 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2789.—केंद्रीय सरकार, पेट्रोलियम और खनिज पाइपलाइन्स (भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन) अधिनियम, 1962 (1962 का 50) की धारा 3 की उप-धारा (1) व धारा 6 की उप-धारा (1) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, भारत सरकार के पेट्रोलियम और प्राकृतिक गैस मंत्रालय की भारत के राजपत्र में प्रकाशित अधिसूचनाओं से निम्नलिखित संशोधन करने का निर्देश देती है;

- (1) का.आ. 634, दिनांक 21 फरवरी, 2005, भारत के राजपत्र II, खण्ड 3, उप-खण्ड (ii) दिनांक फरवरी 20-फरवरी 26, 2005 के पृष्ठ 1800 में प्रकाशित गाँव बोलों का सांवता के सम्बन्ध में कॉलम 2 में अंकित खसरा संख्या "839" के स्थान पर खसरा संख्या "837" पढ़ा जावे।
- (2) का. आ. 3015 दिनांक 24 अगस्त 2005, भारत के राजपत्र II, खण्ड 3, उप-खण्ड (ii) दिनांक अगस्त 21-अगस्त 27, 2005 के पृष्ठ 9577 में प्रकाशित गाँव बोलों का सांवता के सम्बन्ध में कॉलम 2 में अंकित खसरा संख्या "839" के स्थान पर खसरा संख्या "837" पढ़ा जावे।

[फा. सं. आर-25011/31/2004-ओ.आर.-1]

एस. के. चिटकारा, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 24th September, 2007

S.O. 2789.—In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (I) of Section 3 and Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962), the Central Government hereby makes the following amendments in the notifications of Government of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas as under namely :—

1. In S.O. No. 634 dated 21st February, 2005 published in Gazette of India Part II, Section 3, Sub-section (ii) dated February 20-February 26, 2005 at page 1813 in respect of Village Bolo Ka Sanvata in column No. 2 Survey No. "839" may be read as "837".
2. In S.O. No. 3015 dated 24th August, 2005 published in Gazette of India Part II, Section 3, Sub-section (ii) dated August, 21-August 27, 2005 at page 9589 in respect of Village Bolo Ka Sanvata in column No. 2 Survey No. "839" be read as "837".

[F.No. R-25011/31/2004-O.R.-I]

S. K. CHITKARA, Under Secy.

नई दिल्ली, 27 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2790.—केंद्रीय सरकार ने पेट्रोलियम और खनिज पाइपलाइन्स (भूमि से उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन) अधिनियम, 1962 (1962 का 50) की धारा 3 की उप-धारा (1) के अधीन जारी की गई भारत सरकार के पेट्रोलियम और प्राकृतिक गैस मंत्रालय की अधिसूचना, का. आ. संख्या और तारीख की नीचे दी गई अनुसूची में यथा उल्लिखित तारीख की अधिसूचना, का.आ. संख्या द्वारा उन अधिसूचनाओं से संलग्न अनुसूची में विनिर्दिष्ट भूमि के अधिकार के अर्जन का अधिकार प्राप्त किया था।

और केन्द्रीय सरकार ने उक्त अधिनियम की धारा 6 की उप-धारा (4) द्वारा प्रदत्त शक्तियों का प्रयोग करते हुए, उक्त भूमियों में जो सभी विल्लंगमों से मुक्त है, उपयोग का अधिकार इंडियन ऑयल कोर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड में निहित किया था।

और सक्षम प्राधिकारी ने केन्द्रीय सरकार को रिपोर्ट दी है कि गुजरात राज्य में कोयली से दहेज पाइपलाइन के मार्गाधिकार में अनुसूची में उक्त ग्रामों की भूमियों में पाइपलाइन बिछाई जा चुकी है। अतः इन भूमियों में प्रचालन की समाप्ति की जाए जिसका संक्षिप्त विवरण इस अधिसूचना की संलग्न अनुसूची में विनिर्दिष्ट किया जाता है।

अतः अब, केन्द्रीय सरकार, पेट्रोलियम पाइपलाइन्स (भूमि में उपयोग के अधिकार का अर्जन) नियम, 1963 के नियम 4 के स्पष्टीकरण-1 के अधीन अपेक्षानुसार उक्त अनुसूची के स्तंभ-7 में उल्लिखित तारीखों को प्रचालन की समाप्ति की तारीखों के रूप में घोषित करती है।

अनुसूची

क्र.सं.	का.आ.नं. एवं दिनांक	गाँव का नाम	तालुका	जिला	राज्य	प्रचालन की समाप्ति की तारीख
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.	3743 दिनांक 14-10-2005	कोयली शेरखी सेवासी महापुरा अंपाड भायली रायपुरा	वडोदरा	वडोदरा	गुजरात	22-07-2006
2.	3747 दिनांक 14-10-2005	जासपुरा पादरा-1 पादरा-2 पादरा-3 पादरा-4 ताजपुरा लतीपुरा पीपली साधी आंती-1 आंती-2 भदारा अंबाडा-1 अंबाडा-2 गयापुरा ठीकरीया कांदा सोखडाराघु	पादरा	वडोदरा	गुजरात	22-07-2006
3.	3746 दिनांक 14-10-2005	वीरजय-1 वीरजय-2 उमज	करजण	वडोदरा	गुजरात	22-07-2006
4.	3745 दिनांक 14-10-2005	वासणा मंजोला कोबला वेडचा चकलाद अदवाला रोंध आमोद-1 आमोद-2	आमोद	भरुच	गुजरात	22-07-2006

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		भीमपुरा आछोड-1 आछोड-2 इटोला रोंजा टंकरीया-1 रोंजा टंकरीया-2 रोंजा टंकरीया-3				
5.	3744 दिनांक 14-10-2005	बदलपुर पदलपुर/चांचवेल केसवान-1 केसवान-2 ट्रंकाल अंभेल गोलादरा नरनावी पादरीया-जलालपुर कडोदरा दहेज	वागरा	भरुच	गुजरात	22-7-2006
1.	848 दिनांक 21-03-2007	ताजपुरा पिपली आंती-2	पादरा	वडोदरा	गुजरात	22-07-2006
2.	847 दिनांक 21-03-2007	आछोद-1 आछोद-2 इटोला रोजा टंकरीया-1	आमोद	भरुच	गुजरात	22-07-2006
3.	846 दिनांक 21-03-2007	बदलपुर पडलपुर/चांचवेल केशवान-1 अंभेल गोलाम्रा दहेज	वागरा	भरुच	गुजरात	22-07-2006

[सं. आर-25011/10/2007-ओ.आर.-1]

एस. के. चिटकारा, अवर सचिव

New Delhi, the 27th September, 2007

S. O. 2790.—Whereas, by the notifications of the Government of India in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas S.O. number and date as mentioned in the schedule below issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962), the Central Government acquired the right of user in the land specified in the Schedule appended to those notifications,

And whereas, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the said Act, the Central Government vested the right of user in said lands, free from all encumbrances in the Indian Oil Corporation Limited;

And whereas, the Competent Authority has made a report to the Central Government that the pipeline for the purpose of transport of petroleum products from Koyali to Dahej through the villages in the State of Gujarat mentioned in the Schedule has been laid in the said lands, so the operation may be terminated in respect of the land description of which in brief is specified in the schedule annexed to this notification;

Now, therefore, as required under Explanation-I of rule 4 of the Petroleum Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963, the Central Government hereby declares the dates mentioned in column 7 of the said Schedule as the dates of termination of operation.

SCHEDULE

Sr. No.	S.O. No. & Date	Name of Village	Taluka	District	State	Date of Termination of Operation
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
(1)	3743 dt. 14-10-2005	Koyali Sherkhi Sevasi Mahapura Ampad Bhaili Raipura	Vadodara	Vadodara	Gujarat	22-7-2006
(2)	3747 dt. 14-10-2005	Jasipur Padra-1 Padra-2 Padra-3 Padra-4 Tajpura Latipura Pipli Sadhi Aanti-1 Aanti-2 Bhadara Ambada-1 Ambada-2 Gayapura Thikariya Kanda Sokhada-Raghu	Padra	Vadodara	Gujarat	22-7-2006

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
(3)	3746 dt. 14-10-2005	Virjai-1 Virjai-2 Umaj	Karjan	Vadodara	Gujarat	22-7-2006
(4)	3745 dt. 14-10-2005	Vasna Manjola Kobla Vedcha Chaklad Adwala Rondh Amod-1 Amod-2 Bhimpura Achhod-1 Achhod-2 Intola Roza Tankariya-1 Roza Tankariya-2 Roza Tankariya-3	Amod	Bharuch	Gujarat	22-7-2006
(5)	3744 dt. 14-10-2005	Badalpur Padalpur/ Chanchvel Keshwan-1 Keshwan-2 Trankal Ambhel Goladara Narnavi Padariya (Jalalpur) Kadodara Dahej	Vagra	Bharuch	Gujarat	22-7-2006
1.	848 dated 21-03-2007	Tajpura Pipli Aanti-2	Padra	Vadodara	Gujarat	22-07-2006
2.	847 dated 21-03-2007	Achhod-1 Achhod-2 Intola Roza Tankariya-1	Amod	Bharuch	Gujarat	22-07-2006
3.	846 dated 21-03-2007	Badalpur Padalpur/Chanchvel Keshwan-1 Ambhel Goladara Dahej	Vagra	Bharuch	Gujarat	22-07-2006

[No. R-25011/10/2007-OR-I]

S. K. CHITKARA, Under Secy.

श्रम एवं रोजगार मंत्रालय

नई दिल्ली, 28 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2791.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 102/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 28-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/306/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2007

S.O. 2791.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 102/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 28-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/306/1998-IR (B-1)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE**BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI**

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT**Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer****Industrial Dispute No. 102/2004****[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 45/99]**

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen).

BETWEEN

Sri L. Murugesan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I,
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised
Representative.

For the Management : M/s. V. Sundar Anandan,
Advocates.

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour vide Order No. L-12012/306/98-IR (B-I) dated 02-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 45/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 102/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri L. Murugesan, wait list No. 341 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub-staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at H.E. Kailasapuram branch from 26-06-87. During 1985-86, the Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the H.E. Kailasapuram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 26-06-87, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Trichy Z.O. branch, another advertisement by the

Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working at as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in

seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility alongwith similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 341 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 341, he was not appointed. The said settlements were *bona fide* which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial

Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 341 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service

exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the

settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wage in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on

behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the

deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the

Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that "in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that "therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement." It further held that "there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside

the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable." Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that "mere wording of reference is not

decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again.” It further held that “the Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits.” Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that “the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties.” He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that “it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner.” He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that “the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court.” Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has

been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJEESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that “the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy.” In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that “in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory.” He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that “by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively.” He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that “candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists” and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that “now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/

temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND

ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a

temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements

entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri L. Murugesan
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.	W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	24-06-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kailasapuram Branch.	W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	03-08-96	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Trichy Z. O. Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No.1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 28 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2792.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 103/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 28-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/307/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2007

S.O. 2792.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 103/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 28-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/307/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 103/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 46/99]

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen)

BETWEEN

Sri P. Velu : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F.B. Benjamin George,
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/307/98-IR (B-I) dated 02-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 46/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 103/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

"Whether the demand of the workman Shri P. Velu wait list No. 455 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub-staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Avoor branch from August, 1983. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Avoor branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From August, 1983, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Avoor branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since

the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the Respondent/Bank has been Regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 457 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 457, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 455 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause I of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause I is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage-basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date; it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration"* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look*

into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose

name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2006.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri P. Velu
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	04.05.85	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Avoor Branch.	W26	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	16.12.97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Avoor Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	18.12.97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Avoor Branch.			
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W19	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 28 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2793.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 98/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 28-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/300/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2007

S.O. 2793.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 98/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 28-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/300/1998-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 98/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 41/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri D. Rajendran : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised
Representative.

For the Management : M/s V. Sundar
Anandan, Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/300/98-IR (B-I) dated 02-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 41/99 and issued

notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 98/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri D. Rajendran, wait list No. 459 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Kattur ADB branch from 1986. During 1985-86, the Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Kattur ADB branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 1986, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Kattur ADB branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working at Bhavani branch, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation

ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Government to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been Regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Government for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 459 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 459, he was not appointed. The said settlements were *bona fide* which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 459 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 11 LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 1LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K. V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to cke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2:

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work. I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed and typed him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri D. Rajendran WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	24-06-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kattur ADB Branch.	W26	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	03-08-96	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tennur Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	03-06-98	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tennur Branch.	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate care & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staaff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W18	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
W19	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No.1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 28 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2794.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 58/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 28-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/261/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2007

S.O. 2794.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 58/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 28-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/261/1998-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 58/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 80/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudiation under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri K. Ramanan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Z.O.
Madurai.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : **Sri V. S. Ekambaram,**
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : **Mr. R. Krishnamachari,**
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government] Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/261/98-IR (B-I) dated 05-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 80/99 and issued notices

to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 58/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri K. Ramanan, wait list No. 388 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub-staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Kuzhithalai branch from 03-10-1983. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Kuzhithalai branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 3-10-1983, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Kuzhithalai branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his

non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 388 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Madurai. So far 219 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 492 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 492 wait listed candidates, 219 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 388, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by Employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 388 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(c) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, in the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in *Express Newspapers P. Ltd.* case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139, *UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH* wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 *SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS* wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 *SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA* wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 *STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS* wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable."s Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri K.Ramanan WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri M.Perumal

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W18	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4,	W19	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W20	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W21	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W23	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	Nil	Xerox copy of the service particulars of Petitioner issued by Kuzhithalai Branch.	W24	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of Reference book on Staff matters Vol. III of consolidated upto 31-12-95.	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W12	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai Zonal Office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai Zonal Office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai Zonal Office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Madurai Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 28 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2795.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 57/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 28-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/262/1998-आईआर (बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2007

S.O. 2795.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 57/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 28-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/262/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 57/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 79/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri P. Ganesan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Z.O.
Madurai

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. R. Krishnamachari,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/262/98-IR (B-I) dated 05-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 79/99 and issued notices

to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and counter statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 57/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri P. Ganesan, wait list No. 324 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Rameshwaram branch from 12-09-1984. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Rameshwaram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 12-09-1984 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Rameshwaram branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure,

the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said

settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No.324 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Madurai. So far 219 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 492 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 492 wait listed candidates, 219 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 324, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against

the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 324 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25F cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wages in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, in the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look*

into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V.VIJEESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and not entitled to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDURIA SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri P.Ganesan WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri M. Perumal

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.	W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module Circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai About filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengersial work.	W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Rameswaram Branch.	W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	25-07-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Rameswaram Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the Reference book on Staff matters Vol. III consolidated upto 31-12-95	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Madurai Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 28 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2796.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 56/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 28-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/272/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2007

S.O. 2796.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.56/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 28-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/272/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT:

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 56/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 78/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri S.Antoniraj : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Z.O.
Madurai.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. R. Krishnamachari,
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/272/98-IR (B-I) dated 05-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 78/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No.56/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

"Whether the demand of the workman Sri S. Antonisror, wait list No. 396 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Tiruchendur branch from 30-08-1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject-matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Tiruchendur branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 30-08-82 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Tiruchendur branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his

non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No.396 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Madurai. So far 219 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 492 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 492 wait listed candidates, 219 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 396, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 396 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC201 H. D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W. P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Section 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I. D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I. Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs; they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Section 18(1) and 18(3) of the I. D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A. P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K. C. P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I. D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into the*

pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in *Express Newspapers P. Ltd.* case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W. P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I. D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued, that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri S. Anthony Raj
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri M. Perumal

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.	W18	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengersial work.	W24	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W9	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchendur Branch	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of reference book on Staff matters upto Vol. III 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W12	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W17	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Madurai Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 28 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2797.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 88/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 28-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/60/1999-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 28th August, 2007

S.O. 2797.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 88/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 28-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/60/1999-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 88/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 263/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri B. Manimuthu : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Z. O.
Madurai.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised
Representative.

For the Management : M/s K. Veeramani,
Advocates.

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/60/99-IR (B-I) dated 10-05-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 263/99 and issued

notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 88/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri B. Manimuthu, wait list No. 386 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Srivilliputhur branch from 02-01-1983. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Srivilliputhur branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 02-01-83, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Sattur branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working at such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure,

the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been Regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Government for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 386 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Coimbatore. So far 219 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 492 wait listed temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 492 wait listed candidates, 219 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 386, he was not appointed. The said settlements were *bona fide* which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by Employment Exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 386 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in, leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal." Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bonafide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1 LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that "in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 11 LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that "therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement." It further held that "there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 1 LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached

with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable." Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that "mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again." It further held that "the Tribunal should look into

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K. V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose

name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri B. Manimuthu
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri M. Perumal

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	06-06-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Sattur Branch.	W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	13-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Srivilliputhur Branch.	W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	26-02-91	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kariapatti Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	07-01-98	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Sattur Branch.	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of Reference book on Staff matters Vol. III consolidated upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Madurai Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2798.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 117/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/401/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2798.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 117/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/401/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 117/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.107/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri K. S. Periasamy : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised
Representative.

For the management : M/s K. S. Sundar,
Advocate

AWARD

The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/401/98-IR (B-I) dated 08-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 107/99 and issued

notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT cum Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 117/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri K. S. Periasamy, wait list No. 348 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at H. E. Kailasapuram branch from 23-01-1987. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the H. E. Kailasapuram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 23-01-87, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Trichy Z. O. branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the

conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the Respondent/Bank has been Regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 348 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 348, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 348 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption alongwith the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals alongwith the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under

Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D.

Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V.VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose

name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri K. S. Periyasamy
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W23	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W24	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W25	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W26	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W27	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W28	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W9	08-02-92	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by H. E. Kailasapuram Branch.	W29	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W10	08-07-93	Xerox copy of the increment letter given by Respondent/Bank	W30	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W11	01-09-93	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli Branch.	W31	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W12	12-10-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Musiri Branch.	W32	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W13	04-05-95	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Ramalinga Nagar Branch.	W33	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W14	21-08-95	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W15	21-09-96	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli Branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W16	12-09-96	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli Branch.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	19-11-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Ramalinga Nagar Branch.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	04-12-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Woraiyur Branch.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W19	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W20	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W21	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W22	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2799.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मकारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 115/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/394/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2799.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 115/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/394/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 115/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 105/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri V. Sankar : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. M/s. V. Sundar Anandan
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/394/98-IR (B-I) dated 08-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 105/99 and issued notices

to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 115/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri V. Sankar, wait list No. 225 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Avoor branch from March 1984. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Avoor branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From March 1984, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Avoor branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure,

the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said

settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 225 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 225, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against

the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 225 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under

Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D.

Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal." Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that "in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that "therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement." It further held that "there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached

with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable." Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that "mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again." It further held that "the Tribunal should look into

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKAR SAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is, not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri V. Sankar
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandit.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Modul Circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	1984-85	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Arasarkulam branch.	W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	04-07-95	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Pudukottai branch.	W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	07-10-96	Xerox copy of service certificate issued by Avoor branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	15-11-96	Xerox copy of service certificate issued by Tennur branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & Service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2800.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 114/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/398/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2800.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.114/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No.L-12012/398/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT:

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 114/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No 104/99]

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen)

BETWEEN

Sri S.Parthiban : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative

For the Management : Mr. F.B. Benjamin George,
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/398/98-IR (B-I) dated 8-2-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 104/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 114/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri S.Parthiban, wait list No. 275 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Cuddalore branch from 22-7-1980. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Cuddalore O.T. branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 22-07-1980 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Cuddalore branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97.

Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been Regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 275 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 275, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 275 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) OF 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, in the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bonafide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bonafide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose

name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri S. Nagarajan WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengersial work.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	15-06-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Cuddalore Branch	W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the Local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	25-07-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Cuddalore Branch	W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the Local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in Reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
			M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2801.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 113/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/397/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2801.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.113/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No.L-12012/397/1998-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 113/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No 103/99]

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen)

BETWEEN

Sri G.Deenadayalan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V.S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F.B. Benjamin George,
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/397/98-IR (B-I) dated 08-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 103/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 113/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

"Whether the demand of the workman Sri G.Deenadayalan wait list No. 443 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Chidambaram branch from 09-03-1981. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Chidambaram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 09-03-1981 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Chidambaram branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required

any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the Respondent/Bank has been Regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and

when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 443 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 443, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged.

It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the wait list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by Employment Exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No. 7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 443 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"

- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the

Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex.M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so-called non-

inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages, as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were

engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal." Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW 1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001

and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.D.s have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed

the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that "in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that "therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement." It further held that "there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it

will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable." Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that "mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor

workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again." It further held that "the Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has

held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling

for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an *ad-hoc* employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on *ad-hoc* basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to

such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of *ad-hoc* employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due

process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was

not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined :—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri G. Deenadayalan
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai About filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	13-06-89	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Chidambaram Branch
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in Reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W12	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W15	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W16	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W17	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W18	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W19	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W20	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W21	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W23	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W24	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2802.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मकारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 112/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/396/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2802.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 112/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No.L-12012/396/1998-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 112/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 102/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri M.Kaliya Moorthy : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s V. Sunder Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/396/98-IR (B-I) dated 08-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.102/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No.112/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri K. Kaliyamoorthy wait list No. 370 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows : —

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub-staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram Main branch from 22-09-1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram Main branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 09-03-1981, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram Main branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97.

Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been Regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 370 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 370, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the wait list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by Employment Exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 370 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wage in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal." Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the expression '*actually worked under the employer*' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that "in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that "therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement." It further held that "there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration." Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached

with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable." Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that "mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again." It further held that "the Tribunal should

look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose

name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam-surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise in giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 IISCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has

been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri M. Kaliyamoorthy
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	13-06-89	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Thirukkuviloor Branch.
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W12	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W15	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.
W16	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W17	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W18	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W19	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W20	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W21	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W23	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W24	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2803.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 109/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/388/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2803.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 109/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/388/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 109/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 99/99]

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen)

BETWEEN

Sri N. Velusamy : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s V. Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/388/98-IR (B-I) dated 05-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 99/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 109/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

"Whether the demand of the workman Shri N. Velusamy wait list No. 219 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Chidambaram branch from 08-04-1981. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Chidambaram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 08.04.1981, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Pinnalur branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97.

Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 219 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 219, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 219 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (c) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look*

into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. " Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation,

fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent/Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri N.V. Velusamy WW2 Sri V. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.	W18	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W24	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W9	01-07-85	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Pinna'ur Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondebnt/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W12	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W17	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2804.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 176/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/555/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2804.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 176/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/555/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 176/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 273/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri K. Rajendran : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party Management
State Bank of India, Region-I

Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the management : M/s K. S. Sundar, Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/555/98-IR (B-I) dated 26-04-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has

taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 273/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 176/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri K. Rajendran, wait list No. 299 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Kullanchavadi branch from 12-12-1984. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Kullanchavadi branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 12-12-1984, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Kullanchavadi branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a

dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and

when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 299 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 299, he was not appointed. The said settlements were *bona fide* which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged.

It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the wait list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 299 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"

(ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible

to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to

MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take

them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence

of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per

length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"In the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen*

of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery*

again." It further held that "*the Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits.*" Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "*the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties.*" He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "*it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner.*" He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "*the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court.*" Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJEESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the only question which falls for determination*

in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "*in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory.*" He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively.*" He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists*" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back*

door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are

only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules."

Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was

not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri K. Rajendran
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.	W20	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W21	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W22	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W23	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W24	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W25	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengersial work.	W26	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W9	02.12.87	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Manjakuppam Branch.	W27	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W10	10.08.88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruppapuliur Branch.	W28	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W11	15.06.89	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kullanchavadi Branch.	W29	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W12	20.05.91	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruppapuliur Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W13	20.01.97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Manjakuppam Branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	Nil	Xerox copy of Reference book on Staff matters Vol. III upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	1992-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Manjakuppam Branch.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06.03.97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W19	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1802/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2805.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 174/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/553/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2805.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 174/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/553/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 174/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 271/99]

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen)

BETWEEN

Sri M. Rajamanickam : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s K.S.Sundar, Advocate

AWARD

I. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/553/98-IR (B-I) dated 26-04-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.271/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 174/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri M. Rajamanickam, wait list No. 615 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Kallakuruchi branch from 1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Kallakuruchi branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 1982, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Kallakuruchi branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his

non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 615 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 615, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 615 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory. Not only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this

stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri M. Rajamanickam WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	08-02-83	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kallakurichi Branch.	W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kallakurichi Branch.	W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	21-11-95	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kallakurichi Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kallakurichi Branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2806.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 173/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/545/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2806.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 173/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/545/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 173/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 270/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri G. Murugaian : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s K. S. Sundar, Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour vide Order No. L-12012/545/98-IR (B-I) dated 26-04-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 270/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 173/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

"Whether the demand of the workman Shri G. Murugaian wait list No. 380 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram Main branch from 10-12-1981. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram Main branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 10-12-1981, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram Main branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97.

Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 380 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 380, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 380 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary, class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look*

into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri G. Murugaian WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	06.04.82	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram Branch.
W10	03.05.84	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram Branch.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondebnt/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staaff matters upto 31-12-95.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2807.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 172/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/532/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2807.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 172/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/532/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 172/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 266/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri M. Puthupattan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s K.S. Sundar, Advocate.

AWARD

I. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/532/98-IR (B-I) dated 26-04-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 266/99 and issued notices

to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 172/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

"Whether the demand of the workman Shri M. Puthupattan, wait list No. 596 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Auroville International Township branch from 1984. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject-matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(I) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Auroville International Township branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 1984, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Auroville International Township branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a

dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 596 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 596, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 596 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible

to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-

inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were

engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001

and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed

the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1 LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 11 LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 1 LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has*

extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor*

workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again.” It further held that “the Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits.” Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that “the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties.” He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that “it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner.” He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that “the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court.” Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has

held that “the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that “in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory.” He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that “by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively.” He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that “candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists” and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that “now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling

for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to

such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due

process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was

not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri M. Puthu Pattan
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.	W18	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	25-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Auroville International Township Branch.	W25	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	22-08-91	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Auroville International Township Branch.	W26	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	26-04-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Auroville International Township Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
			M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2808.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 165/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/574/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2808.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.165/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/574/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 165/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 234/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri M. Natesan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region - I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F. B. Benjamin George,
Advocate

AWARD

I. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/574/98-IR (B-I) dated 26-03-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 234/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and counter statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 165/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

"Whether the demand of the workman Sri M. Natesan, wait list No. 409 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Karur branch from 1978. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Karur branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 1978 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Karur branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended

in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 409 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 409, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that the name and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 409 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"

- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the

Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-

inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wage in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were

engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, in the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001

and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc"* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed

the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1 LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 11 LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 1 LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has*

extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor*

workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again." It further held that "the Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has

held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling

for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to

such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due

process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was

not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri M. Natesan
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Karur Branch.
W10	21-10-80	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Karur Branch.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2809.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 164/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/525/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2809.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.164/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/525/1998-IR (B-1)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 164/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.226/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri K. Easwaran : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region -I, Z.O.,
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s. K. Veeramani,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/525/98-IR (B-I) dated 19-03-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal

Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 226/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 164/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri K. Easwaran, wait list No. 296 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Periyakulam branch from 18-11-1981. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Periyakulam branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 18-11-1981 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Periyakulam branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

I-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 296 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Madurai. So far 219 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 492 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 492 wait listed candidates, 219 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 296, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 296 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under

Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D.

Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K. V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no

right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. Number Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri K. Easwaran WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri M. Perumal

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	04-03-89	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Periyakulam Branch.	W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	18-06-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Periyakulam Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	Nil	Xerox Copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2810.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 163/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/526/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2810.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 163/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/526/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 163/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 225/99]

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen)

BETWEEN

Sri K. Navamani : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative

For the Management : M/s. K.S. Sundar, Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/526/98-IR (B-I) dated 19-03-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 225/99 and issued notices

to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 163/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri K. Navamani, wait list No. 258 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Pondicherry Main branch from 1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Pondicherry Main branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 1982, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Jipmer branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to

this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 258 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 258, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 258 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under

Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D.

Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuance of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri K. Navamani
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	01-09-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Pondicherry Branch.	W26	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	12-07-89	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Jipmer Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	23-06-92	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Jipmer Branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W18	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
W19	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2811.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 101/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/305/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2811.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.101/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/305/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 101/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.44/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri E.Maruthamuthu : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s.V.Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/305/98-IR (B-I) dated 02-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal

Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No.44/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 101/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri E. Maruthamuthu, wait list No. 446 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Tiruchirapalli branch from 26-12-85. During 1985-86, the Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Trichy branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 26-12-1985 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Trichirapalli branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 446 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 446, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 446 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted obnly off the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under

Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D.

Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. " Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri E. Maruthamuthu
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai About filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W9	05-06-86	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tirchy Branch	W26	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W10	05-03-92	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tirchy Branch	W27	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W11	06-04-93	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tirchy Branch	W28	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W12	05-04-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tirchy Branch	W29	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W13	07-04-95	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tirchy Branch	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W14	14-11-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tirchy Branch	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W15	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W19	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
			M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2812.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 130/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/281/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2812.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.130/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/281/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 130/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.121/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri V.Kannan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s.V.Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/281/98-IR (B-I) dated 09-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour

Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No.121/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 130/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :—

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri V. Kannan, wait list No. 510 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Tiruchirapalli Town branch from 08-05-85. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Tiruchirapalli Town branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 08-05-1985 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Trichy Z.O. branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to

his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 510 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 510, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 510 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :—

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MWI. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc"* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the*

Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits. Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG-NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that “the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties.” He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that “it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner.” He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that “the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court.” Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJEESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that “the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose

name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy.” In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that “in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory.” He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that “by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively.” He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that “candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists” and relying on all these decisions; learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that “now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S. C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :—

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicted to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri V. Kannan
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W9	02-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirappalli Town Branch	W26	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W10	12-08-91	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirappalli Town Branch	W27	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W11	31-10-92	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchy Town Branch.	W28	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W12	20-04-93	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Ramalinga Nagar Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W13	31-5-93	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirappalli Branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondebnt/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	Nil	Xerox copy of the Reference book on matters consolidated upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W19	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2813.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 171/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/531/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2813.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 171/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/531/1998-IR(B-1)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 171/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 265/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri N. Varadarajaperumal : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s K. S. Sundar, Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/531/98-IR (B-I) dated 26-04-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No.265/99 and issued notices

to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGITcum Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 171/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri N. Varadarajaperumal wait list No. 280 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Pondicherry Main branch from September, 1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Pondicherry Main branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From September, 1982 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Pondicherry Siruthozhil branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to

his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 280 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 280, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 280 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer'*" cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that "the

Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG-NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Government service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicted to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri N. Varadharajaperumal WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengersial work.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W9	14-03-83	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Pondicherry Branch.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W10	03-05-84	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Pondicherry Branch.	W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W11	24-02-92	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Pondicherry Siruthozhil Branch	W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W12	04-06-98	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Pondicherry Siruthozhil Branch	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondebnt/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate care & service conditions.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
			M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2814.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 160/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/529/1998-आईआर (बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2814.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 160/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/529/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 160/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 222/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri E. Mohan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F. B. Benjamin George,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/529/98-IR (B-I) dated 19-03-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 222/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and counter statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 160/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

"Whether the demand of the workman Shri E. Mohan wait list No. 368 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram Main branch from 27-01-1981. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 27-1-1981 the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his

non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 368 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 368, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto

31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 368 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(c) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc"* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find any same technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri E. Mohan
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No. Date	Description	Ex. No. Date	Description
W3 24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19 Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4 01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20 13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5 20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21 09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6 15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22 09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7 25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23 09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8 Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W24 07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9 16-03-82	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram Branch.	W25 31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10 01-12-83	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—	
W11 Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex. No. Date	Description
W12 Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1 17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13 06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2 16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14 06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3 27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15 06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4 9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16 17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.	M5 30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17 26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of parttime Menial—G. Pandi.	M6 09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W18 31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M7 28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
		M8 15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
		M9 10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
		M10 Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
		M11 25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2815.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 108/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/391/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2815.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.108/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/391/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 108/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.97/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudiation under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri K.Mohan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s. V. Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

The Central Government, Ministry of Labour vide Order No. L-12012/391/98-IR (B-I) dated 05-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.97/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 108/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri K.Mohan, wait list No. 381 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram Main branch from October, 1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram Main branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From October, 1982, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram Main branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to

his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No.381 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 381, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 381 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc"* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJEESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose

name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Government service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come-first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri K. Mohan WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in messenger vacancies.	W20	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	09-04-83	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	W26	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	21-12-89	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Madras Z.O. branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	1982—96	Xerox copy of the statement showing number of days worked by petitioner.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondebnt/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W18	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of parttime Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
W19	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.	M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2816.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 107/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/390/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2816.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.107/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/390/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 107/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 95/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri R. Kumar : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirappalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s. V. Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour vide Order No. L-12012/390/98-IR (B-I) dated 05-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal

Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No.95/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No.107/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri R.Kumar, wait list No. 352 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram Main branch from November, 1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram Main branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From November, 1982, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram Main branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the Respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 352 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 352, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 352 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, in the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K. V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable". Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no

right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was

not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri R. Kumar
	WW2 Sri V. S. E kambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai About filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	17-03-83	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.
W10	15-11-84	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.
W11	25-02-85	Xerox copy of the internal letter of absorption
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W17	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W18	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W19	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W20	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W21	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W22	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W25	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W26	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2817.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 106/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/389/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2817.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 106/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/389/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 106/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 94/99]

(In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen)

BETWEEN

Sri C. Sridharan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s V. Sundar Anadan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/389/98-IR (B-I) dated 05-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.94/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No.106/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri C. Sridharan, wait list No. 476 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Kaludur branch from 27-12-1984. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Kaludur branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 27-12-84, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Neyveli bazar branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to

his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 476 in wait list of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 476, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 476 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under

Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the

I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex. M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 11 SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in C/DJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner WW1 Sri C. Sridharan
 WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram

For the Respondent MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
 MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	23-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kaludur Branch.
W10	25-07-98	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Neyveli Bazar Branch.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondebnt/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W19	Feb.2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2818.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 120/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/399/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2818.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 120/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/399/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 120/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 110/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri D. Venunathan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F. B. Benjamin George,
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/399/98-IR (B-I) dated 08-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 110/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 106/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri D. Venunathan, wait list No. 242 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Murkkeri branch from 19-10-1985. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Murkkeri branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 19-10-85, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Murkkeri branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a

dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not *bona fide* and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 242 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 242, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 242 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wage in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1 LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 11 LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 1 LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAE IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look*

into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy. In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent/Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri D. Venunathan WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengersial work.
W9	8-01-87	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Murukkeri Branch.
W10	16-11-87	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Murukkeri Branch.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post-V. Muralikannan.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post-J. Velmurugan.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars - J. Velmurugan.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.

Ex.No.	Date	Description
W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex.No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2819.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 119/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/392/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2819.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.119/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/392/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 119/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 109/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri G.Jagadesan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCES

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s. V. Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

The Central Government, Ministry of Labour vide Order No. L-12012/392/98-IR (B-I) dated 8-2-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 109/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 119/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri G. Jagadesan, wait list No. 330 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at H.E. Kailasapuram branch from 11-4-1985. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the H.E. Kailasapuram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 11-4-1985, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in H.E. Kailasapuram branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to consider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-7-88, 7-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 330 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 waitlisted temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 330, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 330 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH *vs.* RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex. M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M 10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M 4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme in the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION *vs.* MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc.*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C. P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS *vs.* STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *"The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity."* Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHII & ORS. *vs.* STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA *vs.* UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that "regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that "it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law." Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGROINDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that "only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service." The Supreme Court also held that "the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore."

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri G. Jagadesan WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.	W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai About filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W9	13-06-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirappalli Heavy Electricals branch.	W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W10	08-10-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirappalli Heavy Electricals branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2820.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 118/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/393/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2820.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.118/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/393/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 118/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.108/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri G.Raman : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s.V.Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/393/98-IR (B-I) dated 8-2-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.108/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 118/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri G.Raman, wait list No. 369 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram branch from 12-04-1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 12-04-1982, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to

his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 378 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 378, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per

settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are:—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 369 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex.W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in The Hindu dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex. M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme in the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the*

settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Govt. may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Govt. is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the*

Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS *Vs.* INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN *Vs.* PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS *Vs.* K. V. JEEESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. *Vs.* SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH *Vs.* UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. *Vs.* PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back

door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC I ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees.

Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC I SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules."

Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent/Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri G. Raman
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W18	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W19	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W20	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai About filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W21	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office Circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W23	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	15-07-82	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	W24	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	04-07-84	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	W25	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars —J. Velmurugan.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
			M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2821.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 125/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/276/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2821.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.125/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/276/1998-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT: Shri K. Jayaraman,
Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 125/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.116/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri R. Vijayakumaran : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-1
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F.B. Benjamin George,
Advocate

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/276/98-IR (B-I) dated 09-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No. 116/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 125/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

"Whether the demand of the workman Sri R. Vijayakumaran, wait list No. 534 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Sripuranthan branch from 14-04-1988. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Sripuranthan branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 14-04-1988, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Sripuranthan branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No.534 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 534, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 534 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex.M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW I. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1 LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 11 LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 1 LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LABIC 1664 VAN SAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K. V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKAR SAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent/Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer.

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri R. Vijayakumaran WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai About filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Sripuranthan Branch
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W12	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W13	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W14	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Maduri zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W15	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W16	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W17	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W18	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W19	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list,
W20	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W21	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W22	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the ssettlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W23	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W24	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP Nos. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2822.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 124/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/275/1998-आईआर (बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2822.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.124/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/275/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 124/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 115/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri P. Ramadas : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised
Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F. B. Benjamin
George, Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/275/98-IR (B-I) dated 09-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has

taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 115/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and counter statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 124/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri P. Ramadas, wait list No. 232 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Kattur ADB branch from 1986. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Kattur ADB branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 1986, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Kattur ADB branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to

his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 232 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 232, he was not appointed. The said settlements were *bona fide* which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto

31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 232 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only of the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to

MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take

them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal." Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MWI. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence

of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer'* cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc." It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per

length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen*

of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery*

again. " It further held that "*the Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits.*" Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K. V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination

in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back

door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 11 SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are

only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors. Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules."

Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P.A., transcribed typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri P. Ramadoss
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W9	04-01-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kattur ADB Branch.	W26	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W10	08-02-93	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli Town branch.	W27	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W11	23-09-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tennur branch.	W28	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W12	29-01-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli Z.O. branch.	W29	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W13	23-06-96	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kattur ADB Branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W14	23-06-98	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Kattur ADB Branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W15	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai Zonal Office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai Zonal Office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W19	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai Zonal Office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
			M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2823.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 123/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/241/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2823.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.123/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/241/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 123/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No. 113/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Shri C. Raman : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II. Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised
Representative.

For the Management : Mr. F. B. Benjamin
George, Advocates

AWARD

I. The Central Government, Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/241/98-IR (B-I) dated 08-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has

taken the dispute on its file as CGID No. 113/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D. No. 123/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :—

“Whether the demand of the workman Shri C. Raman wait list No. 378 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub-staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram main branch from 04-06-1981. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram Main branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 4-6-1981, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram Main branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from 1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to

his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff Federation which resulted in five settlements dated

17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 369 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 369, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto

31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 378 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex.M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex.M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex.W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex.W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex.M 10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex.M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex.M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex.M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to

MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combing equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex.M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M 10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex.M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex.M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M 10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take

them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies' casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme. In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence

of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc"* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the ID. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per

length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1 LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the*

establishment. Even in case of the first category, if the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list No. given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery*

again." It further held that "*the Tribunal should look into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits.*" Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination

in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARA SINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back

door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of lower Courts." He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity." Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are

only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules."

Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account

of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner WW1 Sri C. Raman
 WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram

For the Respondent MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
 MW2 Sri T. L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head Office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instructions in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India Staff Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	07-06-84	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram Branch.	W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	27-12-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli branch.	W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	26-09-90	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	02-12-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tindivanam branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate care & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office For interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	09-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2824.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 122/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/395/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2824.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.122/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/395/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT: Shri K. Jayaraman,
Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 122/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.112/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri N.Sengalani : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s.V.Sundar Anandan,
Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/395/98-IR (B-I) dated 08-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.112/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 122/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:—

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri N.Sengalani, wait list No. 416 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:—

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram branch from 18-11-1981. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 18-11-1981, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 416 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 416, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P. No. 7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 416 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wagers in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal.*" Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that "*the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc*" It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bonafide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being good will between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no

right to the posts, their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri N. Sengalani WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	08-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Manalurpet branch.	W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	10-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Periaseralai branch.	W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	16-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	18-08-88	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/Bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2825.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 175/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/554/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2825.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.175/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/554/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT: Shri K. Jayaraman,
Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 175/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.272/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri P. Kalamurthy : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s.K.S.Sundar, Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/554/98-IR (B-I) dated 23-04-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.272/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 175/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows:

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri P. Kalamurthy, wait list No. 349 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows:

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Villupuram branch from 22-09-1982. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Villupuram branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 22-09-1982, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Villupuram branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 349 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements; out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 349, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 349 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 I LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 I LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look into*

the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this say the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri P. Kaliamurthy
	WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
	MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex.No.	Date	Description	Ex.No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W21	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W22	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W23	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W24	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W25	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W26	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W9	15-12-83	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	W27	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W10	09-10-84	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	W28	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W11	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	W29	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W12	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	W30	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W15	Nil	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Villupuram branch.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	Nil	Xerox copy of the Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W19	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W20	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
			M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No.16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2826.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 151/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/284/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2826.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.151/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/284/1998-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT: Shri K. Jayaraman,
Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 151/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.159/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri R. Kamaraj : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.
For the Management : M/s.K.S.Sundar, Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/284/98-IR (B-I) dated 11-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal

Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken the dispute on its file as CGID No.159/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No. 151/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

“Whether the demand of the workman Sri R. Kamaraj, wait list No. 635 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?”

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Palakkarai (Trichy) branch from 23-06-1987. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Palakkarai branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 23-06-1987, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some times performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Trichy Main branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 635 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 635, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 635 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW 1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released / published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 II LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 1 LLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 11 LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 1 LLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look*

into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VAN SAG NATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuance of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or

other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this say the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner	WW1 Sri R. Kamaraj WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram
For the Respondent	MW1 Sri C. Mariappan MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.
W9	13-08-6	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Palakkarai branch.
W10	17-02-92	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Tiruchirapalli branch.
W11	1993	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Trichy branch.
W12	05-02-94	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Trichy branch.
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by respondent/bank regarding recruitment to subordinate cadre & service conditions.
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of Vol. III of Reference book on Staff matters upto 31-12-95.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.
W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of part time Menial—G. Pandi.

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.

For the Respondent/Management :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 27 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2827.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 131/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 27-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/420/1998-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 27th August, 2007

S.O. 2827.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.131/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Chennai as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 27-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/420/1998-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Wednesday, the 31st January, 2007

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 131/2004

[Principal Labour Court CGID No.129/99]

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause(d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of State Bank of India and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri P. Balasubramanian : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Assistant General Manager, : II Party/Management
State Bank of India, Region-I
Trichirapalli.

APPEARANCE

For the Petitioner : Sri V. S. Ekambaram,
Authorised Representative.

For the Management : M/s.K.S.Sundar,Advocates

AWARD

1. The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-12012/420/98-IR (B-I) dated 11-02-1999 has referred this dispute earlier to the Tamil Nadu Principal Labour Court, Chennai and the said Labour Court has taken

the dispute on its file as CGID No.129/99 and issued notices to both parties. Both sides entered appearance and filed their claim statement and Counter Statement respectively. After the constitution of this-CGIT-cum-Labour Court, the said dispute has been transferred to this Tribunal for adjudication and this Tribunal has numbered it as I.D.No.131/2004.

2. The Schedule mentioned in that order is as follows :

"Whether the demand of the workman Sri P. Balasubramanian, wait list No. 539 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of State Bank of India and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified? If so, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :

The Petitioner was sponsored by Employment Exchange for the post of sub staff in Class IV cadre in State Bank of India and he was given appointment as messenger after an interview and medical examination. He was appointed on temporary basis at Karur Siruthozhil branch from 23-08-1985. The Petitioner was orally informed that his services were no more required. The non-employment of the Petitioner and others became subject matter before Supreme Court in the form of Writ Petition filed by State Bank Employees' Union in Writ Petition No. 542/87 which was taken up by the Supreme Court. The Respondent/Bank, in addition to its counter, filed a copy of settlement under Section 18(1) reached between management of State Bank of India and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation and the settlement is with regard to absorption of Class IV temporary workmen who were denied employment after 1985-86 were classified in the settlement was under consideration once again and they classified the workmen under three categories namely A, B and C. Though the classification was unreasonable, the Respondent/Bank brought to the notice of the Petitioner about the interview to be held through advertisements. The Petitioner also submitted his application in the prescribed format through Branch Manager of the Karur Siruthozhil branch. He was called for an interview by a Committee appointed by Respondent/Bank in this regard. But, they have not informed the result of interview and also with regard to appointment. But, the Petitioner was informed orally to join at the branch where he initially worked as a class IV employee. From 23-08-1985, the Petitioner has been working as a temporary messenger and some time performing work in other branches also. While working on temporary basis in Siruthozhil Karur branch, another advertisement by the Respondent/Bank was made regarding casual workers who were reported to be in service during the same period. While the Petitioner was working as such, the Manager of the branch informed the Petitioner orally on 31-3-97 that his services are not required any more and he need not attend the office from

1-4-97. Hence, the Petitioner raised a dispute with regard to his non-employment. Since the conciliation ended in failure, the matter was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. Though reference was sent to this Tribunal, the reference framed did not satisfy the grievance of the Petitioner, he has made a fresh representation to Govt. to reconsider the reference and the Petitioner requested the Respondent/Bank to continue to engage him in service as obtained prior to 31-3-97 and to regularise him in service in due course. The Respondent/Bank took up an unreasonable stand that the service and the number of days worked by Petitioner were treated as of no consequence, since according to the Respondent/Bank, it engaged the Petitioner only in temporary services after the settlement. The Petitioner was not aware of settlement by which his services and number of days worked by him after interview do not merit consideration. The Petitioner was not a party to the settlement mentioned by the Respondent/Bank before the conciliation officer. Therefore, the Respondent's action in not absorbing him in regular service is unjust and illegal. Further, the settlements are repugnant to Sections 25G & 25H of the I.D. Act. The termination of the Petitioner is against the provisions of para 522(4) of Sastry Award. Even though the settlement speaks about three categories only a single wait list has been prepared and the respondent/Bank has been regularising according to their whims and fancies. The Respondent/Bank has also not observed the instructions regarding grant of increments, leave, medical benefits etc. to the temporary workmen which amounts to violation of relevant provisions of circular. The Respondent/Bank engaged the Petitioner and extracted the same work either by payment of petty cash or by directing him to work under assumed name or by both which amounts to unfair labour practice. The wait list suffers serious infirmities and it is not based on strict seniority and without any rationale. Hence, for all these reasons the Petitioner prays to grant relief of regular employment in Respondent/Bank with all attendant benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement alleged that reference made by the Govt. for adjudication by this Tribunal itself is not maintainable. The Petitioner was not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise. The engagement of Petitioner was not authorised. The Petitioner is estopped from making claim as per Claim Statement. The settlement drawn under provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of I.D. Act in lieu of provisions of law, retrenchment and implemented by Respondent/Bank. The claim of the Petitioner is not bona fide and made with ulterior motive. The Petitioner concealed the material facts that he was wait listed as per his length of engagement and could not be absorbed as he was positioned down in seniority. Due to the business exigency, the Respondent/Bank engaged the temporary employees for performance of duties as messenger and such engagements were prevailing from the year 1970 onwards. Such of those employees who are claiming permanent absorption and when their case was espoused by State Bank of India Staff

Federation which resulted in five settlements dated 17-11-87, 16-07-88, 07-10-88, 9-1-91 and 30-7-96. The said settlements became subject matter of conciliation proceedings and minutes were drawn under Section 18(3) of I.D. Act. In terms thereof, the Petitioner was considered for permanent appointment as per his eligibility along with similarly placed other temporary employees and the Petitioner was wait listed as candidate No. 539 in waitlist of Zonal Office, Trichy. So far 212 wait listed temporary candidates, out of 652 waitlisted temporary employees were permanently appointed by Respondent/Bank. It is false to allege that the Petitioner worked as a temporary messenger. The Petitioner was engaged only in leave vacancies as and when it arose. When the Petitioner having submitted to selection process in terms of settlements drawn as per retrenchment provisions referred to above, cannot turn around and claim appointment. Such of those temporary employees who were appointed were engaged for more number of days and hence, they were appointed. Under the settlement, employees were categorised as A, B, and C. Considering their temporary service and subject to other eligibility criteria, under category (A) the temporary employees who were engaged for 240 days were to be considered and under category; (B) the temporary employees who have completed 270 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months and under category (C) the temporary employees who have completed 30 days aggregate temporary service in any calendar year after 1-7-75 or minimum 70 days aggregate temporary service in any continuous block of 36 calendar months were to be considered. As per clause 7, the length of temporary service was to be considered for seniority in the wait list and it was also agreed that wait list was to lapse in December, 1991 and the cut off date was extended up to 31-3-97 for filling up vacancies which were to arise upto 31-12-94. The Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment. The Respondent had implemented the voluntary retirement scheme and even the permanent vacancies stand substantially reduced. There were no regular vacancies available. The peculiar problem was due to the facts that all the aforesaid temporary employees were working in leave vacancies and not in regular permanent vacancies. In terms of aforesaid settlements, out of 652 wait listed candidates, 212 temporary employees were appointed and since the Petitioner was wait listed at 539, he was not appointed. The said settlements were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlements directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Further, the said settlements were not questioned by any union so far and the settlements of bank level settlements and operated throughout the country. The Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 does not apply to Respondent/Bank and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such plea. It is not correct to say that documents and identity of Petitioner was verified before the Petitioner was engaged. It is also not correct to say that the Petitioner was

discharging the work of permanent messenger. As per settlements, vacancies upto 31-12-94 were filled up against the waited list of temporary employees and vacancies for 1995-96 has to be filled up against the wait list drawn for appointment of daily wages/casual labour. Further, for circle of Chennai wait list of daily wages was not finalized and hence not published and there is only one wait list for the appointment of temporary employees. After the expiry of wait list, the Petitioner has no claim for permanent absorption. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays to dismiss the claim with costs.

5. In the additional claim statement, the Petitioner contended that he was having been sponsored by employment exchange and having undergone medical examination, the Petitioner has fulfilled the criteria set out by the Respondent/Bank for selection of candidate for appointment in the post of messenger and other class IV post. He was engaged in the messenger post in the subordinate cadre of the Respondent/Bank continuously with deliberate and artificial breaks. Therefore, the Respondent/Bank is duty bound to regularise the services of the Petitioner as he has acquired the valuable right enshrined in the Constitution of India. In the year 1998, the Respondent/Bank has issued a circular to the effect that under no circumstances, wait listed persons like the Petitioner be engaged even in menial category, thus, the Respondent/Bank imposed total ban for his future employment. Even though there were sufficient number of vacancies in class IV category, the Respondent/Bank deliberately delayed in filling up the vacancies by the wait listed workmen with ulterior motive. The Respondent/Bank has been arbitrarily filling up the vacancies with the persons other than wait listed workmen according to their whims and fancies. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

6. Again, the Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the Counter Statement of the Respondent, wherein it is stated that all the settlements made by the bank with the State Bank of India Staff Federation were under Section 18(1) of the Act and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. As per recruitment rules of the Respondent/Bank, recruitment of class IV staff in the Respondent/Bank is in accordance with the instructions laid down under codified circulars of the Respondent/Bank. Even in the Writ Petition before the High Court in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, the Petitioner questioned the settlement dated 27-10-88 and 9-1-91. It is false to allege that the settlements are contrary to the rights of the Petitioner. Hence, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed in his favour.

7. In these circumstances, the points for my consideration are :—

- (i) "Whether the demand of the Petitioner in Wait List No. 539 for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?"
- (ii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point No. 1 :

8. In this case, on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that the Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected industrial disputes have been sponsored by Employment Exchange and they having been called for interview and having been selected and wait listed in terms of the relevant guidelines/circulars of the Respondent/Bank in permanent vacancies in subordinate cadre on temporary basis. After engaging them intermittently for some years, the Petitioner in this case and other Petitioners in the connected disputes were terminated without any notice. Since the Respondent/Bank terminated several temporary employees in the year 1985, the State Bank Employees' Union had filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court to protect the legal and constitutional rights of the workmen concerned and while the matter was pending in Writ Petition No. 542 (Civil) of 1987, the Respondent/Bank hurriedly entered into a settlement on the issue of absorption of temporary employees and filed it before the Supreme Court at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition. This settlement has become an exhibit of the Respondent/Bank and has been marked as Ex. M1. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected cases attacked this settlement as it is not binding on them on the ground that they have been interviewed and selected in the permanent vacancy and Respondent/Bank without any intimation or notice denied an opportunity to work in the bank after 31-3-1997 and therefore, they have raised the dispute in the year 1997 before the labour authorities and they questioned the retrenchment as unjust and illegal and they further prayed for reinstatement with back wages and other attendant benefits.

9. On behalf of the Petitioner, it is contended that these Petitioners were recruited as temporary employees in the Respondent/Bank under the guidelines and circulars issued by the Respondent/Bank from time to time and further, the same guidelines carry the procedure for regularisation of service of the temporary employees and any settlement in this regard is redundant and in any case, the Petitioner is not bound by settlement under Section 18(1) entered into between the alleged Federation and the Respondent/Management. They further contended that though the Respondent/Bank has stated that the Petitioner has not worked for more than 240 days in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and was not in continuous service on 17-11-1987, therefore, they have no valid and enforceable right for appointment, in the wake of strict instructions and circulars/guidelines issued by the Respondent/Bank to the effect that temporary employees at branches/offices are not allowed to be in service exceeding 200 days, hence the question of Petitioner working for 240 days does not arise at all. Further, they have invoked the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act and it is preposterous to contend that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment as Sections 25G and 25H are very much applicable to the Petitioners who are retrenched messengers and are eligible to be reinstated. Learned representative for the Petitioner

contended that in 1996 LAB & IC 2248 CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Vs. S. SATYAM AND OTHERS the Supreme Court has held that Chapter V-A of the I.D. Act providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom Section 25F applies but for all cases of retrenchment. Therefore, the application of Section 25H cannot be restricted only to one category of retrenched workmen. Therefore, the contention of the Respondent/Bank that the Petitioner has no valid and enforceable right for appointment is untenable. It is further contended that on behalf of the Petitioner that Ex. W2, W3 and W8 as well as Ex. M8 which constitute/relate to the circular instructions of the Respondent/Bank issued from time to time in connection with the implementation of the settlements on absorption and which are statutory in character. Further, a combined study of Ex. M1 and the averments of MW1 and MW2 and their testimonies during the cross-examination will clearly show how the bank has given a raw deal to the Petitioner from the beginning linking his future with the settlements. Further, Clause 1 of Ex. M1 deals with categorization of retrenched temporary employees into 'A, B and C', but this categorization of 'A, B & C' is quite opposed to the doctrine of 'last come—first go' or 'first come—last go' and therefore, the categorization in Clause 1 is illegal. Clause 1 (a) of Ex. M1 provides an opportunity to persons who were engaged on casual basis and allowed to work in leave/casual vacancies of messengers, farashes, cash coolies, water boys, sweepers etc. for absorption along with the other eligible categories of temporary employees is not valid. Further, engaging casuals to do messengerial work is in contravention of the guidelines mentioned in Reference Book on Staff matters, copy of which is marked as Ex. W8. Further, the appointment of daily wage basis for regular messengerial jobs etc. are strictly prohibited as per bank's circulars/instructions. In such circumstances, the absorption of casuals along with the eligible categories is not valid. Therefore, these persons who were engaged by the Respondent/Bank on casual basis should not be given permanent appointment in the bank service. Those casuals were given more beneficial treatment in the matter of arriving at qualifying service for interview and selection. But, temporary employees have not been informed about this amendment which includes casuals affecting their interest and chance. Further, as per instructions in Ex. W2 four types of waiting lists have to be prepared. But the Respondent/Bank has alleged to have prepared only one wait list for each module as per Ex. M10 in this case. Those candidates under Ex. M10 were found suitable for appointment as messengers and sweepers. Even MW1 is unable to say as to when the wait list Ex. M10 was prepared, but it is mentioned in Ex. M10 that it was prepared based on the settlement dated 17-11-87, 27-10-88 and 9-1-91 which are marked as Ex. M1, M3 and M4 respectively. But, when MW1 has spoken about the settlements, he deposed that settlement dated 27-10-88 was not included in the Madras circle since the High Court order is there, but he has not produced any document in support of the so called non-inclusion except his bald statement. Further, according to MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 was prepared on 2-5-92 but

there is no pleading in the Counter Statement with regard to this wait list. Further the Hon'ble High Court has held in its order dated 23-7-99 in W.P.No.7872 of 1991, which is marked as an exhibit, in which it is stated that 'it is clear that the 1987 settlement was concerned with the temporary class IV employees who were paid scale wages as per Bipartite Settlement while the 1988 settlement dealt with daily wager in Class IV category who were paid wages daily on mutual agreement basis. In such circumstances, as rightly contended the Respondent are not justified and combined the list of candidates covered under 1987 settlement and 1988 settlement since they formed two distinct and separate classes and they cannot treat one class and their action undoubtedly amounts to violation of Article 14 of Constitution of India.' Further, the averment of MW1 and the statements in Counter Statement are contrary to the above and it is nothing but a desperate attempt to wriggle out the illegality committed or perpetrated by the Respondent/Bank by combining equals with unequals. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as per deposition of MW1 wait list under Ex. M10 comprises of both messengerial and non-messengerial candidates. While the temporary employees were appointed after due process of selection and were paid wages on the basis of industrywise settlement, it is not so in the case of casuals. Therefore, both belongs to two different and distinct categories. But, Ex. M3 provides for the same norms to the casuals as in the case of temporary employees in the matter of absorption. Therefore, it is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the Petitioner contended that preparation of Ex. M10 namely wait list is not in conformity with the instructions of Ex. M2 and non-preparation of separate panels amounts to violation of circular. Secondly, it has not been prepared as per instructions in Ex. W2 circular regarding projected vacancies for the period from 1987 to 1994. Furthermore, no wait list was released/published even after the Court order in WMP No. 11932/91 W.P. No. 7872/91 directing the Respondent/Bank to release the list of successful candidates pursuant to the first advertisement published in 'The Hindu' dated 1-8-88. Furthermore, wait list under Ex. M10 does not carry particulars about the candidates, date of initial appointment and the number of days put in by them to arrive at their respective seniority. From all these things, it is clear that Ex. M10 has been prepared in violation of instructions and ceased to have the credibility attached to the wait list. Above all, Ex. M1 was not produced at the time of conciliation proceedings held during the year 1997-98 held at Chennai and Madurai and only during the year 2003 the Respondent/Bank produced the wait list Ex. M10 before this Tribunal marking it as a confidential document. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though the Respondent/Bank has alleged that these petitioners were engaged in leave vacancy, they have not been told at the time of initial appointment that their appointment was in leave vacancy. Further, even before or after the settlement on absorption of temporary employees, the expression that they were engaged in leave vacancy was used as a device to take them out of the principal clause 2 (oo) of the I.D. Act, 1947.

Though the Petitioner's work in the Respondent/Bank is continuous and though the Petitioner has performed the duties continuously which is still in existence, the categorisation as such is not valid and the provisions of Sastry Award are also violated. Further, the representative of the Petitioner relied on the rulings reported in 1985 4 SCC 201 H.D. SINGH Vs. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"to employ workmen as 'badlies', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for many years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is illegal."* Learned representative further contended that Ex.M 10 wait list has not been prepared in accordance with principle of seniority in the legal sense, since the selected candidates with longest service should have priority over those who joined the service later and therefore, the wait list under Ex. M10 which has been drawn up is contrary to law and also bad in law. Thus, the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the law and the spirit of the settlement, but in utter violation and in breach of it. Though clause 2(e) of Ex. M4 states that candidates found suitable for permanent appointment will be offered appointment against existing/future vacancy anywhere in module or circle and in case, a candidate fails to accept the offer of appointment or posting within the prescribed period, he will be deemed to have refused it and the name shall stand deleted from the respective panel and he shall have no further claim for being considered for permanent appointment in the bank. The Respondent/Bank has not produced any document to show how he has arrived at the seniority and till date, it is a mystery as to who that senior was and there is no documentary evidence in support of the averment and also for the averment of MW1. Therefore, the termination of the Petitioner who was in regular service of the Respondent/Bank is arbitrary, mala fide and illegal and the Respondent/Bank has not acted in accordance with the terms of settlement on absorption of temporary employees. Though the Respondent/Bank has produced Ex. M6 which alleged to be a copy of minutes of conciliation proceedings dated 9-6-75 before Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Hyderabad, it is neither a 18(3) settlement nor 12(3) settlement as claimed by the Respondent/Bank which says only with regard to modification of Ex. M1 to M4 made in terms of Ex. M6. Though the Respondent/Bank produced Ex. M7 and M11 interim orders passed by High Court of Madras in WMP No. 11932/91 in W.P. No. 7872/91 ceased to have any relevance when the main writ has been disposed of in the year 1999 and therefore, they do not have any bearing in the case of the Petitioner. Further, though the Respondent/Management has examined two witnesses, the deposition of management witnesses during the cross-examination had become apparent that they have no personal knowledge about the settlements which are marked as Ex. M1 to M5. Above all, though the Respondent/Bank has referred to voluntary retirement scheme, In the Respondent/Bank it was implemented only in the year 2001 and it constitutes post reference period and hence evidence of Respondent/Bank has no application to the Petitioner's

case. The Petitioners have completed the service of 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months as enshrined under Sections 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, their retrenchment from service is illegal and against the mandatory provisions of Section 25 and therefore, they are deemed to be in continuous service of the Respondent/Bank and they are entitled to the benefits under the provisions of I.D. Act. It is further contended on behalf of the Petitioner that though some of the Petitioners in the connected I.Ds. have not completed 240 days, since the Respondent/Bank has not taken into consideration and not included the Sundays and paid holidays as days on which the Petitioners have actually worked and hence, they have also completed 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months. He also relied on the rulings reported in 1985 11 LLJ 539 WORKMEN OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION Vs. MANAGEMENT OF AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"the expression 'actually worked under the employer' cannot mean that those days only when the workmen worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which they were in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc."* It is further, argued that call letters produced by the Petitioner will clearly prove that the Respondent/Bank has conducted the interview and selected the temporary employees who have reported to have submitted their application for absorption as per the bank's circular and therefore, their retrenchment is illegal. In all these cases, the Petitioners were in employment as sub-staff in early 1980s but were denied further engagement on account of settlements/lapsing of wait lists and out of these Petitioners some of them have completed 240 days and more in a continuous period of 12 calendar months and they are in age group of 40 to 50 years and for no fault of theirs, they find themselves stranded in life midstream. They have also not gainfully employed. In such circumstances, this Tribunal has to pass an award in their favour.

10. But, as against this, the learned senior counsel for the Respondent/Bank contended that the reference made by the Government itself is not maintainable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner in this case and the Petitioners in the connected disputes were not in continuous service. Hence, the question of regular appointment/absorption does not arise at all and their engagement was not authorised. Further, the Petitioners are estopped from making claim as they had accepted the settlements drawn under the provisions of Sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the I.D. Act, in lieu of the provisions of law and implemented by the Respondent/Bank and the claim of the Petitioners are not bona fide and are made with ulterior motive. Further, they have concealed the material facts that the Petitioner was wait listed as per length of his engagement and could not be absorbed as he

was positioned down in the seniority. The Respondent/Bank was engaging temporary employees due to business exigency for the performance of duties as messenger. Further, the allegation that he was sponsored by Employment Exchange is incorrect and the allegation that he worked as temporary messenger is also incorrect, they were engaged against leave vacancies. The settlement entered into by the Respondent/Bank and the Federation were bona fide which were the only workable solution and is binding on the Petitioner. The Petitioner accepted the settlement and accordingly he was wait listed and therefore, the Petitioner is estopped from questioning the settlement directly or indirectly and his claim is liable to be rejected. Furthermore, the said settlements were not questioned by any union and the settlements were bank level settlements and operate throughout the country. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1991 ILLJ 323 ASSOCIATED GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A.P. AND OTHERS wherein under Section 12(3) the union entered into a settlement with the management settling the claim of 11 workmen and the workmen resigned from the job and received terminal benefits, but the workmen raised a plea before the Tribunal that they did not resign voluntarily. But the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that *"in the absence of plea that the settlement reached in the course of conciliation is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the settlement is binding on the workmen."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 II LLJ 1189 ASHOK AND OTHERS Vs. MAHARASHTRA STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that *"therefore a settlement arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent, it departs from the ordinary law of contracts, the object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minority union from scuttling the settlement."* It further held that *"there may be exceptional cases, where there may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. But, in the absence of such allegations, a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration."* Learned counsel for the Respondent further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 ILLJ 308 K.C.P. LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlements are divided into two categories namely (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under Section 18(3). A settlement of the first category has limited application and binds merely parties to it and settlement of the second category made with a recognised majority union has extended application as it will be binding on all workmen of the establishment. Even in case of the first category, if*

the settlement was reached with a representative union of which the contesting workmen were members and if there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the terms of the settlement, it must be binding on the contesting workmen also." He further relied on the rulings reported in AIR 2000 SC 469 NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that *"settlement is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and other inducements, it could be subject-matter of yet another industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the conciliation officer must be fair and reasonable."* Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that though it is alleged that they are not parties to the settlement, since the Federation in which the Petitioner is also one among them, they have entered into settlement with the bank and therefore, it is binding on the Petitioner. Further, he argued that no union of the bank has questioned the settlement and in such circumstances, it cannot be said that it is not binding on them and he is estopped from disputing the same.

11. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that though the reference made in this case and other connected disputes is 'whether the demand of the workman with wait list Number given for restoring the wait list of temporary messengers in the establishment of Respondent/Bank and consequential appointment thereupon as temporary messenger is justified?' The Petitioner contended that the retrenchment made by the Respondent/Bank is not valid and he has to be reinstated in service with full back wages etc. Hence, the Petitioner's contention against the reference made by the Government is not valid. Further, in this case, the Court has to see whether the restoration of wait list can be made as contended by the Petitioner and not reinstatement as alleged by the Petitioner in the Claim Statement.

12. But, as against this on behalf of the Petitioner it is contended that mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference and he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 345 SECRETARY, KOLLAM JILLA HOTEL AND SHOP WORKERS UNION Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM wherein the Kerala High Court has held that *"mere wording of reference is not decisive in the matter of tenability of a reference. Even though the Tribunal cannot go beyond the order of reference, if points of difference are discernible from the material before it, it has only on duty and that is to decide the points on merits and not to find out some technical defects in the wording of reference, subjecting the poor workman to hardship involved in moving the machinery again."* It further held that *"the Tribunal should look*

into the pleading and find out the exact nature of pleading of the Petitioner to find out the exact nature of dispute instead of refusing to answer the reference on merits." Further, he argued that the Tribunal has got power to go into the question whether the Petitioner is to be reinstated in service or not for which he relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1664 VANSAGNATHAN ORIENT PAPER MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS. wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that "the Tribunal cannot go behind the terms of reference, but that does not mean that it cannot look into the pleadings of parties." He also relied on the rulings reported in 1998 LAB IC 1507 A. SAMBANTHAN Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, MADRAS, wherein it has been held that "it has been repeatedly held that the Labour Court should not attempt to consider the order under reference in a technical manner or a pedantic manner, but should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner." He also argued that in Express Newspapers P. Ltd. case reported in AIR 1993 SC 569 the Supreme Court has held that "the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider all incidental matters also and the order of reference should not be construed in the manner which would prolong the industrial adjudication. The Labour Court is expected to decide the real nature of disputes between the parties and with that object in view, it should consider the order of reference in a fair and reasonable manner, though the order of reference is not happily framed nor was it framed to the high expectation of the Labour Court." Relying on all these decisions, the representative for the Petitioner argued that though in the reference, it is not mentioned that whether the retrenchment is valid or not, from the pleadings it is clear that the Petitioners have been retrenched from the Respondent/Bank and therefore, this Tribunal can look into the pleadings of the Petitioners and can decide whether the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service as alleged by him and whether he is entitled to the back wages as alleged by him. Therefore, the argument advanced on the side of the Respondent that it is beyond the scope of reference is without any substance.

13. I find some force in the contention of the representative for the Petitioner. Therefore, I find this Tribunal is entitled to go into the question whether the relief prayed for by the Petitioner can be given to him or not? But, I find that the settlement was validly entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since it is not questioned by any of the unions of the Respondent/Bank, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to question the settlement.

14. Then the learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner mentioned that he has been kept in the wait list and the time of wait list has been exhausted, now the Petitioner cannot question that he should be reinstated in service and he relied on the rulings reported in 1996 3 SCC 139 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS Vs. K.V. VIJESH wherein the Supreme Court has held that "the only question which falls for determination in this appeal is whether a candidate whose name appears

in the select list on the basis of competitive examination acquires a right of appointment in Govt. service in an existing or a future vacancy." In that case, pruning of select list on reduction in number of vacancies was made in view of the impending absorption of steam surplus staff and a policy decision has been taken to reduce the number of vacancies and consequently, a certain number of bottom persons were removed from the select list and the remaining selectees were given appointments according to their comparative merits. In which, the Supreme Court has held that "in such circumstances, denial of appointment to the persons removed from the select list is not arbitrary and discriminatory." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1997 6 SCC 584 SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. Vs. SHANKAR PAUL AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "by its letter dated 7-2-87 the bank informed the Respondents that the panel was valid for one year only and that inclusion of their names in the panel was not to confer on them any right to seek permanent appointment in the services of the bank. Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was a yearly panel expiring on 6-2-98, we are of the opinion that the Respondents did not get any right because of inclusion of their names in the said panel for permanent absorption in the services of the bank. Whatever conditional right they had come to an end with the expiry of the panel. The claim of the Respondents as contained in the W.P. was thus, misconceived and therefore, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, when it first decided the appeal were right in dismissing the Writ Petition and the appeal respectively." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1991 3 SCC 47 SHANKARSAN DASH Vs. UNION OF INDIA wherein the Supreme Court has held that "candidates included in merit list has no indefeasible right to appointment even if a vacancy exists" and relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has no right to question the wait list and since there is no mala fide on the part of the Respondent/Bank in preparing the wait list, it cannot be said that preparation of wait list was made with mala fide motive. Under such circumstances, after the expiry of the date namely 31-3-1997, the Petitioner cannot plead for restoration of the wait list and he cannot pray for reinstatement as alleged by him. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in 1992 LAB IC 2168 STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. Vs. PIARASINGH AND OTHERS wherein the Supreme Court has held that "now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad-hoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy; (b) he was not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back door; (c) he was not eligible and qualified for the post

at the time of his appointment; (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are the additional problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad-hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no rule of thumb in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case, such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. From this, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable." Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of Lower Courts. He further relied on the decision reported in 1997 II SCC 1 ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS wherein the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has considered the above regularisation of appointment in excess of sanctioned posts. "So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry itself was illegal and void is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularisation of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise, if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad-hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But, if the initial entry itself is unauthorised and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularising the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given, it would be an exercise in futility. It would amount to decorating a still born baby. Under these circumstances, there was no occasion to regularise them or to give them valid confirmation. *The so called exercise of confirming these employees, therefore, remained a nullity.*" Therefore, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that these temporary employees were appointed only due to exigencies and they have not appointed against any regular vacancy and they have only appointed in leave vacancies and therefore, they are not entitled to claim any absorption in the Respondent/Bank. Further, he relied on the rulings reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3657 HIMANSHU KUMAR VIDYARTHI & ORS. Vs. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. wherein the Supreme Court has held that "they are temporary employees working on daily wages. Under these circumstances, their disengagement from service cannot be construed to be a retrenchment under the I.D. Act. The concept of retrenchment therefore, cannot be stretched to such an extent as to cover these employees. Since they are only daily wage employees and have no right to the posts,

their disengagement is not arbitrary." He further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 3 LLJ (Supp.) 754 wherein the Rajasthan High Court has held that "Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act retrenchment procedure following principle of 'last come - first go' is not mandatory but only directory, on sufficient grounds shown, the employer is permitted to depart from the said principle retrenching seniors and retaining juniors." Though in this case, the Petitioner has alleged that his juniors have been made permanent in banking service, he has not established with any evidence that his juniors were made permanent by the Respondent/Bank. Any how, if the Petitioner has shown anything, the Respondent/Bank is ready to establish the fact before this Tribunal that he has worked more days than the Petitioner. In such circumstances, the prayer for reinstatement in the services of Respondent/Bank cannot be given to the Petitioner and, therefore, the claim is to be dismissed with costs.

15. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that even in recent decision reported in 2006 4 SCC 1 SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. UMA DEVI, the Supreme Court has held that "merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right." Further, it has also held that "it is not as if, the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature is not aware of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arms length since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible." Further, the Supreme Court while laying down the law, has clearly held that "unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee..... It has to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by relevant rules." Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 443 NATIONAL FERTILIZERS

LTD. AND OTHERS Vs. SOMVIR SINGH, wherein the Supreme Court has held that “regularisation furthermore, is not a mode of appointment and if appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity, the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of purported period of probation would not arise.” Further, in CDJ 2006 SC 395 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SUJANPUR Vs. SURINDER KUMAR, the Supreme Court has held that “it is not disputed that the appointment of the Respondent was not in sanctioned post. Being a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Appellant for the purpose of recruiting its employees was bound to follow the recruitment rules. Any recruitment made in violation of such rules as also in violation of constitutional scheme enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be void in law.” Further, in 2006 2 LLN 89 MADHYA PRADESH STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Vs. S.C. PANDEY wherein the Supreme Court has held that “only because an employee had worked for more than 240 days of service by that itself would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularised in service.” The Supreme Court also held that “the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Govt. in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, in view of the settled legal position, as noticed hereinbefore.”

16. Relying on all these decisions, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that since the Petitioner has not been appointed for regular post nor has he been appointed in regular vacancy or sanctioned post, the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation of his service. Further, when they have not been questioned the five settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation and since they have not questioned the wait list prepared by the Respondent/Bank, they are not entitled to dispute the same and they are estopped from doing so. Further, their prayer before the labour authorities was only to restore the wait list and also for appointment thereon as temporary messenger as per wait list. Under such circumstances, after expiry of the period mentioned in the settlements which were subsequently amended by settlements, the Petitioners cannot now question either the preparation of wait list or number allotted to them. Under such circumstances, it cannot be questioned by the Petitioner.

17. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent. Though in the Claim Statement, the Petitioners have made so many allegations with regard to preparation of wait list and also settlements entered into between the Respondent/Bank and Federation, at the time of reference, they have not questioned the settlement nor the number allotted to each individual in the wait list. Further, the Petitioners have not questioned the settlement and they have not alleged that settlement was not a bona fide in nature or it has been arrived at on account of mala fide, misrepresentation, fraud or even corruption or other inducements. Under such circumstances, I find the

Petitioners cannot now question the settlements at this stage and since they are only temporary employees and since it is not shown before this Tribunal that the Respondent/Bank has got sanctioned posts for temporary employees to be absorbed, I find the Petitioners cannot claim for reinstatement or regularisation in services of the Respondent /Bank.

18. Further, the representative for the Petitioner contended that in similar cases, this Tribunal had ordered for reinstatement with back wages and these disputes are also similar in nature and hence, the Petitioners are entitled for the same relief.

19. But, I find since the Supreme Court has held that temporary employees are not entitled to claim any rights for regularisation, merely because they have completed 240 days of continuous service in a period of 12 calendar months and the Supreme Court has also held that each case must be considered on its own merit and the changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing is evident, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or reinstatement in the Respondent/Bank as alleged by him. Therefore, I find this point against the Petitioner.

Point No. 2 :

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

20. In view of my foregoing findings that the Petitioner is a temporary employee and he is not entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent merely on the strength of such continuance of work, I find the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. No Costs.

21. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dicated to the P.A., transcribed and typed by nim, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 31st January, 2007.)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined:—

For the Petitioner WW1 Sri P. Balasubramanian
 WW2 Sri V. S. Ekambaram

For the Respondent MW1 Sri C. Mariappan
 MW2 Sri T.L. Selvaraj

Documents Marked :—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	01-08-88	Xerox copy of the paper publication in daily Thanthi based on Ex. M1.
W2	20-04-88	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines issued by Respondent/Bank for implementation of Ex. M1.

Ex. No.	Date	Description	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W3	24-04-91	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding absorption of daily wagers in Messenger vacancies.	W20	31-03-97	Xerox copy of the appointment order to Sri G. Pandi.
W4	01-05-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu on daily wages based on Ex. W4.	W21	Feb. 2005	Xerox copy of the pay slip of T. Sekar for the month of February, 2005 wait list No. 395 of Madurai Circle.
W5	20-08-91	Xerox copy of the advertisement in The Hindu extending period of qualifying service to daily wagers.	W22	13-02-95	Xerox copy of the Madurai Module circular letter about Engaging temporary employees from the panel of wait list.
W6	15-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular letter of Zonal Office, Chennai about filling up of vacancies of messenger posts.	W23	09-11-92	Xerox copy of the Head office circular No. 28 regarding Norms for sanction of messenger staff.
W7	25-03-97	Xerox copy of the circular of Respondent/Bank to all Branches regarding identification of messenger vacancies and filling them before 31-3-97.	W24	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the minutes of the Bipartite meeting.
W8	Nil	Xerox copy of the instruction in Reference book on staff about casuals not to be engaged at office/branches to do messengerial work.	W25	09-07-92	Xerox copy of the settlement between Respondent/Bank and All India State Bank of India Staff Federation for implementation of norms—creation of part time general attendants.
W9	09-01-86	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Karur Siruthozhil branch	W26	07-02-06	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Conversion of part time employees and redesignate them as general attendants.
W10	24-12-92	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Karur branch.	W27	31-12-85	Xerox copy of the local Head Office circular about Appointment of temporary employees in subordinate cadre.
W11	24-12-97	Xerox copy of the service certificate issued by Siruthozhilur Karur branch.	For the Respondent/Management :—		
W12	03-08-89	Xerox copy of the call letter from Respondent/Bank to the petitioner.	Ex. No.	Date	Description
W13	Nil	Xerox copy of the administrative guidelines in reference book on staff matters issued by Respondent/bank regarding appointment of temporary employees.	M1	17-11-87	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W14	Nil	Xerox copy of the Reference book on Staff matters Vol. III consolidated upto 31-12-95.	M2	16-07-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W15	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—V. Muralikannan.	M3	27-10-88	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W16	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—K. Subburaj.	M4	9-01-91	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W17	06-03-97	Xerox copy of the call letter from Madurai zonal office for interview of messenger post—J. Velmurugan.	M5	30-07-96	Xerox copy of the settlement.
W18	17-03-97	Xerox copy of the service particulars — J. Velmurugan.	M6	09-06-95	Xerox copy of the minutes of conciliation proceedings.
W19	26-03-97	Xerox copy of the letter advising selection of parttime Menial—G. Pandi.	M7	28-05-91	Xerox copy of the order in W.P. No. 7872/91.
			M8	15-05-98	Xerox copy of the order in O.P. No. 2787/97 of High Court of Orissa.
			M9	10-07-99	Xerox copy of the order of Supreme Court in SLP No. 3082/99.
			M10	Nil	Xerox copy of the wait list of Trichy Module.
			M11	25-10-99	Xerox copy of the order passed in CMP No. 16289 and 16290/99 in W.A. No. 1893/99.

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2828.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार विजया बैंक के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय बंगलोर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 34/2001) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12011/13/2001-आईआर(बी-II)]

राजिन्द्र कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2828.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 34/2001) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Bangalore as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of Vijaya Bank and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-12011/13/2001-IR (B-II)]

RAJINDER KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, BANGALORE-560022

Dated, 7th August, 2007

PRESENT

Shri A. R. Siddiqui, Presiding Officer

C. R. No. 34/2001

I PARTY

The General Secretary,
Vijaya Bank Workers Organisation,
37/1, Floor, Car Street, Ulsoor, Bangalore

II PARTY

The Regional Manager,
Vijaya Bank, Head Office, 41/2, M.G. Road,
Trinity Circle, Bagalore.

AWARD

1. The Central Government by exercising the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section 2A of the Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has referred this dispute vide order No. L-12011/13/2001/IR (B-II) dated 30th April 2001 for adjudication on the following schedule:

SCHEDULE

“Whether M/s. Vijaya Bank is justified in removing Shri Narayan P. Bangera, former Clerk from service w.e.f. 14-2-1998? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?”

2. A charge sheet dated 2-6-1997, came to be issued against the first party workman for his act of remaining on unauthorised absence on five occasions between the periods from 15-7-1996 to 4-3-1997 for a period of 168 days and also remaining on continuous absence from 10-3-1997 & onwards, on feigned sickness disobeying the instructions of higher authorities calling upon him from time to time to report for duty, reporting for duty at Zonal Office, Bombay in terms of transfer order and relieving order dated 13-7-1996 to Bandra Branch directing to report for duty at Zonal Office Bombay and that he failed to appear before the doctor of bank's choice to get him medically examined to ascertain the genuineness of the reasons of medical grounds mentioned by him in various medical certificates in remaining absent from duty and therefore, he committed the misconduct against the following five charges:—

Charge No. 1: Your act of remaining absent from the duty unauthorisedly in violation of the leave rules of the bank amounts to gross misconduct under sub clause(p) of Clause 19.5 of Chapter XIX of the Bipartite Settlement.

Charge No. 2. Your non compliance of instruction of your official superiors and your failure to report for duty amounts of disobedience of lawful and reasonable orders of the official superiors, which is an act of gross misconduct under sub clause(e) of clause 19.5 of Chapter XIX of the Bipartite Settlement.

Charge No. 3. Your act of remaining absent from duty on the grounds of feigned sickness as detailed above amounts of an act subversive of discipline constituting gross misconduct under sub clause (j) of clause 19.5 of Chapter XIX of the Bipartite Settlement.

Charge No. 4. Your act on not reporting for duty in terms of the Transfer Order of Zonal Office, Mumbai and Relieving order of Bandra Branch as detailed above amounts to an act gross misconduct under sub clause (e) Clause 19.5 of Chapter X of the Bipartite Settlement.

Charge No. 5. Your habitual act of remaining absent from duty unauthorisedly contrary to the leave rules of the bank constituting gross misconduct under sub clause (f) of Clause 19.5 Chapter XIX of the Bipartite Settlement.

You are, therefore, required to submit within 7 days of receipt of this charge sheet, a written statement of defence, if any, in triplicate to the undersigned setting forth your defence and show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you for your alleged acts of misconduct, failing which it will be deemed that you have no written statement of defence to submit and the matter will be proceeded with accordingly.

3. The first party appears to have given his reply to the said charge sheet by way of his statement of defence dated 9-6-1997 admitting that he had failed to comply with the leave rules of the bank and requested the management to treat his case under Clause 19.12 (e) of the Bipartite Settlement and to take a lenient view on humanitarian grounds. Not satisfied with the explanation offered by the first party and keeping in view the misconduct of unauthorised absence committed by the first party workman on earlier occasions also the management thought it fit to hold an independent departmental enquiry against the first party and accordingly, the DE was held against him and on the conclusion of the enquiry, findings were submitted by the enquiry officer holding him guilty of the above said 5 charges and it is thereupon, the first party once again was given opportunity of hearing supplying him the copy of the enquiry report and ultimately was removed him from service.

4. The case of the first party workman as made out in the Claim Statement is that he joined the services of the management bank as a sub staff on 19-7-1980 and was promoted as a Clerk from 1-1-1985. He worked with different branches in different capacities and at the time of his termination from service he was working at Bandra branch, Mumbai.

5. After referring to the charge sheet and the fact that the Domestic enquiry was ordered against him despite his submitting explanation giving out the reasons for his absence from duty. The first party challenged the enquiry proceedings on several grounds (not referred there being separate finding on DE). As far as the merits of the case is concerned, the first party challenged the enquiry findings on the ground that they suffered from perversity as there was no discussion of evidence and documents produced by the management and that conclusion drawn by the enquiry officer holding him guilty of the charges was not supported by evidence brought on record. He then challenged the order passed by the disciplinary authority in removing him from service on the ground that the disciplinary authority mechanically adopted the reasons given by the enquiry office ignoring his past record of service and that the punishment imposed upon him was disproportionate to the charges of misconduct alleged to have been committed by them. He also contended that the management victimised him by passing the impugned punishment order though some of the employees were given lesser punishment for similar misconduct of unauthorised absence committed by him. Therefore, requested this tribunal to set aside the impugned punishment order and to reinstate him in service with full backwages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits.

6. The management by its counter statement, while, giving out the details of the past conduct of the first party and the punishment imposed upon him on several occasions earlier to the charge sheet in question, at para 4 of the Counter Statement gave the details of charge sheet at paras 7 to 16 of the Counter statement. While,

meeting the case of the first party on merits, the management contended that a detailed and full dress enquiry was conducted against the first party giving him opportunity to defend himself, however, the first party pleaded guilty to the charges and the management to be on safer side adduced oral as well as documentary evidence in order to substantiate the charges leveled against the first party and it is on the conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his findings holding him guilty of the charges giving cogent and valid reasonings supported by sufficient and legal evidence and therefore, enquiry findings suffered from no perversity; that the Disciplinary authority after careful consideration of the entire records and taking into consideration the representation dated 5-1-1998 given by the first party in response to the enquiry report, proposed the punishment of removal from service vide order dated 24-1-1998 and once again the first party by his representation dated 7-2-1998 requested the management to take lenient view. However, keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct, the disciplinary authority confirmed the punishment proposed against the first party; that the first party did not choose to prefer any appeal against the final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority but raised the dispute dated 19-9-2000 after two year of the dismissal order resulting into the present proceedings and therefore, the reference is liable to be dismissed.

7. Keeping in view the respective contentions of the parties with regard to the validity and fairness or otherwise of the enquiry proceedings, this tribunal on 25-3-2004 framed the following preliminary issue:—

“Whether the Domestic Enquiry conducted against the first party by the second party is fair and proper”?

8. During the course of trial of the said issue, the management examined the enquiry officer as MW1 and got marked seven documents at Ex. M1 to M7. The first party examined himself as W1 and after hearing the learned counsels for the respective parties this tribunal by order dated 20-7-2006 recorded a finding on the above said issue holding that the DE held against the first party by the second party is fair and proper. Thereupon, learned counsels for the respective parties were heard on merits and the case is posted this day for award.

9. Learned counsel Shri BDK representing the first party, vehemently, argued that the first party though did not dispute his absence from duty for a period of 168 days as leveled in the charge sheet but it is not disputed that he submitted leave applications followed by medical certificates on almost all the occasions and his absence being on medical grounds, it cannot be said that it was a case of unauthorised absence and that the first party remained absent from duty intentionally or that it was a gross misconduct committed by him so as to invite the extreme punishment of removal from service. Learned

counsel submitted that keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the first party deserved lenient view and therefore, the punishment imposed upon him be modified by a lesser punishment.

10. Whereas, learned counsel for the management supported the findings of the enquiry officer. His contention was that the first party workman has admitted his unauthorised absence from duty for the period in question right from the day he submitted his explanation to the charge sheet and till the date he gave his representation to the Disciplinary Authority in response to the enquiry report and then in response to the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority proposing the above said punishment. He further contended that apart from the plea of guilt by the first party the management produced oral as well as documentary evidence during the enquiry to substantiate the fact of the misconduct committed by the first party not only in remaining absent from duty but also in not reporting for duty despite the instructions given to him and in not presenting himself before a doctor of bank's choice for the purpose of medical examination to ascertain the fact of his ill health on which ground he was seeking leave from time to time to justify his absence from duty. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that keeping in view of the fact that the first party was punished on several occasions in the past for the very misconduct of unauthorised absence from duty and not showing any improvement in his conduct despite sufficient opportunity given to them to do so taking lenient view, there was no wrong committed by the disciplinary authority in passing the impugned punishment order as he deserved no other punishment keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case.

11. In the face of the findings recorded by this tribunal that the DE held against the first party by the second party is fair and proper, the two points now emerge for consideration are—

- (i) "Whether the findings of the enquiry officer holding the first party guilty of the charges suffered from any perversity and if not,
- (ii) The punishment imposed upon the first party removing him from service was not proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct committed by him."

12. As far as the first point is concerned, learned counsel for the first party as noted above, has not challenged the enquiry findings on merits very seriously. His only argument was that on each and every occasion of his absence from duty the first party had submitted leave letters and whenever he reported for duty he submitted the medical certificates so as to disclose that during the period when he was away from duty he was suffering from ill health. Therefore, his submission in other words was to the effect that the case on hand was not the case of

unauthorised absence but the absence caused on account of ill health so to say on medical grounds.

13. After, having gone through the evidence brought on record during the course of enquiry and the reasonings assigned by the enquiry officer in holding the first party guilty of the charges I am not inclined to accept his submission. First of all as could be read from the proceedings of enquiry and the finding of the enquiry officer, the first party workman admitted the charges of misconduct leveled against him when he submitted his explanation to the charge sheet, unconditionally, however, with request to the disciplinary authority to consider his case under clause 19.12(e) of the Bipartite Settlement so as to take a lenient view against him. When the enquiry was ordered and he appeared before the enquiry officer, on the very first date of hearing, he pleaded guilty to the charges once again when was read over with them. It can be read from the records that after the enquiry findings were submitted holding the first party guilty of the charges and the first party was served with the enquiry report, by his representation referred to supra was once again requested the disciplinary authority to take a lenient view pleading guilty of the misconduct committed by him. It was the same stand taken by him when he was served with the order proposing the punishment of removal from service. Therefore, through out the enquiry proceedings and the proceedings taken place before the disciplinary authority, the first party went on pleading guilty to the charges seeking lenient view from the disciplinary authority.

14. As far as findings of the enquiry officer is concerned, it can be very much revealed that the management in order to substantiate the aforesaid charges of misconduct, in all produced 28 documents marked at Ex. MEX 1 to 28 and examined one witness supporting the aforesaid charges. From the reading of the findings, it can be very well seen that for each and every charge leveled against the first party, the enquiry officer has given a separate and independent finding referring to the oral as well as documentary evidence. While referring to the documents at Ex. MEX 25 which are the copies of attendance register of Zonal Office, Bombay Pertaining to the months of August 1996 to 1997, the enquiry officer observed that the first party was absent during the period from 15-7-1996 to 13-8-1996, from 19-9-1996 to 20-9-1996, from 23-9-1996 to 24-9-1996, from 7-10-1996 to 21-12-1996, from 5-1-1997 to 4-3-1997 and from 10-3-1997 onwards for a period 30 days, 2 days, 2 days, 76 days & 58 days respectively. He observed that as per Ex. MEX 11, the letter dated 7-10-1996 the first party informed the Chief Manager, Zonal Office, Bombay of his intention of going on leave on the ground that he was not keeping well and requested to sanction three weeks leave on medical ground. He also enclosed medical certificates. However, he remained absent from duty after the expiry of leave period from 7-10-1996

onwards without seeking further extension of leave. He should have reported for duty on 27-10-1996 but he failed to do so. He once again wrote a letter to the authority on 19-11-1996 seeking leave on medical ground for a period of one month without enclosing medical certificate. Enquiry officer while referring to Ex. MEX. 14, the leave letter of the first party dated 23-12-1996 requesting for sanction of leave for 76 days from 7-10-1996 to 21-12-1996 observed that the said leave applied was not sanctioned by the competent authority and it was treated as unauthorised absence. He referred to telegram dated 9-01-1997 at Ex. MEX 15 where under the first party requested leave for two weeks but that was not considered vide Ex. MEX 16. He then referred to the letter and the application of the first party dated 5-03-1997 at MEX. 17 & 18 to observe that first party reported for duty to Zonal Office, Bombay only on 5-03-1997. Giving margin to the fact that the first party remained absent for two weeks from 6-01-1997 under the intimation to the management, however, the enquiry officer was justified in holding that for the remaining period of 44 days from 20-01-1997 to 4-03-1997 there was no intimation from the first party for remaining absent from duty. Therefore, he recorded a finding that it was a case of unauthorised absence from 6-01-1997 to 4-03-1997. Likewise for his absence from 10-03-1997 onwards, enquiry officer after having discussed and referred to MEX. 17, 20, 21, to 24 recorded a finding to the effect that he remained absent from duty unauthorisedly from 10-03-1997 onwards continuously and exceeding the period of 30 days. While discussing the charges No. 2 & 4 the enquiry officer also recorded his finding with reference to the documents that the first party did not report for duty at zonal office on 15-07-1990 in terms of relieving order dated 13-07-1996 issued at Bandra branch. He failed to report for duty despite the instruction given to him to do so immediately. While referring to the letters and the medical certificates produced by the first party at MEX. 9, 10, 14 & 18, enquiry officer observed that the first party was in the habit of submitted his application along with the medical certificate requesting for sanction of leave only after reporting for duty at the office. Having referred to MEX. 6 to 8, 11, 13, 17, 19, & 24 he observed that though by this letter it can be said that there was prior intimation from the first party for remaining absent but they were not considered by the bank as they were not submitted in accordance with the leave rules of the bank. He then observed that then the first party was informed vide letters at Ex. MEX 12 & 23 to report for duty immediately but he failed to do so and thereby did not comply with the lawful and reasonable orders of the official superiors and findings accordingly was given. As regard to the charge No. 3 the first party failed to present himself before a doctor of bank's choice, there is again a clear cut finding by the enquiry officer. Charge No. 5, which relates to the past record of the first party, there is again separate finding given by the enquiry officer. Therefore, the findings of the

enquiry officer have been very much supported by sufficient and legal evidence and the reasonings given by him and the charges of misconduct leveled against the first party are very much valid and cogent. The contention of the first party that he went on submitting leave letters followed by medical certificates, therefore, he cannot be treated as unauthorised absence has absolutely no significance in the light of the aforesaid findings. Only because he went on submitted leave letter along with medical certificates, it cannot be considered to be a compliance of leave rules, as the leave asked for must be sanctioned by the authority concerned. In the instant case undisputedly, there was no leave sanctioned in favour of the first party for the period in question. Merely because he produced certain medical certificates in support of leave letters it cannot be a circumstance sufficient to say that the reason given by him for remaining absent from duty was true and genuine. From the perusal of the medical certificate produced by him it can be seen that he suffered from no single disease and each and every medical certificate shows a different kind of diseases like back ache, Abscess over upper lips, Spinal back, pain in abdomen, pain in ear, acute mental depression etc. Therefore, none of the disease mentioned above, first of all not come under the category of any serious disease so as to prevent the first party from attending the duty and secondly on their face itself it cannot be taken to be genuine medical grounds. Had he suffered from a serious disease that too for a sufficient long time and remained absent from duty for such a period then the matter would have been different. Here is the case where he goes on taking leave on medical ground and submitting such medical certificates for one disease or the other spreading over different period. That was the same reason which prompted the management to subject the first party for medical examination by a doctor of its choice. However, the first party did not oblige the management subjecting himself for such a medical examination and thereby it was further established that the medical grounds mentioned by him in the leave letters followed by medical certificates were not true and genuine. Therefore, keeping in view all these facts and circumstances of the case, the arguments advanced for the first party that he was not on unauthorised absence, cannot be accepted. As noted above, findings of the enquiry officer in holding him guilty of the charges are very much perfect and legal based upon sufficient legal evidence and hence it is to be held that charges of misconduct leveled against the first party have been very much proved.

15. Now, coming to the question of quantum of the punishment. Keeping in view the fact that first party has remained absent from duty for a period of 168 days just within a span of 7 to 8 months, it cannot be said that the misconduct committed by him was not grave in nature. That apart, as could be read from his past record found mentioned at Para 4 of the Counter Statement and not countered or challenged by the first party, it can be seen that on earlier 5 occasions he had committed similar

misconduct of unauthorised absence. During period between 8-10-1987 to 23-01-1988 he was absent from duty unauthorisedly and when was charge sheeted he requested the disciplinary authority to treat his case under clause 19.12(e) of the Bipartite Settlement and his request being granted by the disciplinary authority, he was punished with 'warning'. On the second occasion he was charged with unauthorised absence for a period of 53 days and similar was the result, once again the matter being closed under clause 19.12(e) of the Bipartite Settlement. On 3rd and 4th occasions he remained absent from duty for a period of 75 days and 202 days and that time also he was given lenient treatment treating the case under the aforesaid clause by imposing the punishment of stoppage of one increment for a period of six months and stoppage of one increment permanently. On the last occasion in between the period from 3-5-1993 and 4-8-1994 i.e. during a period of about 15 months he was charge sheeted for unauthorised absence for a total period of 440 days and this time enquiry was ordered and after having found him guilty of the charges a penalty of stoppage of six increments vide final order dated 30-8-1996 was imposed upon him. Therefore, as argued for the management the case on hand appears to be a case of 'habitual absentee' amounting to gross misconduct. Here is the first party who never made any improvement in his conduct despite being given several opportunities to mend himself taking a lenient view against him not on one occasion but on several occasions. As noted above, the last order of the disciplinary authority passed against him for his misconduct was dated 3-8-1996 and it is from the month of July 1996 itself again he started remaining absent from duty as could be read from the present charge sheet. Therefore, first party appears to be incorrigible not bothered or interested in performing his duties. The banking institutions certainly cannot afford to have been services of such an employee. These are the institutions to be run very systematically with the help of sincere and hard working employees. In the result, it cannot be said that the management is not justified imposing the punishment of removal from service so as to get rid of the first party once and for all having been fed up with him taking lenient view on number of occasions. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned punishment was in any way disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct committed by the first party. Hence the following award:

AWARD

The reference stands dismissed. No costs.

(Dictated to PA transcribed by her corrected and signed by me on 7th August, 2007)

A. R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2829.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार यूनियन बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में औद्योगिक

अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, उदयपुर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 7/2000) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12011/113/2000-आईआर(बी-11)]

राजिन्द्र कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2829.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 7/2000) of the Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Udaipur as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-12011/113/2000-IR (B-II)]

RAJINDER KUMAR, Desk Officer

अनुबन्ध

औद्योगिक विवाद अधिकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, उदयपुर
(राज.)

पीठासीन अधिकारी—श्री हरसुखम पूनिया, आर. एच. जे.
एस.

प्रकरण सं. 07/2000 श्रम वाद

रामलाल पुत्र घासीराम हरिजन निवासी माछला मगरा,
स्वराजनगर, उदयपुर द्वारा—जनरल सेक्रेटरी,
यूनियन बैंक एम्प्लॉयज यूनियन, राजस्थान, जयपुर

---प्रार्थी

विरुद्ध

असिस्टेंट जनरल मैनेजर, यूनियन बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया,
रीजनल आफिस परिसर, जयपुर

---विपक्षी

उपस्थित :—

प्रार्थी की ओर से : श्री राजेश सिंधवी,
विपक्षी की ओर से : श्री राजेन्द्र सिंह चौहान

पंचाट

दिनांक 20 जून, 2007

भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय, श्रम शक्ति भवन, नई दिल्ली के आदेश संख्या एल-12811/113/2000 दिनांक 12-10-2000 के द्वारा निर्मांकित विवाद इस न्यायालय को अधिनिर्णय हेतु प्रेषित किया गया:—

Whether the action of the management of the Union Bank of India, Jaipur in imposing the penalty of Compulsory retirement w.e.f. 4-12-1999. Upon Shri Ramlal Harijan, a full time Sweeper is legal and justified If not, what relief the workman concerned is entitled to?

उक्त प्रसंग प्राप्त होने पर न्यायालय द्वारा दिनांक 25-10-2000 को नियमित श्रम वाद संख्या 07/2000 दर्ज रजिस्टर किया जाकर

पक्षकारान को नोटिस जारी किये गये। जिस पर प्रार्थी की ओर से क्लेम व विपक्षी की ओर से जबाब पेश किया गया।

प्रार्थी की ओर से प्रस्तुत क्लेम के तथ्य संक्षेप में इस प्रकार है कि प्रार्थी विपक्षी के अधीन 1-8-1979 से स्वीपर के पद पर शाखा फतेहपुरा उदयपुर में था, उसके बाद उसका स्थानान्तरण शाखा बापू बाजार, उदयपुर में कर दिया गया। प्रार्थी ने अपनी सेवाएं संतोषप्रद रूप से दी। शाखा प्रबन्धक द्वारा प्रार्थी को अनुसूचित जाति का होने के कारण नाजायज परेशान किया गया तथा अभद्र व्यवहार किया व इस व्यवहार पर आपत्ति करने पर उसे जलील करने की नियत से सामान्य समिति में केस बैंक के ड्यूटी समय को बदल कर दो पारी के अन्तर्गत कार्य करने पर विवश किया और उसका शोषण किया गया। प्रार्थी के मेडिकल बिल बैंक में प्रस्तुत करने पर शाखा में तैनात एक अधिकारी द्वारा बिल पास करवाने के लिये जबरन रकम वसूल की गई, जिसकी शिकायत उच्चाधिकारी व प्रधानमंत्री भारत सरकार को की गई, जिसके कारण विपक्षी द्वारा प्रार्थी को एक आरोप पत्र दिया, जिसमें प्रार्थी पर यह आरोप लगाया कि वह स्टाफ के सदस्यों के खिलाफ इस प्रकार की झूठी शिकायत करता है। जिस पर प्रार्थी ने जवाब देकर यह स्पष्ट किया कि प्रार्थी ने जो शिकायत की है, वह सही है। लेकिन विपक्षी द्वारा इस सम्बन्ध में जांच अधिकारी नियुक्त कर जांच कराई गई, जिसमें जांच अधिकारी श्री रवि खन्ना द्वारा प्रार्थी को डरा धमका कर जबरन आरोप स्वीकार करने को मजबूर किया गया व प्रार्थी के मना करने पर जांच अधिकारी व शाखा प्रबन्धक सहित चार अधिकारियों द्वारा प्रार्थी को पीटा गया, जिसके लिये प्रार्थी ने उदयपुर न्यायालय में इस्तगासा भी प्रस्तुत किया, परन्तु वहां भी अधिकारियों के प्रभावशील होने के कारण प्रार्थी कोई कार्यवाही नहीं कर सका। जांच के आधार पर प्रार्थी को विपक्षी के आदेश दिनांक 26-10-99 द्वारा नौकरी से निकालने का दण्ड प्रस्तावित किया व आदेश दिनांक 20-11-99 द्वारा प्रार्थी को दिनांक 4-12-99 को क्षेत्रीय कार्यालय जयपुर में व्यक्तिगत सुनवाई हेतु बुलाया, जिस पर उसने इनिशियल व फाईन्डिंग की प्रति प्राप्त करने के लिये विपक्षी को आवेदन पत्र पेश किया, जो विपक्षी द्वारा दिनांक 4-12-99 को व्यक्तिगत रूप से देने पर नहीं लिया, तब प्रार्थी ने 4-12-99 को रजिस्टर्ड पोस्ट से विपक्षी को भेजा, इसके बावजूद प्रार्थी को विपक्षी के आदेश दिनांक 4-12-99 द्वारा आवश्यक रूप से सेवा निवृत्ति के दण्ड से दण्डित किया इस कार्यवाही में प्रार्थी को सुनवाई का युक्तियुक्त अवसर नहीं दिया, विपक्षी के गवाहान से जिरह करने का मौका नहीं दिया, गवाहान पेश करने का मौका नहीं दिया। प्रार्थी अंग्रेजी समझने में पूर्णतया असमर्थ है, इसके बावजूद सारी जांच अंग्रेजी में की गई। दण्ड दिये जाने के पूर्व दण्ड के प्रश्न पर सुनवाई का अवसर नहीं दिया गया। दण्ड क्वान्टम से अधिक होने से निरस्त किये जाने योग्य है। इसलिये प्रार्थना की है कि उसे सेवा निवृत्त किये जाने के दण्ड को अनुचित व अवैध घोषित किया जावे तथा सेवा निवृत्त किये जाने की दिनांक से निरन्तरता के साथ, समस्त वेतन-भत्ते, सेवा लाभ आदि के साथ सेवा में लिये जाने का आदेश दिलाया जावे।

विपक्षी ने अपने जवाब में यह अंकित किया है कि प्रार्थी रामलाल शुरु से अंशकालीन सफाई कर्मचारी था और 18-10-96

के आदेश से पूर्ण कालिक सफाई कर्मचारी की तरह नियुक्त था। प्रार्थी के वेतनमान आदि के बारे में दिनांक 28-10-96 को आदेश जारी किये गये। प्रार्थी हमेशा अनुसूचित जाति का सदस्य होने की धमकी देकर बैंक के कर्मचारियों व अधिकारियों को डरा-धमका कर उनसे नाजायज लाभ प्राप्त करने के लिये तत्पर रहता। प्रार्थी ने झूठे आरोप लगा कर बैंक के अधिकारियों व कर्मचारियों को जलील व परेशान किया। प्रार्थी का मूल उद्देश्य यह रहा था कि वह बिना काम के एवं बिना हाजरी दिये अपनी तनख्वाह प्राप्त करें। काम बताने वाले को प्रार्थी अनुसूचित जाति का सदस्य होने की धमकी देकर उसका काम नहीं कर उसे जलील व परेशान करता। प्रार्थी की ओर से झूठी शिकायत प्रधानमंत्री, भारत सरकार को की गई। यह अपने आप में दुराचरण था, फिर भी विपक्षी ने इसकी जांच करवाई व जांच में प्रार्थी की शिकायत को झूठा पाया गया। प्रार्थी ने पुलिस स्टेशन, सूरजपोल पर बैंक के अधिकारियों के खिलाफ एक झूठा मुकदमा दर्ज कराया, वह भी अनुसूचित जाति एवं जनजाति अत्याचार निवारण के तहत होकर एफ.आई.आर. सं. 282/1996 है। पुलिस अन्वेषण के पश्चात् यह मुकदमा झूठा व मिथ्या पाया गया। प्रार्थी के विरुद्ध बैंक द्वारा जो जांच करायी गयी वह सम्पूर्ण रूप से प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धान्तों के तहत करवायी गयी और प्रार्थी को अपने बचाव का पूर्ण अवसर प्रदान किया। जांच में जो भी कार्यवाही की गई वह प्रार्थी को पूर्ण रूपेण समझा कर की गई और प्रार्थी ने आज तक इस बारे में कभी भी जांच अधिकारी के समक्ष इस बात की शिकायत नहीं की कि उसने कार्यवाही को गलत समझ कर हस्ताक्षर किये हैं। प्रार्थी को दण्ड के प्रश्न पर सुनने के लिये समुचित अवसर दिया गया और वह जान बूझ कर उपस्थित नहीं हुआ, इसलिए जो आदेश दिये गये वे उचित एवं वैध हैं। प्रार्थी का सेवकाल अच्छा नहीं रहा तथा वह बैंक के अधिकारियों व कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ शिकायतें करने का आदि रहा है एवं अपने अनुसूचित जनजाति का सदस्य होने का गलत तरीके से लाभ उठाने का असफल प्रयत्न करता रहा। इसलिए क्लेम प्रार्थना पत्र खारिज किये जाने का निवेदन किया। विपक्षी ने अपने जवाब के विशेष उत्तर में अंकित किया कि जांच पूर्णतया प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धान्तों की पालना करते हुए की गई, इसके बावजूद यदि न्यायालय इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुंचे कि की गई जांच में कोई कमी है तो विपक्षी बैंक प्रार्थी पर लगाये गये आरोपों को न्यायालय में साबित करने के लिये तैयार है।

पूर्व में घरेलू जांच की फेयरनेस पर बहस सुनी गई और दिनांक 17-5-07 आदेश पारित कर प्रार्थी के विरुद्ध की गई घरेलू जांच को फेयर घोषित किया गया। इसके पश्चात् प्रार्थी को दिये गये दण्ड के प्रश्न पर दोनों पक्षों की बहस सुनी गई।

प्रार्थी को विपक्षी ने दिनांक 4-12-99 को प्रार्थी पर लगे आरोप में अनिवार्य सेवा निवृत्त करने का दण्ड दिया गया। प्रार्थी पर ये आरोप था कि उसने विपक्षीगण के विरुद्ध झूठी शिकायत प्रधानमंत्री भारत सरकार एवं अन्य को की जिससे विपक्षीगण तंग व परेशान हुए और विपक्षीगण की प्रतिष्ठा गिरी।

प्रार्थी के प्रतिनिधि ने अपने तर्कों के समर्थन में निम्नांकित न्यायिक निर्णय प्रस्तुत किये हैं :-

(1) III एल.एल.जे. (सप्ली.) कर्नाटक पेज 252

(2) III एल.एल.जे. (सप्ली.) इलाहाबाद पेज 79।

विपक्षी के प्रतिनिधि ने अपने तर्कों के समर्थन में निम्नांकित न्यायिक निर्णय प्रस्तुत किये हैं :-

- (1) 1994 (2) डब्ल्यू.एल.सी. (राज.) पेज 340 (डी.बी.)
- (2) 1993 (2) डब्ल्यू.एल.सी. (राज.) पेज 202 (डी.बी.)
- (3) 1999 एल.आई.सी. पेज 1224 (राज.)
- (4) 1999 एल.आई.सी. पेज 1493 (कर्नाटक)
- (5) 2003 (T) सी.एल.आर. पेज 825 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट)
- (6) 2006 एल.एल.आर. पेज 657 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट)
- (7) 2005 (T) सी.एल.एल.आर. पेज 959 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट)
- (8) 1998 (TT) सी.एल.आर. पेज 1070 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट)
- (9) 1998 एल.एल.आर. पेज 356 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट)
- (10) ए.आई.आर. 1998 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट) पेज 2713
- (11) 1997(77) एफ.एल.आर. पेज 170 (इलाहाबाद)

मैंने दोनों पक्षों की ओर से प्रस्तुत न्यायिक निर्णयों का सम्मान के साथ अवलोकन किया तथा इस प्रकरण की पत्रावली का पुनः सावधानी पूर्वक अवलोकन किया।

अब पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध मौखिक एवं दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य का अवलोकन किया तथा प्रचलित विधि एवं प्रस्तुत न्यायिक निर्णयों के आधार पर इस प्रकरण के सम्बन्ध में मेरा निर्णय इस प्रकार है -

प्रार्थी प्रतिनिधि ने अपने तर्कों में यह बताया है कि प्रार्थी को जानबूझ कर तंग व परेशान कर अनिवार्य सेवा निवृत्त किया है जो अनफेयर लेबर प्रैक्टिस की तारीफ में आता है। लेकिन प्रार्थी ने ऐसा कथन अपने द्वारा प्रस्तुत क्लेम आवेदन पत्र में नहीं किया है। प्रार्थी अनुसूचित जाति का था और इस कारण उसने जानबूझ कर विपक्षीगण को तंग व परेशान किया, ऐसा साक्ष्य रेकार्ड पर नहीं है।

प्रार्थी प्रतिनिधि का दूसरा तर्क यह है कि प्रार्थी के द्वारा किया गया कृत्य दुराचरण (मिस कन्डक्ट) नहीं है। प्रार्थी पर दुराचरण करने का आरोप लगाया है उसकी विधिवत् रूप से घरेलू जांच हुई है, उस जांच में प्रार्थी को सुनवाई का समुचित अवसर प्रदान किया गया है। प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धान्तों की पालना की गई, नियम व विधि के अनुसार प्रक्रिया अपना कर प्रार्थी को दुराचरण के आरोप का दोषी ठहराया है। अतः प्रार्थी प्रतिनिधि का यह कथन स्वीकार करने योग्य नहीं है।

प्रार्थी के विरुद्ध घरेलू जांच करने हेतु जांच अधिकारी नियुक्त किया गया है। जांच नियम एवं विधि के अनुसार निर्धारित प्रक्रिया अपना कर सम्पादित की है। जांच रिकार्ड पर तैयार की गई और उसके आधार पर प्रार्थी को विपक्षीगण ने दण्ड दिया है जो दण्ड उचित है। प्रार्थी का यह कथन है कि प्रार्थी के कृत्य के अनुपात में प्रार्थी को अधिक दण्ड दिया गया है, इस कारण नरमी बरती जाये। मैंने इस तर्क पर गौर किया तथा प्रार्थी द्वारा किये गये कृत्य पर विचार किया। प्रार्थी द्वारा किया गया कृत्य गम्भीर है। प्रार्थी ने विभाग के उच्च अधिकारियों की शिकायत प्रधानमंत्री तक की है जो शिकायत जांच से

झूठी पाई गई तथा उचित माध्यम द्वारा शिकायत न कर सीधी शिकायत प्रधानमंत्री को भिजवाई है जो अनुशासनहीनता की तारीफ में आता है। प्रार्थी ने विपक्षीगण के विरुद्ध कोर्ट में इस्तगसा भी प्रस्तुत किया और इस सम्बन्ध में पुलिस में भी कार्यवाही की गई। एक अधीनस्थ कर्मचारी द्वारा विभाग के उच्च अधिकारियों के विरुद्ध इस प्रकार की कार्यवाही करना हर प्रकार से अनुचित है जो अनुशासनहीनता है। ऐसे व्यक्ति सेवा में बने रहने के अधिकारी नहीं रह सकते। प्रार्थी को घरेलू जांच के माध्यम से जो दण्ड दिया गया है वह दण्ड प्रार्थी द्वारा किये गये कृत्य के अनुसरण में उचित एवं वैध है, जिसमें इस न्यायालय द्वारा हस्तक्षेप करने की आवश्यकता नजर नहीं आती है।

अनुशासनिक प्राधिकारी जांच अधिकारी भी हो सकता है, अगर नियम व विधि में प्रावधान है। इस प्रकरण में भी जांच अधिकारी अनुशासनिक प्राधिकारी भी है। अतः जो घरेलू जांच की गई है और उसके आधार पर प्रार्थी को जो दण्ड दिया गया है वह दण्ड उचित एवं वैध है।

प्रार्थी के प्रतिनिधि ने अपने तर्कों के समर्थन में जो न्यायिक निर्णय प्रस्तुत किये हैं उन न्यायिक निर्णयों में वर्णित तथ्य एवं परिस्थितियाँ इस वर्तमान प्रकरण के तथ्यों एवं परिस्थितियों से मेल नहीं खाती हैं, इसलिये उक्त दोनों न्यायिक निर्णय इस प्रकरण पर लागू नहीं होते हैं। जबकि विपक्षी प्रतिनिधि ने जो न्यायिक निर्णय अपने तर्कों के समर्थन में प्रस्तुत किये हैं, उनमें से अधिकांश न्यायिक निर्णय के तथ्य एवं परिस्थितियाँ इस वर्तमान प्रकरण के तथ्यों एवं परिस्थितियों से मेल खाती हैं, इस कारण वो न्यायिक निर्णय इस प्रकरण पर लागू होते हैं।

परिणामस्वरूप इन हालात में प्रार्थी को विपक्षीगण ने घरेलू जांच सम्पादित कर अनिवार्य सेवा निवृत्त करने का दिनांक 4-12-99 को जो आदेश पारित किया है, उस आदेश में वर्णित दण्ड उचित एवं वैध है। इसलिये प्रार्थी रामलाल कोई राहत पाने का अधिकारी नहीं है।

अतः भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय के आदेश दिनांक 12-10-2000 को उत्तरित करते हुए पंचाट इस प्रकार पारित किया जाता है कि - विपक्षी यूनियन बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के आदेश दिनांक 4-12-99 के अनुसार प्रार्थी श्री रामलाल हरिजन को अनिवार्य सेवा निवृत्ति का दण्ड दिया गया है वह उचित एवं वैध है। अतः प्रार्थी कोई राहत एवं राशि प्राप्त करने का अधिकारी नहीं है।

पंचाट आज दिनांक 28-06-2007 को खुले न्यायालय में लिखाया जाकर सुनाया गया।

हरमुखराम पूनिया, पीठासीन अधिकारी

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2830.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार कॉरपोरेशन बैंक के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, अहमदाबाद के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या

944/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/100/93-आईआर(बी-II)]

राजिन्द्र कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2830.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 944/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Ahmedabad as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of Corporation Bank and their workman, received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/100/93-IR(B-II)]

RAJINDER KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT AT
AHMEDABAD**

PRESENT

Shri A. A. LAD, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute (Reference C.G.I.T.A.) No. 944/04
Old I.T.C. 9/93

Regional Manager
Corporation Bank
Navrangpura
Ahmedabad-380 009

.....First Party

V/s.

President
Gujarat Bank Workers Union
8, Jagmat Cross
Rajkot

.....Second Party

APPEARANCE

First Party : (Absent)
Second Party : Shri P.S. Vasavada

AWARD

1. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment by its Order No. L-12012/100/93/IR(B-II) dated 01-09-1993 in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 have referred the following dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication :

“Whether the action of the management of Corporation Bank, Regional Office, Ahmedabad for not considering the case of Shri P.R. Chauhan a part-time employee for absorption as full time employee is justified? if not, to what relief the employee is entitled to?”

2. In support that second party filed statement of claim by Ex. 5 which was replied by first party by filing written statement by Ex. 7.

3. Meanwhile second party arrived to withdraw and by purshis by Ex. 13 he prayer to take this reference on board and decide.

Accordingly today reference is taken on board. Second party by his purshis Ex. 13 presented in Secretary Gujarat Bank Work's Union with Advocate prayed to disposed off the reference. Hence I hereby pass the following order.

ORDER

In view Ex. 13 the reference is disposed off. No costs.

Dated : 25-6-2007

Ahmedabad

A. A. LAD, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2831.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार इलाहाबाद बैंक के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय नं.-1, चंडीगढ़ के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 145/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/224/2003-आईआर(बी-II)]

राजिन्द्र कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2831.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 145/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, No. 1, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of Allahabad Bank and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/224/2003-IR(B-II)]

RAJINDER KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**BEFORE SHRI RAJESH KUMAR, PRESIDING OFFICER,
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-
CUM-LABOUR COURT-1, CHANDIGARH**

Case No I.D 145/2004

Sh. Dilbagh Singh C/o Sh. J.G.Verma. H. No. 3030/1,
Sector 44-D, Chandigarh.

Applicant

Versus

The Regional Manager, Allahabad Bank, Regional Office,
Jalandhar (Punjab)- 144001

Respondent

APPEARANCES

For the workmen : None
 For the management : Shri I. P. Singh with Basant Lal

AWARD

Passed on 7-8-2007

Central Govt. vide notification No. L-12012/224/2003-IR (B-II) dated 10-3-2004 has referred the following dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication :—

“Whether the action of the management of Allahabad Bank, Jalandhar in imposing the punishment of removal from service on Shri Dilbagh Singh, Ex-Head cashier w.e.f. 19-7-2001 by way of compulsory retirement on the allegation of misappropriation of Rs. 92,000 is illegal and unjustified? If so, what relief the concerned workman is entitled to and from which date?”

2. Case repeatedly called. None appeared for the workman. Awaited upto 3 P.M. Sh. I.P. Singh advocate for the management request for closing the case as on the last date of hearing also none appeared for the workman. I have found that on the last date proxy advocate appeared and on the last to last date i.e. 19-3-07 none appeared and last opportunity was given. It appears that workman is not interested to pursue with the present reference as for the last many dates none has appearing on behalf of the workman. In view of the above since none is appearing on behalf of the workman, there is no useful purpose will be served in keeping this reference pending, therefore, the same is returned to the Central Govt. for want of prosecution. Central Govt. be informed. File be consigned to record. Chandigarh : 7-8-2007.

RAJESH KUMAR, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2832.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार दी न्यू इंडिया इश्योरेंस कम्पनी लि., के प्रबंधन के संबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में औद्योगिक अधिकरण, उदयपुर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 7/2003) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-17012/9/2003-आईआर(बी-1)]
 अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2832.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 07/2003) of the Industrial Tribunal, Udaipur, as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of The New India Insurance Company Ltd.,

and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-17012/9/2003-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

अनुबन्ध

औद्योगिक विवाद अधिकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, उदयपुर
 (राज.) पीठासीन अधिकारी-श्री हरसुखराम पूनिया,
 आर. एच. जे. एस.

प्रकरण सं. 7/03 आई.टी.आर.

श्री बाबूसिंह पिता नबलसिंह राजपूत,

निवासी गांव वरडा, तहसील गिर्वा, जिला उदयपुर

...प्राथी

विरुद्ध

1. श्रीमान् प्रादेशिक उप प्रबन्धक, प्रादेशिक कार्यालय,
 दी न्यू इण्डिया इश्योरेंस कम्पनी लि.,
 नेहरू प्लेस, द्वितीय भवन, टॉक रोड, जयपुर
2. श्री शाखा प्रबन्धक,
 दी न्यू इण्डिया इश्योरेंस कम्पनी लि.,
 3-बापू बाजार, उदयपुर
3. श्री मण्डल प्रबन्धक, मण्डल कार्यालय,
 दी न्यू इण्डिया इश्योरेंस कम्पनी लि.,
 3- बापू बाजार, उदयपुर

...विपक्षीगण

उपस्थित :

प्राथी की ओर से : श्री राजेश सिंघवी,

विपक्षीगण की ओर से : श्री परमेश्वर पोरवाल

पंचाट

दिनांक 24 मई, 2007

भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय, न्यू देहली द्वारा दिनांक 8 मई, 2003 को आदेश संख्या एल./17012/9/2003-आई आर (बी-आई) से इस आशय की अधिसूचना इस मंत्रालय को अधिनिर्णय हेतु प्रेषित की गई :—

Whether the action of the management of the New India Insurance Company Ltd., in terminating the services of Shri Babu Singh S/o. Shri Nawal Singh w.e.f. 7-12-95 is legal and justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?”

उक्त आशय का प्रसंग प्राप्त होने पर न्यायालय द्वारा दिनांक 16-6-2003 को नियमित श्रम वाद संख्या 7/03 दर्ज रजिस्टर किया जाकर पक्षकारान को नोटिस जारी किए गए। जिस पर प्राथी की ओर से कलेम व विपक्षीगण की ओर से जवाब पेश किया गया।

प्राथी की ओर से प्रस्तुत कलेम के तथ्य संक्षेप में इस प्रकार है कि प्राथी को विपक्षी संख्या एक दिनांक 15-5-91 के आदेश से

दिनांक 24-5-91 से 16-8-91 तक अस्थायी पानी वाले के पद पर विपक्षी संख्या 2-3 के अधीन नियुक्त किया। उसके पश्चात् विपक्षी सं. एक के आदेश दिनांक 20-4-92 द्वारा दिनांक 1-5-92 से 24-7-92 तक आदेश दिनांक 14-8-93 से द्वारा 7-6-93 से 30-8-93 तक अस्थायी पानी वाले के पद पर प्रार्थी को विपक्षी सं. 2-3 के अधीन नियुक्ति जारी की, लेकिन विपक्षीगण द्वारा प्रार्थी सं. दिनांक 24-5-91 से 6-12-95 तक लगातार बिना किसी गेप के चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर कार्य लिया गया। विपक्षीगण द्वारा प्रार्थी को नियुक्ति आदेश के तहत किए गए कार्य के दौरान नियमित वेतन श्रृंखला के हिसाब से वेतन राशि का भुगतान किया गया, लेकिन अन्य दिनों का प्रार्थी को न्यूनतम वेतन अनुसार मनमर्जी से राशि का भुगतान किया जाता था। विपक्षीगण ने प्रार्थी को दिनांक 7-12-95 को बिना कोई कारण बताए मौखिक आदेश से सेवा पृथक कर दिया और उसके स्थान पर जनवरी, 96 में नए कर्मचारी को भर्ती कर लिया प्रार्थी को दिनांक 7-12-95 को सेवा पृथक करने से पूर्व विपक्षी ने कोई आरोप पत्र, चेतावनी पत्र नहीं दिया, कोई नोटिस या नोटिस पे आदि भी नहीं दिए। प्रार्थी ने विपक्षीगण के अधीन नियोजन के दौरान प्रत्येक वार्षिक काल में 240 दिन से अधिक कार्य दिवस पर उपस्थित होकर अपनी सेवाएं विपक्षी संस्थान को अर्पित की है। विपक्षीगण द्वारा प्रार्थी को इस तरह सेवा पृथक करना अनुचित श्रम व्यवहार है व प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धान्तों के विरुद्ध है। इसलिए प्रार्थना की है कि दिनांक 7-12-95 को की गई सेवा मुक्ति को अनुचित व अवैध घोषित किया जावे प्रार्थी को तत्काल सेवा में बहाल कराया जावे व सेवा पृथक दिनांक से पुनः बहाली तककी अवधि के सम्पूर्ण वेतन व अन्य लाभ दिलाए जावे।

विपक्षीगण ने अपने जबाब में ये प्रारम्भिक आपत्तियां ली हैं कि विपक्षी संख्या एक ने दिनांक 15-5-91 अथवा किसी भी अन्य दिवस को स्थायी अथवा अस्थायी पानी वाला के पद पर किसी भी अवधि के लिए प्रार्थी को विपक्षी सं. 2, 3 के अधीन नियुक्त नहीं किया। प्रार्थी को अंशकालीन एवं अस्थायी रूप से केवल मात्र कुछ दिनों के लिए पानी भरने को दैनिक मजदूरी पर रखा। पानी वाले अथवा वाटर ब्यू का न तो कोई पद था न किसी को नियुक्त किया। प्रार्थी दैनिक मजदूर अस्थायी अंशकालीन था तथा प्रार्थी स्वयं ने आना बन्द कर दिया। प्रार्थी एवं विपक्षीगण के मध्य कोई भी सेवा संविदा किसी भी सेवा अवधि के लिए नहीं रही। प्रार्थी को कभी भी सेवा में रखा ही नहीं गया तो उसे सेवा से पृथक करने का कोई प्रश्न नहीं था। प्रार्थी ने केवल मात्र विपक्षीगण से अवैध रूप से लाभ प्राप्त करने के उद्देश्य से यह क्लेम प्रस्तुत किया है। प्रार्थी ने 240 दिन से अधिक कार्य दिवस पर कार्य करना अंकित किया जो नितान्त मिथ्या है। प्रार्थी दिनांक 24-5-91 से 6-12-95 तक की कथित अवधि में कथित वेतनश्रृंखला में कभी भी विपक्षी बीमा कम्पनी में चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी का कार्य करने हेतु कार्यरत नहीं था।

विपक्षीगण ने अपने जबाब में मदवार उत्तर में भी प्रार्थना पत्र में वर्णित तथ्य गलत, आधारहीन एवं झूठे होना बताया है तथा यह अंकित किया है कि प्रार्थना पत्र में अंकित दिनांक व आदेश से विपक्षी के अधीन नियुक्त करने के तमाम तथ्य प्रार्थी ने मिथ्या अंकित किए

हैं। प्रार्थी से विपक्षी ने दिनांक 24-5-91 से 6-12-95 तक लगातार चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद का कार्य लेने के तथ्य को भी गलत होना बताया है। जब प्रार्थी विपक्षी के अधीन सेवा में ही नहीं था तो उसे दिनांक 7-12-95 को सेवा से पृथक करने का कोई प्रश्न ही नहीं था। जब प्रार्थी सेवा में ही नहीं था तो उसे कोई आरोप पत्र, चेतावनी पत्र, नोटिस, नोटिस पे आदि देने का प्रश्न ही नहीं था। प्रार्थी ने विपक्षी बीमा कम्पनी के कार्यालय में कभी भी 240 दिन या उससे अधिक अवधि तक कार्य नहीं किया। प्रार्थी झूठे तथ्यों के आधार पर सदोष लाभ प्राप्त करना चाहता है। इसलिए प्रार्थी का प्रार्थना पत्र भारी खर्चे करने पर खारिज किए जाने की प्रार्थना की है।

प्रार्थी की ओर से अपने क्लेम के समर्थन में स्वयं का शपथ पत्र पेश दिया जिससे विपक्षी प्रतिनिधि ने जिरह की। विपक्षी की ओर से श्री बी. डी. मीणा का शपथ पत्र पेश हुआ जिससे प्रार्थी प्रतिनिधि ने जिरह की। दोनों पक्षों ने संबंधित दस्तावेज को प्रदर्शित कराया है।

पक्षकारों के प्रतिनिधियों की मौखिक बहस विस्तार से सुनी गई। पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया गया। प्रार्थी प्रतिनिधि ने अपने तर्कों के समर्थ में डब्ल्यू एल सी (राज.) यू. सी. 2006 पेज 525 का न्यायिक निर्णय प्रस्तुत किया है। जबकि विपक्षी प्रतिनिधि ने अपने तर्कों के समर्थन में आर एल आर 2003 (1) पेज 30 व 1 (2006) ए सी सी पेज 56 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट) के न्यायिक निर्णय प्रस्तुत किए हैं।

मैंने प्रस्तुत न्यायिक निर्णयों का सम्मान के साथ अवलोकन किया।

रेकार्ड पर उपलब्ध मौखिक एवं दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य के अवलोकन करने प्रचालित विधि का अध्ययन करने एवं प्रस्तुत न्यायिक निर्णयों का अवलोकन करने के आधार पर इस प्रकरण के सम्बन्ध में मेरा निर्णय इस प्रकार है :-

प्रार्थी बाबुसिंह की ओर से प्रदर्श 4 से प्रदर्श-212 तक दस्तावेज प्रस्तुत किये गए हैं। जिन सभी का मैंने अवलोकन किया। इन दस्तावेज के अवलोकन करने से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि प्रार्थी विपक्षी के अधीन चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर नियमित पद पर कभी भी नियुक्त नहीं रहा है, बल्कि उसे आकस्मिक एवं अंशकालीन कार्य हेतु कार्य के अनुरूप दैनिक मजदूरी पर रखा गया था, जो कार्य नियमित नहीं होकर आवश्यकता अनुसार था। चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर नियमित नियुक्ति पाने वाला कर्मचारी विपक्षी कार्यालय में प्रत्येक कार्य के अलग-अलग पैसे व मजदूरी प्राप्त नहीं करता, बल्कि उसे नियमित वेतन श्रृंखला के अनुरूप माह के अन्त में वेतन का भुगतान किया जाता है। जबकि प्रार्थी ने प्रत्येक छोटे बड़े कार्य के एवज में अलग-अलग भुगतान प्राप्त किया है।

प्रार्थी को चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर नियमित नियुक्ति दी गई हो ऐसा कोई सबूत रेकार्ड पर नहीं है। विपक्षी संस्थान में प्रार्थी की अन्य कर्मचारी के साथ हाजरी भी दर्ज नहीं है, जबकि नियमित कर्मचारी की उपस्थिति हाजरी रजिस्टर में दर्ज होती है। प्रार्थी को प्रति

माह का नियमित रूप से कभी भी भुगतान नहीं किया गया है। प्रार्थी को अवकाश के दिन की भी मजदूरी या मजदूरी राशि नहीं दी गई। इसका सीधा अर्थ यही है कि प्रार्थी को स्थाई अथवा अस्थायी नियुक्ति नहीं दी। विधिवत् नियुक्ति के लिये निर्धारित प्रक्रिया अपनाई जाती है, लेकिन ऐसी कोई प्रक्रिया अपना कर प्रार्थी को विपक्षी ने नियुक्ति नहीं दी। प्रार्थी ने वर्ष 1991 से 1994 तक लगातार चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर विपक्षी के अधीन कार्य करना बताया गया है, जबकि रिकार्ड पर उपलब्ध मौखिक एवं दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य से यह किसी भी रूप में प्रमाणित नहीं हो पाया है।

प्रार्थी ने सर्वप्रथम माननीय राजस्थान उच्च न्यायालय में पिटीशन दर्ज की इससे पूर्व विपक्षी संस्थान में इस प्रकार का कोई आवेदन प्रस्तुत कर यह जाहिर नहीं किया कि वह करीब चार वर्ष से चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर नियुक्त है। प्रार्थी ने विपक्षी के अधीन चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर नियमित रूप से कार्य किया हो, इस तथ्य को साबित करने का भार प्रार्थी पर है, लेकिन प्रार्थी इस तथ्य को साबित करने में पूरी तरह असफल रहा है। प्रार्थी ने अंशकालिन एवं आकस्मिक श्रमिक के रूप में विपक्षी के यहां यदा-कदा आवश्यकता अनुसार कार्य किया है। प्रार्थी के ऐसे कार्य का विपक्षी संस्थान ने भुगतान किया है। इस प्रकार का श्रमिक विपक्षी के यहां नियमित नियुक्ति पाने का अधिकारी नहीं हो सकता है। ऐसा श्रमिक किसी भी राहत एवं राशि को प्राप्त करने का अधिकारी नहीं है, ऐसे श्रमिक के लिये औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम के प्रावधान भी लागू नहीं होते हैं। प्रार्थी जब विपक्षी के यहां सेवा में किसी भी पद पर कार्यरत नहीं था तो फिर ऐसे श्रमिक को विपक्षी द्वारा सेवा से पृथक करने का प्रश्न ही उत्पन्न नहीं होता है। प्रार्थी ने विपक्षी के अधीन किसी भी कलेण्डर वर्ष में 240 दिन अथवा उससे अधिक अवधि तक कार्य नहीं किया। इस कारण भी प्रार्थी किसी भी प्रकार की राहत प्राप्त करने का अधिकारी नहीं है।

परिणाम स्वरूप इन उपरोक्त हालात में प्रार्थी बाबू सिंह ने विपक्षी के अधीन केवल अंशकालीन व आकस्मिक श्रमिक के रूप में यदा-कदा कार्य किया है, जिस कार्य के एवज में उसे भुगतान कर दिया गया है। प्रार्थी विपक्षी के अधीन चतुर्थ श्रेणी कर्मचारी के पद पर नियुक्त नहीं रहा। ऐसा श्रमिक विपक्षी से किसी भी प्रकार की राहत व राशि प्राप्त करने का अधिकारी नहीं हो सकता है। इस कारण प्रार्थी का क्लेम स्वीकार करने योग्य नहीं है।

अतः भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय द्वारा प्रेषित विवाद को उत्तरित करते हुए पंचाट इस प्रकार पारित किया जाता है कि विपक्षी न्यू इण्डिया इन्श्योरेंस कम्पनी लि. द्वारा प्रार्थी बाबू सिंह पिता नवल सिंह को दिनांक 7-12-95 को सेवा पृथक किया जाना प्रमाणित नहीं है। अतः प्रार्थी श्रमिक कोई राहत एवं राशि प्राप्त करने का अधिकारी नहीं है।

पंचाट आज दिनांक 24-5-2007 को खुले न्यायालय में लिखाया जाकर सुनाया गया।

हरसुखराम पूनिया, पीठासीन अधिकारी

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2833.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ बीकानेर एंड जयपुर के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में औद्योगिक अधिकरण उदयपुर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 2/2002) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/214/2001-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2833.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 2/2002) of the Industrial Tribunal Udaipur as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/214/2001-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

अनुबन्ध

औद्योगिक विवाद अधिकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, उदयपुर
(राज.) पीठासीन अधिकारी-श्री हरसुख पूनिया,
आर.एच. जे. एस.,

प्रकरण सं. 2/2002 श्रम वाद

अखिल भारतीय स्टेट बैंक ऑफ बीकानेर एण्ड
जयपुर कर्मचारी संघ, द्वारा एस.बी.बी.जे.
सुराणा मार्केट, पाली-मारवाड़

—प्रार्थी

विरुद्ध

श्री सहायक प्रबन्धक-1
स्टेट बैंक ऑफ बीकानेर एण्ड जयपुर,
अंचल कार्यालय, 6 न्यू पतेहपुरा,
उदयपुर

—विपक्षी

उपस्थित :

प्रार्थी की ओर से : श्री प्रदीप पालीवाल,

विपक्षी की ओर से : श्री सी.पी. शर्मा

पंचाट

दिनांक 16 मई, 2007

भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय, द्वारा अपने आदेश संख्या
एल-12012/214/2001-आई आर (बी-1) नई दिल्ली दिनांक
16-8-2001 के द्वारा निम्नलिखित अधिसूचना इस न्यायालय को
अधिनिर्णय हेतु प्रेषित की गई :

“Whether the action of the Management of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Udaipur in imposing penalty is withdrawal of Head Cashier Category ‘E’ allowance for one year is justified? If not, what relief the workman concern is entitled?”

उक्त अधिसूचना प्राप्त होने पर न्यायालय द्वारा दिनांक 29-1-2002 को नियमित श्रम वाद संख्या 2/2002 दर्ज रजिस्टर किया जाकर पक्षकारान को नोटिस जारी किए गए। जिस पर प्रार्थी की ओर से क्लेम व विपक्षी की ओर से जबाब पेश किया गया।

प्रार्थी की ओर से प्रस्तुत क्लेम के तथ्य संक्षेप में इस प्रकार है कि प्रार्थी कर्मचारी संघ एक पंजीकृत व्यावसायिक संघ है तथा विपक्षी संस्थान में नियोजित कर्मचारियों का प्रतिनिधित्व करता है एवं उनकी ओर से विवाद प्रस्तुत करने हेतु पूर्णतया सक्षम एवं अधिकृत है। श्री भंवरलाल जोशी विपक्षी नियोजक की मावली शाखा में प्रधान रोकडिया कटेगरी ‘ई’ के पद पर कार्यरत था। सहायक महाप्रबन्धक-1, उदयपुर अंचल द्वारा भंवरलाल जोशी को उनके पत्र क्रमांक 118 दिनांक 28 अक्टूबर, 1998 को दिया जो प्रदर्श बी-5 के रूप में विभागीय जांच में अंकित है। आरोप पत्र में श्री जोशी को उत्तर देने के लिये तीन दिन का समय दिया, आरोप पत्र पूर्ण रूपेण अस्पष्टक, निरर्थक है तथा उसमें स्पष्ट समय, स्थान, घटना का सही उल्लेख नहीं है, न ही आरोप पत्र निर्धारित प्रारूप में दर्शाया गया है जिससे आरोपित कर्मचारी को अपने बचाव में प्रतिकूल प्रभाव पड़ा। मूल शिकायत प्रदर्श बी-1 के निरीक्षण के लिये निवेदन किये जाने पर भी उसका निरीक्षण नहीं कराया गया, जिसका विरोध भी पत्रावली पर दर्ज है। प्रदर्श बी-1 पर कांट-छांट की हुई है तथा शिकायत कर्ता के हस्ताक्षर अंकित नहीं है। घटना के सम्बन्ध में किसी प्रकार की प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट दर्ज नहीं कराई गई। शिकायत को अधिक विलम्ब से पेश करने के कारण डिले डिफेक्ट इक्विटी का सिद्धान्त लागू होता है। जांच अधिकारी द्वारा निष्पक्ष जांच नहीं की गई। जांच रिपोर्ट पूर्णतया पक्षपात पूर्ण है। जांच अधिकारी के पास जांच कार्यवाही के सामान्य सिद्धान्तों का प्रारम्भिक ज्ञान नहीं है। जांच के सामान्य सिद्धान्तों की अवहेलना की है। जांच अधिकारी ने बैंक की गवाही पर ही महत्व दिया है व निर्भर किया एवं उसी आधार पर जांच रिपोर्ट तैयार की। बचाव पक्ष के समस्त गवाहों की छह महत्वपूर्ण साक्ष्य पर कतई ध्यान नहीं दिया। अनुशासनिक प्राधिकारी द्वारा दण्ड प्रस्तावित करते समय व्यक्तिगत सुनवाई का मौका आरोपित कर्मचारी को नहीं दिया। जिससे अनुशासनिक अधिकारी की निष्पक्षता संदेह के घेरे में आती है। इसलिये प्रार्थना की है कि बचाव पक्ष के तमाम गवाहों के बयानों के आधार पर बैंक द्वारा दिया गया आरोप पत्र क्रमांक 118 दिनांक 28 अक्टूबर, 1998 पूर्ण रूप से असत्य, निराधार एवं निरस्त योग्य है, अतः उसे निरस्त कर भंवरलाल जोशी के रोके गये विशेष भत्ते की भुगतान दण्डादेश की तारीख से भंवरलाल जोशी को कराने का अनुरोध जारी फरमावे।

विपक्षी ने अपने जबाब में यह अंकित किया है कि प्रार्थी किसी भी प्रकार से कानूनन मांग पत्र, आवेदन पत्र प्रस्तुत करने के लिये अधिकृत नहीं है। मांग पत्र, आवेदन पत्र पर न्यायाधिकरण को विवाद सुनने का अधिकार प्राप्त नहीं है। आरोप पत्र, जो दिया उस पर

श्री भंवरलाल जोशी को अपना पक्ष प्रस्तुत करने हेतु प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धान्तों को दृष्टिगत रखते हुए पूर्ण अवसर दिया गया व निष्पक्ष जांच की। भारत सरकार ने सजा की न्याय संगतता के बारे में रेपरेन्स न्याय निर्णयन हेतु किया है, परन्तु श्री जोशी ने अपना पक्ष प्रस्तुत करने हेतु कोई भी मांग पत्र प्रस्तुत नहीं किया है। अतः प्रार्थी यूनियन ने मांग पत्र, आवेदन पत्र में जो विभागीय जांच के लिए बिन्दू उठाये हैं, वे खारिज किये जाने योग्य हैं। विभागीय जांच पूर्ण अवसर पर प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धान्तों की पालना करते हुए की व जांच रिपोर्ट में उसे दोषी पाये जाने पर जांच रिपोर्ट श्री जोशी को दी गई, उस पर सुनवाई का मौका दिया जाकर प्रस्तावित दण्ड की प्रति देकर उस पर पुनः सुनवाई का मौका देकर द्विपक्षीय समझौते के अनुसार पूर्णतः उचित एवं वैध रूप से दण्डित किया गया। प्रार्थी ने उक्त आदेश के विरुद्ध अपील भी की थी, जिसे समुचित जांच करने के बाद अपीलीय अधिकारी ने श्री जोशी को दिया गया दण्ड यथावत रखा एवं भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय द्वारा भेजी गई सूची में यह बिन्दू न्याय निर्णयन हेतु नहीं है।

विपक्षी ने अपने जबाब के विशेष कथन में यह अंकित किया है कि श्री जोशी पूर्व में भी कदाचरण के आदि रहे हैं तथा उपस्थिति, समय-बद्धता, व्यवहार में संयम एवं शालीनता नहीं बरतने, उच्चाधिकारियों के आदेशों की अवहेलना करने बाबत चेतावनी के दण्ड से दण्डित किया गया है। अतः क्लेम निरस्त किये जाने की प्रार्थना की है।

पूर्व में पक्षकारों के प्रतिनिधियों की घरेलू जांच (डी.ई.) की फेयरनेस पर बहस सुनी जाकर इस न्यायालय के आदेश दिनांक 15-2-2007 के द्वारा प्रार्थी भंवरलाल जोशी के विरुद्ध की गई घरेलू जांच को फेयर घोषित किया गया था।

अब पक्षकारों के प्रतिनिधियों की प्रार्थी भंवरलाल जोशी को घरेलू जांच में दी गई सजा के बिन्दू पर विस्तार से बहस सुनी गई। पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया गया।

विपक्षी ने अपने तर्कों के समर्थन में 2006 (110) एफ.एल.आर. 452 सुप्रीम कोर्ट का न्यायिक निर्णय प्रस्तुत किया है, जिसका मैने सम्मान के साथ अवलोकन किया।

अब रेकार्ड पर उपलब्ध मौखिक एवं दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य, प्रचलित विधि एवं प्रस्तुत न्यायिक निर्णय के आधार पर इस प्रकरण के सम्बन्ध में मेरा निर्णय इस प्रकार है।

प्रार्थी के प्रतिनिधि ने अपनी बहस में यह बताया है कि प्रार्थी के विरुद्ध जो घरेलू जांच की गई है वह फेयर नहीं है, उसमें पक्षपात हुआ है, जबकि पूर्व में घरेलू जांच के फेयर होने या न होने बाबत दोनों पक्षों की बहस सुनी जाकर उस पर दिनांक 15-2-07 को आदेश पारित कर उस घरेलू जांच को फेयर घोषित किया जा चुका है। ऐसी स्थिति में अब इस स्टेज पर इस बिन्दू को उठाना और फिर उस पर अलग से आदेश पारित करने का कोई औचित्य नहीं है। अतः यह तर्क अस्वीकार किया जाता है।

दण्ड के प्रश्न पर सुना जाना है। प्रार्थी को दिया गया दण्ड उसके कृत्य के अनुपात में है अथवा अधिक है?

मैंने इस सम्बन्ध में पत्रावली का पूर्ण रुपेण अवलोकन किया है। प्रार्थी के प्रतिनिधि का यह तर्क रहा है कि प्रार्थी को प्रस्तावित दण्ड से अधिक दण्ड दिया गया है। मैंने प्रस्तावित दण्ड व दिये गये दण्ड दोनों का अवलोकन किया। प्रार्थी को दिया गया दण्ड उसे प्रस्तावित किये गये दण्ड से अधिक नहीं है। प्रार्थी पर जो आरोप लगाये गये हैं, जो आरोप घरेलू जांच में साबित हो चुके हैं, उसके अनुपात में दिया गया दण्ड अधिक न होकर उचित है। उस दिये गये दण्ड की प्रार्थी ने अपील भी की है, लेकिन दिये गये दण्ड को सही मान कर अपील खारिज की गई है।

परिणाम स्वरूप इन उपरोक्त हालात में प्रार्थी की ओर से प्रस्तुत क्लेम आवेदन पत्र स्वीकार करने योग्य नहीं है, प्रार्थी को दिया गया दण्ड उसके कृत्य के अनुपात में उचित है। अतः इसमें दखल देने का कोई उचित आधार नहीं है।

अतः भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय द्वारा प्रेषित विवाद को उत्तरित करते हुए पंचाट इस प्रकार पारित किया जाता है कि स्टेट बैंक ऑफ़ बीकानेर एण्ड जयपुर के प्रबन्धक द्वारा श्री भंवरलाल जोशी प्रधान रोकडिया के विशेष भत्ते रोके जाने का आदेश उचित है। अतः प्रार्थी कोई राहत एवं राशि प्राप्त करने का अधिकारी नहीं है।

पंचाट आज दिनांक 16-5-2007 को खुले न्यायालय में लिखाया जाकर सुनाया गया।

हरसुखराम पूनिया, पीठासीन अधिकारी

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2834.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ़ सौराष्ट्र के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण अहमदाबाद के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 1171/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/213/2000-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2834.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 1171/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal Ahmedabad as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of Saurashtra and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/213/2000-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, AHMEDABAD

PRESENT

Shri A. A. Lad, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute (Reference C.G.I.T.A.) No. 1171/04
(Old I. T. C. 10/2001)

The Dy. General Manager,
State Bank of Saurashtra,
Zonal Office Swami Vivekanand Road,
Post Box No. 7,
Rajkot (Gujarat) 360002

...First Party

V/s.

Shri Praful Kumar Mani Lal Vyas
C/o., Saurashtra Majoor Sangh,
3rd Floor Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,
Gujarat Bank Workers Union,
Rajkot (Gujarat)

...Second Party

APPEARANCE

First Party : (Absent)

Second Party : Shri M.C. Makwana

AWARD

1. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment by its Order No. L-12012/213/2000/IR (B-I) dated 26-4-2001 in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 have referred the following dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication :

“Whether the action of the management of State Bank of Saurashtra Zonal Office Rajkot in terminating the services of Shri P.M. Vyas, Peon at Upleta Branch w.e.f. 31-3-1997 is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?”

2. In support that second party filed statement of claim by Ex. 2, which was replied by First party by filing written statement by Ex. 5.

Meanwhile Second party arrived to withdrawal and by purshis by Ex. 17 he prayer to take this reference on board and decide.

Accordingly today reference is taken on board. Second party by his purshis Ex. 17 present with Advocate pyred to disposed off the reference. Hence I hereby pass the following order

ORDER

In view Ex. 17 the reference is disposed of. No order as to cost.

A. A. LAD, Presiding Officer

Date 25-6-2007
Ahmedabad

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2835.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ बीकानेर एंड जयपुर के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारियों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, उदयपुर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 03/2001) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-08-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/433/2000-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2835.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 03/2001) of the Industrial Tribunal, Udaipur, as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-08-2007.

[No. L-12012/433/2000-IR (B-1)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

अनुबंध

औद्योगिक विवाद अधिकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, (राज.)

पीठासीन अधिकारी—श्री हरसुखराम पूनिया,

आर. एच. जे. एस.

प्रकरण सं. 3/2001 श्रम वाद

अखिल भारतीय स्टेट बैंक आफ बीकानेर

एण्ड जयपुर कर्मचारी संघ,

द्वारा एस. बी. बी. जे.,

तुराना मार्केट, पाली मारवाड़

—प्रार्थी

विरुद्ध

श्री सहायक महाप्रबन्धक-1

स्टेट बैंक ऑफ बीकानेर एण्ड जयपुर

अंचल कार्यालय, 6 न्यू फतेहपुरा,

उदयपुर (राज.)

—विपक्षी

उपस्थित :-

प्रार्थी की ओर से : श्री प्रदीप पालीवाल,

विपक्षी की ओर से : श्री सी. पी. शर्मा

पंचाट

दिनांक 16 मई, 2007

भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय, श्रम शक्ति भवन, नई दिल्ली के आदेश क्रमांक एल.-12012/433/2000/आई आर-(बी-1) दिनांक 05-01-2001 के द्वारा निम्नलिखित अधिसूचना इस न्यायालय को अधिनिर्णय हेतु प्रेषित की गई :-

Whether the action of Assistant General Manager, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Udaipur in imposing

Penalty as "Permanent debarment of allowance of 'E' Category Head Cashier and 1 year debarment of 'E' Category Head Cashier Allowance" on Shri Bhanwar Lal Joshi, Head Cashier, S.B.B.J. Branch Mavli is Justified? If not what relief the concerned workmen is entitled to?

उक्त प्रसंग प्राप्त होने पर न्यायालय द्वारा दिनांक 01-05-2001 को नियमित श्रम वाद संख्या 03/01 दर्ज रजिस्टर किया गया तथा पक्षकारान को नोटिस जारी किये गये। जिस पर प्रार्थी की ओर से क्लेम व विपक्षी की ओर से जवाब पेश किया गया।

प्रार्थी की ओर से प्रस्तुत क्लेम के तथ्य संक्षेप में इस प्रकार हैं कि—प्रार्थी कर्मचारी संघ एक पंजीकृत व्यावसायिक संघ है, तथा विपक्षी संस्थान में नियोजित कर्मचारियों का प्रतिनिधित्व करता है एवं उनकी ओर से विवाद प्रस्तुत करने हेतु पूर्णतया सक्षम एवं अधिकृत है। भंवरलाल जोशी विपक्षी नियोजक की भावली शाखा में प्रधान रोकडिया कैटेगरी "ई" के पद पर कार्यरत था। सहायक महा-प्रबन्धक-1, उदयपुर अंचल द्वारा श्री भंवरलाल जोशी को उनके पत्र क्रमांक 118 दिनांक 28 अक्टूबर, 1998 को दिया जो प्रदर्श बी-5 के रूप में विभागीय जांच में अंकित है। आरोप पत्र में श्री जोशी को उत्तर देने के लिये तीन दिन का समय दिया, आरोप पत्र पूर्ण रूपेण अस्पष्ट, निरर्थक है तथा उसमें स्पष्ट समय, स्थान, घटना का सही उल्लेख नहीं है, न ही आरोप पत्र निर्धारित प्रारूप में दर्शाया गया है, जिससे आरोपित कर्मचारी को अपने बचाव में प्रतिकूल प्रभाव पड़ा। मूल शिकायत प्रदर्श बी-1 के निरीक्षण के लिये आवेदन किये जाने पर भी उसका निरीक्षण नहीं कराया गया, जिसका विरोध भी पत्रावली पर दर्ज है। प्रदर्श बी-1 पर कांट-छांट की हुई है तथा शिकायतकर्ता के हस्ताक्षर अंकित नहीं हैं। घटना के संबंध में किसी प्रकार की प्रथम सूचना रिपोर्ट दर्ज नहीं कराई। शिकायत को अधिक विलम्ब से पेश करने के कारण डिले डिफेक्ट इक्विटी का सिद्धान्त लागू होता है। जांच अधिकारी द्वारा निष्पक्ष जांच नहीं की गई। जांच रिपोर्ट पूर्णतया पक्षपात पूर्ण है। जांच अधिकारी के पास जांच कार्यवाही के सामान्य सिद्धान्तों का प्रारम्भिक ज्ञान नहीं है। जांच के सामान्य सिद्धान्तों की अवहेलना की है। जांच अधिकारी ने बैंक की गवाही पर ही महत्व दिया व निर्भर किया एवं उसी आधार पर जांच रिपोर्ट तैयार की। बचाव पक्ष के समस्त गवाहों की महत्वपूर्ण साक्ष्य पर कतई ध्यान नहीं दिया। अनुशासनिक प्राधिकारी द्वारा दण्ड प्र-वित करते समय व्यक्तिगत सुनवाई का मौका आरोपित कर्मचारी को नहीं दिया। जिससे अनुशासनिक प्राधिकारी की निष्पक्षता के घेरे में आती है। इसलिये प्रार्थना की है कि बचाव पक्ष के तमाम गवाहों के बयानों के आधार पर बैंक द्वारा दिया गया आरोप पत्र क्रमांक 118 दिनांक 28 अक्टूबर, 1998 पूर्ण रूपेण, असत्य, निराधार एवं निरस्त योग्य है। अतः उसे निरस्त कर श्री भंवरलाल जोशी के रोके गये विशेष भत्ते का भुगतान दण्डादेश की तारीख से भंवरलाल जोशी को कराने का अनुरोध जारी फरमावे।

विपक्षी ने अपने जवाब में यह अंकित किया है कि—प्रार्थी किसी भी प्रकार से कानूनन मांग पत्र, आवेदन पत्र, प्रस्तुत करने के लिये अधिकृत नहीं है। मांग पत्र आवेदन पत्र पर न्यायाधिकरण को

विवाद सुनने का अधिकार प्राप्त नहीं है। आरोप पत्र जो दिया उस पर श्री भंवरलाल जोशी को अपना पक्ष प्रस्तुत करने हेतु प्राकृतिक न्याय के सिद्धान्तों को दृष्टिगत रखते हुए पूर्ण अवसर दिया गया व निष्पक्ष जांच की। भारत सरकार ने सजा की न्याय संगतता के बारे में रेफरेन्स न्याय निर्णयन हेतु किया है, परन्तु श्री जोशी ने अपना पक्ष प्रस्तुत करने हेतु कोई भी मांग पत्र प्रस्तुत नहीं किया है। अतः प्रार्थी यूनिनयन ने मांग पत्र में तथा आवेदन में जो विभागीय जांच के लिये बिन्दु उठाये हैं, वे खारिज किये जाने योग्य हैं। विभागीय जांच पूर्ण अवसर प्रदान कर प्राकृतिक न्याय के नियमों की पालना करते हुए की व जांच रिपोर्ट में भंवरलाल जोशी को दोषी पाये जाने पर जांच रिपोर्ट श्री जोशी को दी गई, उस पर सुनवाई का मौका दिया जाकर प्रस्तावित दण्ड की प्रति देकर उस पर पुनः सुनवाई का मौका देकर द्विपक्षीय समझौते के अनुसार पूर्णतः उचित एवं वैध रूप से दण्डित किया गया। प्रार्थी ने उक्त आदेश के विरुद्ध अपील भी की थी, जिसे समुचित ढंग से जांच करने के बाद अपीलीय अधिकारी ने श्री जोशी को दिया गया दण्ड यथावत रखा एवं भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय द्वारा भेजी गई सूची में यह बिन्दू न्याय निर्णयन हेतु नहीं है।

विपक्षी ने अपने जवाब के विशेष कथन में यह भी अंकित किया है कि श्री भंवरलाल जोशी पूर्व में कदाचरण के आदि हैं तथा उन्हें, उपस्थिति, समयबद्धता, व्यवहार में संयम एवं शालीनता नहीं बरतने, उच्चाधिकारियों के आदेशों को अवहेलना आदि के बारे में उन्हें पूर्व में चेतावनी के दण्ड से दण्डित किया जा चुका है। अतः क्लेम निरस्त किये जाने की प्रार्थना की है।

पूर्व में पक्षकारों के प्रतिनिधियों की घरेलू जांच (डी.ई.) की फेयरनेस पर बहस सुनी जाकर इस न्यायालय के आदेश दिनांक 15-2-2007 द्वारा प्रार्थी भंवरलाल जोशी के विरुद्ध की गई घरेलू जांच को फेयर घोषित किया गया था।

अब पक्षकारों के प्रतिनिधियों की प्रार्थी को घरेलू जांच में दी गई सजा के बिन्दू पर विस्तार से बहस सुनी गई। पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया गया।

विपक्षी ने अपने तर्कों के समर्थन में 2006 (110) एफ.एल. आर. पेज 452 सुप्रीम कोर्ट का न्यायिक निर्णय प्रस्तुत किया है, जिसका मैंने सम्मान के साथ अवलोकन किया।

अब रिकार्ड पर उपलब्ध मौखिक एवं दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य, प्रचलित विधि एवं प्रस्तुत न्यायिक निर्णय के आधार पर इस प्रकरण के सम्बन्ध में मेरा निर्णय इस प्रकार है :—

प्रार्थी के प्रतिनिधि ने अपनी बहस में यह बताया है कि प्रार्थी के विरुद्ध जो घरेलू जांच की गई है, वह फेयर नहीं है, उसमें पक्षपात हुआ है, जबकि पूर्व में घरेलू जांच के फेयर होने या न होने बाबत दोनों पक्षों की बहस सुनी जाकर उस पर दिनांक 15-02-2007 को आदेश पारित कर उस घरेलू जांच को फेयर घोषित किया जा चुका है। ऐसी स्थिति में अब इस स्टेज पर इस बिन्दू को उठाना और फिर उस पर अलग से आदेश पारित करने का कोई औचित्य नहीं है। अतः यह तर्क अस्वीकार किया जाता है।

दण्ड के प्रश्न पर सुना जाना है। प्रार्थी को दिया गया दण्ड उसके कृत्य के अनुपात में है अथवा अधिक है।

मैंने इस सम्बन्ध में पत्रावली का पूर्ण रूपेण अवलोकन किया है। प्रार्थी के प्रतिनिधि का यह तर्क रहा है कि प्रार्थी को प्रस्तावित दण्ड से अधिक दण्ड दिया गया है। मैंने प्रस्तावित दण्ड व दिये गये दण्ड दोनों का अवलोकन किया। प्रार्थी को दिया गया दण्ड उसे प्रस्तावित किये गये दण्ड से अधिक नहीं है। प्रार्थी पर जो आरोप लगाये गये हैं, जो आरोप घरेलू जांच में साबित हो चुके हैं, उसके अनुपात में दिया गया दण्ड अधिक न होकर उचित है। उस दिये गये दण्ड की प्रार्थी ने अपील भी की है, लेकिन दिये गये दण्ड को सही मान कर अपील खारिज की गई है।

परिणामस्वरूप इन उपरोक्त हालात में प्रार्थी की ओर से प्रस्तुत क्लेम आवेदन पत्र स्वीकार करने योग्य नहीं है। प्रार्थी को दिया गया दण्ड उसके कृत्य के अनुपात में उचित है। अतः इसमें दखल देने का कोई उचित आधार नहीं है।

अतः भारत सरकार के श्रम मंत्रालय द्वारा प्रेषित विवाद को उत्तरित करते हुए पंचाट इस प्रकार पारित किया जाता है कि विपक्षी स्टेट बैंक ऑफ बीकानेर एण्ड जयपुर के महाप्रबन्धक द्वारा श्री भंवरलाल जोशी, प्रधान रोकडिया के विशेष भत्ते रोके जाने का आदेश उचित एवं वैध है। प्रार्थी भंवरलाल जोशी कोई राहत एवं राशि प्राप्त करने का अधिकारी नहीं है।

पंचाट आज दिनांक 16-05-2007 को खुले न्यायालय में लिखाया जाकर सुनाया गया।

हरसुखराम पूनिया, पीठासीन अधिकारी

नई दिल्ली, 29 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2836.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार बिहार स्टेट कोपरेटिव बैंक लि. के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, पटना के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 8सी/2007) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-08-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12011/22/2006-आईआर (बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 29th August, 2007

S.O. 2836.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 8C/2007) of the Industrial Tribunal, Patna as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd., and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 29-08-2007.

[No. L-12011/22/2006-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE
BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL, PATNA

Reference Case No. 8(C) of 2007

Between the management of the Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd., and their workman represented by the General Secretary, Bank Employees Federation Bihar, Saboo Complex, 2nd Floor, behind Hotel Republic, Exhibition Road, Patna.

For the management : Shri R. N. K. Sharma,
 Authorised Representative.

For the Workman : Shri B. Prasad, General
 Secretary, Bank Employees
 Federation, Bihar, Patna.

PRESENT

Vasudeo Ram, Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal,
 Patna.

AWARD

Patna, the 21st August, 2007

By adjudication Order No. L-12011/22/2006-IR(B-I) dated 14-3-2007 the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi under Clause (d) of Sub-Section (1) and Sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for brevity) has referred the dispute between the management of the Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. and their workmen represented by the General Secretary, Bank Employees Federation, Bihar to this Tribunal for adjudication on the following :

"Whether the action of the management of Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. in not considering the demands as raised by the Union vide their letter dated 12-12-2005 is legal or justified? If not, what relief the union/workmen entitled to?"

2. The parties appeared on notice and filed their respective statement of claim and the Written Statement. The contention of the workmen is that several posts are lying vacant under the management and the employees are not being promoted since 25 years back causing frustration among the employees. Secondly, in the past there has been two bi-partite settlements viz. VII & VIII and the wages of the Bank Employees have gone high but the management has not revised the wage structure from last ten years causing financial hardship to the employees. Thirdly, the wages of the employees are being cut for no fault on their side which is illegal. Fourthly, overtime work is taken from the employees but they are not paid for the over time work. Further, the contention of the workmen is that even if their leave is due in case of absence on exigencies no leave is sanctioned and leave without pay is sanctioned causing financial loss to the employees. Further, the employees and the officers of the bank have been directed by the management to observe dress-code but no allowance for the dress or washing allowance is given. Lastly, the employees even in the case of transfer to other station are not given transfer allowance. According to the workmen

due to the high-handedness of the management the employees are suffering. According to the workmen the above demands i.e. promotion, wage revision, stopping wrongful wage-cut, overtime allowance, granting leave, dress allowance including washing allowance and transfer T.A. be considered and direction to the management be given not to resort to unfair labour practice.

3. The contention of the management is that the present dispute is not maintainable before this Tribunal, the matter should have been raised before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies u/s. 48 of Bihar Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, which is an special enactment. As regards the promotion the contention of the management is that the matter of promotion is under active consideration. As regards wage revision the management contends that the Board of Directors of the Bank has already approved pay-revision at par with the employees of other Commercial Banks and it is in process. As regards wrongful wage cut the contention of the management is that the Managing Director of the Bank under clause 64 of the Bye-Laws of the Bank read with Section 14(3) of the Bihar Cooperative Societies Act has the power of supervision and control. The deductions are made by way of punishment on having been found guilty by the Managing Director. As regards overtime work the contention of the management is that work is taken from the employees in accordance with the provisions of Section 16 of Staff Regulation and if at all work more than the prescribed hours is taken it is due to necessity of work and exigencies of service occasionally and not regularly. As regards the leave the management contends that the leave can not be claimed as a matter of right, its acceptance or denial depends on the exigency of work. As regards dress-allowance the management contends that in order to take care the status and the livelihood of its workmen ensuring regular payments dress-code and punctual working habits were enforced, the same may be ignored by the employees. As regards transfer T.A. the management's contention is that in transfer made on administrative grounds and on request of the employee no transfer T.A. is allowed as a matter of practice. Accordingly the management the claims made on behalf of the workmen are fit to be rejected.

4. Upon the pleadings of the parties and the terms of reference the following points arise out for decisions :

- (i) Whether the reference is maintainable before this Tribunal ?
- (ii) Whether the action of the management of Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. in not considering the demands as raised by the Union vide letter dated 12-12-2005 is legal and justified ?
- (iii) To what relief or reliefs, if any, the union/workmen are entitled ?

FINDINGS

5. Both the parties have adduced evidence in support of their respective contentions. The management has examined two witnesses namely Sudhir Kumar Singh (M.W.1) and Anil Kumar Rai (M.W.2). The workmen have examined Direndra Dhari Singh (W.W.1), Sarvar Alam

(W.W. 2), Suresh Prasad Singh (W.W. 3), Hiranya Prabha (W.W. 4) and Sudheeshwar Prasad Singh (W.W. 5). Besides oral evidence the workmen have produced photo copies of charter of demand dated 28-6-2005 addressed to the Board of Directors (Exw) demand letter dated 18-7-05 (Ext. W/1), memorandum dated 1-9-2005 (Ext. W/2), representation of Imran Ali dated 30-11-2005 (Ext. W/3), Office order dated 23-11-2005 regarding transfer (Ext. W/4), Office order dated 6-12-2005 regarding transfer (Ext. W/5), Union's letter dated 6-9-2005 (Ext. W/6), Union's letter dated 10-1-2006 (Ext. W/7), letters dated 20-2-2006, 17-6-2006, 23-9-2006, 5-7-2005, 10-4-2007 and 28-11-2005 (Ext. W/8 to W/13), reminder (Ext. W/14), Union's letter dated 31-1-2006 regarding working hours (Ext. W/15), Cash Memo dated 16-6-2005 of dress (Ext. W/16), Bill dated 18-6-2005 (Ext. W/17) and Office order dated 14-2-2006 regarding working hours (Ext. W/18). No document has been adduced in evidence on behalf of the management.

Point No. (i) :

6. It has been argued on behalf of the management that when the alternate remedy is available to the workmen to raise their grievance before the registrar, Co-operative societies U/s. 48 of Bihar Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 which is a special enactment this Reference before this Tribunal is not maintainable. As against that it has been submitted on behalf of the workmen that they approached the Board of Directors of which registrar, Co-operative Societies is a member, concerning their demands but nothing came out after several years and thereafter this industrial dispute has been raised. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the parties I find that the management has not produced anything to show that there is any legal bar in raising industrial dispute without exhausting the opportunities in the department. That may be a practice for convenience but exhausting departmental remedies before raising an industrial dispute is not a legal requirement. Moreover the workmen raised their demands in the department and nothing came out then the industrial dispute was raised. Under the circumstances discussed above I find that the reference is maintainable before this tribunal. This point is decided accordingly.

Point No. (ii) :

7. The bank employees' Federation, Bihar (hereinafter called 'the Union' for brevity) vide letter dated 12-12-2005 raised the demands concerning Promotion, Wage Revision, Wrongful Wage-cut, Denial of overtime allowance, leave, dress-allowance and Washing Allowance and Travelling Allowance on transfer. The Union raised these issues previously vide letter dated 22-6-2005, 18-7-2005, 1-9-2005, 10-1-2006 (Exts. W/1 to W/2 & W/6) before the departmental authorities. I will discuss the demands one by one.

(i) **Promotion** :—There is no dispute on the point that there has been no promotion in the Bihar State Co-operative Bank from 25 years back. As regards the same W.W. 2 has stated that he is an Assistant in the bank but from three years back he is doing the work of Branch Manager in Nala Road Branch at Patna. At other branches

also the Assistants are working as the Branch Manager. In this connection M. W. No. 1 & 2 have stated that the matter is under consideration before the Government. The Union raised the demand of promotion several times but no fruitful result appears to have come out as yet. The statement of M.W. 2 that the matter is pending before the government, does not appear to be a convincing plea. Many employees would have retired without promotion within last twenty-five years and the management Bank is busy in preparation of roster. By not making promotion to the post lying vacant since several years back the management has not done justice to the employees rather has committed great injustice.

(ii) **Wage revision** :—Dhirendra Dhari Singh (W.W. 1) has stated and it has not been denied by the management that the salary of the Officers and the Staff of the Bihar State Co-operative Bank is similar to that of the Bank of India. The Settlements which are applicable in Banking Industry are also applicable in Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. He has further stated that there have been altogether eight settlement/wage revisions but the management Bank is still making payment of wages to its employees on the basis of sixth settlement M.W. 2 has stated that the demands of the workmen are genuine. Under the circumstances I find that the management's action in not implementing the wages revisions in accordance with the Bipartite Settlements is illegal and unjust.

(iii) **Wrongful Wage-Cut** :—It has been alleged on behalf of the workmen that the wages of the employees are cut on flimsy grounds. The example of one such wage-cut is of employee Imran Ali who filed representation against his illegal wage-cut (Ext. W/3) which shows that his wages of 15 days was cut on the allegation that he was not driving cash-van properly and his dress was not tidy. On such allegations 15 days wage cut can not be said to be justified. A warning letter or one day wage-cut, under the circumstances was more than sufficient.

(iv) **Over-time Allowance** :—The workmen witness No. 5 has stated that the management vide Office Order dated 14-2-2006 (Ext. W/18) has fixed the working hours of 7 hours on week days and 5 hours on Saturday. In case the management takes work from the employees more than the prescribe hour the overtime allowance must be paid to the employees. Non-payment of overtime allowance in case of overtime work can not be justified.

(v) **Denial of leave despite having sufficient balance and resorting to leave without pay** :—In this connection it has been submitted on behalf of the Union that leave without pay is granted even in case an employee has sufficient balance of leave in his account. As against that the management contends that leave can not be claimed as a matter of right and it is with the management to grant leave or not. It is true that the leave can not be claimed as a matter of right but the fact remains that no one can foresee the exigencies and emergencies. No one can speculate that his family member will fall ill to-tomorrow and would apply for casual leave beforehand. The management must

consider this aspect and should not disallow the petition for casual leave and grant leave without pay in case of absence on genuine cause from work, otherwise the very purpose of casual leave will be frustrated.

(vi) **Dress Allowance and Washing Allowance:**—The W.W. 3 and W.W. 4 have stated that the management imposed dress-code according to which all the employees of the Bank are required to come in prescribed dress. For that initially Rs. 2500/- was given to each employee but later on the same was deducted from their wages on instalments. In this connection it has been submitted on behalf of the management that the employees are free not to observe dress-code. If that be so let the management issue instruction accordingly otherwise so long the dress code remains in force the management must pay cost of dress and at least Rs. 100/- (Rs. one hundred) only per month Washing allowance.

(vii) **Travelling Allowance on transfer:**—It has been submitted on behalf of the Union that the employees an administrative purposes are transferred to other stations but the cost of transfer of family and personal effects are not reimbursed. if the transfer of an employee is made an administrative reason or purpose his cost of transfer both person and property must be reimbursed in future.

Point No. (iii):

8. Keeping in view the discussions made above and the findings arrived at on different issue I find and hold that the vacant posts if required to be filled up by promotion, must be filled up within three months of the publication of the award. I further find and hold that the employees are entitled to get wages according to 8th Bi-partite Settlement which the employees of other Banks get. There should not be disproportionate wage-cut or wage cut on flimsy grounds. The employees are entitled to over-time allowance in case work more than the prescribed hours is taken from them. There should not be arbitrary denial of leave if the leave is due to any employee. I find and hold that so long the dress-code is in force the employees are entitled to get four sets of dress per year or the cost of it reimbursed and washing allowance @ Rs. 100/- per month. The employees on transfer on administrative reasons are entitled to get the travelling allowance along with family members besides the freight charges of personal effects. This point is decided accordingly.

9. In the result I find and hold that the action of the management of Bihar-State Co-operative Bank Ltd. in not considering the demands as raised by the Union *vide* their letter dated 12-12-2005 is neither legal nor justified. Consequently, I direct the management of Bihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. to fill up all the vacant post which require filling up by promotion, within three months from the date of publication of the Award. I further direct the management to implement the wage structure as suggested by 8th Bi-partite Settlement within three months from the date of publication of the Award. I direct the management not to resort to wage cut on flimsy grounds, to make payment of over time allowance in case over-time work is

taken from the employee. I further direct the management not to resort to wrongful denial of leave to the employees if the leave is due. I also direct the management to make payment of dress allowance and the washing allowance as discussed and held above and travelling allowance on transfer of the employees on administrative reasons.

10. And this is my award.

Dictated & corrected by me.

VASUDEO RAM, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2837.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार इंडियन एअर लाइंस लि. के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय अहमदाबाद के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 52/05) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-08-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-11012/25/2004-आईआर(सी-1)]

स्नेह लता जवास, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2837.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 52/05) of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court Ahmedabad now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of Indian Airlines Ltd., and their workman, received by the Central Government on 29-08-2007.

[No. L-11012/25/2004-IR (C-1)]

SNEH LATA JAWAS, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT,
AHMEDDABAD

PRESENT

Shri A. A. Lad : Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute (Reference C. G. I. T. A.) No. 52/05

Regional Director,
M/s. Indian Air Lines Ltd.,
New Engineering Campus,
Sahara Mumbai-400099

... First Party

V/s.

Secretary,
Air Corporation Employees Union
Indian Air Lines Ltd.,
New Engineering Campus,
Sahara Mumbai-400099

... Second Party

APPEARANCE

First Party : Shri P. S. Gogia

Second Party : Shri P. M. Khakhar

AWARD

1. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment by its Order No. L-11012/25/2004-IR (C-I) dated 2-6-2005 in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2 (A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 have referred the following dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication :

“Whether the action of the management of M/s. Indian Airlines Ltd., to award the punishment of reduction of basic pay by five incremental slabs with cumulative effect w.e.f. 1-8-2003 on Shri D. V. Sheth Traffic Suptd., vide order dated 17/21-7-2003 is just, fair and legal?” If, not to what relief is the workman entitled ?

2. In support that second party filed statement of claim by Ex. 7, which was not replied by first party.

3. Meanwhile both parties arrived to withdraw and by purshis by Ex. 9 they pray to take this reference on board and decide.

Accordingly today reference is taken on board. Second party by his purshis Ex. 9 presented in person with Advocate and prayed to disposed of the reference. Even Advocate of the first party Shri P. S. Gogia also consented to the said proposal of the second party. Hence I hereby pass the following order.

ORDER

In view Ex. 9 the reference is disposed of. No order as to cost.

A. A. LAD, Presiding Officer

Ahmedabad. Dated: 25-6-2007

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2838.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार ओ एन जी सी के प्रबंधन के संबंध निर्योजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, अहमदाबाद के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 201/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 29-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-30012/151/98-आईआर(सी-1)]

स्नेह लता जवास, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2838.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 201/2004) of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Ahmedabad, now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of ONGC and their workmen, which was received by the Central Government on 29-8-2007.

[No. L-30012/151/98-IR(C-I)]

SNEH LATA JAWAS, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT,
AHMEDABAD**

PRESENT

A. A. LAD, In Charge/ Presiding Officer, Mumbai

REFERENCE (C.G.I.T.A.) No. 201/2004

The Director (Personal)

ONGC Ltd.,

Oil Bhawan,

Deheradun

... First Party

THEIR WORKMAN

Branch Secretary,

ONGC

Electrical & Employee Staff Asso.

P. Vishwakarma Society, Somnath Road,

Mehsana-384001

... Second Party

APPEARANCE

For the Employer : Shri K. V. Gadhiya

Shri Mahendra Patel
(Advocates)

For the Workman : Shri R. C. Shukla
Representative

AWARD

1. The matrix of the facts as called out from the reference are as under :—The Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment by its Order No. L-30012/151/98/IR (C-I) dated 18-05-1999 in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub Section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 have referred the following dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication :

SCHEDULE

1. Providing of Acting allowance to Asst. Technician (Electrical) appointed from 1980 be paid acting allowance for performing higher duties is legal ? If not what relief the workmen are entitled to what extent ?

2. Whether union demand is, Electrical Staff who are having supervisor license be paid supervisor payment from the date they are performing the duties is legal and justify ? If yes what relief workman are entitled and extent ?

3. Whether union demand is to pay extra payment to Asst. Technician (Electrical/Electrician) who are operating Diesel Generator set is legal and justify ? If yes what relief workmen are entitle ?

4. Whether the demand of providing job specification to Electrical Staff is legal and justify ? If yes what direction is necessary ?

5. The second party submit that workman who are possessing competency Electrical Supervisor license and

performing supervisory duties be promoted to the post of junior Engineer who are performing the duties of Supervisor Electrical from the date of they joined as Asst. Technician (Electrical) and provide justice to the workmen ?

2. In support the subject matter referred in the reference, second party filed Claim Statement at Ex. 5 stating that, the claimant listed at serial No. 1 is an Assistant Technician (E) to the lower post equal to helper category. Said claimant was performing the duties of Electrician, Motor Rewinding, S.R.P pump for checking and all maintenance work and was attending-high voltage line work, which actual is not a work of employee of that category. However, he was compelled and forced to attend such a duties right from 1980 without paying extra benefit or wages of said work. So demand is made to pay allowances of employee mentioned at Serial No. 1 of said additional work.

3. The employee listed at serial No. 2 of the reference was appointed as an Assistant Technician (E) like employee appointed at serial No. 1. However, he was forced to obtain Electrical Supervisor license to utilize said services. As per mines act, Supervisor is not a workman and he has powered to mark absent, to issue memo, to call explanation of subordinate under and to submit it. He has over and above workman category. However, O.N.G.C. has not considered the status and given benefit of the post on which he was serving. So it is prayed to give the wages to the employee at serial No. 2 of that status.

4. The employee listed at serial No. 3 enclosed to the reference was utilized by the first party at Diesel Generator Set. It was disturbing electric city at site and at office building, colony and at work place. So Diesel Generator Set was operated by the said employee to said supply without any extra wages. So claim of pay to the workman at serial No. 3 made.

5. The employee listed at serial No. 4 is not provided the wages as per specification of electrical category still, first party is taking benefit of his services. Said workman is compelled to perform any type of such duties under duress and threat and by victimizing the first party against the policy compel such a workman of National Mineral Development Corporation who is operating mines of iron which provided job specification of the employee of this type and are facilitated with allowances of said duty. However, said is not given. As it is not given to the said workman it is prayed to give said active allowances as per said who is working in mines.

6. The workman which is listed in at serial No. 5 of the reference as an Assistant Engineer is listed as Junior Engineer and is getting promotion after 4 years of experience as a Chargeman (E) who has Supervisor License. A employee with education of I.T.I. qualification and experience are getting promotion after six years in the management of the first party. First party Making disparity

and not given a promotion as followed in other filled to employee of that category. So union prayed to give promotion to said employee of that category.

7. This reference is disputed by the first party by filling a Written Statement at Ex. 7 stating that, reference is not maintainable and this Court/Tribunal has no jurisdiction. It is stated that, a reference is incompetent and bad in law. It is stated that, all the claim is denied by the first party.

8. It is further stated that, Assistant Technician (E) are not forced to perform duty of Electrician and was not compelled to attend that work right from 1980 and entitled to get extra benefit of said work. It is stated that, said demand is not justified and second party is not entitled to get it. It is further stated that, if helper is qualified to consider for appointment of Jr. Assistant Technician (E) can be appointed subject to qualification fulfilling by said employee. As a safety and OMR, any Technician having ITI certificate and Electrical Supervisor certificate issued by the State Government can work on Electrical system only. All Assistant Technician (E) are falling in this line and possess the Electrical Supervisor certificate. It is denied that, there work is independently done by them as claimed by the union. Post of Assistant Technician (E) grade was an induction level post in the Electrician category as per R&P, 1980. However, as per MRPR 1980 which is in force since 1-I-1997, the induction level bottom of class III level in electrical discipline, as now in the post Jr. Assistant Technician (E) is getting scale of Rs. 2,370. The post of Assistant Technician (E) has now become a promotion post. Assistant Technician (E) getting promotion as per policy of the organization after fulfilling requisite criteria. Helpers are having different grade I, II, III. So it is that they prayed demand on that points required to be rejected.

9: The claim made about at serial No. 2 is not proved, correct and admitted by the first party. It is denied that, Asst. Technician (E) are forced perform the Supervisor duty from 1980. It is stated that, since ONGC installations have been declared oil mine by the Government of India long back, it is followed OMR which is mandatory and binding and as per that, work of an Electrical System in the oil mine. Electrical person working on any such electrical system required to possess electrical certificate issued by the Government of India or by the State Government. It is made for safety helps. So it is stated that, demand on that point is bad and it is not required to consider.

10. As far as demand of employee of No.3 is concerned, he worked as Diesel Mechanic and he has to check DG Set quite frequently. He just do the work of to switch On/Off. It is not a extra work. So employee at No.3 cannot claim additional/extra wages.

11. Regarding demand group employee No.4 it is stated that, it is not admitted to first party. It is denied that, said employee is doing said work under pressure.

12. As far as of employee No.5 is concerned it is stated that, said demand is not admitted to the first party. It is denied that, Jr. Engineer and Chargeman (E) are qualified to the promotion and they are entitled to promotion. It is stated that, qualifications prescribed for Jr. Engineer (E) is higher than that of Chargeman (E) and also is the post in higher scale. It is stated that ONGC defined R&P rules and by following cases of employee who are promoted and recruited. So it is stated that, claim made by the union is deserved dismissed.

13. In view of the above pleadings following issues arises for determination which are answered against it.

- (i) Whether the demand of the union regarding employee list at serial No. 1 that, he is forced to perform duties of electrician and compelled to attend that work right from 1980, and his entitled to get extra benefit of said work ?
- (ii) Whether the demand of employee listed at serial No. 2 being an Assistant Electrician (E) are post which require to perform Supervisory duty and they are entitle to get benefit of scale of Supervisor category ?
- (iii) Whether the demand regarding employee listed at serial No. 3 of checking Diesel Generator Set is entitled to get extra benefit of said duty ?
- (iv) Whether the demand regarding employee listed at serial No. 4 who is compelled to perform duty under duress is entitled to benefits of said work and entitled for promotion and allowances of the said work ?
- (v) Whether the demand regarding employee listed at serial No. 5 of post of Assistant Engineer (E) is filled by way of promotion from Junior Engineer (E) after 4 years. However, in the ONGC which is considered of after six years and as such said employee is entitled to promotion is equal to the promotion given in other filled ?
- (vi) What second party is entitled to get ?
- (vii) What order ?

My answer to the above issues are as under as per reasons given below :

- (i) No.
- (ii) No.
- (iii) No.
- (iv) No.
- (v) No.
- (vi) No.
- (vii) As per order below.

REASONS

Issues Nos. I to VI

14. Union filed claim statement for these 5 workers making of their respective grievances regarding wages, special allowance, promotion and threat given to work. It is also claimed that, the working in other departments of their respective status is different and it is challenged by the first party making different case that, union can not file such a claim. The relief prayed in the claim statement stating that, list of so called employees who have grievances are placed on record by the claim statement, is not produced and is not also referred and send by the Labour Ministry (Central) while making reference of the grievances of so called workman. Besides it is stated that, there are separate rules and regulations which are followed of promotion vis-a-vis of treating nature of services of the concerned employees. It is stated that, evidence lead by the witness of the second party does not made different case with the existence case examples are not given of the employees who are getting benefited as claimed by the second party union.

15. To support that, second party has examined witness at Ex. 16 Shri Fuljibhai L. Chaudhry and at Ex. 17 Shri Nandjisingh Motisingh. Second party also examined Shri Hargovind Bhai Patel at Ex. 20 and Shri Dinesh Kumar Pandey at Ex. 22. Whereas First Party examined Shri Husain Fakirmohamed at Ex. 26. Both have submitted their respective written argument more precisely by Second party at Ex. 29 and by first party at Ex. 30, stating that they have already argued matter before my Id. predecessor Shri B.I.Kazi (Ex. P.O.) who was holding this post.

16. First we go through evidence lead by the second Party, we find that, there are 5 workmen. 4 witness are examined for them. Besides it is not made clear which witness is real claimant of the demand referred by the Labour Ministry (Central) in the reference ? It is not also made clear that, the list is submitted by the second party is admitted and in argument as well as in supplementary written argument it is not made clear how they are concerned with the claim statement and how they will be benefited? Even while filing claimant statement and while filing written argument second party go on mention in that. It want to reserve its right to make their case at necessary time i.e. means though argument is submitted still second party itself want to reserve its right to make out different case which is beyond understanding.

17. As stated above, evidence led by the second party if read one by one we find witness Shri Fuljibhai L. Chaudhry admits that, he was appointed as per rules. He also state that, recruitment rules are changed in 1997. He stated that, post Junior Asst. (E) was created in 1997. He stated that, said Junior Asst (E) has to work under Asst. Technical (E). If we turn to the another witness Shri Nandjisingh Motisingh recorded at Ex. 17 we find that, he

has made different case that, the claim statement and says that he is getting a salary of Asst. Technical (E). His position of Supervisor which is senior to the workman category. He states that, ONGC sends the name of Supervisor to the Dy. Director. ONGC also informed about supervisor. He states that, he is performing work of inspection, noting log-sheet and not getting wages of it. However, in the cross he admits that, there are rules of recruitment and promotion in the ONGC. He also admits that, there is no Supervisory post in ONGC. He admits that, he has no evidence to show that in other mines, Supervisor are getting more salary than Supervisor working with ONGC. The evidence led by Shri Hargovind Bhai Patel at Ex. 20 reveals that, he was appointed as an Asst. Technician (E) and work at present as a chargeman. He stated that, he has to perform duty of changing and electrical testing but not getting wages. In the cross he admits that, when he was posted, he was SSC and ITI. He also states that, he was having certificate of Electrical Supervisor. He admits that, about 200 to 250 Technician are operated in D.G. Set. This D.G. Set are there since beginning. He admits that, revision of scale which is made in ONGC by discussing the recommendation of the union. He also states that, D.G. Set are operated at Ankleshwer and Baroda site, and in others places those are operated by duty technician. The evidence of Shri Hargovind Bhai Patel reveals that, he is a Chargeman-cum-Electrician and want scale of Asst. Engineer Supervisor because that post come in senior category. He also states that, he is doing work of inspection, filling log-sheet and checking the mine installation but not getting payment of it. In the cross, this witness admits that, qualified of the Asst. Electrical & ITI with Supervisor certificate is must and it is possessed. He admits that, promotion are given as per the rules of 1980. He admits that, work done by him is not denied but, work attending by him as Asst. Technician in other is disputed places by the first party. Evidence of Shri Husain Fakirmohamed at Ex. 26 reveals that, Supervisor is not a post by its a certificate course required to possess by the Electrician Technician (E). He also admits that, there is no post of Supervisor in the O.N.G.C. He also states that, there is a no separate category of Supervisor and he denied the claimed made by the second party.

18. Going though this and argument submitted by both, it is clear that, second party has not established who are really claimant of this demand. Besides there is no list of the employee as argued and presumed submitted by Labour Ministry (Central) while sending reference. It is to be noted that, a number of applicants are given referring list but it is not clarified by the union. Moreover, it is admitted fact that, there is no Supervisor post in ONGC and ONGS is following the rules and regulation of recruitment via-a-vis of promotion. The claim of second party that workman though are working of different work and different post but are not getting additional wages. More precisely workman at serial No. 1 (It is not known

who is the said person) work as Assistant Technician, but force to work of rewinding, checking and maintaining work and maintain work of as well as the supervising high voltage line work. However, it is not proved who is doing that work and which work is additional work as claimed? Moreover, about so called employee mentioned at Serial No. 2, and his demand, the case of second party that, the said person is compelled to do work of Electrical Supervisor and Supervisor and in other places such employees are getting more salary. However, same is not proved by leading cogent evidence on that points. Same can be observe about so called employee mentioned in list of at serial No. 3 and it is not clean who has claimed D.G. Set is attended and his services are utilized at the site as well as at office building and in colony and in some other places which are operated with the help of Asst. Technician. It is not proved that they are doing said but their wages are not paid. It is also not proved that, attending work of D.G. Set by the Asst. Technician is a additional work. Same can observe about so called employee of serial No. 4 and about his demand where it is claimed that, worker is compelled to perform any duty under threat and pressure and they are victimized for which they are not paid. About employee listed at serial No. 5 and his demand saying that, Junior Engineers are promoted after 4 years in other departments, but & the ONGC after 6 years in not proved. It is not established that from which other area such promotion are given to the Asst. Engineer after 4 years and how said is bidding of the ONGC. ? When ONGC has its own rules and regulation of recruitment and promotion?

19. Going though all these and the case made out by both I am of the view that, second party miser failed to establish the claim and fail to prove that ably demand referred by the Labour Ministry (Central) to this Tribunal/ Court for adjudication deserve to allow. So I answer above issues in the negative and conclude that demand of second party deserves to be reject. Hence the order.

ORDER

Reference is rejected.

A. A. LAD, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2839.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार साऊथ इंडियन बैंक लि. के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, इरनाकूलम के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 15/2005) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/129/2005-आई.आर. (बी-1).]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2839.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 15/2005) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of South Indian Bank Ltd. and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/129/2005-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

Shri P. L. Norbert, B.A., L.L.B., Presiding Officer

(Friday the 17th day of August, 2007/
26th Sravana, 1929)

I.D. 15/2005

Workman : Smt. Lizzieamma Punnoose
Kelachandra House
Pallimukku, Pettah
Thiruvananthapuram-695024.

Management : The Chairman and CEO
The South Indian Bank Ltd.
P.B. No. 28, T.B. Road
Thrissur-680001.

Adv. Shri Saji Varghese.

AWARD

This is a reference made by Central Government under Section 10(1)(d) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication. The reference is :—

“Whether the action of the management of Mallappally Branch of the South Indian Bank Ltd., Thrissur, Kerala State in dismissing the services of Smt. Lizzieamma Punnoose (E-clerk), Kelachandra House, Pallimukku, Pettah, Thiruvananthapuram w.e.f. 14-12-2004 is justified? If not, to what relief the concerned worker is entitled?”

2. The facts of the case in brief are as follows :—

The claimant Smt. Lizzieamma Punnoose joined the service of South Indian Bank on 1-4-1976 as a clerk. She served the bank for about 21 years. According to the claimant, during 1977 she fell sick due to Rheumatic Arthritis and proceeded on leave. Her leave continued intermittently

till 4-9-1998. Thereafter she was on leave continuously. In 2004 she was served with a charge-sheet alleging unauthorized absence without intimation from 15-10-2001 onwards. A domestic enquiry was conducted and she was found guilty of the charges. The disciplinary Authority dismissed her from service. According to the claimant the Enquiry Officer had not complied with the principles of natural justice. She was not supplied with documents of management. She was not given sufficient time to go through the document of management. No fair opportunity was given to defend. The enquiry is vitiated. Her absence was intimated to the management. The findings are perverse. At any rate punishment of dismissal from service is shockingly disproportionate to the charges levelled. Her previous unblemished service was not taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority while imposing the punishment. Only on account of sickness leave was availed. The second medical opinion was obtained as required by the management and they were convinced that the claimant was unwell. The claimant remains unemployed even now. She is entitled to be reinstated with all benefits, continuity of service etc.

3. The management in their written statement contends that until the claimant was transferred to Mallappally Branch she had no illness. When she stated availing leave constantly she was asked to get a second medical opinion. The medical opinion is that she was having Rheumatic Arthritis of a mild variety. She remained absent continuously and unauthorisedly and without intimation from 15-10-2001 onwards. The enquiry was conducted in full compliance with the principles of natural justice and the procedure prescribed for domestic enquiry. She was allowed to be represented by a union representative. The worker fully participated in the enquiry. The findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on evidence. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the report of Enquiry Officer as well as objection raised by the worker concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. An opportunity of Personal hearing was given to the worker regarding the proposed punishment. But the worker wanted a personal hearing at Thiruvananthapuram, her place of residence. However she submitted a detailed written submission of the Disciplinary Authority. Appeal filed by the worker was dismissed for valid reasons. Copies of all the documents were furnished to the worker at the commencement of enquiry. The management witnesses were cross-examined. There was no request for postponement of the enquiry for the purpose of cross-examination of the management witnesses. No intimation of the absence of the worker was given to the management. Mere application for voluntary retirement will not amount to intimation of absence. There were no extenuating circumstances to reduce the punishment. The worker has not put in sufficient years of service to qualify for pension of Voluntary Retirement as per Pension Regulation applicable to the worker. The worker is not entitled for any relief.

4. In the light of the above contentions the following points arise for consideration:

- (1) Is the enquiry valid?
- (2) Are the findings sustainable?
- (3) Is the punishment proper?

5. Point No. (1):

The question of validity of enquiry was considered as a preliminary issue and an order was passed on 18-9-2006, finding that the enquiry is vitiated. Thereafter evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges. The evidence consists of the oral testimony of MWs 1 to 3 and documentary evidence of Exts. M1 to M8 on the side of management and WW1 and Exts. W1 to W2(b) on the side of worker.

6. Point No. (2):

Smt. Lizzieamma, the worker was charge-sheeted on 27-5-2004. Ext. M1 is the enquiry file. It contains the charge. The charges are:—

(1) That she is unauthorisedly absenting from duty from 15-10-2001 onwards till this date, without intimation/application of leave.

(2) That she unauthorisedly absenting from duty as stated in Charge No. 1., even though she was fully aware of the fact that she has no eligibility for leave of absence got sanctioned as per the service rules applicable to her employment in the Bank.

(3) That she has absented from duty without any application or information for a period exceeding 30 days which as per the service rule applicable to her employment in the bank is a gross misconduct.

The worker is alleged to have remained absent unauthorisedly and continuously and without intimation from 15-10-2001 onwards. In her reply dated 5-6-2004 the reason for remaining absent is stated to be illness (Rheumatic Arthritis). The Enquiry Officer found her guilty of the charges of remaining unauthorisedly absent without intimation. Exts. M-7 & 8 Attendance Registers showing continuous absence from 15-10-2001 onwards. Thus the worker admits her absence from 15-10-2001 and even prior to that from 4-9-1998 to 14-10-2001. However the management did not take any action regarding her absence from 4-9-1998 to 14-10-2001, probable because she had applied for leave though she had no leave at credit. But for the subsequent period from 15-10-2001 onward there was no leave application. Hence for the period from 15-10-2001 onwards disciplinary action is taken by issuing a charge-sheet on 27-5-2004. Between 15-10-2001 and 27-5-2004 no action was taken and not even a memo was issued to the worker asking her to report for duty. The worker admits that she had not applied for leave, but had submitted an application for voluntary retirement. Ext. MX-23 in Ext. M1

is her application submitted to the General Manager of the bank through the Branch Manager. A letter with a request to forward the application is addressed to the Branch Manager and the application for VRS to the General Manager. The reason for applying for VRS is illness (Rheumatic Arthritis). It is also stated in the application that she was not able to travel long distance from Thiruvananthapuram to Mallappally and to continue her treatment with her doctor at Thiruvananthapuram. Ext. MX-23 is dated 14-8-2001. Her request for VRS was rejected by Ext. M-3 reply dated 19-10-2001. However she continued to remain absent. The management did not take any action until 2004. On a previous occasion when she took leave off and on she was asked to get a second medical opinion from Government hospital, Thiruvalla. She appeared before the doctor and she was examined and the doctor gave a Medical Examination Report dated 6-2-1998 (Ext. M-2) to the management. The opinion of the doctor was that the worker was suffering from Rheumatic Arthritis of a mild variety. She was advised to consult a Rheumatologist. Since the continuous absence and non-submission of leave application is admitted by the worker it is not necessary to go into the question of absence. When there is no leave application or when leave is refused or when there is overstay after sanctioned leave period, the absence thereafter becomes unauthorized. The allegation as per charge-sheet is that she was absent unauthorisedly without intimation. It is a gross misconduct within Clause 5(p) of 7th Bipartite Settlement (Supplementary) dated 10-4-2002 (pg. 565 & 566 of 'Bipartite Settlements' published by M/s. H.P.J. Kapoor, Twelfth Edition, 2005). That provision reads:

"Clause 5:

By the expression 'Gross misconduct' shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee:—

(p). Remaining unauthorisedly absent with intimation continuously for a period exceeding 30 days."

Hence, according to the management, it is a 'gross misconduct' for which punishment is provided in clause 6 of the same Bipartite Settlement. However it was argued by the learned counsel for the worker that unauthorized absence alleged can only be a 'minor misconduct' as intimation of absence was given by the worker to the management. On the contrary, according to the learned counsel for the management Ext. MX-23 is not an intimation but only an application for VRS addressed to the General Manager. According to the learned counsel if intimation was intended to be given it should have been given to the Branch Manager and that too specifying why she was absent and how long she would have been absent. It is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the management. In the 1st Bipartite Settlement unauthorized absence was treated only as a minor misconduct. A change was made only in the

7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement dated 10-4-2002 making it a gross misconduct. The 1st Bipartite Settlement, Clause 19.5 deals with 'gross misconduct'. But unauthorized absence is not a 'gross misconduct'. However it is a 'minor misconduct' as per Clause 19.7(a). But in the 7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement dated 10-4-2002 'unauthorized absence without intimation' is treated as a 'gross misconduct' {Clause 5 (p)}. Whereas 'absence without leave' or 'overstaying sanctioned leave without sufficient grounds' is a 'minor misconduct' as per Clause 7(a). Clause 7 (a) reads:—

“Clause 7. By the expression ‘minor misconduct’ shall be meant for all the acts and omissions on the part of an employee:—

- (a) Absence without leave or overstaying sanctioned leave without sufficient grounds”.

Similarly, in the 1st Bipartite Settlement, Clause 19.7(a) 'absence without leave' is treated as 'minor misconduct'. It reads:—

“19.7. “By the expression ‘minor misconduct’ shall be meant for all the acts and omissions on the part of an employee:—

- (a) absence without leave or overstaying sanctioned leave without sufficient grounds”.

Therefore the original provision regarding absence without leave contained in Clause 19.7 (a) is repeated in the 7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement in Clause 7 (a) and treated only as 'minor misconduct'. Absence without applying for leave is definitely unauthorized absence. But in the present case admittedly there was no leave application. She had been applying for leave time and again from 1998 to August 2001. Thereafter no leave application was submitted, probably because there was no use of applying for leave because there was no leave at credit. She was already on leave without allowance. Chapter XIII of 1st Bipartite Settlement deals with Leave Rules. Clause 13.34 is regarding extraordinary leave (L W A). As per that provision extraordinary leave can be availed at a time for a period not exceeding 3 months and during the entire period of service 12 months. Since the worker was feeling unwell and as she was already on leave without allowance and as she did not intend to join duty but wanted to take voluntary retirement, she did not further submit any leave application. Therefore her absence was definitely unauthorized. But the unauthorized absence is only a 'minor misconduct'. When the unauthorized absence is even without intimation it becomes a 'gross misconduct'. Therefore the pivotal point is whether the absence was intimated to the bank or not.

7. It is relevant to note that the word 'application' is not used in Clause 5 (p) of the 7th Bipartite Settlement but only the word 'intimation'. Both cannot have the same

meaning. Intimation cannot be synonymous with application. If it were so then absence without application for leave is merely unauthorized absence, which is only a 'minor misconduct'. Hence 'intimation' has definitely a different connotation. By the word 'intimation' it simply means that an absent employee should intimate or inform the employer that he/she would be absent. There is no prescribed format for intimation unlike leave application. It is a mere communication to the employer that so and so would be absent from duty. The contention of the learned counsel for the management that intimation should be in the proper format specifying reason for absence, how long one would be absent etc. does not appear to be sound. The Leave Rules do not prescribe that the 'intimation' mentioned in Clause 5 (p) must be in any prescribed format. There is no possibility or need for supplying details in an intimation letter like leave application. What is meant by Clause 5(p) of the Settlement is that despite an employee remains absent unauthorisedly, if he/she is also not informing the employer that he/she would be absent, then the misconduct becomes serious and it cannot be treated as a mere 'unauthorized absence' which is only a 'minor misconduct'. It is that reason that prompted the parties to the 7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement to add one more clause under 'gross misconduct' i.e. 'unauthorized absence without intimation'. Though Ext. MX-23 is a VRS application it is also an intimation to the employer that the worker would be absent thereafter. There was no need for sending a separate intimation. Once the management is informed of her intention to retire from service under VRS, it is meaningless to intimate separately that she would be absent. Besides, Ext. MX-23 VRS application was sent through the Branch Manager with a covering letter addressed to the Branch Manager requesting him to forward the application for voluntary retirement to the General Manager. Therefore both the Branch Manager and the General Manager were informed that the worker would be absent after 14-8-2001. A separate letter to the Branch Manager containing only 'intimation' was not necessary. Thus Ext. MX-23 is enough intimation. The absence is merely unauthorized. However long that absence may be it is only a 'minor misconduct' either falling under Clause 19.7(a) of the 1st Bipartite Settlement or Clause 7 (a) of the 7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement. The management slept over the matter for long 3 years before launching an action. Not even a memo was issued asking the employee to report for duty, the disobedience of which would have been a gross misconduct as per Clause 19.5 (e) of 1st Bipartite Settlement. The learned counsel for the management however wanted me to advert to the decision in *Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India*, (2003) 3 SCC 309. It was a case in which the charge-sheeted employee was a member of Armed Forces and was posted in a terrorist-affected area. He proceeded on leave without proper intimation and permission presumably to attend the marriage of his brother-in-law. Disciplinary action was

taken under S-9(1) of Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 and Rule 44 of Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959. He was found guilty of the charge and he was removed from service. The employee was working in Railway Protection Special Force. The Rules that govern grant of leave, offences and punishment are discussed in the judgment, particularly R-104.3 & 147 (vi) and 156 (b)(iii). R-104.3 says that without specific permission no member of the Force shall leave his station even on holidays.

R-147 (vi) says that absence without proper intimation to his controlling authority shall be punishable.

R-156 (b) (iii) says that absence from duty without proper intimation shall entail in removal of employee from service.

The word 'proper' (intimation) is discussed in Para 8 of the judgement by Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant portion reads:—

"Therefore, mere making an application for leave cannot be construed to be of any consequence in the background of the strict requirement of giving proper intimation. Even if it is accepted that there was intimation, that by no such imagination can be construed to be a proper intimation for diluting the requirement of obtaining permission before absents from duty. Stress is on the expression 'proper'. It means appropriate, in the required manner, fit, suitable, apt. The mere making of a request of leave, which has not been accepted, is not a proper intimation."

It is to be noted that the decided case cannot be compared or applied to the facts of this case. In the decided case the employee was a member of Armed Forces who require strict discipline and hence they are governed by strict Rules of discipline. They cannot leave their station even on holidays without permission. Absence without proper intimation is considered as a major misconduct. In the instant case the wording in Clause 5(p) of Bipartite Settlement is different from R-147 (vi) and R-156 (b) (iii) of Railway Protection Force Rules. The word "proper" is absent in the Bipartite Settlement. In the like manner the word "unauthorized" in Clause 5(p) of Bipartite Settlement is absent in Railway Protection Force Rules. Thus the factual scenario and the Rules governing disciplinary proceedings differ and hence the decision cannot be applied to the case on hand.

8. As per 5th Bipartite Settlement dated 10-4-1989, Clause 17 (a) (page 367 of the book 'Bipartite Settlements' referred supra) when an employee absents himself from work for a period of 90 or more consecutive days without submitting any application for leave..... the management may at any time give a notice to the

employee calling upon him to report for duty within 30 days of the notice stating that the employee has no intention of joining duty. If the employee does not respond to the notice he/she would be deemed to have voluntarily retired from bank's service on the expiry of the said notice. No such notice was issued by the management in this case. I have referred to the above provision only to point out that the management is not without remedy against an erring employee who remains absent continuously. For reasons best known to the management no such steps were taken. The charge as it is can only be a minor misconduct. It is unnecessary to scan the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer as well as before this Court to arrive at a conclusion as the main part of allegation is admitted by the employee, namely, absence without applying for leave. Hence only the legal position is to be clarified. As already pointed out, the absence is merely unauthorized and not without intimation and therefore it can be only a 'minor misconduct'. To that extent the finding of the Enquiry Officer is not correct.

9. However it was submitted by the learned counsel for the management that apart from violation of Leave Rules, the charge also contains the allegation that the worker willfully disobeyed the lawful and reasonable order of the management {Clause 19.8 (e)} and her acts are prejudicial to the interest of the bank (Clause 19.5 (j) of 1st Bipartite Settlement). In Chapter XIX of 1st Bipartite Settlement which provides for disciplinary action and procedure therefor, gross misconduct is described and enumerated in Clause 19.5 (a) to (t). For each offence a specific clause is provided. When there are specific clauses for specific offences they cannot be brought under a general clause. The memo of charges contains three charges and they are separately numbered. They are regarding unauthorized absence without applying for leave and intimating the absence. It is violation of Leave Rules. There was no direction by the management to report for duty immediately or within specified period. Hence there is no disobedience. The management has not explained what is the disobedience committed by the worker. So also, there is a general statement in the charge that the act of worker is prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. If all acts are prejudicial to the interest of the bank even minor misconduct of unpunctual or irregular attendance (Clause 19.7 (b) could be an act prejudicial to the interest of the bank. That is not the intention of defining different acts as different offences. Otherwise one clause {19.5 (J)} was sufficient to bring every offence under the banner of 'gross misconduct'. Since the charges alleged are specific and they are regarding unauthorized absence without intimation, violation of leave rules and absence exceeding 30 days, they cannot be brought under any other clause than either under Clause 5(P) or 7(a) of 7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement dated 10-4-2002.

10. Point No. (3) :

The punishment imposed is dismissal. It is meant for gross misconduct. For remaining absent the punishment imposed is dismissal. It is meant for gross misconduct. I have found that the offence is only a minor misconduct for which punishment is provided in Clause 8 of 7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement. The maximum punishment is stoppage of increment for a period not longer than six months {Clause 8(c) }. The punishment in this case therefore has to be altered to stoppage of increment for a period not exceeding six months.

11. In the result, an award is passed finding that the action of the management in dismissing the claimant Smt. Lizzieamma Punnoose from service w.e.f. 14-12-2004 cannot be legal and justified. However she is guilty of minor misconduct of unauthorized absence and is liable to be punished with stoppage of increment for a period not longer than six months under Clause 8(c) of 7th Supplementary Bipartite Settlement dated 10-4-2002. She is entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service and consequential benefits, but without back wages provided she is directed to report for duty and she reports for duty accordingly. The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs. The award will take effect one month after its publication in the official Gazette.

(Dictated to the Personal Assistant, transcribed and typed by her, corrected and passed by me on this the 17th day of August, 2007.).

P. L. NORBERT, Presiding Officer

APPENDIX**Witness for the Worker:**

WW1-Smt. Lizzieamma Punnoose—8-5-2007

Witness for the Management:

MW1-Shri James Kappan—5-6-2006.

MW2-Shri Vijayan P.—22-3-2007.

MW3-Shri Johnson Chackalakal—22-3-2007.

Exhibits for the Worker:

W1-Photostat Copy of Memo dated 28-1-1998 issued to the worker by management.

M2-Photostat copy of letter dated 14-8-2001 submitted by the worker to the Branch Manager, South Indian Bank, mallappally.

M2(a)-Photostat copy of letter dated 14-8-2001 submitted by the worker to the General Manager, South Indian Bank Ltd.

M2(b)-Photostat copy of Ack. Card in R/o Ext. W2(b).

Exhibits for the Management:

M1-Enquiry File.

M2-Photostat copy of Memo dated 28-1-1998 issued to the worker by management.

M3-Photostat copy of letter dated 19-10-2001 issued to the worker by management.

M4-Application dated 26-5-1997 submitted by worker to the management seeking permission to visit foreign country.

M5-Application dated 26-5-1997 submitted by the worker for extension of leave.

M6-series-Leave application submitted by the worker along with medical certificates (16 pages).

M7-Attendance Register of Mallappally Branch of South Indian Bank Ltd. for the Period 6-11-2000 to 28-10-2002.

M8-Attendance Register of Mallappally Branch of South Indian Bank Ltd. for the period 4-11-2002 to 28-10-2004.

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2840.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इंडिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चण्डीगढ़ के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 1056/2k5) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/100/2003-आई.आर.(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2840.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 1056/2k5) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/100/2003-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-II,
CHANDIGARH**

Presiding Officer : Shri Kuldip Singh

Case I.D. No. : 1056/2k5

Registered on : 20-09-2005

Date of Decision : 25-05-2007

Chandgi Ram S/o Sh. Bachana Ram, House No. 3086,
Sector-44-D, Chandigarh

...Petitioner

Versus

The Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India,
Region-I, Zonal Office, Hoshiarpur

... Respondent

APPEARANCE

For the Workman Sh. Vinod Kumar Verma,
AR

For the Management Sh. V.K Sharma
Law Officer

AWARD

The Government of India vide their Order No. L-12012/100/2003-IR(B-I) dated 31st July, 2003 desired to know the following :—

“Whether the action of the Management of Regional Manager, State Bank of India, Ludhiana in imposing the punishment of dismissing the services of Sh. Chandgi Ram S/o Sh. Bachana Ram, Ex-Messenger w.e.f. 27th January, 2001 is legal & just? If not what relief the concerned workman is entitled to and from which date?”

The Parties are present through their representatives, I have heard them on the question of fairness of domestic inquiry, held in this case.

The workman filed his Claim Statement by which he claimed that the Management had illegally terminated his service for which he had approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner(C) for amicable settlement, but due to the attitude of the Management the settlement could not be arrived at. His claim is that he was appointed as messenger in the Kaithal Branch of the Management Bank on the basis of his sponsorship by the Employment Exchange, Kundli; that he had registered himself with the employment exchange after he passed middle standard but subsequently he passed matriculation examination; that at the time of interview and joining the service of the Bank, he produced all the necessary documents including his qualifications testimonials and thereafter he was appointed vide appointment letter dated 3rd April, 1987. He joined his duties on 4th April, 1987. However, on 5th March, 1988 he was served with a notice that since he has not disclosed the factum of his having passed matriculation examination, therefore, he has committed misconduct. He replied the notice and denied the charges that he had concealed the facts. The Management however initiated inquiry proceedings and appointed Sh. Y.S. Kaushik as inquiry officer but no notice of the appointment was given to him. The inquiry officer, without any notice visited the Kaithal Branch on 22nd March, 2000, where the workman was posted and obtained his signatures on some papers. He was later on told that the inquiry in the matter has been conducted. On coming to know about it, he rushed to Chandigarh and sent the telegram to the inquiry officer for his illegal conduct.

The workman further claimed that he received a letter from the Disciplinary Authority informing him that they have tentatively decided to remove him from service on the basis of the inquiry held and asked him to appear on 17th July, 2000 for personal hearing. The inquiry officer denied him the right to engage a defence representative, therefore, he alone appeared before the inquiry officer on 19th July, 2000 and submitted true facts. He demanded fresh inquiry in the matter. Thereupon the Disciplinary Authority provided him another opportunity of personal hearing on 30th Sep., and 1st November, 2000 but on both the dates the Disciplinary Authority was again not available, therefore, he was again called for 27th August, 2001. It is further his claim that till date he has not been provided with a copy of the inquiry report nor the copy of the inquiry proceedings; that the inquiry officer did not hold any inquiry nor provided him the opportunity to himself. He was also not given the chance to engage a defence representative. Although all these facts were brought to the notice of Disciplinary Authority, but no action was taken by him; that the signatures were obtained from him under threat and undue pressure, therefore, the inquiry held against the workman is in violation of the law procedure and principles of natural justice. The workman has challenged the fairness of the inquiry on the ground that the charge framed against him is illegal, vague and unjustified. The matter was not decided on merit nor any reasons have been given about the termination of services of the workman. The inquiry is a sham proceeding as the rules and law was not followed, no authorized defence representative was provided to the workman; that the inquiry officer as well as Disciplinary Authority never conducted the inquiry rather obtained the signatures of the workman by exerting undue pressure; that the workman as remained without gainful engagement all through this period. He has prayed for holding that the charge sheet framed against him was vague, undefined and concocted and that the inquiry held was a sham transaction; and that the punishment awarded was disproportionate to the misconduct alleged against the workman. He has also prayed for reinstatement in service, with full back wages and other service benefit besides the interest at the rate of 24% p.a on the amount found due to him. In support of his claim he has placed on record the copy of the charge sheet, copy of the letter of the workman signed by the Presenting Officer and the Inquiry officer, besides the copies of the letters exchanged between the inquiry officer and the AGM. The order of the Appellate Authority, copy of the appeal.

The Management has opposed the claim of the workman claiming that the workman had concealed the factum of his having passed the matriculation examination of his appointment as a messenger in the Management Bank. As per the Bank norms the educational qualification for appointment as a messenger was 8th Class and not 10th Class. The workman obtained the appointment by concealing the true facts, as on the date of interview he was already a matriculate and thus was ineligible for appointment as a messenger. That the workman had

committed a gross misconduct by concealing the fact of his academic qualification, therefore, he was served with a charge sheet by the Disciplinary Authority. The workman could not give satisfactory answer therefore, the Departmental inquiry was initiated against him. Sh. Y.S. Kaushik was appointed as inquiry officer to conduct the inquiry in a fair and proper manner in conformity with the principles of natural justice. The workman was given full opportunity to defend himself. However he opted to defend himself and did not seek the assistance of a defence representative throughout the inquiry he admitted the charges voluntarily, therefore, the charges were proved against him. The Disciplinary Authority gave personal hearing to the workman and after taking into account the facts and circumstances, he was ordered to be removed from service for having committed gross misconduct. The workman filed the appeal, but the same was dismissed. The action of the Management is legal and justified.

On merit it is submitted by the Management that the paras 1 and 2 of the Claim Statement is correct. The workman was given fair and proper opportunity to defend himself. Claiming that the workman had passed the matriculation examination in the year 1988, it is submitted by them that since the workman had declared his academic qualification as 8th pass, therefore, he was appointed as a messenger; that a fair and proper inquiry was held against the workman and since he admitted the charges framed against him voluntarily without any coercion therefore the charges were found proved against him. They denied that the documents declaring the academic qualification were filled by the official of the Management and not by the workman. They further denied that the workman had ever sought the assistance of defence representative. They further contested the claim of the workman that he had no notice of date and place of inquiry as he had appeared in the inquiry and took active part in it. That the authorities relied upon by the workman were not applicable to the present case; and that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is legal and justified, therefore, the workman is not entitled to any relief. They have taken the additional plea that in case it is found that the inquiry held against the workman is not fair and proper, the Management may be provided opportunity to produce evidence so as to prove the charges against the workman and to justify the punishment awarded to him.

I have considered the submissions made by the party and have also gone through the record. I am of the opinion that the inquiry held against the workman was not fair and proper.

The perusal of the inquiry proceedings show that the memorandum carrying the articles of charges dated 18th May, 1999 was issued to the workman but there is no evidence to show as to on which date the same was served upon the workman. The workman filed the reply dated 11th June, 1999, by which he claimed that before the issuance of the memorandum he had already submitted the reply and he reiterated that he did not conceal the facts from the

Management. He claimed that except the documents and the information provided by the employment exchange the selection committee did not ask him for any other information; that he had also submitted the copies of all the documents. The only undertaking the selection committee took from him was that he had not worked in any other Bank earlier. The Management did not feel satisfied with the reply of the workman and by their letter dated 3rd July, 1999 informed the workman that since the charges against him amounted to gross misconduct therefore, the Management has decided to hold a departmental inquiry for which they have appointed Y.S. Kaushik as inquiry officer and Sh. J.P. Aggarwal as the Presenting Officer. It was further notified to him that the inquiry officer shall inform him about the date, time and place where the inquiry shall be conducted. It is worth note here that alongwith the memorandum of charges, the Disciplinary Authority did not provide, the list of witnesses and the documents which the Management proposed to produce against the workman nor provided the copies thereof to the workman so as to make him to know that what evidence shall be produced against him and which witness shall dispose against him. The Disciplinary Authority therefore, committed his serious lapse in not informing the workman about the evidence proposed to be produced against him and in such a situation it could not be taken that the action of the Disciplinary Authority was fair and proper. There is nothing on record to show that the inquiry officer ever informed the workman about the date, place and time where the inquiry was to be held despite the assurance of Management in writing. Here the claim of the workman appears to be correct that suddenly on 22nd March, 2000 the inquiry officer visited the Kaithal Branch of the Management and asked the workman to sign on some papers, by using influence and later on he was told that the inquiry in the case has held. This version of the workman gets further support from the fact that on the same day, he sent a telegram to the inquiry officer from Chandigarh, a copy of which is placed on record telling him as to how he has conducted himself, and that the inquiry, claimed to be held has never held and the inquiry officer misconduct himself by obtaining signatures of the workman on papers. The Management has failed to explain the allegation made in the telegram. The other support the workman in this regard gets from his own statement claimed to be made by him before the inquiry officer. The perusal of the statements make interesting reading. The statement is claimed to be recorded on 22nd March, 2000. Before recording that statement the inquiry officer did not ask the workman whether he had been served with the charge sheet or not and whether he would like to be assisted by defence representative or not. He was also not asked whether he has received the articles of the charges the list of the witnesses and the documents which are likely to be produced against him and whether he wants to inspect some documents or need any other assistance so as to show that the workman was well aware before recording his statement that what are charges against him and what

documents were to be produced against him and whether he wanted the assistance of defence representative or he himself wanted to defend him. Nothing such was done by the inquiry officer which shows that he conducted the inquiry in a very casual manner, and it seems, violating the instructions issued by the Management the procedure and principles of natural justice he did so to benefit the Management.

If we go through the statement of the workman recorded during the so called inquiry one finds that the same could not be the statement of the workman, who is semi literate person. How could one expect him to keep the detail of the memorandum, including its number and date? In reply to the charge sheet he denied that he had concealed any facts from the Management and claimed, that the performatas, in which the information about the academic qualification was entered, were filled by the employees of the Management and the information was given by the employees of the employment exchange; and that the selection committee did not ask him for any more information. He had submitted the copies of all the testimonials, therefore, he did not conceal the facts. There is another reason to look at the correctness of the statement with caution. The workman signed on the third page of his statement after a wide gap and on right side, down below, whereas on the first two pages, he is shown to have signed on the left side down below which gives reasons to believe that the signatures were obtained first and the contents were written later on. Therefore, I have reason to believe that the statement of the workman was recorded later, but his signatures were obtained earlier and somebody else was the author of the statement.

There are other cogent reasons to doubt the fairness of the inquiry in the case. The workman claimed that before the service of the memorandum of charges given he had already made the statement and explained his position. The workman has placed on record a copy of the statement dated 22nd Dec., 1999. This statement was made five months after the service of letter dated 3rd July, 1999 by which the Management had appointed Sh. Y.S. Kaushik as the inquiry officer and Sh. J.P. Aggarwal as the Presenting Officer. This statement is shown to have been made in presence of Sh. Y.S. Kaushik and J.P. Aggarwal. In this statement the workman claimed that he had registered himself with the employment exchange on 31st Dec., 1996 on the basis of his having passed 8th standard examination he was sponsored for the post of messenger in the SBI; that on 26th March, 1997, he appeared before the selection committee and produced his testimonial that on the basis of the interview he was appointed and he joined his duties he further claimed that at the time of his appointment his qualification was above middle and he had informed about it to the Management. In this statement he did not admit that he had concealed the fact so as to get the employment as he had no option except that as the jobs were not available and all other things which are shown to have told by him in his statement dated 22nd March, 2000. It is not

understandable as to what was the occasion for the workman to have made the statement on 22nd Dec., 1999, and if at he had already made the statement, then what was the necessity for recording his subsequent statement on 22nd March, 2000. Interestingly no question was put to him about his previous statement although the same was also made in presence of both the presenting and the inquiry officers. There seems to be some manipulation somewhere about which the Management has not come forward give reasons. I doubt that the statement of the workman is shown to have been made on 22nd March, 2000 was infact made.

Now coming to the main question whether the workman was guilty of misconduct as is alleged. It is the admitted case of the parties that the workman was sponsored by the Employment Exchange, Kaithal. The Management has placed on record photo copy of the requisitions made by the Management, dated 5th and 10th February, 1997. The copies of the requisitions and the sponsorship letter of the Employment Exchange, claimed to be the documents of the Management are on record. The first requisition was made for one post of general and one for reserved category meant for Scheduled Caste. The workman is a Scheduled Caste. The qualification required for the post was as under :—

Qualification required :

- | | |
|---------------|-----------------------------------------|
| (1) Essential | under matric, minimum 8th standard pass |
| (2) Desirable | N.A. |

The Management has also placed on record the performa A claims to be signed by the workman. The Management has failed to prove that the entries made in this performa was in the hands of the workman or that he understood the contents thereof. This performa was filled on 26th March, 1997. Column 5, which concerns the educational qualification, reads as under :—

Educational qualifications : 8th standard in first class.

Furnish details in respect of 8th standard onward in case you are applying for a post in subordinate cadre.

Name of School/ Board and Exami- nation passed	Year of Passing	Class or Div.	percentage of marks	No. of sittings and not attempts in which the Exa- mination was passed.
G.M.S. Chandra, Kurukshetra, BSE (Bhiwani) Haryana 30th, April, 1980	1986	8th Pass	66.71%	N.A. only one

According to this performa the candidate was required to give the detail of his educational qualifications in respect of 8th standard onward provided he had applied for the post in the Subordinate Cadre. As per the requisition, referred to above, the essential qualification

for the post of messenger was under matric and in no case less than 8th standard pass which clearly meant that for appointment as a messenger, one should not be less than 8th standard pass. The requisition letter nowhere stated the maximum qualification required for the post of messenger. Against the column of "Desirable Qualification" the Management clearly stated NA so the Management did not desire further qualification or preferential qualification for the post of messenger. In the requisition letter there is absolutely nothing to show a person who was possessing higher qualification was ineligible for appointment as a messenger. For example in the case of Age Limit, the requisition clearly prohibited the candidates having age more than 26 to apply for the post, but in the case of academic qualification, no such rider was put and it is not permissible to the Management to claim that a matriculate could not apply for the post of messenger and since the workman was a matriculate so was not eligible to apply for the post of messenger. In order to support their claim the Management was required to further show that the workman concealed the facts by not declaring his academic qualification onwards 8th standard. Since the minimum qualification required for the post of messenger had been shown by the workman, therefore, if he did not mention about his having passed matriculation examination, to my mind, he did not commit any misconduct. Moreover he gave this declaration on 26th March, 1997 on which day he was not even the employee of the Management, so was not subject to the standing orders, rules and notifications of the Management so as to take that his failure to state correct facts, about the academic qualification amounted to misconduct for which he was required to be punished under the Bipartite settlements, circulars or notifications.

A similar case came for the consideration of the Hon'ble Division Bench of H.P. High Court in the case of Prem Lal Sharma V/s. SBI, CWP No. 348 of 1997 decided on 25th November, 1999. Hon'ble Division Bench, relying upon a number of authorities of Hon'ble Supreme Court, "that it could be seen from the above stipulation that what is stated in the said rule is of minimum qualification. The use of word minimum while explaining under matric postulate that neither it was meant to be the only qualification nor any ceiling on the possession of qualification over and above envisaged in the contemplation of the rule making authority or any such inhibition or restriction has been engrafted in the said rule. Regarding the question of alleged suppression of the actual qualification by the petitioner that he was a matriculate on the date of his interview as also his appointment their Lordship held that, suppression or concealment invariably is indicative of an element of fraud also in it and to suppress anything is to put a stop to it when it actually exists and at times it may not constitute suppression by merely preventing or withholding that which may lead of the actual factum of suppression. Thus they held that the non mention of matriculation as the qualification of the workman did not amount to concealment though it may be a factum of suppression.

In view of the discussion made above I am of the opinion that the workman did not commit any misconduct as he was not prevented to apply for the post of messenger being a matriculate. No doubt as, a good citizen he was supposed to disclose all the facts truly and if he suppressed his qualification of being matriculate, he did not commit a misconduct. In my opinion the Management did not hold a fair and proper inquiry in the matter. They further violated the provisions of the law and principles of natural justice by awarding the punishment of dismissal to the workman from the service, for his having concealed the factum of his being a matriculate. The impugned proceedings, initiated against the workman, for his alleged misconduct had no basis either on facts and in law and, therefore, the same are set aside both being unfair and improper and for their being no basis for the same.

The Management as an additional plea prayed that they may be allowed to lead the evidence in case the Tribunal comes to the conclusions that the inquiry held was not fair and proper or it was visited with infirmity. I considered this submission of the Management, but I am of the opinion that the same cannot be allowed. The Management has already placed on record all the documents including the copies of inquiry proceedings. Moreover the workman has also admitted that he was matriculate on the day he joined the service of the Management. In the circumstances the permission to the Management to lead evidence by exercising powers under Section-11 A of the I.D. Act shall be an abuse of process of law as that will further prolong the agony of the workman and shall put the parties to further expenses, a wastage of time and energy but without any result in view of the discussion made above.

For what has been stated above I am of the opinion that the inquiry held against the workman was not fair and proper, rather the Management had no basis to initiate the proceedings against the workman, therefore, the inquiry proceedings as well as the punishment awarded to the workman is quashed and the workman is treated to be in service as if there was no order of his dismissal from service. He is entitled to all the service benefits including back wages as if he was all along in the service of the Management. The award is passed in his favour. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for necessary action and the file be consigned to records after due completion.

KULDIP SINGH, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2841.-- औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ़ पटियाला के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण चण्डीगढ़ के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 646/2के5) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-8-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/125/1999-आई. आर. (बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2841.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.646/2005) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of Patiala and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30-8-2007.

[No. L-12012/125/1999-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-II,
CHANDIGARH**

Presiding Officer : Shri Kuldip Singh

Case I.D. No. : 646/2k5

Registered on : 24-08-2005

Date of Decision : 14-05-2007

M.S. Pathania, General Secretary, State Bank of Patiala,
Staff Union (Regd.) House No.13, Ward No.6, Solan
(Himachal Pradesh)

.....Petitioner

Versus

The Deputy General Manager, State Bank of Patiala,
Sco 156-158, Sector -17-C, Chandigarh

.....Respondent

APPEARANCE

For the Workman : Sh. R.P Rana, Advocate

For the Management : Mr. N.K. Zakhmi,
Advocate

AWARD

The following reference has been received from the Ministry of Labour, Government of India vide their number L-12012/125/99-IR(B-1) dated 7th Sep., 1999:-

“Whether the action of the Deputy General Manager, State Bank of Patiala, Sector-17, Chandigarh in denying the demand of State Bank of Patiala Staff Union, Solan(H.P.) to correct the alleged wrong fixation of pay of Sh. M.S Pathania, Clerk posted at Mall Road, Shimla Branch of State Bank of Patiala is just and legal? if not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?”

The notice of the reference was issued to the parties. The parties appeared. The workmen filed the Claim Statement and his rejoinder. The Management has filed the Written Statement. Both the workmen and Shri J.L Sharma, Deputy Manager, witness of the Management filed their affidavits. Both of them also came in the witness box in support of their claim with the respective parties.

The claim of the workman is that after serving the armed forces from 1974 to 1990, he joined the service of the respondent Bank on 1st Dec., 1993. As per the instructions issued by the Government of India bearing No. PER/52 of 1987 dated 18th May, 1997, it was required of the Management to have protected his salary last drawn by him in the armed forces. However, the Management did not fix his pay in accordance with instructions. His representation to the Management also did not wake them and the same was rejected. According to him his salary should have fixed at Rs. 1400 since he was drawing Rs.1378 as his last salary with the armed forces whereas the Management fixed his salary at Rs. 1890. He has prayed for a direction to the Management to fix his pay scales at Rs. 1400 from the date he joined the service and according to the revised pay scale w.e.f. 1st Nov., 1992 in terms of circular of Management No. PER/52 dated 18th May, 1987.

The Management has opposed his claim. They have taken preliminary objections to the maintainability of the reference by claiming that the workman has no cause to maintain this reference as the pay of the workmen was correctly fixed in accordance of compendium of Government guidelines received from Indian Bank Association, Bombay. According to them the basic salary of the workmen was fixed at Rs. 900 D.A 990 i.e. 1890 per month which was higher the salary, he was drawing at the time of his release from Army. Moreover, the reference is bad for mis joinder and non joinder of the necessary party as the Management Bank is an autonomous body and could sue and be sued in its name. On merit it is their claim that the workman had joined the service of the Management on 1st Dec., 1993. Denying the contents of para no.2, but admitting the contents of para no. 3 of the Claim Petition, it is stated by them to para no. 4 that the claim made is misconceived, misstate, therefore, denied. According to them the pay of the Ex-servicemen who joined the service should be on the basis of protection of pay last drawn in the armed forces, plus D.A. in the Bank whichever is higher. They have claimed that the pay of the workman was to be fixed in accordance with the Government guidelines and circulars issued from time to time. Since the Management has already done so, therefore, the claim made by the workmen is, therefore, not maintainable.

In the rejoinder the workman has reiterated that his basic salary should have been protected at Rs. 1378 whereas the Bank fixed it at Rs.900. Thus, the claim of the Management is wrong that they have fixed the salary of the workman rightly. He has claimed that his pay should have been fixed at Rs. 1400. The workman in his statement admitted the contents of affidavit W-1 and documents W 2 to W5 besides Mark-A. When cross examined he admitted that the D.A and Basic pay is mentioned in document W 4 and the same is 1883. He admitted that at the time he joined the service he was paid Rs.1890. He further admitted that his basic pay at the time of joining

service with the Bank was Rs. 900 and the D.A. was 990. He denied that he received more emoluments than he was drawing in the Armed Forces.

The witness of the Management, Sh. J. L. Sharma, also proved his affidavit and the documents M-2 and M-3. He admitted that at the time the workman joined his service his pay was as per W-4 Rs.1385 and the workman was accommodated in the Grade of 900—2560 vide document 3. However he was allowed basic pay at the rate of Rs. 900. He further admitted that LPC W-4 the workman was getting Rs.75 as Class pay and good service pay at the Rate of 48% p.a. He admitted that circular, W-2 was considered at the time of fixation of pay, of the workman and the total emoluments the workman was drawing in the army was protected. However, his basic pay as he was drawing in the army, was not protected in isolation. Though it was done by adding the allowances.

From the pleadings of the parties the dispute which has emerged out is whether the Management fixed the pay of the workman correctly on the day he joined service with them on 1st Dec., 1993 or not. The workman has made his claim on the basis of circular No. PER/52 of 1987 dated 18th May, 1987. Relevant para of circular reads as under:—

Those who joined the service of the Bank on or after, 1st July, 1983;

The fixation of pay in the case of ex-servicemen who joined the service of the Bank on or after 1st July, 1983 (date of 4th Settlement) should be made on the basis of protection of "Pay" drawn in the Armed Forces or at a stage where the New Basic Pay+D. A. corresponds to the basic Pay+D.A. drawn by them in the Armed forces, whichever is higher. Those persons who joined the service of the Bank on or after 1st July, 1983 but were given the fitment in the scale of pay under 3rd Bi-partite Settlement, they may be given re-fixation in the following manner :—

Last pay drawn in Army	3rd Bi-partite Appointed in October, 1983 pay Fixed in the Bank Cashe formula of Protection of pay	4th Bi-partite If fitted on the basis of protection of pay	4th Bi partite On the basis of protection of pay+DA
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There is no dispute that the workman had joined the service with the Management on 1st December, 1983, therefore, with regard to fixation of his pay, he was to be governed by the para referred to above. It is his claim that the Management was required to protect his pay in terms of the first part of this para i.e. he was to be given the basic salary at Rs. 1255 plus Class pay 75 plus good service pay at Rs. 48 and the sum total of which should come to 1,378. Thus his pay was to be protected at Rs. 1400+D.A. @Rs.

505. He was, therefore, entitled to the salary at that amount right from 1st December, 1983, whereas the Management fixed his salary at the rate of 900+D.A. at the rate of Rs. 990. He has also claimed that since by virtue of 4th Bi-partite settlement the D.A. was raised to which the workman also became entitled and, therefore, he was entitled to the salary @ Rs. 2390 per month. The Management has opposed his claim and submitted that the interpretation of the rule given by the workman is not correct. According to them the objective of the circular relied upon by the workman was to ensure that the ex-servicemen, at the time of employment in the public sector bank, does not get the amount lesser than what he was drawing while in defence service. They have contended that as per his own saying the workman was getting salary at the rate of Rs. 1883 per month as per exhibit M-3 and the Management fixed his salary at higher amount than he was getting i.e. at the rate of Rs. 1890. The workman has contested this claim saying that the Management has failed to protect his pay by fixing his pay at the rate of Rs. 900 whereas he was getting the basic salary at the rate of 1,378 on the day he retired from the army service. In reply to this the Management has relied upon the authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as 2003 LAB. I.C.2622.

I have gone through authority referred by the Management and find that the arguments made by the Management is supported by the said authority. Their Lordship have held in the judgement that when a question of pay protection comes, the basic feature is that the fitment of fixation of pay in a particular scale must be such as to ensure that the total emoluments have not been reduced. They further held that in terms of letter dated 28th January, 1983, issued by Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Banking Division, Government of India the purposes of letter was to give protection to the salary drawn by the ex-servicemen in the armed forces before going to the services of the Management. The protection was to be given to total emoluments i.e. Pay+D.A. (Instead of only pay) last drawn by the ex-servicemen before their retirement from the armed services. In the letter so referred the Ministry desired that protection was to be given to total emoluments and not only to the pay only. The stress on the document of the concerned Ministry was on protection of total emoluments received by the concerned employees in the armed service. It was only that the total emoluments do not fall below to what was being received by him as pay+D.A. in the armed forces. The judgement relied upon by the Management is the answer to the claim made by workman. Since the salary of the workman was fixed, on the day he joined service with them on 1st December, 1983, at the rate of 1890, his salary which he was drawing at the time of retirement was well protected and cannot be said to be less than what was he getting as he was drawing Rs. 1883 as his salary at that time.

The workman has further contended that the Management has already fixed the salary of Messrs. Roshan Lal, Y. S. Rana and S. S. Katoch, who also retired from armed services and were given protection of the pay and their salary was not protected as total emoluments, rather their basic pay was protected they were drawing in the armed forces and for that purpose it was not their total emoluments rather their pay was separately protected and they were allowed to draw other allowances as were admissible to them on their protected pay. He has placed on record a statement showing the salary paid to him and the person named by him. He has alleged that there is the discrimination perpetuated by the Management in this regard, therefore his emoluments may be fixed in the manner those are fixed in the case of three employees who have also joined service with the Management in the same manner as the workman joined. In this regard I find that this claim of the workman is afterthought as he did not take this plea in the Claim Statement. Therefore, the Management had chance to rebut this claim in their Written Statement. The other occasion of the workman to have highlighted this fact was either to have produced the evidence to support his claim or could put this situation to the witness of the Management who was in his hand at the time of making the statement. Not a single question was put to the witness, Mr. J. L. Sharma, when he was in the witness box nor I find any record to support this claim of the workman. Therefore this plea of the workman cannot be considered even otherwise in view of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which is law of land, this claim of the workman cannot be allowed on even if the Management may be doing mistake be paying the salary to those persons named, in the manner stated by the workman.

In view of the discussion made above that the workman is not entitled to any relief. The award is passed against him holding that he is not entitled to any relief and that the Management was justified in not accepting the demand of the SBOP Staff Union, Solan, with regard to the fixation of pay of the workman. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for necessary action and the file be consigned to records after due completion.

KULDIP SINGH, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2842.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चंडीगढ़ के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 323/2k5) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-08-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/36/1991-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2842.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 323/2k5) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30-08-2007.

[No. L-12012/36/1991-IR(B-1)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT-II, CHANDIGARH

Presiding Officer : Shri Kuldip Singh

Case I.D. No. : 323/2k5

Registered on : 12-08-2005

Date of Decision : 4-07-2007

Mahavir Prasad General Servant as Represented by
State Bank of India, Staff Congress, 3135/22-D,
Chandigarh

...Petitioner

Versus

General Manager (P), State Bank of India, Local Head
Office, Sector-17, Chandigarh

...Respondent

APPEARANCE

For the Workman : Mr. Raj Kaushik, AR

For the Management : Mr. D.V. Mehta, Advocate

AWARD

The Government of India, Ministry of Labour, vide their Order No. L-12012/36/91-IR (B-3) dated 18th/19th June, 1991, referred the following dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal :—

“Whether the action of General Manager (P) State Bank of India, L.H.O. Sector 17, Chandigarh, in terminating the services of Shri Mahavir Prasad, engaged by the Bank w.e.f. 17th May, 1985 is legally valid and justified? If not to what relief the workman is entitled to and from which date?”

The reference was entered in the concerned register and the notices were issued to the parties who appeared through their counsel and filed their pleadings in the shape of Claim Statement, Written Statement, Reply to the Written Statement, affidavit of the workman, affidavit of Shri Munni Lal Agarwal, Deputy Manager, witness of the Management. The parties have also placed on record photo

copies of a number of documents. The workman, through his counsel, made an application for a direction to the Management to produce the record as detailed therein. The Management disputed the relevancy of the application. They also claimed by subsequent application, that the record summoned stand destroyed and supported their claim with a certificate issued by the Deputy General Manager. The Management also refused to admit or deny contents of the copies of the documents, the photo copies of which were placed on record by the workman, stating that the same cannot be done in the absence of the original record.

I have gone through the file and have also considered the submissions made by the counsel for the parties.

By this reference, the Government of India has desired to know whether the action of General Manager (p) State Bank of India, L.H.O. sector 17, Chandigarh in terminating the services of Shri Mahavir Prasad, engaged by the Bank w.e.f. 17th May, 1985 is legally valid and justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to and from which date? The claim of the workman is that his termination from service was bad in law and has prayed for declaring the same so and for quashing the same. According to him, he was appointed by the Management as general servant to work at the residence of the C.G.M., Guest House at 66, sector 9-A, Chandigarh and 139, sector 19-A, Chandigarh. He also claimed to have worked in the office under the Liaison Officer w.e.f. April, 1984 to 17th of May, 1985 continuously and was paid wages @ rupees 10/- per day although as general servant he was entitled to the scale of pay applicable to subordinate staff. He was also not allowed weekly off, National and gazetted holidays. The workman served the Management for more than 240 days during the twelve months preceding the date of termination of his services, but the Management neither gave any notice of termination to the workman nor paid him the wages for the notice period. They engaged fresh hands as general servant including one Abhey Chander who was later on permanently absorbed in the department in 1989. The Management therefore, violated the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act 1947, hereinafter to be referred to as 'ACT' and rules.

The Management has opposed the claim of the workman. It is stated by them that the workman was never engaged as General Servant to work at the residence of CGM, in the Guest House or in Office Manager's Department. He was rather engaged on different occasions during the period 13th May, 1984 to 17th May, 1985 for doing petty odd jobs such as cleaning of chairs, during official parties/functions, dusting the furniture etc. The job for which he was engaged was not of regular nature. He was however, paid wages as agreed to between the parties. Since the workman was not appointed as an employee of the Bank, therefore, the question of termination of his services never arose. Since he was a casual labourer, therefore, no notice was required to be given to him before disengaging him. The recruitment in the Management was governed by eligibility criteria and norms. Since the

workman used to work for 2/3 hours a day for which he was paid agreed amount of wages, therefore, the Management did not violate the provisions of the Act or rules. They also did not violate the principles of Natural justice. They have prayed for dismissal of the claim of the workman being devoid of any merit.

Stated in brief the claim of the workman is that he was appointed as General servant by the Management for working at the residence of the CGM, in the guest house and in the Office of Manager Department. He has failed to produce the order by which he was appointed. He has also failed to produce any other evidence which could show that the workman was appointed as General servant as is claimed. By his own pleadings he admitted that he was not given the grade of General servant and was paid rupees 10/- per day as wages. He claimed, in his statement made before this tribunal that he was paid wages by cheques. He has however, not produced any evidence to show that he had ever received his wages by cheques. His claim that he had continuously worked for the management from April, 1984 to 17th of May, 1985 has been contested by the Management. According to them the workman was engaged on different occasions for doing petty odd jobs such as cleaning of furniture during the parties and functions in the Bank guest house for two three hours during the period 13th May, 1984 to 17th May, 1985. Shri Desh Bandu Chief Manager who appeared as witness for the Management admitted that the workman was engaged as casual labour who worked in the Bank guest house for CJM and he was paid labour charges for three months. He further admitted that the Liaison Officer was engaging him earlier and was submitting bills of labour charges.

On record I find a photo copy of statement showing the payments made to one B.S. Anand Liaison Officer and others. The detail of payments made include for working in house No. 139/19-A, for different periods and at different rates. The labour charges were paid at times for full month at the rate rupees 10/- per day. This statement, however, does not show that the payments made and detailed in this statement pertained to the engagement of the workman as these nowhere make reference about him by name. There are however, photo copies of some receipts issued by one Mahavir Prasad for different amount for having worked in the kothi of CGM during Oct, November, 1984 and January, 1985. There are also two other receipts for an amount of rupees 310/- each which do not contain the detail of month to which these relate to. These receipt at the best show that one Mahavir Prasad had performed the duty at the residence of CGM of the Management during that period on wages at the rate of rupees 10/- per day. Except this there is no evidence to show that the workman had served the Management continuously for 240 days twelve months preceding the date of termination of his services by the Management. The evidence rather is to the effect that the workman had worked as casual labourer during different

periods on wages @ 10/- per day. The workman has, therefore, failed to show that he had served the Management continuously for 240 during twelve months preceding the date of his dis-engagement. The evidence brought on record rather shows that the workman was engaged by the Management for doing certain manual jobs on payment of rupees 10/- per day for certain period and that he was not engaged after 17th of May, 1985. He has thus failed to show that he had worked continuously for the Management for 240 days twelve months preceding the date of termination of his services on 17th May, 1985. He is therefore, not entitled to the protection under section 25-F of the Act.

In view of the discussion made above the reference in hand is answered against the workman holding that he is not entitled to any relief. Let a copy of this award sent to the appropriate Government for necessary action and the file be consigned to records after due completion.

KULDIP SINGH, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2843.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार नार्थन रेलवे जम्मू के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चंडीगढ़ के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 1226/2k5) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-08-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-41012/49/2005-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2843.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 1226/2k5) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of Northern Railway Jammu and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30-08-2007.

[No. L-41012/49/2005-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT-II, CHANDIGARH

Presiding Officer : Shri Kuldip Singh

Case I.D. No. : 1226/2k5

Registered on : 19-12-2005

Date of Decision : 30-5-2007

Gopal Prasad through Shri Ashok Kumar Basotra, Advocate, High Court of J & K, 130/3, Shastri Nagar, Jammu.

Petitioner

Versus

1. Messrs. Continental Construction Company, Continental House, 28, Nehru Place, New Delhi.
2. The Deputy Chief Engineer, Jammu Udhampur Rail Project, Northern Railway, Jammu.

Respondent

APPEARANCE

For the Workman	Mr. Ashok Kumar Basotra, Advocate
For the Management	Mr. S.K. Shukla, Advocate for R-1. Mr. Hari Hartar Singh, Advocate for R-2.

AWARD

The parties are present through their counsel. It is stated by them that the parties have reached to compromise and the workman has agreed to accept rupees 1.5 lacs (one lac fifty thousands only) as the full and final settlement of his all claims against respondent No. 1 and its officers as named in the statement of claim, therefore, the reference be answered accordingly. Statement of counsel for the workman has been recorded and he has admitted that the workman has accepted rupees 1.5 lacs as the full and final settlement of his all claims against respondent No. 1. The workman has already admitted in this statement, recorded in this Tribunal that he has no claim to make against respondent No. 2 Shri S.S. Sinha, Deputy Manager (admn) of respondent, who is duly authorized Special Power of Attorney of the Management and who has been appointed by the Receiver of the Management, has made the statement that the Management offers rupees 1.5 lacs (One lac fifty thousand only) to the workman as the full and final settlement of his Claim against the Management. Thus the parties have settled their dispute amicably with the intervention of the Tribunal. The workman is therefore, held to be entitled to rupees 1.5 lacs as the full and final settlement of his claims against the Management. Therefore, it is held that the workman is entitled to rupees one lac fifty thousands as the full and final settlement of his all claims against the Management.

It is stated that respondent No. 2 has withheld an amount of rupees more than eight lac of respondent No. 1 on the direction of the ALC (c) Jammu. The prayer of the workman is that the amount now found and be paid to him. Both the counsel for the respondents have shown no objection to it. Rather the prayer of respondent No. 1 is that after deducting the amount now offered to the workman as full and final settlement of his claims against the Management and the balance amount be ordered to be released in their favour. In view of this it is directed to respondent No. 2 to deposit an amount of rupees 1.5 lac in this Tribunal on 27-6-2007, out of the amount they have

retained from the payments of the respondent No. 1 Since the reference has been finally disposed off, therefore, respondent No. 2 is further directed to release the balance amount of respondent No. 1 in their favour unless respondent No. 1 is otherwise liable to discharge some other liability towards respondent No. 2.

In view of the discussion made above the reference is answered in the terms that in view of compromise arrived at between the parties the workman is not entitled to any other relief against the Management. Let a copy of the award be sent to appropriate Government for necessary action besides to the parties for compliance. The file be consigned to records after due completion.

KULDIP SINGH, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2844.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ इण्डिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, चण्डीगढ़ के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 449/2k5) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-08-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/232/1997-आई.आर.(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2844.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 449/2k5) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Chandigarh as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of India and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 30-08-2007.

[No. L-12012/232/1997-IR (B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT-II, CHANDIGARH

Presiding Officer : Shri Kuldip Singh

Case I.D. No. : 449/2k5

Registered on : 19-08-2005

Date of Decision : 7-07-2007

Pawan Singh S/o. Shri Chajju Ram,
Village and Post Keorak,
Tehsil and District-Kaithal

...Petitioner

Versus

The Regional Manager,
State Bank of India,
Sector-17, Chandigarh

...Respondent

APPEARANCE

For the Workman Mr. V.B. Aggarwal,
Advocate

For the Management Mr. V. K. Sharma, AR

AWARD

The Government of India, Ministry of Labour, vide their order No. L-12012/232/97-IR (B-I) dated 20th May, 1998 referred the following dispute for adjudication to this Tribunal :—

“Whether the action of the Management of State Bank of India in terminating the services of Shri Pawan Singh is legal and justified? If not, to what relief Shri Pawan Singh is entitled?”

The notice of the reference was given to the parties to appear. The workman was represented by an advocate whereas Mr. Kohli, Law Officer appeared as representative of the Management. The workman filed his Claim Statement, to which the Management filled the reply. The workman supported his claim with his own affidavit whereas the Management filed the affidavit of their Deputy Manager, D.S. Rastogi. Both the workman as well as the witness of the Management D.S. Rastogi appeared as a witness.

The claim of the workman is that he was appointed as guard on temporary basis with the bank on 2nd Sep., 1992 and he served them upto January, 1994 when his services were terminated orally without any notice, charge sheet or inquiry. He was also not paid retrenchment compensation and wages for the notice period although he had served the Management for 240 days continuously within 12 months before the date of termination of his services. The Management thus violated the provisions of I.D. Act, for short “Act”, and the principles of natural justice. He prayed for declaring the termination of his services as bad in law and for consequential benefits and back wages. The Management has opposed the claim of the workman stating that the workman had not served the Management for 240 days in twelve months preceding the date of his termination, as is claimed by him. He did not fall in the category of workman, so is not entitled to the protection of Section 25-F of the Act. On merit it is their submission that the workman was engaged intermittently, as temporary guard in the Kaithal branch, where he served for 52 days from Dec., 1992 to March 1993 and at Kalai Kaithal Branch, for 191 days during the period April, 1993 to January, 1994, as and when required basis. Giving the details of the working days, on which the workman had served the Management, it is further submitted by them there was no requirement of issuance of notice to the workman and holding of the inquiry against him since he did not fall within protection of Section 25-F of the Act. Claiming that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of American Express reported as AIR 1986 Supreme Court 458, it is submitted by them that since

the workman was a temporary/Badli Guard, therefore, he could not be paid for intervening Sundays and Holidays. They have prayed for dismissing the claim of the workman.

The workman appeared as a witness and proved his affidavit exhibit W-1. In his cross examination he admitted that he had not applied for the job in the Management Bank and was engaged as daily wager. However he was not given any appointment or termination of service letters by the Management. He admitted to have served the Kaithal Branch of the Management for 52 days and for 191 days in the Talai Branch. But claimed that on three occasions he had performed double duty. He further claimed that he had performed double duty atleast 15 times but he had not paid wages for that. He specifically claimed that Sh. A.L. Dhingra the Branch Manager of the Branch had assured him that he will be called for duty as and when the vacancy would arise. Sh. Dinesh Rastogi, who appeared as a witness for the Management proved his affidavit M-1 and admitted that the workman had served in the Kaithal Branch in January, 1993 for 42 days and Talai Branch from April to Dec., 1993 for 178 days. He further admitted that the workman had served in January 1994, for 13 days; and that the workman had performed double duty which was included in 31 days. He showed lack of knowledge that the workman had served double duty in Dec., 1993. He, however, admitted that he was not paid compensation in terms of Section 25-F of the Act.

From the pleading of the party the facts which emerge out are that the workman had served the Management from January, 1993 to 1994. There is however dispute about the total number of days the workman served with the Management. As per the workman, he had served the Management from Dec., 1992 to March 1993 for 52 days and for 191 days from April, 1993 to January, 1994. He further claimed to have to perform double duty in Talai Branch. He further claimed to have performed double duty for 15 times but admitted in the same breath that the Management had not recorded his double duty nor had paid him the wages for that. He also could not give the dates on which he had performed double duty and was occasion for performing double duty. The Management has, however, denied the claim of the workman and have given the detail of the working days in their Written Statement on which the workman had served the Management. Since there is no dispute that the termination of the services of the workman had been done in January, 1994. Therefore, so as to find out the number of days he served for the Management, the calculation has to be made from Feb., 1993 to January, 1994. The Management has given the detail of the working days during which period the workman served them, as 214 days whereas the workman has not given the details of the number of days, he served the Management from Feb., 1993 to January, 1994. He has also produced no evidence to show that he was paid wages for Sundays as well as National Holidays

during the intervening period. He has, however, claimed benefit of Sundays and Holidays, on the strength of the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of workmen of Express International Banking Corporation Vs. American Express reported as AIR 1996 SC 458. In that judgement the Hon'bel Supreme court held as under :—

“The qualification for relief under Section 25-F is that he should be a workman employed in an industry and has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. What is continuous service has been defined and explained in Section-25-B of the Act. In view of Sub-s. (2) of Section 25-B the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service if he has actually worked under the employer” for particular period. The expression “actually worked under the employer” cannot mean those days only when the workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc. **Thus Sundays and other paid holidays should be taken into account for the purpose of reckoning the total number of days on which the workman could be said to have actually worked.”**

As stated earlier the workman has not produced any evidence nor could elicit from the cross examination of the witness of the Management that he was paid wages for all Sundays and Holidays intervening in the period of his engagement by the Management. Thus by any calculation it cannot be said that the workman had performed duty for the Management for 240 days in 12 months preceding the date of termination of services, therefore, he cannot claim protection under Section 25-F of the Act even when the Management has admitted that neither any notice was issued to him nor wages for the notice period and retrenchment compensation was paid to the workman. For what has been said above the workman is not entitled to any relief. Therefore, the reference is answered against him. Let a copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for necessary action and the file be consigned to records after due completion.

KULDIP SINGH, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2845.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार नार्थ फरन्ट रेलवे के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मकारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, गुवाहाटी के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 13/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-08-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-41012/212/2002-आई.आर. (बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2845.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 13/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of N.F. Railway and their workman, received by the Central Government on 30-08-2007.

[No. L-41012/212/2002-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

IN THE CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, GUWAHATI, ASSAM

PRESENT

**Shri H. A. Hazarika, Presiding Officer,
CGIT-cum-Labour Court, Guwahati.**

Ref. Case No. 13 of 2004

In the matter of an Industrial Dispute between :—

The Management of N.F. Railway, Guwahati.

-Vrs-

Their workmen Sri Sukdev Das represented by General Secretary, Rail Mazdur Union N.F. Railway, Rest Camp, Pandu.

APPEARANCES

For the Workman : Mr. L. P. Sarma, Advocate
Smt. R. Bhattacharjee,
Advocate.

For the Management : Mr. K. C. Sarma, Rly.
Advocate.

Date of Award : 21-08-07

AWARD

1. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, vide its order No. L-41012/8/2005-IR(B-I) referred this Industrial Dispute arose between the employers in relation to the Management of the General Manager (P), N. F. Railway, Lumding and their Workman, Sri Chitta Ranjan Rishi to adjudicate and to pass an award on the strength of powers conferred by Clause (d) of sub-Section (1) and Sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) on the basis of the following Schedule.

SCHEDULE

“Whether the action of the Management of N.F. Railway, Maligaon, Guwahati in dismissing the service of Shri Sukdeb Das, Ex. Khalashi and also denying Shri Das to resume duties is justified? If not, what relief Shri Das, Ex. Khalashi is entitled to?”

2. The Case record received on transfer from the Learned Industrial Tribunal, Guwahati on 06-12-04 and on

being appeared by both the parties the proceeding is proceeded here for disposal being Numbered 13/2004 as per procedure.

3. The case of the workman Sri Sukdeb Das in brief from narration of his W.S. is that he was appointed as Khalashi in District Signal Telecommunication Engineer by the N. F. Railway, Rangia and as such he joined in his service on 2-11-1982. That in the last part of 1985 he was transferred to Maligaon then in 1995 he was transferred to Silchar where he fell sick and hospitalized at N.F. Railway, Silchar Hospital wherefrom he was referred to NFR, Central Hospital at Maligaon. After recovery from his illness while the workman reported for duty at Silchar he was told by the DSTE to report for his duty at Maligaon Railway Head Quarter without giving any formal order to enable him to report at Maligaon Railway Headquarter. He came from Silchar thrice in order to report for his duty at Maligaon but he was not allowed to join in his duty. Once he was fell down while he was working at Rangia from Signal Post and treated by the Guwahati Medical College Hospital for which he had to remain absent from duty for few days. Though he was attended regularly at Silchar he was not allowed to work and received a Memorandum on 15-12-1992 by which statement of imputation and misconduct or misbehavior and the article of charges were forwarded alleging that the workman has been absconding from duties since 10-11-1987 without any authority. The authority also issued a letter No. N/97/17/CON/SCL dated 7-7-1989 for report to his duty within 7 days from the date of receipt of said letter. The charges were forwarded to him as per para 3 of the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules 1966. He never received the above Letter No. N/97/17/CON/SCL dated 7-7-1989. Then he was intimated by letter from DSTE/CON/Maligaon that Sri A.K. Saha, ASTE/CON/Maligaon has been appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry into the charges levelled against him. Though the workman duly present in the enquiry but none questioned him nor he was given any opportunity to cross examine any of the witness that may be examined by the enquiry officer. No witness of the prosecution were examined in his presence and no opportunity to cross examine is given in gross violation of the principle of natural justice. That no report and findings of the enquiry officer, furnished to him nor he was given any reasonable opportunity to explain on the allegedly conducted by the enquiry officer and as such, the enquiry was not valid. Though he requested to furnish copies of documents such as:

1. Copies of the documents which have relevant to the issues under enquiry, more particularly, the alleged report of immediate superior regarding continuous absence from duties of the worker;
2. DSTE/CON/SCL letter No. N/97/17/CON/SCL dated 7-7-1989.
3. Acknowledge receipt of the letter mentioned at serial 2 above and further relevant records.

4. That the workman has not yet received any order of termination from service and/or affecting the service condition by the Management of N.F. Railway. He raised the matter before the competent authority though his Union wherefrom appropriate Government referred the matter for adjudication. That the workman is not out of employment and the Management of N.F. Railway are not allowed to resume his duty and he prayed to pass an award to hold that the action of the NF Railway Administration in dismissing him from the duties is not at all justified and he is entitled for reinstatement in service with back wages and consequent benefits there of.

5. The case of the Management N.F. Railway in brief is that this proceeding is not maintainable in present form in law as well as in fact and is liable to dismiss. That Sri Sukdeb Das, S/o Sri D. Das the workman was initially engaged as Casual Khalasi with effect from 2-11-82 and he has been awarded temporary status w.e.f. 1.1.84. That the workman was referred by ADMO/Silchar on 3-8-87 for treatment as Out Door patient in ENT clinic of CHS/N.F. Railway, Maligaon vide CHS/MLG's letter No.H/184/3 dated 14-8-87. There is no record that the workman fell down while working at Rangia at Signal Post. But he submitted a discharged certificate issued by Gauhati Medical College Hospital vide No. Nil. dated 7-9-92 issued on dated 7-9-92. is for a period of one month from 24-8-86 to 23-9-86 wherein mentioned that he was patient due to vehicular accident. The N.F Railway, Silchar informed ASTE/Con/Silchar that the workman Sukdeb Das remain absent unauthorisedly and also remain absent absconding himself. On the basis of this information the workman Sukdeb Das was warned vide Letter No.N/97/17/Con/SCL dated 7-7-89 that if he fails to attend his duty within thirty days his name will be struck off from the muster roll. Though the workman denied having receipt of the letter yet record revealed that the workman after receiving the workman had appealed to DSTE/Con/Silchar that he requires rest for another 15 days as per advise of the Doctor and he would join at the earliest. But he never appeared before the authority for report and joining. That the conciliation proceeding fails at the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Guwahati. That the claim of the Petitioner workman is false and frivolous and is noting but gross misuse of law and as such it is liable to be dismissed with no award.

6. Heard the argument submitted by learned Advocate Mr. K.C. Sarma for the Management and Mr. L. P. Sarma, Advocate for the Union/workman. Perused the evidence submitted on Affidavit by the workman Sri Sukdeb Das. He is cross examined by the learned Advocate Mr. K.C. Sarma for the Management. The Management examined Sri Arup Kr. Sinha, Assistant Personnel Officer, Construction, who is also cross-examined by the learned Advocate for the workman, Sri L.P. Sarma. Perused the following exhibited documents.

Exhibited documents of the Management.

- (i) Ext. A. Notice of absconding from duties
- (ii) Ext B. Reply of the Workman.
- (iii) Ext. C. Notice of termination of service of Sri Sukdeb Das, Khalasi.
- (iv) Ext. D. Prayer of the workman for resumption to duty.

Exhibited documents of the Workman.

- (i) Ext. 1. Memorandum dated 15-12-92.
- (ii) Ext 2. Statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehavior etc.
- (iii) Ext.3. Article of Charges.
- (iv) Ext. 4. List of documents.
- (v) Ext. 5. Letter dated 6-1-93
- (vi) Ext.6. Letter dated 8-1-93.
- (vii) Ext. 7 & 8. Notices of enquiry Officer.
- (viii) Ext. 9. Schedule Caste Certificate.
- (ix) Ext. 10. Series of medical certificates, prescriptions etc.

7. The workman deposed that he joined in the service of N.F.Railway on 2-11-1982 and was posted under the District Signal Telecommunication Engineer (BG) at Rangia. He was transferred to Maligaon under the Chief Signal Telecommunication Engineer (CSTE), N.F.Railway, Maligaon. That he was transferred in the year 1985 from Maligaon to Silchar as Khalasi under the CSTE (Con). As he was suffering from illness he was treated by the Silchar Railway Hospital wherefrom he was referred to the Central Hospital, N.F. Railway, Maligaon and was indoor patient for 20 days in Central Hospital, N.F. Railway, Maligaon. After recovery of illness while he reported at duty at Silchar, the DSTE, Silchar asked him to report at Maligaon Railway Headquarter. While he came back to Maligaon and reported for join he was not allowed to join at Maligaon. Then he returned back to Silchar and regularly attending the office to Silchar but he was not allowed to work and did not pay his wages. On 15-12-92 he was received a statement of misconduct with an article of charges that he was absconding from duties since 10-11-87 without authority. But he has not received the letter issued by DSTE/Con/Silchar vide No.N/97/17/Con/SCL dated 7-7-89. Ext. 1 is the Memorandum dated 15-12-92, Ext.2 is the statement of misconduct, Ext.3 is the article of charges, Ext.4 is the list of documents. But no list of witness were furnished to him along with the Memorandum. That vide letter No.N/PC/CON/MLG/299-284 dated 8-1-93 received from DSTE/CON/Maligaon, whereby Sri A.K.Saha, ASTE/CON/Maligaon has been appointed as an Enquiry Officer to conduct the

enquiry into the charges leveled against him. That he was not received the termination order but at the same time he was not allowed to work and ultimately moved the conciliation authority which was failed. In cross examination he said he worked three years at Rangia and received monthly salary @ Rs.2200 (Rupees two thousand two hundred) per month. He was hospitalized for 2/3 months. Then again he fallen sick and transferred to Maligaon to join but no transfer order was given to him.

8. The Management witness Sri Arup Kr. Sinha deposed that workman was initially engaged as Casual Khalasi on 2-11-82 then after working 120 days he was awarded with temporary status with effect from 1-1-84 as casual Khalasi. That the workman was habit of remaining absent for which he was communicated a letter Ext. A and he was also warned vide Ext.B and intimated to join within 30 days otherwise his name will be struck off from the master roll. The workman prayed for 15 days rest on medical ground. After that he did not turn to his duty and ultimately he was terminated on 14-9-89 vide Ext.C and after that he never resumed his duty and appealed to the competent authority. After lapse of 5 years he submitted a representation dated 15-12-92 with medical certificate. Then departmental proceeding was initiated against the workman and workman was notified in the enquiry committee submitted his defence and ultimately he was dismissed from service. After lapse of 8 years on 10-7-02 he preferred an appeal before the competent authority. In cross examination he deposed that he does not know who is the appointing authority of the concerned workman Sukdeb Das. Before issuing of termination letter dated 14-9-89 no charge sheet, no enquiry, no opportunity was given to the workman Sri Sukdeb Das. He can not say whether Ext. C was received by the workman or not but there is an acknowledgement receipt dated 17-2-93. On Ext.B no action was taken, Ext. C is an office Note and not an order and copy of which was not communicated to the workman. He has got no knowledge about the office of the Dy. Chief Signal Telecommunication Engineer from 1992 to 2003 as he was joined in the office only in the year 2004. He was not present at the time of preparation of Ext. A, Ext. B, Ext. C and Ext. D and he was also not present at the time of enquiry. He does not know if the concerned workman was given any opportunity to defend his case during enquiry. After terminating the workman the enquiry was conducted.

9. Perused the following Case Laws submitted by the workman.

- i. (1991) 1 SCC 588.
- ii. AIR 1966 SC 951.
- iii. (1996) 3 SCC 364.

10. On careful scrutiny of the record I find the Management has only submitted Ext.A, Ext.B, Ext.C and Ext.D. It is the burden of the Management to submit the record of

proceeding conducted by the Management. Further I also find the enquiry as claimed by the management was conducted by Mr. A.K. Saha but Mr. A.K.Saha or Presenting Officer for the management were not examined by the Management. It is admittedly the workman was suffering from illness at Silchar. He was also treated for accident. He admittedly submitted for extension for his leave but neither he was allowed leave nor his petition was rejected.

11. The Management ought to have been examined Sri A.K.Saha who was the Enquiry Officer as he was well acquainted with the matter but he is not examined. The witness Sri Arup Kr. Sinha examined by the Management admittedly was not present at the time of enquiry held in 1992. He has got no knowledge about the working of the office of the Dy. Signal Telecommunication Engineer from 1992 to 2003 as he joined with the Office only in 2004. So admittedly he does not know the signatures of Exts. A, B, C & D, as he was not present at the time of preparation of Exts. A to Ext. D. He does not know if the concerned workman was given an opportunity to defend his case at the time of enquiry. The Management must prove by documents that workman was allowed to defend his case but no such documents were given by the Management as regards opportunity to defend his case.

12. It is pertinent to note here that admittedly, as I find, in the cross-examination part of the Management witness that after writing the Office Note, Ext.C on 14-9-89 the enquiry was held in 1992. After termination of the workman the enquiry was conducted. The termination must not be before the enquiry. Moreover, it is very much important to note here that the workman prayed vide Ext.B for 15 days rest but surprise to note here that the Management did not take action on the said letter submitted by the Workman Sukdeb Das. It is deposed by the management witness that the workman preferred an appeal after lapse of 8 years and as such, the same was time barred but the Management has not proved any appeal petition preferred by the Workman. So I can not hold that the workman preferred appeal which was time barred.

13. It is very much important to note here that the workman is a Master Roll employee and he was hospitalized, as such Management ought to have been looked into the prayer of the workman (Sukdeb Das). The manner in which the workman is terminated is not proper.

14. Under the above facts and circumstances I find the Management is not justified in terminating the workman from his job. Hence, I find the action of the Management is not justified as he ought to have been allowed to resume his duty at Silchar. I also find as the Workman is Master Roll employee he is not entitled to have back wages without performing his duties. As his last place of Posting is at Silchar the Management is to allow him to resume his duty at Silchar and he will be entitled to get pay from the date of his joining after passing of this award.

15. Accordingly prepare the award and send it to the Government as per procedure.

H.A. HAZARIKA, Presiding Officer
नई दिल्ली, 30 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2846.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार विदेश संचार निगम लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, नं.-II, नई दिल्ली के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 8/2005) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 30-09-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-40012/131/2004-आई.आर. (डी.यू.)]
सुरेन्द्र सिंह, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 30th August, 2007

S.O. 2846.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 8/2005) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, No. II, New Delhi as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and their workmen, which was received by the Central Government on 30-08-2007.

[No. L-40012/131/2004-IR (DU)]
SURENDRA SINGH, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM- LABOUR COURT-II, NEW DELHI

Presiding Officer : R. N. Rai. I.D. NO. 8/2005

PRESENT: SH. A.K. TRIVEDI —1st party
SH. RAJIV KUMAR —2nd party

In The Matter of :-

Shri Mahipal Singh,
S/o Shri Krishan Singh,
R/o Village : Lokra,
Tehsil : Pataudi
Distt : Gurgaon,
Haryana -122 414.

Versus

The General Manager,
M/s. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited,
Videsh Sanchar Bhawan,
Bangla Sahib Road,
New Delhi -01.

AWARD

The Ministry of Labour by its letter No. L-40012/131/2004-IR(DU) CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DT. 28-01-2005 has referred the following point for adjudication.

The point runs as hereunder:—

“Whether the services of Shri Mahipal Singh S/o Shri Krishan Singh, Ex-Peon have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management or Shri Mahipal Singh has resigned from the service voluntarily? If so, to what relief the workman is entitled to and from which date?”

The workman applicant has filed claim statement. In the claim statement it has been stated that the workman was employed as Peon in the overseas Communication services, on 22-01-1957 by the Management of the concern and the overseas communication merged into the management/opposite party had taken over the concerned overseas communication services in the year 1990-91.

That since the date of joining the workman had been discharging his responsibility with full efficiency and sincerity till 12-06-1972 and he had not been charge sheeted or adversely remarked by the any authority of the management. Unfortunately the workman had lost the mental balance on 13-05-1972 and not only left the working place but left his own house and family members without any intimation either to his employer or to his family member.

That fortunately the workman regained his mental balance and after meeting with the family members the workman went to his office for the purpose of joining duty on 10-11-1991 but was refused to continue the work by concerned authority. The management told the workman on enquiry that his service was terminated and when asked by the workman to show the termination letter so that he can get other benefit of the termination but the management shows his helplessness whereupon the workman submitted a request letter alongwith joining the letter on dated 7-4-1992 in the office of the management.

That the employees of the management compelled the workman to sign on the resignation letter then only the workman can get the benefit of pension and other facilities as per law. Being an innocent and undedicated person and also not knowing the consequences of his signature obtained by the Management to sign the document in the locked room surrounded by the management personnel on 17-12-1993. The resignation letter has no validity in the eyes of law on the basis of facts mentioned in this para.

That the management has sent a letter bearing reference No. HQ-B/0601(1)/92ADMN dated 01-12-1992. The contents of the letter has submitted the representation and also admitted that the management had not terminated the services of the workman till then.

That the workman had written a letter of representation on dated 7-4-1992 and 21-7-1992 with regard to the service benefit and reinstatement of his service and other legal benefits. The workman has also written a letter

dated 9-6-1993 to the management which has been acknowledged by the letter dated 28-6-93 bearing reference No. B/06/01/A 92 ADMN. The photocopy of the letter dated 7-4-1992, 21-7-1992 and the letter of management dated 28-6-93, are enclosed herewith as Annexure-B to D respectively.

That the workman has sent another letter dated 1-10-1993 to the management which is acknowledge by the departmental letter written and sent to the workman on dated 15-10-93. It is pertinent to mention here that the Ministry of Communication had sent a direction letter to the Head Office of the management on first week of December 1993, with direction to issue the workman with continuation of service. The said letter has been sent by the head office to its branch office at Delhi where the workman had been employed.

The issued of the giving the appointment letter to the workman, the officers of the management at Delhi namely Shri S. N. Bhardwaj head clerk and Shri Y. N. Sharma A.A.O. had applied their undue influence on the workman and obtained the signature of the workman on the resignation letter in the locked room. The photocopy of the letter dated 15-10-1993 enclosed Annexure-E.

That the management had written a letter on 12-4-1993 with respect of the speedy action on the representation of the workman by the department. The management has sent letter dated 4-3-1994 bearing reference No. 4/39/93/PE-1 to the workman in both English and Hindi language mentioning therein that the resignation of the workman has been accepted by the competent authority of the management with effect from 27-12-1993 as very special case. However, the period of the absence of the workman from his service has been treated as "DIES-NON". The photocopy of the letter dated 12-4-1993 and 4-3-1993 are enclosed herewith as Annexure-F & G.

That the Management had sent a letter dated 24-5-1996 in which the details of the workman's service benefits are mentioned but still no payment has been made though the workman is not willing to accept the same as full and final settlements but mentioned here only for the purpose of exhibiting the ulterior, arbitrary and illegal act of management. The photocopy of the letter is enclosed herewith as Annexure-H.

That, if the resignation letter is valid and accepted by the management then why the management delayed the termination benefit of the service of the workman to be released? It is seems that the management personal are waiting and watching the ability of the workman whether the workman is going to take the legal action against their illegal act of obtaining the resignation letter and also not allowing the workman to continue his service in the department. Hence the acceptance letter of resignation has no validity in the eyes of law.

That the non-compliance of order of the Misistry and with holding of the arrears of the wokman arrears

including back wages, bonus, interest on GPF and other funds etc. and terminated the workman form his service ellegally, arbitrarily and malfidedly.

That the workman has exhausted all his source to amicably settle the matter with the management but failed. Hence the workman constrained to sent a legal-cum-demand notice dated 23-11-1995 through registered A/D bearing postal receipt No. 4823 of dated 24-11-1995 and also through UPC which was duly served and a baseless reply has been sent by the management on 22-12-1995. The photocopy of the notice postal receipts and reply of the notice are enclosed herewith as Annexure-I, J, K respectively.

That workman has receipt the provident fund amounts to Rs.1098/- which is without interest and yet the department has not paid the other service benefit to the workman.

It is , therefore, most respectfully paryed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass an order/award thereby directing the management to reinstated the wokman's service with fully back wages and continuity of his services with all consequential benefits from the date of termination.

The Management has filed written statement. In the written statement it has been stated that at the very outset the respondent denies each and every statement, averment made by the claimant in the claim nothing contained in the same may be taken as admitted unless the same has been specifically admitted hereunder.

That the entire claim of the claimant is false and baseless. The claim has been filed on false avermemts. The entire story of the claimant having lost his mental Balance has been concocted so as to bring the claim within limitaion. It is settled law that whoever approaches the Court with unclean hands shall get no relief from the Court. The claim ought to be rejected on this ground alone.

That the claim is barred by the provisions of Payment of wages Act, Gratuity Act and the Industrial Disputes Act and is not maintainable in law.

That the respondent believes that for the period from 1972 to 1991 the claimant must have been working somewhere else and has filed the claim on false pleas now to wrongly ask for backwages, and other benefits to which he is not entitled.

That when the present respondent came into formation in 1986 the service of the claimant had already been terminated by overseas communication in the year 1975, therefore the claimant cannot have any claim as against the present respondent. A copy of the letter of overseas communicaion dated 30th July 1975 in respect of termination of the claimant is Annexed hereto as Annexure A.

The claimant is wrongly trying to take advantage of the gratuitous act of respondent in accepting the resignation of the claimant so that the gratuity could be paid to the claimant. The claimant cannot be allowed to take undue advantage of the bonafide act of the respondent.

That the complaint has been paid his gratuity of the sum of Rs. 1,0998/- vide cheque No. 661365 dated 14-2-95 and is now not entitled to claim any further Amount.

That the contentions in the paras in the present reply are without prejudice to each other and may be read so.

That the applicant was appointed in the Department of Overseas Communications Service, under the Ministry of Communications, government of India which ceased to exist on 31-3-1986, and a company titled as Videsh Sanchar Nigam limited was registered under the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at Bombay and it started functioning with effect from 1-4-1986. Since the applicant was not on the rolls of the Department of Overseas Communication Service on 31-3-86 at the time of takeover, no liabilities whatsoever in respect of employment or non-employment of the applicant can be in accordance with Law. Hence, no employer employee relationship exists between the applicant and the opposite party. As such, the present dispute is bad in law.

That since the applicant was employed in a subordinate office of the Government of India and from where his service have ceased to exist in terms of Government of India's decision No. 5(2) under Revised Leave rules, any relief, if at all, ought to have been at the very outset been filed with the Ministry of Communications for which the Central Administrative Tribunal is the right forum to agitate. Hence, the present dispute raised by the applicant before this Tribunal is misconceived and lacks jurisdiction.

That according to the Claimant himself, he has been on authorized absence for about 20 years without any intimation or permission from the authority concerned and he had now come up with a concocted story which cannot be believed. With about 20 years unauthorized absence, the applicant has himself forfeited all his claims, if any.

That without prejudice to the above stand, the alleged dispute is belated and suffers from delay and laches. The same is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.

That assuming through not admitting that the Claimant was suffering from mental imbalance for about 20 years, he is not all a fit person to be taken in employment cannot be expected to perform his duties satisfactorily. The claimant has also not attached any medical records to prove that he was suffering from mental illness as alleged

by the claimant without any proof of the medical illness and the subsequent medication the present complaint is not maintainable.

That at the very outset, it is stated that the claim filed by the Petitioner is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. That, VSNL has ceased to be a public Sector Undertaking form 13-2-02. Therefore, at the time when the claim was filed the 1st Respondent was not a Govt. company, the claim does not lie against VSNL as VSNL is no longer a Government company as per Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Central Government is not the proper authority to make the reference. Section 617 of the Companies act is set out herein below for ready reference.

"617 Definition of "Government Company"—for the purpose of (this Act) Government company means any company in which not less than fifty-one percent of the (paid up share capital) is held by the Central Government, or by any State Government or Governments, or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments and includes a company which is a subsidiary of a Government company as thus defined."

Govt. had 52.97 stake in VSNL out of this 25% has been transferred to M/s. Panatone Finvest Limited an investing vehicle of Tata Group. A copy of the letter dated 13-2-2002 of Panatone Finvest Limited acknowledging the transfer of 7,12,50,000 equity shares in favour of panatone Finvest Limited is annexed herewith as Annexure 'B'.

The Respondent No. 1 is neither a State nor an instrumentality of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore the present claim is not maintainable. That the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case. The Prage Tools Copn. Vs. Sh. C.A. Imanuel & others 1969(1) SCC 585 has held that a writ of mandamus of or an order or direction of like nature does not lie against a company under Article 12.

That even the Board of directors of the Respondent No. 1 has been reconstituted. Tata Group has nominated the chairman and a Managing director. They have a majority on the Board. The constitution of the Board is as on 20th August, 2002 is annexed hereto as Annexure-'C'.

That the present claim is not maintainable as per the own admission he has not worked from 1972 till 1991 therefore the claimant cannot be held entitled to claim any amount in respect of the said period. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and also various High Courts. The said proposition proceeds on the footing that a person who had not worked for a particular period cannot claim any amount for the same and this principle is also in consonance with the principles of equity.

That admittedly the present claim and those filed prior to this have been filed after a long delay and the same are barred by limitation and not maintainable before this commission.

That at the very beginning on 21-7-92 the only claim which had been raised by the claimant was in respect of gratuity and pension and not in respect of any dues or pay as now claimed by the claimant in the said letter, the claimant has also not claimed any future employment or benefit arising therefrom. The present claim is only a malafide attempt of the claimant to wrongly extract money from the respondents on false and baseless pleas which cannot be entertained by this Hon'ble Commission.

That the claimant having tendered his resignation cannot maintain the present claim. The claimant has been paid the gratuity for the period from 22-1-57 to 12-8-72 which has been accepted by the claimant and therefore the present claim is not maintainable in law.

It is denied that Overseas Communications Service was a concern. As stated earlier, Overseas Communication Service was a subordinate office under the Ministry of Communications, Govt. of India which ceased to exist on 1-4-1986. As the applicant ceased to be in employment much before the date of cessation of Department he has to establish his claim before the Ministry of Communications, and not against the Opposite party. Moreover, the applicant was not on the roll of the Overseas Communications Service as on 31-3-86 therefore question of taking over the services of the applicant by the Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd., which came into the existence as on 1-4-86, does not arise at all. It is further denied that the respondent had taken over from Overseas Communication with all liability of its employees. Any suggestions in respect of the same is denied the claimants serious had been terminated in 1975 itself and the acceptance of resignation was only a via media to give the claimant his gratuity.

The applicant has himself admitted that he remained on unauthorized absence without any intimation from 13-6-1972 to end of 1991, and as such, he himself is to be blamed from loss of service in accordance with Government Rules. It is further denied that the applicant lost mental balance and/or left the working place and stayed at various unknown places, as alleged. He deserted the job on his own accord and the opposite party has nothing to do in the matter. The present claimant has not even appended a single document in support of its contention that he had lost his mental equilibrium. Without any evidence in respect of the claimants medical record the present claim is not maintainable in law. That as per the respondents records the claimant had been highly irregular in his presence prior for 1972 and had been repeatedly cautioned for the same. The relevant records pertaining to the same can be produced before the court in case he denies.

It is specifically denied that the claimant regained his mental balance as alleged on 10-11-1991 or that he was entitled to rejoiner duty from 1991 onwards. The claimant was never on the rolls of the respondent and therefore was not entitled to rejoin the duty the services of the claimant had been terminated prior to the present respondent coming in picture.

The letter of joining on 7-4-1992 was a malafide attempt by the claimant to recover/to extract money from the present respondent to which the claimant is not entitled. It is vehemently denied that the applicant submitted joining letter dated 7-4-1992 or continued doing work since then with the respondent, as alleged. It is submitted that the applicant did not work at all with the respondent.

It is further denied that the Management compelled the workmen to sign resignation letter, as alleged. It is also denied that the applicant signed that resignation letter in the locked room on 27-12-93. It is submitted that the applicant tendered his resignation letter voluntarily and did not object or raise any objection of the said resignation letter having been signed by him under alleged duress. The applicant did not raise any objection after tendering the resignation and upto the time of acceptance thereof nor he complained about the alleged misguiding/forcing him for the tendering of the resignation to any authorities. The Claimant had resigned on 27-12-93 and the resignation was accepted on 7-3-94 and it was only sometime in October, 1994, that is, after 10 months from tendering his resignation and 7 months from acceptance of resignation that he raised the alleged pleas which on the face of it is false, concocted and an after thought infact due to refusal of terminal benefits conveyed by the Ministry of Communications in October, 1994.

It is denied that the Ministry of Communications had sent a direction letter to the opposite party, as alleged. It is wrong and denied that the applicant ever worked with the opposite party. The said letter only stated that the allegations made by the claimant were being looked into and the same cannot be construed in any manner as an admission.

The claimant's representations as alleged were not maintainable. The same had been filed with a malafide intention to wrongly extract money from the respondent. It is submitted that the applicant gave the resignation letter voluntarily on his free-will and not under any duress or influence, as alleged and after the resignation had been tendered the claimant was not entitled to claim reinstatement in service.

It is denied that the opposite party has not complied with the orders of the Ministry by withholding of the arrears of the workman, including back-wages, bonus, interest on GPF and other funds, etc. as alleged. The opposite party has not received any orders from the

Ministry of Communications, Govt. of India, for giving re-employment, or payment of wages/arrears etc. as alleged. The applicant tendered his resignation voluntarily which was accepted to his knowledge and he did not raise any objection for about 7 months even after the acceptance of his resignation. As such, the claim in itself is wrong, misconceived, and untenable. It is further denied that Shri S.N. Bhardwaj, Head Clerk or Shri Y.N. Sharma, AAD applied their influence and got the signature of the workman in a locked room, as alleged.

It is denied that the management had written for speedy action on representation of the claimant. The claimant's resignation had been accepted as a special case only in view of the circumstances of the claimant. The said acceptance of the resignation was only on the condition that period in which the claimant had not worked he would not claim any amount in respect of the same. The claimant is now wrongly trying to take benefit of the magnanimity shown by the respondent even though the claimant was not on the rules of the respondent.

The claimant has been paid the gratuity for the period from 22-1-57 to 12-8-72. The said payment was made as special case in a magnanimous manner by the respondent even though the respondent was not liable to pay the same. It is denied that no benefits had been paid to the claimant's or that the same had not been accepted by the claimant as full and final settlement.

It is denied that the management is following a policy of wait and watch or that there has been any illegal act by which the claimants resignation has been obtained. The claimant was not entitled to be put in service for the reason mentioned above. It is denied that the resignation tendered by the claimant had no legal validity. The claimants resignation having been accepted the claimant cannot now ask for reinstatement in service or any claim in respect of the same. The detailed reason for the same have been given herein above on which the respondent crave leave to rely upon.

It is further denied that there is any order of the Ministry directing the respondent to take back the claimant in service. It is further denied that the claimant is entitled to any arrears as alleged. The detailed reason for the same have been given herein above on which the respondent crave leave to rely upon. It is further denied that the claimants service had been wrongly terminated to the contrary the respondent has been magnanimous in accepting the resignation tendered by the claimant by the claimant and paying the claimant the gratuity amount, which it was not liable to pay.

The notice as alleged to have been sent on 23-11-95 was whole leave baseless and without any foundation in law or otherwise and a suitable reply to the same had been

given by the respondents advocates on 22-12-95 which may be read as part of the present written statement.

This Hon'ble Commission does not have the jurisdiction to decide the present claim as the Central Government is not the competent authority to refer the present dispute the detailed reasons for the same have been set out in the preliminary objection which may be read as part of this para in reply.

The workman applicant has filed rejoinder. In his rejoinder he has reiterated the averments of his claim statement and has denied most of the paras of the written statement. The management has also denied most of the paras of the claim statement.

Evidence of both the parties has been taken.

Heard arguments from both the sides and perused the papers on the record.

It was submitted from the side of the workman that he was employed as Peon in the Overseas Communication Services on 22-10-1957. The Overseas Communication merged into the management/opposite party in the year 1991. The workman performed his duties with full efficiency and diligently till 12-06-1972. The workman unfortunately lost his mental balance on 13-05-1972. He left the working place without any intimation to his employer.

It was further submitted that unfortunately the workman regained his mental balance and after meeting with his family members he went to his office for the purposes of joining duty on 10-11-1991 but he was refused duty.

It was further submitted that on 17-12-1993 the workman was compelled to sign the resignation letter under duress and undue influence of 2 employees of the management. This letter dated 17-12-1993 is not valid as it has been obtained by Sh. S.N. Bhardwaj, Head Clerk and Shri S.N. Sharma, AAO under duress.

It was further submitted that the workman is entitled to reinstatement and full back wages from 07-04-1992 and the resignation letter got signed by the workman under undue influence is not valid and there is no cessation of the services of the workman on the basis of his resignation letter.

It was submitted from the side of the management that the workman signed resignation letter voluntarily for obtaining his old dues, a sum of Rs.1 098/- and it was paid to him through cheque.

It was further submitted that the management VSNL has been registered under Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at Bombay. It was taken over by the present management on 31-03-1986. The workman was no longer

an employee of the old Company so there existed no employer-employee relationship between the management and the applicant.

It was further submitted that after about 20 years unauthorized absence without any intimation and permission the workman has concocted a story for extracting money. The dispute is belated and suffers from delay and latches.

It was further submitted that the workman has not filed any medical certificate or any other document to establish that he lost mental balance in the year 1972. He has not filed any medical certificate that he has regained his mental balance at present.

It was further submitted that VSNL has ceased to be a Public Sector Undertaking from 13-02-2002. It is neither a State or instrumentality of a State within the meaning of the Article 12 of the Constitution of India so the claim is not maintainable in view of (1969) 1 SCC 585.

It was the duty of the workman to establish the fact that he lost his mental balance in the year 1972 and he regained it automatically in the year 1991. The workman has not filed any documentary evidence to substantiate these facts. He has not examined any other witness to establish his mental ailment. So it is not found proved that the workman suffered from mental agony for the period of almost 20 years and he regained it all of sudden. The workman could have done it by examining the persons related to him. He might have working somewhere else and for extracting money from the management, he has come up with concocted theory of losing mental balance and regaining it after a lapse of 20 years.

It transpires from persusal of CPF account of the applicant that his CPF was calculated as Rs.1098 on 31-03-1975. It has been also mentioned that his services have been terminated.

It has also been mentioned in this document that the workman has not preferred any claim and his address is not known. This document proves that when the workman was not available for 2-3 years his services were terminated and his CPF amount was calculated.

It is admitted fact that the workman absented from 1972 and in the year 1991 for the first time he approached the management for joining his services. He was unauthorizedly absent for 20 years. This long period is a sufficient ground for terminating the services of the workman. There is no proof of the mental ailment of the workman. In the absence of cogent evidence it is held that the workman did not suffer from any mental illness.

Central Government is not an appropriate Government. The management is neither a State nor an instrumentality of a State. It is a Private Establishment, so the State Government is the appropriate Government for making reference in view of [(2001) 7 SCC 1] Steel Authority of India.

It was further submitted that the Central Government has made this reference after a period of 32 years. Such delayed reference cannot be entertained.

It was submitted from the side of the management that there is no explanation of delay. Not to speak of plausible or satisfactory explanation. There is no explanation at all what prevented the workman to approach this forum after a long period of 26 years. It is settled law that stale claim made after an inordinate and unexplained period could not be entertained.

My attention was drawn to 2005 (5) SCC page 91 paras 12 and 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that long delay impedes the maintenance of the records. Belated claim should not be considered.

It has been held in (2001) 6 SCC 222 as under:—

“Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service.”

In the instant case reference has been made after a delay of long 26 years. Limitation Act is not applicable in ID cases but stale cases should not be considered. Delay in the instant case is inordinate and relief can be rejected on the ground of delay alone.

It was submitted from the side of the management that the workman did not raise any objection against the acceptance of his resignation letter. He raised objections only after one year of signing resignation letter. The resignation letter has been signed by the workman voluntarily. It cannot be believed that 2 employees exercised undue influence on him to sign the resignation letter. The workman signed the resignation letter willingly to obtain his old dues.

The workman has failed to prove his claim statement. The resignation letter dated 17.12.1993 has been voluntarily signed by the workman as he did not dispute it for almost one year.

The reference is replied thus:—

The service of Shri Mahipal Singh S/o Shri Krishan Singh, Ex-Peon has not been terminated illegally and unjustifiably by the management. Sh. Mahipal Singh has resigned from the service voluntarily. He is not entitled to get any relief as prayed for.

The award is given accordingly.

Date: 28-08-2007

R. N. RAI, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 31 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2847.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार मद्रास फर्टीलाइजर्स लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारियों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, बंगलूर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 35/2006) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 31-8-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-42012/21/2006-आईआर(डी. यू.)]

सुरेन्द्र सिंह, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 31st August, 2007

S.O. 2847.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 35/2006) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Bangalore as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Madras Fertilizers Ltd. and their workmen, which was received by the Central Government on 31-08-2007.

[No. L-42012/21/2006-IR(DU)]

SURENDRA SINGH, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, BANGALORE

Dated : 20th August, 2007

PRESENT

Shri A. R. Siddiqui, Presiding Officer

C. R. No. 35/2006

I Party

Ms. Farhath Sulthana,
D/o Chand Pasha,
Residing at No. 1-6-125
Indira Nagar,
Raichur
Karnataka State

II Party

The Regional Manager,
Madras Fertilizers Ltd.,
Azad Nagar,
Raichur
Karnataka State

AWARD

1. The Central Government by exercising the power conferred by clause (d) of sub-section 2A of the Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 has referred this dispute *vide* order No. L-42012/21/2006-IR (DU) dated 18th August, 2006 for adjudication on the following schedule :

SCHEDULE

"Whether the action of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Madras Fertilizers Ltd., Manali, Chennai in terminating the service of their workman Ms. Farhath Sulthana w.e.f. August 1999 is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?"

2. After the receipt of the reference schedule from the Government, notices were ordered against the first party as well as the second party A&B. On 13-11-2006, when the case was taken up for hearing, the first party and second

party (A) were reported to be served by registered post notices but remained absent when called out. A fresh RPAD notice was sent to Second Party (B). The Second Party A&B made appearance through counsels on subsequent dates i.e. on 02-02-2007 & 02-03-2007 and on behalf of Second Party A&B counter statement was filed. Then the matter came to be posted for evidence of the management. However, the management did not adduce any evidence and therefore, proceedings have been taken closed and posted for award.

3. The management by its counter statement has taken a contention that the first party did not serve under them continuously for a period of 240 days and more and that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present reference proceedings as the Central Government was not the appropriate Government to make reference of the case before this tribunal.

4. As noted above the first party did not appear nor filled her claim statement giving out of the fact and basis of her right to claim any relief from the hands of this tribunal much less, making out of a case as to how the alleged order of termination of her services by the management was bad in law. In the absence of any claim statement put forth by the first party and the fact that she remained absent before this tribunal despite service of notice, what appears is that she is not interested in prosecuting the case against the management. Hence the following award:

AWARD

The reference stands dismissed. No costs.

(Dictated to PA transcribed by her corrected and signed by me on 20th August, 2007)

A. R. SIDDQUI, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 31 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2848.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार कोलकाता टेलिफोन्स के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारियों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, कोलकाता के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 8/95) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 31-8-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-40012/213/94-आईआर(डी. यू.)]

सुरेन्द्र सिंह, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 31st August, 2007

S.O. 2848.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 8/95) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kolkata as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Calcutta Telephones and their workmen, which was received by the Central Government on 31-08-2007.

[No. L-40012/213/94-IR (DU)]

SURENDRA SINGH, Desk Officer.

ANNEXURE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
AT KOLKATA

Reference No. 8 of 1995

Parties Employers in relation to the management of
 Calcutta Telephones

And

Their workmen.

PRESENT

Mr. Justice C. P. Mishra, Presiding Officer

APPEARANCE

On behalf of the Management : Mr. Tapas Chowdhury,
 Advocate.

On behalf of the Workmen : Mr. J. C. Consul,
 Advocate.

State : West Bangal. Industry : Telephones.

Dated : 24th August, 2007.

AWARD

1. By Order No. L-40012/213/94-IR (DU) dated 23-03-1995 the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 10(1)(d) and (2A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the following dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication :

“Whether the action of Management of Calcutta Telephones in not regularising the services of 19 casual workmen as per Annexure is justified? If not, to what relief the said 19 workman are entitled to?”

Annexure

Names of 19 workmen are mentioned below :

1. Raj Kumar Singh	S/o. Shri Panna Lal Singh
2. Suresh Singh	S/o. Shri Panna Lal Singh
3. Tapan Kumar Halder	S/o. Shri Khagendra Nath Halder
4. Rajendra Prasad	S/o. Khud Lal Prasad
5. Misar Kayal	S/o. Kamini Kant Kayal
6. Tarun Kr. Ghosh	S/o. Shri Ajit Kr. Ghosh
7. Apu Paul	S/o. Shri Ramani Mohan Paul
8. Subrata Paul	S/o. Shri Shanti Ranjan Paul
9. Dhananjay Mondal	S/o. Shri Ajit Kumar Mondal
10. Ganesh Ch. Dey	S/o. Shri Gobind Chandra Dey
11. Gautam Samal	S/o. Anadi Charan Samal
12. Umesh Roy	S/o. Mahendra Ray
13. Phelan Ch. Biswas	S/o. Shri Surendra Nath Biswas
14. Bijay Paul	S/o. Hari Mohan Chandra Paul
15. Ashit Kr. Nhanda	S/o. Harendra Nath Nanda
16. Avijit Bose	S/o. Shri Shyam Surndar Bose
17. Samar Bakuli	S/o. Shri Chandu Bakuli
18. Samar Sumar Das	S/o. Shri Jai Prasad Das
19. Biswajit Hati	S/o. Shri Subodh Kumar Hati

2. The case of the workmen in brief is that the aforesaid 19 workmen under Calcutta Telephones management at Salt Lake joined the service in ACG-17 account on different dates between 08-01-1985 and 01-10-1990 as shown in the sheet Appendix-A to their written statement and all of them as such completed one year's of continuous service viz. more than 240 days work in a year and acquired the status of regular worker. In this connection it is also stated that 17 casual workmen of 46 Exchange of Calcutta Telephones had preferred a reference being Reference No. 10 of 1985 to this Tribunal who by Award dated 5th July, 1989 directed their reinstatement with payment of full back wages and other consequential relief from January, 1983 which was also given effect to by Order No. SAA-2035/XIX/A dated 09-1989 of the Assistant General Manager (R & E), Calcutta Telephones. In view of that from September, 1989 the Divisional Engineer of 34/36 Exchange did not give work to the workers who were working continuously for more than a year and their case was referred to the higher authorities for necessary instruction and the workmen were only shown on duty for not more than 15 days in a month accordingly. The concerned workmen since not given work, they agitated their case and the Divisional Engineer and the officials of the three unions entered into an agreement to give work for 10 to 20 days in a month so that there could be no objection from the higher authorities who had to take a decision thereon. The concerned workmen were as such given less work in each month for 5 to 15 days showing lesser attendance than actual and putting false names and not permitting them to put their signatures in the ACG-17 attendance rolls for the same in this connection. Two or three blank vouchers with revenue stamps signed by the workmen were also obtained. They were also paid lesser amount @ Rs. 20 or Rs. 25 or Rs. 30 per day instead of the sanctioned rates which were more for the different period from January, 1989 to December, 1993 as mentioned in paragraph 6.4 of the written statement. The concerned workmen made their representation to the Divisional Engineer and the S.D.O. (Phones) from time to time against the said unfair labour practice but without any result. They further made approach to the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata on 25th January, 1994 where the management was asked to produce original records, attendance sheets, payment vouchers etc. but they did not produce the same. The conciliation having failed the matter was referred to the Central Government and ultimately it referred the matter to this Tribunal for adjudication. It is stated that since the workmen concerned had completed one year of continuous service, they could not have been retrenched without payment of compensation and notice and so they are entitled to full back wages for the period of their forced unemployed and also there was no justification for termination of their services and as such they are entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages and other benefits as well as seniority.

3. A written statement has been filed on behalf of the management of Calcutta Telephones denying the aforesaid allegations made by the workmen in this regard and it is stated that the concerned 19 workmen did not work continuously for one year or for more than 240 days in a year and there is no question of regularisation of their services which were in the nature of ad-hoc engagement. Moreover, 240 days work cannot be the exclusive consideration to be entitled for regularisation. In this connection it is further stated that the total manning of the engagement of the Mazdoors of Calcutta Telephones was promulgated vide Circular No. 270/6/84-STN dated 30-03-1985 issued by the Directed General of Posts & Telegraphs and Circular No. 270/6/84-STN dated 22-06-1985 and the alleged number of days of work of the concerned workman is immaterial in this regard. It is also stated that the alleged Award of this Tribunal in Reference No. 10 of 1985 does not create any precedent to the disposal of the present reference which stands on different set of facts and footing. More so, the concerned workmen at no material time have worked for 240 days nor did they work continuously in a year. According to the management they were provided work on requirement basis and their actual number of days is shown in the details of engagement vide Annexure-X to the written statement filed on their behalf. The other allegations made by the workmen regarding the lesser attendance, putting false names, manipulation of accounts have been denied as false and baseless. The management accordingly has prayed that the reference to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the management.

4. Three witnesses have been examined on behalf of the workmen. WW-1, Umesh Roy is one of the concerned workman. He has deposed for himself and also for other nine workmen, namely, Raj Kumar Singh, Suresh Singh, Misar Kayal, Rajendra Prasad, Dhananjay Mondal, Bijoy Paul, Ganesh Ch. Dey, Gautam Samal and Phelan Ch. Biswas. He has stated that all these workmen including himself appeared before the authorities of Calcutta Telephones for appointment as casual workmen on the basis of the notice which was hung up in the notice board and they joined the Calcutta Telephones between 1985 to 1990. They were originally appointed in the 31, 34 and 37 Exchanges which were made 331, 334 and 337 Exchanges subsequently. It is further stated that he joined the service on 26-09-1989 and continuously worked till his termination on 05-05-1996. Regarding the other workmen he has stated that they also put in more than 240 days of continuous service in one year and their services were also terminated on 05-05-1996. He has further stated that 8 of the concerned workmen have since been engaged in the office through contractor, rest of the workmen concerned did not agree to such engagement. He has also stated that the management used ask them in blank vouchers. According to the witness they were not paid on daily basis on the

prescribed rate, but they were initially paid @ Rs. 20/=, then @ Rs. 25/= and finally @ Rs. 30/= per day. He prayed for regularisation in service and also benefits for the period of non-employment. In cross-examination the witness, however, stated that he has not prayed for regularisation in service. He has also stated that the post on which he was working did not exist and those were just casual labourer. He also could not say about the dates of engagement of the other concerned workmen. Regarding the certificate Ext. W-8 he has stated that it was issued to him by Shri A. K. Gupta the Cable Jointer who wrote and signed it in his presence.

WW-2, Bijoy Paul has deposed in the same line like WW-1 for the 11 concerned workmen. He has stated that neither any notice was served nor any compensation was paid at the time of their retrenchment. He could not say the name of the J.T.O. who used to maintain the attendance of the concerned workmen. In cross-examination the witness has however named one S. K. Das the J. T. O. who used to take their signatures on the vouchers. WW-3 Raj Kumar Singh also has deposed in the same line. He has however stated that 8 of the concerned workmen withdrew from the case as they were asked by the management to do so on the assurance of getting job. In cross-examination the witness has stated that it will be revealed from the attendance register maintained by the J. T. O. that they have worked for more than 300 days.

5. Seven witnesses have been examined on behalf of the management. They are all the officers of the Calcutta Telephones. MW-1, Arun Kumar Ghosh was S. D.O. P. at Salt Lake Exchange No. 1 under Salt Lake Division of Calcutta Telephones. He has admitted that there were four casual Mazdoors under him at the relevant time who are Dhananjay Mondal, Phelan Biswas, Umesh Roy and Rajendra Prasad, but denied that they worked continuously from 1989 to 1996. He also stated that they had not completed 240 days work in a year. According to him work used to be allotted to the concerned four workmen on the basis of requirement for different number of days in a particular month. He used to note the presence of the workmen in a register, marked Ext. M-1. He referred to ACG-17 vouchers and ACE-2 accounts for ascertaining the number of days for which payments were made to them. He has denied that the workmen were engaged on the basis of a notice hung on the notice board or that their signatures used to be taken on the blank vouchers as alleged by the workmen in their evidence. He categorically stated that no person by name Bijoy Paul ever worked under him. He denied the contents of the certificates Exts. W-3, W-5 and W-8 and also the contents of the document Ext. W-9. In cross-examination the witness has stated that the J.T.O. was not marking the attendance of the persons concerned and he had to rely on the report of the J.T.O. He has categorically denied that the entries in the Register Ext. M-1 have been made in one sitting.

MW-2, Madhusudhan Biswas was the J. T. O. from April, 1987 to August, 1994 and posted in various sub-divisions under the Salt Lake Exchange. In Sub-division II there were three casual labourers and in Sub-division IV there were two such casual and he has named Vijoy Singh, Apu Paul, Biswajit Hati and Suresh Singh as those casual labourers. He has denied that they have worked continuously or that they have put in 240 days service in a year. In cross-examination the witness has stated the labourers used to him as well as to Spicer and the Spicer happened to be the best person to know who had attended to work on a particular date. He admitted that from guess he has said that Suresh Singh had worked for 50-60 days. He could not also give the number of days of work of others excepting for what is available in ACE-II accounts and ACG—27 vouchers.

MW-3, Chinmoy Mitra is a retired officer of the Calcutta Telephones. From 1985 to 1992 he was posted as J. T. O. under Sub-division III under Salt Lake Exchange and from January, 1993 to 27th September, 1993 he was posted as S. D. O.-IV and from 28-09-1993 to 28-02-1997 he was posted in Sub-division III in the same capacity. He has stated that Raj Kumar Singh, Suresh Singh, Umesh Roy and Misar Kayal were the casual labourers who worked under him. He denied that he was maintaining attendance register in respect of casual labourers. It is also denied that he used to take the signatures of casual labourers on blank vouchers and fill up the names of other persons on the blank vouchers later. He has also denied that Raj Kumar Singh had worked from 1-8-1988 to 31-7-89 for more than 300 days. According to him on an average they used to work for 10 to 15 days in a month. In cross-examination the witness has stated that he used to engage casual labourers as and when required and used to give slip regarding the persons engaged and on its basis the register was maintained. He has also stated that it will be evident from the register maintained by the S. D. O. as to for how many days and how many times he had issued the slips regarding the engagement of casual labourers.

MW-4, Sunil Kumar Das was the J. T. O. Stores at Salt Lake Telephone Exchange from 1985 to 1996. He has stated that Bijoy Paul used work as casual labour under him on average for about 10 days in a month and not more than 6 months in a year and the said Bijoy Paul never signed any other voucher or document except-ACG-17 vouchers relating to the payment of his wages.

MW-5, Asit Baran Sil is the S. D. O. P. of Salt Lake Telephone Exchange of Calcutta Telephones and he was also working as such from 1993 to 1995. He has stated that during this period Bijoy Paul used to work as casual labour in his Exchange, but his engagement did not exceed 12 days ja month on average, His engagement was need-based and he was not a regular employees. He has further stated

that the actual days of work performed by this workmen could be ascertained from ACE-2 accounts and ACG-17 vouchers and also from the attendance book, Ext.-M2. The witness in cross-examination has stated that this Bijoy Paul was casual labour and not temporary labour. His further statement is that there was no practice for maintaining attendance register for the casual labourers. It is also stated by him that during the relevant period 5 casual labourers, namely, Bijoy Paul, Samir Kumar Bakuli, Samar Das, Biswajit Hati and Apu Paul were working under him, but after 1994 only two of them, namely, Bijoy Paul and Samar Kumar Bakuli continued to work there and the rest were shifted to other places. He has also stated that the practice is that a worker who is engaged is asked some day that there is no work available for him, but again on subsequent day he is engaged. It is stated that Sunday is not a working day. He has denied that ACG-17 vouchers are prepared at fines at fictitious names.

MW-6, Asit Baran Sadhu was a J.T.O., Section-3 at Salt Lake Telephone Exchange from November, 1991 to November, 1994. He has stated that five casual labourers viz. Bijoy Paul, Samir Kumar Bakuli, Samar Kumar Das Biswajit Hati and Apu Paul were working during that period. He has denied that they worked for more than 240 days continuously in every year and stated that they used to work on average for 13 days in a month. According to him complete ACE-2 account and ACG-17 vouchers have been filed and nothing has been suppressed and withheld. He has also denied that the J.T.Os. used to obtain signatures of the workmen on three different vouchers at the time of making payments and also on blank vouchers. In cross-examination the witness has stated that the casual labourers used to report to him directly and he used to allot them work. He has denied that he used to take signatures of the labourers in order to reduce the number of days for which the workmen had worked. He has also denied that in some cases names of the workers are shown differently to suppress their period of work and that he has deposed falsely and have withheld the documents.

MW-7, Dipak Bhawal was another J.T.O. posted at Salt Lake Telephone Exchange from 1989 to 1996. He has stated that during the time Ganesh Chandra Dey and Gautam Samal were working as casual labourers in that Exchange and the casual labourers were not engaged on regular basis, rather their engagements were as and when required. According to him the number of their working days can be ascertained from ACE-2 Accounts and ACG-17 vouchers concerned. He has denied that the casual labourers used to sign attendance register or that all of them had worked for more than 240 days in a year. He has also denied that the ACG-17 vouchers contained false and fictitious names of the casual laboureres. In cross-examination the witness has stated that there is no instruction regarding maintenance of attendance register for the casual labourers.

6. Some documents have been exhibited on behalf of the workmen. Exts. W-1 to W-11 are certificates issued to the concerned workmen and Ext. W-12 is a ACG-17 voucher. Several documents have however been exhibited on behalf of the management, Exts. M-1 to M-1/3 are the attendance registers of casual workmen. So also Ext. M-2. Ext. M-3 is synopsis of attendance. Ext. M-4 and Ext. M-4/1 are the circulars dated 30-03-1985 and 22-06-1988 regarding engagement of casual labour. Ext. M-56 is the ACE-2 Register. Ext. M-57 is some loose pages of ACE-1 Register. In addition to these several Ty. Advance Accounts of different J.T.Os. alongwith concerned payment vouchers have been exhibited on behalf of the management and those are marked Exts. M-5 series to M-55 series.

7. It is evident that as per order of reference claim of 19 casual workmen as per Annexure attached to it was referred to this Tribunal for adjudication. However, during the pendency of this case here in this Tribunal 8 workmen who were represented by their counsel Mrs. Kavita Das, Advocate made a joint petition dated 28th June, 1996 with a prayer that they would like to settle the matter with the management amicably and as such they wanted to withdraw the claim in this regard to be considered by this Tribunal and as such after hearing the matter my learned predecessor, Hon'ble Justice K.C. Jagadeb Roy passed an order dated 01-07-1996 permitting them to withdraw themselves from this reference and accordingly claim of the 11 workmen viz. Raj Kumar Singh, Suresh Singh, Rajendra Prasad, Misar Kaval, Dhananjay Mondal, Ganesh Ch. Dey, Gautam Samal, Umesh Roy, Phelan Ch. Biswas, Bijay Paul and Samar Bakuli is only to be considered for deciding their claim for regularisation etc. as per schedule of reference in this regard.

8. On the perusal of the aforesaid evidence and the written notes of argument as submitted on behalf of either side it is evidence that the aforesaid 11 workmen have claimed for their regularisation and payment of dues etc. as they have already completed 240 days of service in 12 calendar months which, however, has been challenged by the management to be otherwise by giving their reply in paragraph 4 of their written statement to say that the concerned workmen at no material time have worked for 240 days nor did they work continuously during the year. In fact, they were provided with work on requirement basis and their period of work has only been to the extent as shown in the Annexure-X which does not show them to have worked for 240 days as it has been so claimed by them in this regard. The management has also raised a preliminary point regarding the maintainability of this reference as the workmen are not in employment so as to get the relief of regularisation. In fact their prayer is for reinstatement which is not so provided for its adjudication in the schedule of reference and therefore it is beyond the power of this Tribunal to grant any such relief in their

favour, unless they are reinstated and the question of regularisation therefore comes thereafter. In this connection the management also challenged the maintainability of the reference brought up by a group of 11 workmen with 11 separate cause of action as disengagement of the workmen were on different dates and since the reference is not taken up by their union, it is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the workmen, however, has challenged the aforesaid submissions made in this regard by submitting that the claim of the 11 workmen can very well be considered to ascertain the entitlement of the workmen as per their position of having worked for more than 240 days and for number of years and the so called retrenchment or disengagement so made without paying them any compensation is illegal and the Tribunal has got ample power to consider their claim in this regard and to grant the relief after considering their entitlement for regularisation as well as for reinstatement whatsoever may be required in the above circumstances.

9. Considering the aforesaid facts it is evident that the schedule of reference no doubt shows that the matter is for regularising the services of 19 casual workmen and in this connection their claim whatsoever is based on their legal right which is to be considered and in view of that their right can very well be considered for reinstatement or for regularisation as the case may be. It is also evident that the claim of the 19 workmen is based on similar cause of action so far as their alleged disengagement is concerned and their claim for regularisation as per schedule of reference in this regard. Therefore, there is no question of any separate cause of action to be there and the reference as such is perfectly all right and its maintainability cannot be challenged.

10. So far as the merit of the claim of the workmen is concerned, it is evident that they are said to have joined the service on different dates between 08-01-1985 to 01-10-1990 as shown in the Appendix—A to their written statement and according to them they have completed one year's continuous service, i.e., more than 240 days work in a year. This fact, however, is challenged to be otherwise by the management which has filed another sheet alongwith their written statement vide Annexure-X to show the period of work done by them on different dates and so they have not so worked for 240 days in a year so as to get any such relief in their favour. It has come in the evidence however that 17 casual workmen of 46 Exchange of Calcutta Telephones had approached this Tribunal in Reference No. 10 of 1985 and the Tribunal vide Award dated 5th July, 1989 directed their reinstatement and the same has also been given effect to by the management in this connection. It has been submitted on behalf of the workmen that the management having realised that the previous decision was in favour of the workmen, in order to deprive the workmen who are working in similar circumstance as such did not give work to the concerned workmen unless

necessary instructions were obtained from the higher authorities. It has also been alleged by them that they were not only given less work in each month for 5 to 15 days than the actual days of work done by them, they were also not permitted to put their signatures in the ACG-17 attendance rolls and therefore, representations were made by them from time to time against such unfair labour practice. On their approach made to the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Kolkata the management was also asked to produce original records of attendance sheets, payment vouchers etc. but they did not produce the same there and also they did not produce the same even during hearing of this matter before this Tribunal so that the aforesaid claim and contention of the workmen could be shown. To support their claim and contention in this regard the workmen have examined three witnesses viz. WW-1, Umesh Roy, WW-2, Bijoy Paul and WW-3, Raj Kumar Singh. It is also evident that out of 19 workmen at whose instance this reference is made, 11 workmen have withdrawn themselves from the reference as the matter has been amicably settled with the management to their satisfaction in this regard. Management, however, has denied the aforesaid allegations and relied on the evidence of number of witnesses who have been examined to substantiate its case set up in the written statement. On the perusal of the statement of the witnesses examined by the management, however, it is evident that according to them the presence of the workmen used to be recorded in the Register, Ext. M-1. In this connection the statement given by MW-1, Arun Kumar Ghosh goes to show that the four workmen, namely, Dhananjay Mondal, Phelan Ch. Biswas, Umesh Roy and Rajendra Prasad had worked under him and he used to note their presence in the Register Ext. M-1. So far as the certificates filed by the workmen, Exts. W-3, W-5 and W-8 which were shown to him, he has only denied its contents but did not challenge the signatures of the concerned officials of the management who in fact had given these certificates to them showing the work done by the concerned workmen for different period vide Exts. W-1 to W-11. Besides him the other witness MW-2, Mudhusudan Biswas has also admitted in cross-examination that the workmen used to do their work and the Spicer was the best person to know who had attended to work at a particular date. The other witness MW-3, Chinmoy Mitra also stated that he was not maintaining attendance register in respect of these workmen and that he used to engage them from time to time by giving slips and on its basis the register was maintained by the department. The aforesaid evidence led by the parties in this case as such go to show the alleged period of work done by the concerned workmen.

11. It is no doubt true that the initial burden lies on the workmen to show that they had worked for more than 240 days in a year and in case this has been discharged by them i.e., stepping in the witness box and by adducing

cogent evidence both oral and documentary, the burden then shifts upon the management to prove it otherwise by filling the relevant document, registers, attendance sheets etc. and in case it is not so produced, adverse inference will naturally be drawn against the management. This is a settled principle of law as it has been so laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in numbers of cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of municipal corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Nivas, 2004(7) JT(SC) for drawing an adverse inference in case of non-production of certain relevant documents has observed:

"A court of law even in a case where provisions of the Indian Evidence Act apply, may presume or may not presume that if a party despite possession of the best evidence had not produced the same, it would have gone against his contentions. The matter, however, would be different where despite direction by a court the evidence is withheld. Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional and one of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration is the background of facts involved in the case. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production, other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable on some reasonable grounds....."

In *Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore V. S. Mani & Ors.* 2005(5) SCC 100 a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the matter regarding the initial burden of proof to be lying on the workmen to show that he had completed 240 days of service and in this case Tribunal's view that the burden was on the employer was held to be erroneous. In *Batala Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd v. Sowaran Singh*, 2005 (7) Supreme 165 it was further held as that:

"So far as the question of onus regarding working for more than 240 days is concerned, as observed by this court in *Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani* [2002(3) SCC 25] the onus is on the workmen."

In *R.M. Yellati v. The assistant Executive Engineer*, 2006(1) SCC 106 the decisions referred to above were noted and it was further observed that:

"Analyzing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforesaid judgements, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken this view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workmen stepping in

thewitness box. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged only upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentry. In case of termination of service of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be not receipt or prove of payment. Thus in most cases, the workmen (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster role for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that more affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimants/workmen will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workmen to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.....”

12. Considering the above legal principle as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in order to see the alleged period of work done by the workmen as to whether they have completed 240 days in a year or not for claiming benefit for the same, it is evident that in this case the workmen have clearly discharged this initial burden as set out by them in the written statement by producing not only their own oral evidence for that, but they have also produced number of documents available to them, viz. certificates issued to the concerned workmen vide Exts. W-1 to W-11 showing in fact the number of days so worked by them in this regard. There is no evidence led by the management to prove it otherwise as stated about it in their written statement to show that these are forged certificates or that these certificates had not been so issued by the officials concerned who had put their signatures thereon. In order to rebut the said claim of the workmen the management could have discharged its burden by producing the attendance sheet or ACG-17 vouchers so that the claim of the workmen could be shown to be otherwise. On the other hand the management has neither produced the attendance register nor they have produced any such evidence to rebut the aforesaid claim of the workmen in this regard. Besides that the concerned officials who have issued these certificates have also not been examined by the management to rebut the claim of the workmen in this regard. Management has also not filed any register to show the entries made in the record so that the allegations made by them about it in the written statement could be substantiated. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and evidence led by the parties the claim and contention of the workmen showing the period of work done by them as per their evidence led by them in this case cannot be doubted and challenged to be otherwise and consequently it would be taken that they had so worked for more than 240 days in a year for number

of years which is so proved by their by them oral as well as documentary evidence in this regard.

13. In view of the above evidence led by the parties in this case it is evident that the workmen concerned have duly proved their case that they had worked for more than 240 days in a year preceding their alleged date of termination by the Calcutta Telephone without notice and compensation. Since termination of their services is not covered by any exception under Section 2(oo) of the Act it clearly amounts to 'retrenchment' and since the same had been effected without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, it is *ab initio* void, invalid and inoperative as it has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd.*, 1981 LAB I.C. 806 that:

“Niceties and semantics apart, termination by the employer of the service of workman for any reason whatsoever would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself. The excepted or excluded cases are where termination is by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action voluntary retirement of the workman, retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf, and termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.

Before a workman can complain of retrenchment being not in consonance with Section 25-F, he has to show that he has been in continuous service for not less than one year under that employer who has retrenched him from service, Section 25-B is the dictionary clause for the expression continuous service.

Both on principles and on precedent it must be held that Section 25-B comprehends a situation where a workman is not in employment for a period of 12 calendar months, but has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months commencing and counting backwards from the relevant date, i.e. the date of retrenchment. It he has, he would be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of Section 25-B and Chapter V-A.

....As precondition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied the termination of service is *ab initio* void invalid and inoperative. He must, therefore, be deemed to be in continuous service.”

14. In this connection it is also evident that in the earlier case, i.e., Reference No. 10 of 1985 this Tribunal by its Award dated 5-7-1989 had considered this aspect of the matter and directed reinstatement of 17 casual workman and had also granted consequential relief in their favour and the same was also given effect to by the management. The claim of those workman had also been based on similar facts and allegations and the management for this had not been able to show the claim of the said workmen to be otherwise even in the case as well. It also could not show the claim of the present workmen to be otherwise by producing any such further oral or documentary evidence to substantiate its plea that the concerned workman, who have discharged their initial onus by leading evidence regarding their period of work, had not so worked so as to be not entitled to get the relief claimed by them in this regard. It is also evident that even in this case out of these 19 workman, 8 workman have already been accommodated by giving them regular employment once they had so withdrawn their claim which was also so preferred by them in this reference. As such, there could be no legal and valid justification for denying a similar benefit to the remaining workman who continued contesting the matter under this reference and whose case also had all along been based on similar set of facts and claim in this case like the aforesaid workman who had earlier put forward their claims seeking relief for reinstatement etc. *vide* Reference No. 10 of 1985 in this regard.

15. The submission made by the Learned Advocate for the management in this regard is that as per schedule of reference the claim of the workman cannot be allowed for regularisation as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1994 LAB. I. C. 1197 and in the absence of pleadings in terms of reference it should be dismissed on this very ground, it is evident that the schedule of reference no doubt refers to the claim of the workman for their regularisation but as per their claim and contention in the written statement in this regard they have also challenged their termination of services without giving any notice and without payment of any compensation as required under the law. As discussed above, the claim of the workman can very well be considered along with all the facts for the claim as per schedule of reference for the relief claimed by them as available to them including the relief for their reinstatement as well for the same as the termination of their services has already been found to be illegal and void *ab initio* in this regard. So far as the claim for regularisation is concerned, no doubt it has to be seen and considered as per rules and statutory guidelines and the Tribunal cannot do it as a mode of recruitment but in this case, the relief claimed by the workman is based on similar claim and contention like their other fellow workman who were allowed the relief by the decision of this Tribunal *vide* Reference No. 10 of 1985 referred before. They have also sought this relief like their other 8 co-workers who were absorbed when they had so withdrawn their claim during the pendency of this reference before this Tribunal and as such the relief claimed by them for regularisation can't be denied to them as per submission of the management in this regard.

16. It is also evident that the allegations made by the workmen concerned is that clearly they all had completed

one year's continuous service and as they had legally acquired the status of casual workers having worked for number of years and like their co-workers working in similar terms and conditions of employment were entitled to be given the benefit of regularisation. As stated above it is an admitted fact in this regard that out of these 19 workmen mentioned in the schedule of the present reference, 8 workmen have already been so accommodated by giving them regular employment once they had withdrawn their claim which was also so preferred by them under this reference. There is no reasonable and legal ground as such to deprive the concerned 11 workman also to get the benefit of regularisation as they have also sought for challenging their termination of services for the same in this regard and as discussed above in the preceding paragraphs the termination of their service is already held to be illegal and void *ab initio* and inoperative. The 11 workman concerned as such are also entitled to get the relief sought by them for regularisation of their services as per their claim under schedule of reference. In view of that there could be no justification for termination of the services of the concerned workman by the management, they as such are entitled to get that relief of regularisation after being so reinstated in services since they were illegally retrenched by the management in this regard.

17. In view of the above the action of the management of Calcutta Telephones in not regularising the services of 11 casual workman viz. Raj Kumar Singh, Suresh Singh, Rajendra Prasad, Misar Kayal, Dhananjay Mondal, Ganesh Ch. Dey, Gautam Samal, Umesh Roy, Phelan Ch. Biswas, Bijay Paul and Samar Bakuli is held to be unjustified. All these concerned workman be reinstated in service and regularised immediately and they be given half back wages with all other consequential benefits from the date of the reference, i.e. 23-03-1995 accordingly.

Dated, Kolkata, C. P. MISHRA, Presiding Officer
The 24th August, 2007.

नई दिल्ली, 31 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2849.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार नार्थ सेन्टर रेलवे के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण, कानपुर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 66/2006) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 31-8-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-41012/163/2005-आईआर(बी. आई.)]
अजय कुमार डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 31st August, 2007

S.O. 2849.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. 66/2006) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Kanpur as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of North Central Railway and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 31-08-2007.

[No. L-41012/163/2005-IR(B-I)]
AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**BEFORE SRI R. G. SHUKLA PRESIDING OFFICER
CENTRAL GOVT. INDUSTRIAL-TRIBUNAL-CUM-
LABOUR COURT
SHRAM BHAVAN A. T. I. CAMPUS, UDYOG
NAGAR, KNAPUR,**

Industrial Dispute No. 66 of 2006

In the matter of dispute between:

Sri K K Chauhan Central Vice President
Indian Raliway Loco Running Men Organisation
House No. 512-D, Company Bagh Tundla
District Firozabad, U.P.

And

The Divisional Railway Manager
North Central Railway Allahabad U.P.

AWARD

1. Central Government, MOL, New Delhi vide notification No. L- 41012/163/2005 IR(B-II) dated 01-09-2006, has referred the following dispute for adjudication to this tribunal:-

Kya Rail Prabandhan NCR Tundla Ke dwara Sri KK Chauhan Vidyut Chalak ko Dandadesh Sankya DEE /RSO /6/DAR-11/926/191 dinank 15-04-2002 ke dwara Vetan Vradhi 2 varsho ke rok aur appeal ke pashchat vradhi par ek varsh ke rok ka dand diya jana uchit avam nyaya sangat hai? Yadi nahi to karmakar kis anutosh ka adhikari hai?

2. In the instant case after receipt of the reference order from the Ministry registered notices to the parties were sent on 5-11-06, 5-10-06 and lastly on 14-05-07 but none has turned up from the side of the union raising the dispute nor any statement of claim was filed. It therefore, appears that the union raising the claim is not inclined to contest the claim before the tribunal. Therefore, the reference is bound to be answered against the union for want of pleadings and proof.

3. Accordingly reference is is answered in negative and against the union raising the dispute for want of pleadings and proof.

R. G. SHUKLA, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 31 अगस्त, 2007

का.आ. 2850.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार स्टेट बैंक ऑफ हैदराबाद के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मकारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण नई दिल्ली के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या 175/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 31-8-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-12012/163/2004-आईआर(बी-1)]

अजय कुमार, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 31st August, 2007

S.O. 2850.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central

Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No.175/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court II New Delhi as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the management of State Bank of Hyderabad and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 31-08-2007.

[No. L-12012/163/2004-IR(B-I)]

AJAY KUMAR, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER: CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL-TRIBUNAL-CUM-
LABOUR COURT-II NEW DELHI**

Presiding Officer: R. N. Rai. I. D. No.175/2004

Present: Sh B. K. Prasad -1st Party

Sh. Pramod Kumar -2nd Party

In The Matter Of:-

Shri Roshan Lal,
C/o. Room No. 95, Barrack No. 1/10,
Jam Nagar House, Shahjahan Road,
New Delhi -110 011.

Versus

1. The Management of M/s. State Bank of Hyderabad, Chandani Choke Branch, G-657-671, Sant Bhawan, Chandani Choke, Delhi- 110 006.
2. The Regional Manager, State Bank of Hyderabad, Regional Office, Region -II, 882, East Park Road, Karol Bagh, New Dehli.
3. The Dy. General Manager, State Bank of Hyderabad, Rachna Sansad Building, 1st Floor, 278, Sankar Chanekar Marg, Prabha Devi, Mumbai-25.

AWARD

The Ministry of Labour by its letter No. L-12012/12/163/2004-(IR(B-I) CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DT. 16-11-2004 has referred the following point for adjudication.

The point runs as hereunder:-

"Whether the action of the Regional Manager, State Bank of Hyderabad, 882, 1st Floor, East Park Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi in terminating/discontinuing the service of Shri Roshan Lal, S/o Sh. Mange Ram. Peon w.e.f 28-04-2003 and not to give full salary of Peon from 05-01-1997 is just, valid and legal? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled for and what directions are necessary in the matter."

The workman applicant has filed statement of claim. It has been stated therein that he worked continuously from 05-09-1997 at Rs.740 per month.

That he was appointed after interview and he performed his duties from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM

That during his period of employment he was not given appointment letter, minimum wages, earned leave, casual leave and OT. He was deprived of all these facilities.

That the management has taken the employees Raj Kumar alias Raju, Pratap Singh and Kartar Singh on regular

basis whereas this workman performed duties for a longer period than the above said workmen.

That the workman was refused duty on 28-04-2003 orally telling him that a letter has been received from the Hd. for not taking him on duty. The workman was not given that letter of the Hd. Office but his services were terminated arbitrarily and illegally.

That the workman has not been given any show cause notice or chargesheet.

That the workman has not been paid notice pay, retrenchment compensation and encashment of earned leave under the provisions of the ID Act, 1947. There is clear violation of Section 25 F of the ID Act, 1947.

That the management has retained the junior workmen and removed the services of this workman illegally.

The management has filed written statement. In the written statement it has been stated that when the matter in question was pending before the Hon'ble ALC (C), K.G. Marg, New Delhi vide order No. L-12012/163/2004-IR (B-1) dated 16-11-2004 the respondent bank submitted its detailed written statement along with annexures and it is requested that the contents of written statement along with all annexures may kindly be perused before passing any appropriate order in this case. And it is clear in this case that the claim of the claimant is neither maintainable on the basis of facts nor as well as law.

That the claim of the claimant is neither maintainable on the basis of facts nor as well as law.

That the claimant is not a workman as alleged by him.

That no cause of action ever arose in favour of the claimant and against the respondent bank at any point of time since the claimant was never appointed by the respondent bank.

It is submitted that the petitioner was not appointed in any permanent vacancy and or any appointment letter was issued.

The petitioner never worked continuously even as casual labour/daily wage. If there is any additional work or if regular staff goes on leave and depending upon contingency, sometimes the petitioner was engaged as a casual labour. Therefore, this does not give any legal right for regularization in service. Daily rated workers/contingent workers are not holder of any post. In absence of any post or vacancy or a statutory provision or a rule, the petitioner cannot be entitled for regularization. Even assuming engaging a person as a casual labour does not attribute to any legal status as per Hon'ble Apex Court Judgment AIR 1994 SC 1635. The Branch Manager has not power to appoint anybody in the service of the bank. So they are engaged by the Branch and they cannot be regularized as it is illegality in terms of SC Judgment 2005 LAB IC pages 1425. Further it is submitted that the question of termination or applicability of Section 25 F of the ID Act, 1947 does not arise as the petitioner is not in service or workman within the meaning of ID Act, 1947.

That it wrong to suggest that the claimant was ever appointed by the respondent bank at any point of time as alleged. It is further **wrong to suggest** that the claimant was ever appointed as a peon on 05-01-1997 as alleged at

monthly salary of Rs. 740 per month as alleged. It is humbly submitted that the employment in the bank is through employment exchange and through proper channel. The branch of the bank has no discretion to appoint anyone for any post. If there is regular post in the bank, demand will be made from employment exchange to send names of candidates for selecting suitable. The claimant was never appointed by the respondent bank. The claimant was engaged as casual labour on daily petty cash basis for attending petty work.

The claimant is not workman as alleged. It is wrong to suggest that the claimant was working with Chandani Chowk Branch of respondent bank since 9:00 AM till 6:00 PM as alleged.

The claimant was engaged as casual labour on cash basis for attending petty jobs. And the claimant is not entitled for any claim as alleged.

It has already submitted that the claimant was engaged as casual labour on cash basis for attending petty jobs. There was no requirement for any notice or chargesheet as alleged.

The claimant is not entitled for any claim as alleged. It is wrong to suggest that there was any violation of mandatory provisions of Section 25 F of the ID Act, 1947.

There is no question of preference as alleged. It has already submitted that the claimant was engaged as casual labour on cash basis for attending petty jobs.

The workman applicant has filed rejoinder. In the rejoinder he has reiterated the averments of his claim statement and has denied most of the paras of the written statement. The management has also denied most of the paras of the claim statement.

Evidence of the both the parties has been taken.

Heard argument from both the sides and perused the papers on the record.

From perusal of the pleadings of the parties the following issues arise for adjudication.

1. Whether the workman has performed 240 days duty as alleged?
2. Whether the workman is entitled to reinstatement?
3. To what amount of back wages the workman is entitled?
4. Relief if any?

Issue No. 1.

It was submitted from the side of the workman that he worked regularly for 7 years continuously at last drawn wages of Rs. 740. His services have been illegally terminated.

The workman has filed Ex.WW-1/1, Identity Card. He has been appointed on part time on Rs. 390. This letter has been issued on 11-01-1998. EX.WW-1/2 is a letter regarding regularization of temporary employees. The workman has been placed at Sl. NO.1 as SC candidate and his place of work has been shown at Chandni Chowk. This letter has been issued by the AGM to the Dy. AGM for regularization of the services of this workman.

EX.WW-1/3 is Identity Card. The workman has been designated as Peon.

The management has not denied these documents. These documents establish that the workman was engaged initially as part time worker. In 1998 he was designated as Peon and on 22-01-2001 the committee constituted for regularization of temporary employees/daily wagers has recommended the name of Sh. Roshan Lal for regularization. These documents go a long way to prove that the workman has worked continuously for 7 years and he has completed 240 days at least in the year 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 & 2002. He was engaged on 05-09-1997 and he worked up to 28-04-2003 as Peon.

It was submitted from the side of the management that the claimant was not appointed by the respondent bank against any permanent vacancy. No appointment letter has been issued to him. He has worked as casual labour/daily wager on leave vacancy and during contingency. It does not give any legal right to him for regularization.

It was further submitted that daily wagers/contingent workers are not holders of any post. Thus, the management has tacitly admitted that the workman has worked for the period 05-01-1997 to 28-04-2003 as alleged.

The management has not denied the working of the workman. The plea is that he worked as daily wager and he has no right of regularization.

Thus, it is found proved that the workman has performed 240 days work in each year of 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 & 2002. This issue is decided accordingly.

Issue No. 2.

It was submitted from the side of the bank that reinstatement is not the only relief in all the cases of illegal termination. Section 11 A of the ID Act, 1947 provides for payment of compensation also.

It was submitted from the side of the workman that compensation is payable in cases where an undertaking has become sick or it has been closed or it is in economic loss. It has not been established that the bank is in economic loss and it is a sick Industry.

My attention was drawn by the Ld. Counsel of the workman to 2000 LLR 523 State of UP and Rajender Singh. The Hon'ble Apex Court ordered for reinstatement with full back wages as the services of the daily wager cleaner who worked for 4 years was dispensed with without following the procedure for retrenchment. In the instant case also no retrenchment compensation has been paid. This case law squarely covers the instant case.

It has been held in 1978 Lab IC 1668 that in case service of a workman is terminated illegally the normal rule is to reinstate him with full back wages.

My attention was further drawn to AIR 2002 SC 1313. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that daily wager even if serving for a short period should be reinstated.

It was submitted from the side of the workman that in the instant case Sections 25 F, G of the ID Act are attracted. In section 25 of the ID Act it has been provided that if a workman has performed 240 days work and if the work is of continuous and regular nature he should be given pay in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation.

It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that there is no cessation of service in case provisions of section 25 F are not complied. In the instant case no compensation has been paid to the workman.

In case a workman has worked for 240 days in a year and the work is of continuous and regular nature he should be paid retrenchment compensation. In case retrenchment compensation is not paid section 25 F of the ID Act is attracted. There is no cessation of his services. He is deemed continued in service in the eye of law. In case there is breach of section 25 F the service is continued and reinstatement follows as a natural consequence. It has not been denied that the work is not of continuous nature.

ID Act, 1947 has been enacted to safeguard the interest of the workmen belonging to poor segment of society. It appears that legislature wanted that such workmen should not be harassed unnecessarily so section 25 F, U, T and Clause 10 of Vth Schedule have been enacted. The objects and reasons of ID Act, 1947 show that the respondent management should not be permitted to indulge in any unfair labour practice. The workman should not be engaged for years and then they should be removed all of a sudden. There is provision of retrenchment compensation for his removal. Retrenchment compensation is for compensating him otherwise so that he can survive long interregnum of unemployment. In the instant case no retrenchment compensation has been paid.

It was submitted from the side of the management that the Hon'ble Apex Court in 2006 (4) Scale has put down a complete ban on regularization and reinstatement. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that employment can only be made on the basis of procedure established in that behalf envisaged by the Constitution. Equality of opportunity is the hallmark and the Constitution enshrines affirmative action to ensure that unequals are not treated equals. So public employment should be in terms of constitutional scheme.

It was further submitted that the Constitution Bench Judgment has afforded a right according to which the government is not precluded from making temporary appointments or engaging workers on daily wages.

The Hon'ble Apex Court has not declared the provisions of ID Act un-constitutional. The Government has got no license to make always appointment of daily wagers and to continue them for life time. Fixed term tenure appointments and temporary appointments cannot be the rule of public employment. At the time of making temporary appointments Articles 14, 16, 21, 23, 226 & 309 are infringed. There is no constitutional mandate that the government is at liberty to go on giving fixed term appointments for the entire tenure of service of an employee.

No such Article of the Constitution has been pointed out under which the Government or Public Sector units can continue incessantly to give temporary and fixed term appointments again and again. Since fixed term appointments and temporary appointments are not governed by any constitutional scheme, such discrimination will amount to vicious discretion. The Government of Public Sector

unit will go on resorting to the method of pick and choose policy and give temporary and adhoc appointments to their favorites and thus the principles of equality enshrined in the constitution will be given a go bye. Such is not the intent of the Hon'ble Apex Court. However, in this judgment the provisions of the ID Act governing the services of the workman have not been declared un-constitutional. Reinstatement is the remedy provided in the ID Act for breach of several provisions enumerated therein or for breach of service rules provided in various labour welfare legislations.

Section 11 A of the ID Act stipulates that in case the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstance of the case may require. According to this benign provision this Tribunal has the authority to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and reinstate the workman on the terms and conditions as it thinks fit.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in 2006 (4) Scale has not annulled section 11 A of the ID Act and the legislature has authorized this Tribunal to set aside dismissal or discharge on its consideration and direct reinstatement. The judgment cited by the management is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.

A three Judges bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in 1993 - II - LLJ that termination of services affects the livelihood of not only of the employee but also of the dependents. So in case of illegal termination of service the workman should be reinstated.

Reinstatement should not be misconceived as regularization. By the order of reinstatement the status quo ante of the workman is restored. He is given back wages in order to compensate him for his illegal dis-engagement. This is a special remedy provided in ID Act and it has not been annulled and set aside by any judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court. The provisions of the ID Act are still constitutional and they are to be given effect too.

In case the workman is reinstated with back wages the respondents have every right, after payment of back wages and reinstatement, to retrench him validly following the principles of first come last go so that section 25, G & H of the ID Act are not violated.

In view of the law cited above and the facts pertaining in this case, the workman is entitled to reinstatement. This issue is decided accordingly.

Issue No. 3.

It was submitted by the management that payment of full back wages is not the natural consequence of the order of discharge or dismissal being set aside. It has been held in (2003) 6 SCC 141 that it is incumbent upon the labour court to decide the quantum of back wages.

It was been further held in this case that payment of back wages having discretionary element involved it is to be dealt with the facts and circumstances of the case. No definite formula can be evolved.

It has been further held in this case that payment of back wages in its entirety is the statutory sanction. In (2003) 4 SCC 27 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in view of delay in raising the dispute and initiating the proceedings back wages need not be allowed. In the instant case there is no delay at least on the part of the workman in raising the dispute.

In 1978 Lab IC 1968 - three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court held that payment of full back wages is the normal rule. In case services have been illegally terminated either by dismissal or discharge or retrenchment, in such circumstance the workman is entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. In the instant case the workman was always ready to work but he was not permitted on account of invalid act of the employer.

In 2005 IV AD SC 39 - three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court held that reinstatement with full back wages is justified. In this case the workman has performed more than 240 days work and he has been retrenched without payment of compensation and pay in lieu of notice.

It was submitted from the side of the management that reinstatement is not the only remedy. In such cases the workman may be given compensation. Section 11 A of the ID Act, 1947 provides that in case of dismissal or discharge is found illegal reinstatement should be ordered. It has been held in a catena of cases by the Hon'ble Apex Court that reinstatement with full back wages is the normal rule. The statute provides for reinstatement. In certain exceptional cases where the undertaking has been closed down or it has become sick there may be order for payment of compensation.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case the workman is entitled to 50% back wages as he is a manual worker and he must be doing some manual work off and on.

Issue No. 4.

The workman is entitled to reinstatement with 50% back wages.

The reference is replied thus:

The action of the Regional Manager, State Bank of Hyderabad, 882, 1 st Floor, East Park Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi in terminating/discontinuing the service of Shri Roshan Lal, S/o. Sh. Mange Ram, Peon w.e.f. 28-04-2003 and not to give full salary of Peon from 05-01-1997 is neither just nor valid nor legal. The management should reinstate the workman along with 50% back wages within two months from the date of the publication of the award.

The award is given accordingly.

Date 29-08-2007 R. N. Rai, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2851.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार उड़ीसा माईनिंग कॉर्पोरेशन लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय भुवनेश्वर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या आईडी केस सं.-2/2006) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-27012/7/2005-आई.आर.(एम)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डैस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2851.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the award (I. D. Case No. 2/2006) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Bhubaneswar as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. and their workman, which was received by the Central Government on 6-9-07.

[No. L-27012/7/2005-IR(M)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL- CUM-LABOUR COURT BHUBANESWAR

PRESENT

Shri N. K. R. Mohapatra,
Presiding Officer, C. G. I. T.-Cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar

Industrial Dispute Case No. 2/2006

Date of Passing Award, 13th August, 2007

BETWEEN

The Management of the Managing
Director, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd.,
O.M.C. House, Bhubaneswar—751001

... 1st Party-Management

AND

Their Workman, Shri Manoj Kr. Das,
Represented through the General Secretary,
Orissa Mining Workers Federation, C/o. OMC Ltd.,
OMC House, Bhubaneswar, Orissa-751001.

... 2nd Party-Union

APPEARANCES

Authorized ...For 1st Party Management
Representative

Shri A. K. Samal, ...For 2nd Party Union
General Secretary

AWARD

The Government of India in the Ministry of Labour, in exercise of Powers conferred by Clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2 (A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) have referred the following dispute for adjudication vide their Order No. L-27012/7/2005-IR (M), Dated 24-1-2006:—

"Whether the action of the Management of M/s. Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. is not providing equal pay for equal work to Shri Manoj Kumar Das as was being given to his regular counterparts engaged in the establishment are not regularizing him in the permanent post considering his length of service in permanent/perennial nature of job is justified. If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?"

2. After receipt of the above reference the 2nd Party-Federation was noticed for filing of his statement of claim. Instead of filing of his statement of claim the Federation today i.e. on 13-8-2007 filed a petition enclosing thereto a minutes of discussion held between the Management and the Federation on 15-5-2007 and contended to pass an award as per the terms of such discussion amounting to settlement.

3. From the above quoted terms of reference one can make out a proposition as if two distinct aspects have been referred for adjudication. But from the manner in which the words have been couched it can be concluded that the real intention behind such reference is only to examine the factum of regularization of the workman. On perusal of the minutes of discussion it is gathered that the Management and the Federation have agreed to place before the Board Committee and the Director, a proposal to give non-permanent status to the DRMP workers within the criteria fixed subject to the approval of the State Government. Para-3 of the minutes of discussion held between the parties further makes it clear that the report of the H. O. Committee given in respect of revision of wages of DRMP workers has also been scheduled to be discussed between the parties and if necessary a revised wage structure has been decided to be given effect to with the approval of the appropriate authority. The relevant paras of the true discussion made between the parties are extracted hereunder for general appreciation:—

Para-2 To bring the DRMP workers to NP Category

The Management informed that the proposal for bringing the DRMP employees to Non-Permanent category was placed in the last meeting of the Board of Directors held on 23-3-2007 and the Board advised that the matter may be examined by the Board Committee on Personnel and Sri D. K. Roy, Director. However, the Management agreed to expedite the matter and to place the proposal again in the ensuing Board meeting for its consideration as per the criteria fixed and sending the same to Government for approval. The Unions demanded for conversion of DRMP, to NPE may be effective from 1-1-2007 would also be placed before the Board for consideration.

Para-3 Revision of Wages of DRMP workers and PR Miners

It was informed that the HO Committee has already submitted its report and discussion with concerned Unions has been scheduled to be held on 21-5-2007 for the purpose. After consultation, the revised wage structure would be given effect to with the approval of appropriate authority.

4. With reference to the above minutes of discussion it is submitted by the Federation that when the Management has come forward to provide service and pay protection to the DRMP workers and the workman being one such

worker, the dispute raised earlier (referring to the terms of reference) has already lost all its vigor for its further adjudication and as such an award may be passed in terms of the joint decision reflected above.

5. As I find there is much force in the submission of the Federation. When the management has come forward to provide a common solution to the problems of the DRMP workers like the workman in question, the same shall not be allowed to be defeated by keeping the reference pending as the decision so taken by the parties provides an ostensible answer to the reference.

6. Accordingly an award is passed in terms of the above settlement reached between the parties.

N. K. R. MOHAPATRA, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2852.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार मैसूर मिनरल लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय बंगलौर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या सी आर सं. 18/1999 एवं 20/1999) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-29012/172/98/आई.आर.(एम.)]

[सं. एल-29012/173/98/आई.आर.(एम.)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डैस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2852.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. C. R. No. 18/1999 & 20/1999) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court Bangalore now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Mysore Minerals Limited and their workman, which was received by the Central Government on 6-9-07.

[No. L-29012/172/98-IR(M)]

[No. L-29012/173/98-IR(M)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT BANGALORE

Dated 14th August, 2007

PRESENT

Shri A. R. Siddiqui, Presiding Officer

C. R. No. 18/1999

I Party	II Party
Smt. Suvama, W/o Narayan,	The Chairman & Managing
C/o Sarai Angadi	Director,
Venka Laxamma,	Mysore Minerals Limited,
Yeggedahalli,	No. 39. M. G. Road
Nanjangud Taluk,	Bangalore-560001
Mysore, Karnataka State	Karnataka State

C. R. No. 20/1999

I Party	II Party
Shri Narayana	The Chairman & Managing
S/o Venkatappa,	Director,
C/o Sarai Angadi Venkata	Mysore Minerals Limited,
Laxamma,	No. 39. M. G. Road
Hullahalli Hobli,	Bangalore-560001
Nanjangud Tk,	Karnataka State
Mysore	

COMMON AWARD

1. The Central Government by exercising the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section 2A of the Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have referred these disputes vide order Nos. L-29012/172/98/IR (M) & L-29012/173/98/IR (M) dated 1st March 1999 for adjudication on the following schedules :—

SCHEDULE (C.R No. 18/1999)

“Whether the termination of Smt. Suvama, Mazdoor, Asuli Manganese Mines by the management of M/s. Mysore Minerals Ltd is justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?”

SCHEDULE (C.R No. 20/1999)

“Whether the termination of Shri Narayana, Mazdoor, by the management of M/s. Mysore Minerals Ltd is justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?”

2. These two cases are taken up together for disposal as involved common question of facts and law for the sake of convenience and to avoid overlapping.

3. The case of the first party workman (in CR No. 18/1999), Smt. Suvama as made out in the claim Statement, relevant for the purpose in brief is that she had been working with the management company as a Mazdoor at Karya Manganese Mines near Karya Village of Nanjangud taluk, Mysore district having joined the services on 23-8-1988. She had been discharging her duties honestly and sincerely all along; that she was transferred from the aforesaid mines to the Asuli Manganese Mines on 29-6-1995 along with other workmen and accordingly she joined duty at Asuli Mines on 7-7-1995; that she applied for leave on medical grounds and after having availed the leave when she reported for duty, the manager of the said Asuli Mines refused to give her work on the ground that disciplinary action has been contemplated against her for certain charges of misconduct. Thereupon, without issuing any charge sheet or any notice of enquiry she was dismissed from service vide order dated 19-9-1996. Therefore, she contended that the aforesaid dismissal order was against the principles of natural justice, contrary to the certified standing orders of the company and also illegal and unjustified. In the result, she requested this tribunal to pass an award setting aside the dismissal order with all consequential benefits including back wages and continuity of service.

4. The management by its counter Statement, not disputing the fact that the first party was working with its mines since from 23-8-1988 having joined the service as Mazdoor, denied the allegation that she was refused work

by the Manager of the Asuli Mines when she came to report for duty. The management contended that ever since the first party reported for duty at Asuli Mines, she was in the habit of abstaining from work frequently and unauthorisedly and therefore, she was served with three memos dated 23-1-1996, 5-2-1996 & 18-2-1996 through registered post. However, the first party remained absent from duty unauthorisedly and never sent any communication for her continuous unauthorised absence from duty. Therefore, as per Clause 11 (2) (e) of the Certified Standing Orders of the Company, absence of an employee from duties for more than 10 days being considered as a serious misconduct, disciplinary action was taken against the first party by ordering an enquiry into the matter of unauthorised absence by the first party; that the first party did not attend the enquiry held on 23-3-1996 therefore, the management got published a notice in the local Kannada Daily on 9-6-1996 asking the first party to report for duty within 7 days, but of no consequence. Finally she was served with show cause notice dated 3-8-1996 once again advising her to report for duty with her explanation for her long unauthorised absence from duty. She did not respond to the said notice therefore, the management having no alternative, dismissed the first party from the services of the company w.e.f. 19-9-1996. Therefore, the management contended that the dismissal order passed against the first party was legal and justified and so also in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the reference is liable to be dismissed.

5. The case of the first party workman, Shri Narayana involved in CR No. 20/1997 as made out in the claim statement, in brief, is that he joined the services of the management company as a Mazdoor at Karya Manganeese Mines in Karya Village of Nanjangud Taluk on 26-5-1982 and was discharging his duties honestly and diligently throughout; that he was transferred from Karya Mines to Asuli Manganeese Mines on 10-7-1996, however, the Manager of the Asuli Mines refused him to give the work on the ground that there is no vacancy of Watchman Post in the Asuli mines; that he submitted several representations to the management personally as well as by post seeking reinstatement in service but to his shock and surprise he received dismissal order from the management dismissing him from service w.e.f. 7-4-1997 without any opportunity given to him much less any enquiry conducted against him. Therefore, he averred that the act of the Manager of the Asuli Mines in refusing him work w.e.f. 7-4-1997 amounts to illegal termination and is liable to be set aside at the hands of this tribunal.

6. The management by its counter statement, not disputing the fact that the first party was working as a Mazdoor in the aforesaid Karya Mines having joined the services in the year 1982, however, contended that since from the date the first party reported for duty at Asuli Mines was in the habit of remaining absent from duty frequently and to that he was served with three memos dated 27-10-1995, 10-11-1995 and 22-11-1995 for his unauthorised absence from duty. He did not respond to those memos and therefore, the management acting under Clause 11 (2)(e) of the Certified Standing Orders of the

company ordered Domestic Enquiry against him. The enquiry officer with due enquiry notice to the first party held the sitting of enquiry on 6-1-1996 but the first party did not attend the enquiry, then notice was published in the local Daily Newspaper on 10-3-1996 calling upon the first party to report for duty within 7 days failing which action will be taken to terminate his services. He did not avail the said opportunity. Finally show cause notice dated 6-6-1996 was issued to the first party from the head office of the company asking the first party to report for duty within 7 days along with his explanation. The first party did not report for duty nor sent any communication about his long unauthorised absence. Therefore, the management had no alternative but to dismiss the first party from his services w.e.f. 7-4-1997.

7. From the order sheet maintained by this tribunal in both the cases (they were being taken up for hearing simultaneously), it would appear that after the pleadings of the parties were completed, the matter came to be posted for evidence to be adduced on behalf of the management keeping in view the schedule reference points. The management made appearance through counsel, Shri TPS and whereas, the first party workmen in both the cases were being represented by Shri Mohan Kumar said to be the President, Mysore Minerals Ltd. workers Union, Hullahalli Nanjangud Taluk. It is revealed from the order sheet that on 29-12-2004 the right of the management to adduce evidence was taken closed and thereupon the matter came to be posted for evidence to be let by its parties. On 16-3-2005, the management through counsel filed interim application to recall the aforesaid order dated 29-12-2004 and also filed an affidavit of the management witness. The first party workmen were not present nor they were represented through the said union representative. The matter came to be adjourned for the say of the first party workmen on the above said application. On 20-4-2005, when the matter was taken up for hearing though the first party workmen were present and their Union Representative did not appear. Therefore, after having heard the counsel for the second party, the aforesaid interim application was allowed and the affidavit of the management witness was taken on record and case came to be adjourned for the purpose of cross examination of management witness (MW1) to the next date. On 18-10-2005, MW1 was recalled and in his further examination in chief documents at EX.M1 to M6 were marked (in both the cases). Once again the matter came to be adjourned for his cross examination, there being no representative for the first party workmen. On 3-1-2006 this tribunal after having gone through the pleadings of the parties noticed that the order terminating the services of the first party workmen were passed by the management after conducting a Domestic Enquiry against them and on the basis of the findings of the Enquiry Officer who held enquiry against them. Therefore, the court thought it proper to frame a preliminary issue on the point as to "whether the enquiry conducted against the first party by the second party is fair and proper" and then the matter came to be posted for evidence of the management on Domestic enquiry issue. Thereupon, the matter came to be adjourned from time to time for evidence

of the Second party to be adduce on the above said Domestic Issue. On 1-2-2007, the request of the management to adduce evidence was refused as several opportunities were already given to the management to adduce evidence on the said issue and the matter came to be posted for evidence of first party workmen. First party workmen also did not lead evidence. On 25-6-2007, when the cases have taken up for hearing, there was no representation for the first party workmen and one Mr. Anand Kumar, Assistant Office Superintendent appearing for the management sought adjournment of the case on the ground that their lawyer has not come. This request of the management was not granted and then the court recorded a finding on the above said issue to the effect that the Domestic Enquiry held against the first party was not fair and proper. The court after having gone through the counter statement filed by the management noticed that there was no plea as such taken by the management to lead fresh evidence to prove the charges of misconduct leveled against the first party workmen in case the Domestic Enquiries were held to be defective for one reason or the other. Therefore, proceedings were taken as closed and cases are posted this day for award.

8. Now, therefore, as things stand, the so called Domestic Enquiries said to have been held against the first party workmen have been set aside by this tribunal holding that they are not fair and proper, at the same time we have got no evidence on the part of the management to substantiate the charges of misconduct leveled against the first party workmen. Even assuming for a moment, if we take into consideration the aforesaid statement of MW1 by way of affidavit and the documents produced in both the cases marked at EX.M1 to M6 respectively, the charges of misconduct leveled against the first party workmen cannot be taken to be proved though the aforesaid affidavit statement of MW1 has not been subjected to cross examination by the first party. The above said statement of MW1 is just the replica of the various averments made by the management in the Counter Statement. If we look into those averments and scrutinize them closely with reference to the contentions taken in the counter statement also, it can be very well revealed that, in fact, there was no Domestic Enquiry as such conducted against the first party workmen by affording any reasonable opportunity by way of notice of enquiry served upon them at any point of time. The documents at EX.M1 to M6 produced in both the case do not disclose the fact of service of the enquiry notices upon the first party workmen. From the very stand taken by the management at para 5 of the counter statement as well as at para 5 of the affidavit of the management witness (MW 1) it becomes highly doubtful as to whether there was any enquiry conducted against the first party much less resulting into any findings rendered by the Enquiry Officer. The contentions in the counter statement as well as the averments in the affidavits read to the effect that after the first party did not attend the enquiry, the Enquiry notices were published in the local Daily newspaper giving directions to the first party workmen to report for duty within 7 days. From this statement made by the management in the counter statement, itself, it will be abundantly clear

that there was no proper enquiry held or conducted against the first party workmen. If there was any enquiry conducted and the first party workmen remained absent before the Enquiry Officer, then it is not understandable rather unbelievable as to what prompted the management once again to publish a notice in the local Daily paper calling upon the first party workmen to report for duty. The natural consequence which should have followed if at all any Domestic Enquiry was conducted against the first party workmen, was by way of findings of the enquiry officer being submitted to hold the first party workmen guilty of the charges and then on the basis of those findings the first party workmen could have been dismissed from services. But as could be read from the aforesaid contentions taken in the Counter Statement, after the so called enquiry was said to have been held on a particular date there were no enquiry findings as such submitted by the enquiry officer. On the other hand, a notice was published in the Daily newspaper calling upon them to attend duty within 7 days. The further reading of the contention would disclose that even after the publication of the said notice once again the management issued show cause notice to the first party workmen calling upon them to report for duty along with the explanation for their unauthorised absence. That means to say that there was no findings of the enquiry officer available to the management and the termination/dismissal order passed against the first party workmen in fact was not based upon those findings. The management before this tribunal produced the so called enquiry reports marked at Ex. M5 in both the cases, separately. From the perusal of those enquiry reports one can never say that these are the findings of the enquiry officer holding the workman guilty of the charges. The reading of the aforesaid reports disclosed that the enquiry officer concerned after having held the enquiry sitting on a particular date reported the management that the first party workmen did not attend the enquiry and therefore, appropriate legal action will be taken against them. These reports do not disclose or refer to any oral or documentary evidence nor there is any finding given by the enquiry officer on the point that the first party were held guilty of any misconduct much less the misconduct of unauthorised absence. The other documents produced by the management are the aforesaid memos said to have been sent to the first party workmen calling upon them to report for duty. Therefore, there is no evidence forthcoming before this tribunal worth credence in the first instance to suggest that there was any Domestic Enquiry held against the first party workmen that too after due notices to them. Secondly, there are no findings of the enquiry officer as such available in holding the workmen guilty of the charges. That apart, the statement of MW1 and the documents produced by the management referred to supra before this tribunal, even if, considered to be the fresh evidence of the management to prove the charges of misconduct before this tribunal as noted above, will not help the case of the management to substantiate the charges of misconduct of unauthorised absence leveled against the first party workmen. Except, the above said self serving statement of MW1, we have no other documents on record to suggest that the first party workmen remained

unauthorisedly absent from duty that too for a particular period as undisputedly, there was no charge sheet issued against them specifying the period of unauthorised absence and as noted above, there was also no enquiry conducted against them on the basis of any charge sheet. Going one step further and treating the above said memos as show cause notices, it can be seen that in both the cases the first party workmen said to have remained absent from duty for a period of about 30 days. Therefore, even assuming for a moment that the first party workmen have remained absent from duty unauthorisedly for a period of about 30 days, the order dispensing the services of the first party workmen by way of termination and dismissal cannot be justified and sustainable in the eye of law. Therefore, the impugned punishment order passed against the first party workmen are liable to be set aside as illegal and void abinitio.

9. Now, the next question to be considered would be about the relief to be granted them. Since the termination order passed against the first party workman, Shri Narayana (in CR No. 20/1999) and dismissal order passed against the first party workman, Smt. Suvarna (in CR No. 19/1999) are held to be illegal and void abinitio, the natural corollary to be followed would be their reinstatement in service. However, the first party workman, Smt. Suvarna has been reported to be dead when a notice issued to her by way of registered post returned unserved with an endorsement that 'addressee Smt. Suvarna has expired'. In the result, relief of reinstatement to Smt. Suvarna does not survive.

10. Coming to the relief of back wages and continuity of service. It is to be noted that throughout the proceedings before this tribunal except on one occasion, the first party workmen have not appeared either in person or through their aforesaid union representative. Keeping in view the aforesaid conduct of the first party workmen, they do not deserve either the relief of back wages or the continuity of service. Hence the following award.

AWARD

The management is directed to reinstate the first party workman, Shri Narayana in its service without any back wages from the date of his termination till the date of his reinstatement without continuity of service throughout the said period. Keep the copy of the award in CR. No. 20/1999. No costs.

(Dictated to PA transcribed by her corrected and signed by me on 14th August 2007)

A. R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2853.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार मैसूर मिनेरल लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, बंगलौर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या सी आर सं. 26/1999) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-29012/188/98/आईआर (एम.)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2853.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the award (C. R. No. 26/1999) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bangalore now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Mysore Minerals Limited and their workman, which was received by the Central Government on 6-9-07.

[No. L-29012/188/98-IR(M)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, BANGALORE

Dated, 17th August, 2007

PRESENT

Shri A. R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer

C. R. No. 26/1999

I Party

Shri K. C. Somasekhar,
No. 15, Near Ganapathi
Temple,
Hasanamba Street,
Hassan-573201
Karnataka State.

II Party

The Chairman & Managing
Director, No. 9, M. G. Road
Bangalore-560001
Karnataka State.

AWARD

1. The Central Government by exercising the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section 2A of the Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 have referred this disputes vide order No. L-29012/188/98-IR (M) dated 22nd March 1999 for adjudication on the following schedule:

SCHEDULE

"Whether the termination of Shri K.C. Somasekhar by the management of M/s. Mysore Minerals Ltd, is justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled to?"

2. The case of the first party workman, as made out in the claim statement, is that after he joined the services of the management on 10-7-1977 on daily wage basis, his services were regularized as Mate Assistant from 1-10-1983 and he was promoted as Supervisor from 12-5-1989 which post he held till he was dismissed from service on 27-7-1993; that while he was working as a Supervisor in the Aladihalli Chromite Mines of the management company, he received an order dated 23-12-1992 placing him under suspension pending enquiry on the grounds that he misappropriated a sum of Rs. 10,000 while he was working at New Mangalore Port in the months of May and June 1991. Thereupon, he was issued with a show cause notice dated 3-2-1993 levelling various charges of misconduct and to that he submitted his explanation, on 15-2-1993 denying those charges. Not being satisfied with his explanation enquiry was ordered against him and thereafter he was dismissed from service. His appeal against

the dismissal order to the Chairman & Managing Director of the company was rejected without proper application of mind by the Board of Directors of the company at their meeting on 27-12-1993, thereby confirming the order of dismissal dated 27-07-1993; that the enquiry conducted against him was not fair and proper conducted in undue haste without giving sufficient and reasonable opportunity to the first party to defend himself; that the report of the enquiry officer was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority without furnishing copy of the findings of the enquiry officer to the first party and therefore, enquiry findings were vitiated and the order of dismissal passed against him based up on the enquiry report behind his back is illegal and unjustified. He requested the court to set aside the dismissal order and to pass an award for his reinstatement in service with back wages and continuity of service and other consequential benefits.

3. The management by its counter statement however, contended that the first party while was working as Supervisor and was handling the cash books at New Mangalore Port had defalcated the company's funds to the extent of Rs. 10,000 and tampered the voucher to cover up the defalcation of the funds. Therefore, he was placed under suspension and thereafter a show cause notice was served upon him seeking explanation about the charge of misconduct levelled against him; that the explanation offered by the first party was not found satisfactory resulting into Domestic Enquiry to be conducted against him and that based upon the enquiry findings and keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, he was dismissed from service. The management contended that enquiry was conducted giving reasonable and fair opportunity to the first party to defend himself and the first party in fact pleaded guilty to the charges leveled against him in the said show cause notice. In the result, the management submitted that the reference is liable to be rejected.

4. After the pleadings were complete, the management examined its witness as MW1 by filing his affidavit evidence on merits of the case and in his further examination chief got marked 10 documents at Ex. M1 to M10. When the matter was being taken up for cross examination of MW1 it was brought to the notice of the court that the dismissal order passed against the first party was preceded by a DE and therefore, a preliminary issue on DE was necessary to be tried in the first instance. Accordingly, on 3-1-2006 following Preliminary issue was framed:

"Whether the domestic enquiry conducted against the first party by the second party is fair and proper."

5. The management was called upon to lead evidence on the said DE issue. However, despite several opportunities given to the management and the case being adjourned for the purpose of evidence of Domestic Enquiry issue from 3-1-2006 till 1-2-2007, management did not lead evidence on the point and therefore, on 1-2-2007 management's side for evidence was taken closed and case came to be adjourned for evidence of the first party. The first party also did not lead evidence. On 25-06-2007 this tribunal recorded a finding to the effect that the DE held against the first party was not fair and proper. The court,

then, went through the counter statement of the management to see whether any plea was taken by the management to lead evidence on merits in case enquiry was set aside as defective for one reason or the other. Since, the management did not take such a plea, the court did not call upon the management to lead evidence on merits and the matter came to be posted for award.

6. Therefore, as could be read from the above, Domestic Enquiry held against the first party have been held to be not fair and proper and we have no evidence adduced on behalf of the management on merits to prove the charges of misconduct levelled against the first party after the Domestic Enquiry issue is set aside. Even for the sake of arguments, if we take into consideration the evidence of the management let in before this tribunal before the Domestic Enquiry issue was answered, then, again we do not find evidence legal and sufficient on the point to prove the charges of misconduct levelled against the first party workman. The statement of MW1 first of all cannot be read in evidence for the simple reason that he was not subjected to cross examination by the first party workman. Secondly, his affidavit is just a replica of the various contentions taken by the management in its Counter Statement. The only two documents which were produced by the management in order to prove the charges of misconduct against the first party marked before this tribunal at Ex. M1 & M2 are namely M/s Sheriff & Associates audit reports with vouchers and a report of verification regarding misappropriation in the records of NMPT management. The contents of these two documents are not proved by the management by examining the competent and relevant witness. Testimony of MW1 cannot be taken into consideration in order to prove the contents of these two documents as he was neither the author of those documents nor was competent to speak on those documents. In the result, and the reasons foregoing, this court has no alternative but to hold that the charges of misconduct against the first party have not been proved and that the dismissal order passed against him is liable to be set aside as illegal and void abinitio.

7. In the light of the finding that the dismissal order is illegal and void abinitio, the only natural consequence to follow would be the reinstatement of the workman.

8. Coming to the relief of back wages, continuity of service and other benefits, it is to be noted that throughout the proceedings before this tribunal the first party never made appearance except on one occasion and the union representative who was representing his case also remained absent before this tribunal all along. There is again no evidence on the part of the first party workman so as to suggest that he was not gainfully employed when he was out of the service of the management. Therefore, keeping in view the aforesaid conduct of the first party workman, the ends of justice will be met if he is granted only the relief of reinstatement denying him the relief of back wages and continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Hence the following award :

AWARD

The management is directed to reinstate the first party workman into its services without back wages, continuity of service and other consequential benefits. The period elapsed between the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement shall be treated as "not on duty". No costs.

(Dictated to PA transcribed by her corrected and signed by me on 17th August, 2007)

A. R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2854.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार मै. मेवाड़ मार्बल लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, उदयपुर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या मु. न.5/2003) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-07 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-29011/102/2002/आई आर (एम)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डैस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2854.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. No. Case No. 5/2003) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Udaipur now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of M/s. Mewad Marble Ltd. and their workman, which was received by the Central Government on 6-9-07.

[No. L-29011/102/2002-IR(M)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

अनुबंध

न्यायाधीश, औद्योगिक अधिकरण एवं श्रम न्यायालय, उदयपुर

केस सं. 5/03 आई. टी. आर. केन्द्र सरकार

अधिसूचना सं. एल 29011/102/02, आई आर (एम), 31-3-2003

अनुवाद.- अ. भारतीय माईन्स एण्ड मिन. द्वारा प्रभुलाल जोशी, पसुन्द बनाम मै. मेवाड़ मार्बल लि. मित्तल टावर मशीन

निर्णय

दिनांक 8-5-2007

प्रार्थी प्रतिनिधि उप./विपक्षी के विरुद्ध एक पक्षीय कार्यवाही चल रही है। प्रार्थी प्रतिनिधि ने No Instruction plead किया। अतः प्रार्थी पक्ष की साक्ष्य बन्द की, मैंने आज पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया।

प्रार्थी पक्ष की अपने क्लेम के समर्थन में कोई साक्ष्य रिकार्ड पर नहीं है। अतः विपक्षी द्वारा धारा 25 एफ/25एफ औ. वि. अधि. की पालना किये बिना दिनांक 13-7-2001 में खनन कार्य बन्द करना व 51 श्रमिकों को दिनांक 17-10-2001 से ड्यूटी पर न लेना उचित व वैध होना प्रमाणित नहीं है। अतः श्रमिक किसी राशि व राहत को पाने के अधिकारी नहीं है। प्रार्थी का क्लेम आवेदन-पत्र

अस्वीकार किया जाता है, पंचाट इसी प्रकार पारित किया जावे। पंचाट प्रकाशनार्थ राज्य/भारत सरकार को भेजा जावे। मिशन दाखिल दफ्तर हो।

ह./-अपठनीय

न्यायाधीश

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2855.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार न्यू मंगलोर पोर्ट के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय बंगलौर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या सी.आर.सं. 6/2003) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-45011/1/2002/आई.आर.(एम)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डैस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2855.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. C.R. No. 6/2003) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court Bangalore now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of New Mangalore Port Trust and their workman, which was received by the Central Government on 6-9-2007.

[No. L-45011/1/2002-IR(M)],

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT,
BANGALORE**

Dated 10th August, 2007

Present

SHRI A.R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer

C.R. No.6/2003

I Party

The General Secretary,
New Mangalore Port &
Dock
Workers' Union,
Market Building,
Panambur,
Mangalore-575010

II Party

The Chairman,
New Mangalore
Port Trust,
Panambur,
Mangalore 575010

AWARD

1. The Central Government by exercising the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section 2A of the Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has referred this dispute vide order No. L-45011/1/2002-IR(M) dated 10th February 2003 for adjudication on the following schedule:

SCHEDULE

“ Whether the action of the management of New Mangalore Port Trust, Mangalore in not promoting Shri Pundana Rama, Serang Grade I as Assistant

Marine Foreman by relaxing academic qualification as per Rule 31 of RSP Regulation is justified? If not, to what relief the said workman is entitled?"

2. The case of the first party workman, whose, cause, has been espoused through the first party union, as made out in the Claim Statement, in brief, is that he was working as Serang Grade-1 possessing MMD Certificate in the year 1986 being promoted to the said grade in the year 1983. He had excellent service record serving the management with utmost dedication and diligence; that as per the New Mangalore Port Trust(RSP) Regulation, the post of Assistant Marine Foreman in the pay scale of Rs.2500-100-3000-120-4800 is required to be filled up by promotion from the employees in Serang Grade -1 with 3 years regular service in the grade and having qualification of Matriculation; that when certain posts of Assistant Marine Foreman were vacant and were to be filled by way of promotion the first party workman was entitled to be promoted as he fulfilled the requirements of the Regulation, having an experience of 8 years and possessing MMD Certificate; that when the first party expected the management to promote him to the said post, the management, instead, promoted one Shri H. Jaya who had just two years experience in Serang grade-1 and who was also facing criminal case and happened to be junior to the first party workman. In another case one Shri Yogesh Karkera was promoted as assistant Marine Foreman by relaxing the requirement of educational qualification as such relaxations are being done by the management for the purpose of promotion in many other cases. Therefore, similarly, the case of first party ought to have been considered for the purpose of promotion relaxing the requirement of educational qualification. Though the management promoted the aforesaid employees, Shri Jaya and Shri Yogesh Karkera by relaxing various requirements but there was a discrimination in the case of the first party not considering his case for promotion; that the first party made several representations to the management in this connection but of no aware. Therefore, his case was taken up with the management by the first party union on 11.01.2001 and 23.03.2001 and there being no response from the management the union approached the Conciliation officer. Therefore, the first party requested this tribunal to pass an award holding that the management was not justified in not promoting the first party workman to the post of Assistant Marine Foreman by relaxing the requirement of educational qualification as done in the case of the others and that he be accorded promotion to the said post from the date on which his juniors were promoted to the said post.

3. The Management by its counter statement contended that as per RSP Regulation (RR), the essential academic qualification required for the post of AMF is matriculation or is equivalent and whereas, the first party workman had qualification of Vth standard and therefore, was not eligible to be promoted; that as per the recruitment rules, the post of AMF is a promotional post from the feeder cadre of Serang Grade-1 with 3 years' of regular service in the grade and educational qualification to be possessed is matriculation or equivalent. Therefore, the first party is not

eligible for promotion his educational qualification being Vth standard; that Shri Jaya since possessed the required qualification as per the said rules has been considered for promotion to the post of AMF on ad hoc basis with the approval of the competent authority as per Rule 32 of RSP Regulation, though he did not complete 3 years of regular service in Serang grade-1. However, his appointment was regularized in the post of AMF w.e.f. 09.03.2001 i.e. after completion 3 years of regular service in the said grade. Therefore, his promotion was as per the provisions of RR and as per the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee. Moreover, it is a selection post for which seniority alone is not the criteria. Therefore, though the first party had more experience but did not possess the required academic qualification, his case was not considered for promotion as AMF; that Shri Yogesh Karkera who was the senior to first party was given promotion to the said post by relaxing academic qualification under the provision of Rule 31 of RSP Regulation with due approval of the competent authority. Therefore, the management contended that the promotions accorded in favour of Shri Jaya and Shri Yogesh Karkera were in accordance with Rule 31 and 32 of the RSP Regulations with due approval of the competent authority and that the case of the first party workman was not considered for the reasons mentioned above. In the result, the management requested this tribunal to dismiss the reference.

4. During the course of trial, the management examined one Mr. K. Vishwanath, Asstt. Secretary, Marine Department of the management by filing his affidavit and in his further examination chief got marked two documents namely, the Xerox copies of the extract of the Recruitment Rules of Assistant Marine Foreman and extract of Seniority and promotion at EX. M1 and M2 respectively. The affidavit averments of the management witness are the just replica of the various contentions taken by the management by way of counter statement and therefore, need not be once again repeated. The first party also filed his affidavit evidence and got marked two documents at Ex. W1 and W2 series. His statement by way of affidavit again is just the repetition of the averments made in the claim statement and therefore, need not be repeated. I would like to come to the statements of MW1 and first party (WW1) made in their cross examination as and when found relevant and necessary.

5. Learned counsel Shri R. Upadhyaya for the management vehemently argued that the case of the first party for the purpose of promotion in question was not considered as he failed to fulfill the required educational qualification of matriculation and whereas, the said Yogesh was promoted relaxing his educational qualification on the recommendation of the competent authority namely, the departmental promotion committee with the approval of the Chairman. He contended that in case of Shri Jaya condition of 3 years regular service was relaxed as at the time of promotion there was no other senior candidate available having required qualification of service as well as education. He also submitted that the first party had already been retired from service attaining the age of

superannuation as on 30.01.2006 and therefore, question of promotion at this juncture does not arise.

6. Whereas, learned counsel, Shri Muralidhar representing the first party in his arguments reiterated the stand taken by the first party workman in the claim statement and took the court through the very affidavit of the management witness to substantiate the case of the first party that he was eligible and entitled for promotion and that he was discriminated by the management while promoting said Shri Jaya and Yogish and in not considering the case of the first party. Learned counsel also invited the attention of this tribunal to the very Rules 31 and 32 of the said Regulation to justify the claim of the first party workman. Learned counsel submitted that though the first party has already been retired from service since, his retirement happened during the course of the proceedings pending before this tribunal, he is entitled to the benefit of promotion with reference to the scale to be fixed and other consequential benefits.

7. After having gone through the records, I find substance in the arguments advanced for the first party. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties, it is worthwhile to bring on record the very rule 31 and 32 of RSP Regulation 80 running as under :—

“Rule 31:—Relaxation of qualifications in certain cases of promotions :

When a post is filled by promotion, departmental promotion committee may subject to the approval of the Chairman relax the academic qualifications, if the candidate to be promoted is otherwise suitable and qualified by reason of adequate experience.

Rule 32 :— Ad hoc appointments :

All appointments by promotion shall be made by the appointing authority in the order in which the employees are placed in the relative select list:

Provided that in case of immediate necessity and non suitable employee is available for promotion, the Chairman or the appointing authority, with the chairman's prior approval may make a purely ad hoc appointment for a period not exceeding six months, at a time and the total period of such ad hoc appointment shall not exceed one year.”

8. The case of the first party that above said Rule 31 is being invoked and relaxation with respect to the educational qualification has been done by the management in number of cases is not to be disputed by the management. Now, relying upon the above said Rule 31 which has not been invoked in his case, he has given specific two instances of the employees by name Shri H. Jaya and Shri Yogish thereby contending that those two employees have been promoted in deference to his promotion and therefore, management was not justified in not promoting him by invoking the said provision of law. Whereas, the case of the management that as far as the case of Shri H. Jaya is concerned is that he has been promoted in compliance with Rule 32 of the said Regulation and whereas, Shri Yogish has been considered for promotion

under the provision of Rule 31 of the said Regulation, In the first instance, coming to the case of Mr. Yogish, I think there cannot be any grievance made against the management when his case was considered for promotion by relaxing educational qualification under Rule 31 of the said Regulation. He, undisputedly, happened to be the senior to the first party. However, the management cannot justify the promotion of Shri H. Jaya in deference to the promotion to the first party. As on the date when vacancy for the post of AMF was to be filled by way of promotion, the first party was very much available with MMD certificate and experience of 8 years service to be considered for the said post. Therefore, in the presence of the first party there was no convincing and reasonable ground for the management to take up the case of said Shri Jaya and to promote him to the said post without considering the case of the first party. The main contention of the management is that in the case of said Shri Yogish Rule 31 was invoked as there was no other candidate available possessing prescribed academic qualification and whereas, when the vacancy for the above said post was filled up at the relevant point of time, case of the first party was not considered as the said employee Shri Jaya who possessed educational prescribed qualification was available from the feeder cadre of Serang Grade -1 post. Therefore, the reasoning given by the management in not considering the case of the first party and at the same time considering the case of Shri Yogish under the exigency and the situation indicated above does not appear to be reasonable. When the case of first party was not considered because of availability of Shri H. Jaya possessing academic qualification then it is yet to be explained by the management as to why the case of Shri Yogesh was considered when the employee Shri Jaya still was available on the roll of the management. Undisputedly, Shri H. Jaya did not possess 3 years service experience which was one of the two necessary conditions for the promotion to the above said AMF post. The management takes shelter under Rule 32 of the said Regulation in order to promote Mr. Jaya and very conveniently does not invoke the provision of Rule 31 of the said Regulation in not considering the case for promotion of the first party under Rule 31 of the said Regulation. Therefore, there appears to be a clear case of discrimination made against the first party by the management while considering the cases of Mr. Jaya and Yogesh for the purpose of promotion invoking the above said Rule 31 and 32 of the said Regulation and at the same time ignoring the case of the first party for promotion though he possessed an experience of 8 years. It is not the case of the management that there was any enquiry or adverse remarks against the service record of the first party, not to consider his case for promotion. In fact, in the statement of cross examination of MW1 it has come that a criminal prosecution was pending against said Jaya when the departmental promotion committee said to have taken up his case for promotion. Very strangely, the management considered his case for promotion despite the fact that he faced criminal prosecution and the fact that he did not possess required 3 years experience which was necessary for the purpose of

promotion to the above said post. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid admitted facts and circumstances of the case, there cannot be any hesitation in the mind of this tribunal in coming to the conclusion that the management was not justified in not promoting the first party to the post of AMF by relaxing the academic qualification as per Rule 31 of RSP Regulation.

9. The contention of the management that since the first party had already been retired from service in the month of April 2006, itself, question of considering his case for promotion by the management does not arise. Of course, in the cases of promotion's relief to be given to the delinquent concerned, in the normal course, the courts will be giving directions to the management concerned to consider his case for promotion and the relief of promotion as such will not be given itself. But in the instant case the first party since has been retired from service after having attained the age of superannuation and his retirement took place during the pendency of the present proceedings, it appears that ends of justice will be met if the relief of promotion on notional basis itself is to be granted by this tribunal so as to enable him to get the financial benefits he could have got had he been promoted as on the date the said Shri Jaya junior to him was promoted. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, following award is passed.

AWARD

It is declared that the management was not justified in not promoting the first party to the post of AMF by relaxing the academic qualification as per Rule 31 of RSP Regulation. The first party is declared to be promoted to the above said post on notional basis w.e.f. 31.01.2001, the date on which said Shri H. Jaya was promoted. The management shall fix the pay scale of the first party in the grade of AMF w.e.f. 31.01.2001 and shall pay him the arrears of his salary in the said scale from the above said date till the date he retired from service with all consequential benefits. No costs.

(Dated to PA transcribed by her corrected and signed by me on 10th August 2007)

A. R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2856.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार एयरपोर्ट अथोरिटी ऑफ इंडिया के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय II, नई दिल्ली के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या आई.डी.सं. 18/2005) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-11011/4/2001/आई.आर.(एम)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2856.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central

Government hereby publishes the award (Ref. I.D.C.R. No.18/2005) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court II, New Delhi now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Airport Authority of India and their workman, which was received by the Central Government on 6-9-2007.

[No. L-11011/4/2001-IR(M)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE PRESIDING OFFICER: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT-II, NEW DELHI

Presiding Officer: R. N. RAI,

I. D. No. 18.2005

IN THE MATTER OF :—

Shri Khushi Ram,
C/o. Delhi Labour Union,
Agarwal Bhawan, Tis Hazari,
New Delhi.

Versus

1. The Chairman,
Airport Authority of India,
Palam, New Delhi.
2. M/s. Vishal Enterprises
through its Proprietor,
71, Kamla Market,
New Delhi.

AWARD

The Ministry of Labour by its letter NO.L-11011/4/2001 IR (M) CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DT. 17.02.2005 has referred the following point for adjudication.

The point runs as hereunder:

"Whether the action of the management of Airport Authority of India in denying employment to Sh. Khushi Ram is justified? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled,"

It transpires from perusal of the order sheet that the workman was directed to file affidavit on 02-11-2006. He has failed to file affidavit till date. The case of the workman is that he has completed 240 days of continuous employment and he has been working against permanent post.

The workman has not filed affidavit in support of his claim statement. He is not entitled to get any relief as prayed for.

The reference is replied thus:—

The action of the management of Airport Authority of India in denying employment to Sh. Khushi Ram is justified. The workman applicant is not entitled to get any relief as prayed for.

The award is given accordingly.

Date: 28.08.2007.

R. N. RAI, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2857.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार दी ए एन एम ए जी के प्रबंधन के संबद्ध नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, चेन्नई के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या आई. डी. सं.-417/2001) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-29012/56/1996-आईआर(एम)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2857.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. I. D. No. 417/2001) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Chennai now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of TANMAG and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 6-9-07.

[No. L-29012/56/1996-IR (M)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, CHENNAI

Monday, the 5th June, 2006

PRESENT

Shri K. Jayaraman, Presiding Officer

Industrial Dispute No. 417/2001

[In the matter of the dispute for adjudication under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), between the Management of TANMAG and their workmen]

BETWEEN

Sri I. Krishnan : I Party/Petitioner

AND

The Chairman cum Managing Director, TANMAG, Salem : II Party/Management

APPEARANCE

For the Workman : M/s. A. Nagarathinam,
Advocates

For the Management : Mr. M. R. Raghavan,
Advocate

AWARD

The Central Government Ministry of Labour, vide Order No. L-29012/56/96-IR (M) dated 27-12-1996 has referred the following industrial dispute to this Tribunal for adjudication :—

“Whether the action of the management of TANMAG in terminating the services of Shri I. Krishnan, T. No. 707 is just, proper and legal? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled?”

2. After the receipt of the reference, the Tamil Nadu Industrial Tribunal has taken it as I.D. No. 1/97 and issued notices to both parties and both the parties entered appearance through their advocates and filed their Claim Statement and Counter Statement respectively. Subsequently, after the constitution of this Tribunal, this industrial dispute was transferred to this Tribunal and this Court has taken on file as I. D. No. 417/2001 and taken up for enquiry. After enquiry, this Tribunal has passed an order stating that the action of the Respondent/Management in terminating the services of Sri I. Krishnan is just, proper and legal and therefore, it held that the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Subsequently, the Petitioner has taken up the matter by preferring Writ Petition before High Court and in that the High Court has remanded the matter for fresh disposal stating that ‘the matter is remanded to 1st Respondent Tribunal for fresh consideration from the stage of furnishing a copy of enquiry report, if not given earlier to enable the Petitioner to show cause how he was prejudiced because of non-furnishing of the enquiry reports’. After its remand, the matter was taken up by this Tribunal again and after ascertaining from the Petitioner that whether he has received the domestic enquiry report and after his reply that he has received the enquiry report, the matter was taken up for enquiry at that stage.

3. The allegations of the Petitioner in the Claim Statement are briefly as follows :—

The Petitioner entered the services of the Respondent/Management in the year 1971 as unskilled worker bearing token No. 707. Subsequently, he was transferred from mines to the auto garage section as mazdoor and he has served more than 23 years in the Respondent/Management. The Petitioner was also involved in trade union activities of Salem District Pattali Thozhil Sangam which was espousing the cause of the workmen in day-to-day problems with the management. Engaged by the Union activities of the Petitioner, the management was waiting for an opportunity to victimize him. The Respondent/Management introduced VRS in the company and the workers are coerced by all means to accept the said scheme. Thus, the Respondent/Management wanted to reduce the strength of the work force and workers were also forced to produce more than that of normal production without any agreement and those who are unable to achieve the target of workload were illegally suspended. While so, 67 workmen belonging to various gangs were suspended on 16-3-94 on the alleged charge for poor performance.

This has created unrest and resentment among the workers in the mines and this was brought to the notice of seven trade unions. The Petitioner along with representatives of seven trade unions met the Respondent/Management to express the resentment that was prevailing among the workmen and requested for revocation of enmasse suspension with a view to bring normalcy. In that proceeding, heated arguments and counter arguments were exchanged by both sides. While so, to his shock and surprise, the Petitioner was served with an order of suspension dated 16-3-1994 alleging that he has abused

the company officials and threatened them on the date of discussion. Even though the Petitioner has submitted his explanation not satisfied with the explanation, the Respondent/Management ordered for domestic enquiry. Subsequently, the 2nd show cause notice was issued to the Petitioner on 18-4-1994 and a final order was passed dismissing the Petitioner from service. The order of dismissal of the Petitioner from service is arbitrary, illegal and unjust. Even the appeal preferred by the Petitioner was dismissed without any reason or rhythm. The domestic enquiry was not conducted in a fair and proper manner and in accordance with principles of natural justice. He was not furnished with list of witnesses who are going to be examined and the list of documents which are going to be marked before the conduct of domestic enquiry. One Mr. K. A. Siddhan, who was the eye witness of the alleged incident was not examined as a witness on behalf of the Petitioner and thus, he was denied an opportunity to defend himself. The Petitioner was also denied supply of copies of enquiry proceedings in spite of requisition made by him. The Petitioner was not paid subsistence allowance during the period of suspension from 16-3-94 to 20-6-94 and it amounts to violation of Section 22(3) of Standing Orders. While passing the dismissal order, the Disciplinary Authority did not consider the past records of the Petitioner and he has not given notice as to the past records and thereby he was denied reasonable opportunity of being heard. The report of the Enquiry Officer are totally perverse and biased. The Respondent/Management examined only the security as a witness in support of the charges. All the management witnesses have stated that there was discussion on that date. In the discussion others also nearly 40 persons have participated, but the Petitioner only was served with order of suspension and he alone was chargesheeted, which shows the motive of the Respondent/Management. There was no misconduct done by the Petitioner as alleged by the Respondent/Management. The Respondent/Management has not conducted any preliminary enquiry on the alleged charges. Above all, the order of dismissal passed by the Respondent/Management is disproportionate to the gravity of the charges alleged against the Petitioner. Hence, for all these reasons, the Petitioner prays that an award may be passed setting aside the order of dismissal and direct the Respondent/Management to reinstate him into service with continuity of services and other monetary benefits.

4. As against this, the Respondent in its Counter Statement contended that no doubt, the Petitioner was employed as mazdoor at Mines Division, Haulage section of the Respondent. On 16-3-94 when the Mines Manager was discussing with certain other workmen and foreman regarding disciplinary action initiated against two workmen, the Petitioner interfered and misbehaved with the Mines Manager and abused him and for this act, the Petitioner was placed under suspension and a charge sheet dated 16-3-94 under clause 21 (7) and 21(10) of the Standing Orders was issued to the Petitioner. Even though the Petitioner has submitted his explanation since it was satisfactory, departmental enquiry was ordered. In that the Petitioner availed all the opportunities offered to him and

participated in the domestic enquiry which held from 21-3-94 to 7-4-94 and was held in a fair and proper manner adhering to the principles of natural justice. Based on the materials placed in the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his findings on 15-4-94 holding that the Petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him. After considering the report, and also after following the procedure and considering the bad pasts record of the Petitioner the Respondent issued 2nd show cause notice dated 18-4-94 to the Petitioner proposing punishment of dismissal. The Petitioner submitted his reply on 20-4-94 wherein he admitted the charges and tendered appology. Independently considering the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the explanation of the Petitioner and his past record, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order on 20-6-94 dismissing him from service. The Appellate Authority before whom the Petitioner has preferred an appeal also considered the matter independently and rejected the appeal. Therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the Respondent is just and legal. The Petitioner was given ample opportunity in the domestic enquiry to defend himself and he examined five witnesses to defend his case and it was held in accordance with principles of natural justice. Since Sri K. A. Siddhan was the representative of the Petitioner in the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer was fair in holding that the said Mr. Siddhan could act as workman's representative only and he could not be a witness and also representative of the workman in the same enquiry. No request for payment of subsistence allowance was made by the Petitioner. It has also not been stated as to how the Petitioner was prejudiced by this. His past records were mentioned in the 2nd show cause notice and he was given ample opportunity to offer his explanation. Therefore, it would be improper to contend that he was not given notice as to the past records and thereby denied reasonable opportunity of being heard. Further, his personal file was also marked in the domestic enquiry where he had an opportunity to contradict the same and the management's action against the Petitioner is not to victimize him for his union activities. When the Petitioner has admitted his guilt, it is not open to him to contend that he was victimized for participating in the union activities. The action of the Respondent/Management in punishing the Petitioner for proved misconduct is just, proper and certainly not motivated by victimisation. Hence, it is not a case for any interference by this Tribunal under Section 11A of the I.D. Act and it cannot be categorised as shockingly disproportionate warranting interference. Hence, for all these reasons, the Respondent prays that the claim may be dismissed with costs.

5. In these circumstances, the point for my determination is:—

- (i) "Whether the Petitioner was prejudiced by non-furnishing of enquiry report?"—
- (ii) Whether the action of the Respondent/Management in terminating the services of Petitioner is just, proper and legal?
- (iii) "To what relief the Petitioner is entitled?"

Point Nos. 1 & 2 :

6. The case of the Petitioner in this dispute is that he was a workman joined as unskilled worker under the Respondent/Management and he was transferred to auto garge section as mazdoor. It is his further allegation that he was involved in trade union activities, therefore, the Respondent/Management has got grudge over him and on 16-3-94 when the Mines Manager was discussing with regard to disciplinary action taken against the two workmen of gang No. 20, he interfered in the discussion and in that discussion, heated arguments were exchanged by both sides. But, the Respondent/Management has issued a charge sheet alleging that he has misbehaved with the Mines Manager and abused him during the discussion. Even though he has given an explanation that he has not misbehaved with any of the officers, his explanation was not accepted and enquiry was conducted against him. The Respondent/Management after a farce of enquiry has passed the final order dismissing him from service. Even though he preferred an appeal against that order, the Appellate Authority also concurred with the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and rejected his appeal. The Petitioner alleged that the dismissal order passed on 20-6-94 by the Disciplinary Authority and the order of confirmation dated 9-7-94 are arbitrary, illegal and unjustified for several reasons.

7. But, as against this, the Respondent contended that the enquiry was conducted in a fair and proper manner and full opportunity was given to the Petitioner and he has also participated in the entire proceedings and therefore, it cannot be said that the enquiry held against him is not proper and therefore, the impugned order need not be set aside and the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief.

8. At the first instance, as I have already stated that this Tribunal had come to the conclusion that dismissal order passed against the Petitioner is valid, just and proper and therefore, claim of the Petitioner was dismissed. Against that award, the Petitioner has preferred Writ Petition and in that the High Court has come to the conclusion that the impugned Award passed by this Tribunal is not sustainable and therefore, the High court has set aside the Award passed by this Tribunal and remitted the matter for fresh consideration from the stage of furnishing of copy of enquiry report.

9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the High Court has come to the conclusion that the enquiry report was not furnished to the Petitioner and when the enquiry report is not furnished and punishment is imposed on the basis of enquiry report, the Tribunal should cause a copy of enquiry report to be furnished to the concerned employee to show cause how he was prejudiced because of non-furnishing of the said report and only after hearing the parties, the Tribunal can come to the conclusion that it would have made no difference to the ultimate punishment given. In this case, after the Enquiry Officer's report, though the Respondent/Management has issued 2nd show cause notice had not furnished copy of enquiry report to the Petitioner and without furnishing the enquiry report, they have obtained explanation from the Petitioner and passed

the final order. Therefore, the Petitioner has to show before this Tribunal as to how he was prejudiced by non-supplying of enquiry report. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further contended that though in the domestic enquiry number of documents were marked, it was not marked through anybody else, but the Enquiry Officer himself has marked those documents without anybody's evidence and the basic documents were not provided to the Petitioner. Secondly, one Mr. Siddhan alleged to be eye witness of this incident, though mentioned as defence witness, has not been permitted to be examined before the domestic enquiry. It was stated that since Mr. Siddhan was defence representative of the Petitioner in the domestic enquiry, he cannot be a witness for the Petitioner. This reason given by the Enquiry Officer is not fair and proper and fair opportunity was denied to the Petitioner on this ground. Thirdly, the management witness one Mr. M. Veerakumar, Mines Manager was examined as MW3 in the domestic enquiry. The said Manager is the higher authority for the Enquiry Officer, further he was also the Disciplinary Authority in this case. When MW1 was not Disciplinary Authority his evidence as MW3 cannot be believed because he has already approached the case with prejudicial mind. Therefore, there is no fairness in the domestic enquiry. Since the enquiry report was not given to the Petitioner, he has not raised all these things in his representation to the 2nd show cause notice. Under such circumstances, a great prejudice was caused to the Petitioner by non-supply of enquiry report to the Petitioner. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further relied on the rulings reported in 1994 1 LLJ 1962 MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECIL, HYDERABAD Vs. B. KARUNAKAR wherein Full Bench of the Supreme Court have held that "whenever therefore, the service rules contemplate an enquiry before a punishment is awarded and when the Enquiry Officer is not the Disciplinary Authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the Enquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment.... he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report as the waiver of his right. Whether therefore, the employee asks for the report or not the report has to be furnished to him. Since the right to make representation to the Disciplinary Authority against the findings recorded in enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and to deny the said right is a breach of principles of natural justice..... In all cases, where the Enquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Court or Tribunal should cause copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee, he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show cause how his or her case was prejudiced because of non-supply of report." Therefore, in this case, since the enquiry report has not been given to the Petitioner the Petitioner has to establish before this Tribunal how he was prejudiced by non-supply of enquiry report. He further contended that the basic documents namely documents on which the Enquiry Officer has based his findings were not given to the Petitioner and the important witness namely Mr. K. A. Siddhan has not been permitted to examine

in the case on the ground that he was the representative of the Petitioner in the domestic enquiry and it was not shown how a representative cannot be a witness for the delinquent. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further contended that in one case *SHANTILAL MOTILAL MARWADI Vs. LIPTON TEA INDIA LTD. AND OTHERS* reported in 1991 II LLR 225 the Bombay High Court has held that "request for permission to be defended by a co-workman on the ground that he was the defence witness, in such case, Enquiry Officer's rejection is violation of principles of natural justice because there is nothing in law that at the domestic enquiry a person who depends can never be examined as a defence witness." In this case, only on the ground that Mr. Siddhan was the defence representative, he was not allowed to give evidence in this case, which is violation of principles of natural justice. Thirdly, MW3 who was the Disciplinary Authority in this case has given evidence against the Petitioner and he has also decided this case as a Disciplinary Authority and he was also examined as management witness, in such case, there is total violation of principles of natural justice. Furthermore, no subsistence allowance was given to the Petitioner throughout the enquiry. When the standing order of Respondent has clearly stated that subsistence allowance must be given to the delinquent employee, the Respondent has not given any reason for not giving subsistence allowance till the end of enquiry. These are some of the prejudices caused to the Petitioner and which was not submitted by the Petitioner due to non-supply of the enquiry report. Thus, the Petitioner was not given an opportunity to question the fairness of the enquiry by giving representation to the 2nd show cause notice. Under such circumstance, it cannot be said that the dismissal order passed by the Disciplinary Authority which was confirmed by the Appellate Authority is fair and just.

10. But, as against this, learned counsel for the Respondent contended that Petitioner even though alleged that he was not given any enquiry report before 2nd show cause notice, he has not stated this in his reply to the 2nd show cause notice. Further, he has not questioned the fairness of the enquiry, on the other hand, he has admitted the guilt in his 2nd show cause notice and he has requested the Respondent/Management to pardon his activities and to pass an order taking liberal attitude. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Petitioner has been prejudiced by non-supply of enquiry report. Furthermore, even in the appeal against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and even in the Claim Statement and also in written arguments, he has not questioned the conduct of enquiry nor stated any prejudice caused to him by non-supply of enquiry report. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that he was prejudiced by non-supply of enquiry report. The contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner is only an afterthought. Therefore, this Tribunal need not come to the conclusion that he was prejudiced by the non-supply of enquiry report. Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that even before the High Court though he has raised certain allegations against the fairness of enquiry, the High Court has not come to the conclusion that the enquiry is

not fair and proper, on the other hand, an opportunity must be given to the Petitioner only to substantiate his claim that prejudice was caused to him by non-supply of enquiry report. Therefore, the Petitioner has not right to question the fairness of enquiry after the matter was remanded for a particular reason and in such circumstances, arguments of the learned counsel for the Petitioner cannot be accepted that there is no fairness in the enquiry.

11. But, again, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the High Court has not gone into the entire allegations of the Petitioner and since the Petitioner's advocate argued with regard to non-supply of enquiry report, the High Court has directed the matter to be remanded to this Tribunal on the ground to provide copy of enquiry report and to proceed with the case from the stage of supply of enquiry report. On this ground, it cannot be contended that the High Court has upheld the fairness of the domestic enquiry in its judgement. Since no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to allege against the enquiry report, it cannot be said that the Petitioner has no authority to question the fairness of the enquiry after remand. Since no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to question all these things, it was a great prejudice caused to the Petitioner by non-supply of enquiry report. If the enquiry report had been given to him, then he must had an opportunity to raise all these pleas in his reply to 2nd show cause notice. But, since the enquiry report was not given to the Petitioner, he has no opportunity to raise all these things in the reply to 2nd show cause notice. Further, learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that 61 employees were suspended and as a representative of the union, he has asked the Respondent/Management that they have to be reinstated and narrated by his representation, but the Respondent/Management has taken vindictive action and suspended him and no opportunity was given to the Petitioner to defend his case. Further, in the domestic enquiry one Mr. R. Subramani was examined, who was the Security in the Respondent/Management and he has spoken to the fact which was subsequent to the alleged incident and no charge was framed against that allegation, therefore, the Enquiry Officer basing this evidence as corroboration to the incident is not fair on his part. Further all the witnesses spoken about the next day after the incident, the Petitioner has spoken in the gate meeting that he has spoken ill of Mines Manager and others and he has also threatened the Mines Manager and other officers and basing this evidence, the Enquiry Officer has come to the conclusion that charge framed against the Petitioner was a true one. But, no charge was framed against the Petitioner for this incident namely gate meeting which took place after the alleged incident and therefore, the findings given by the Enquiry Officer basing his finding on the alleged incident subsequent to the charge is not fair and it cannot be believed.

12. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner because in this case from the proceedings of the domestic enquiry, I find the basic documents were marked by the Enquiry Officer without any evidence and further, he has not obtained the consent of the Petitioner for marking these documents. Further,

even though the Petitioner has alleged that Mr. Siddhan was his defence witness, the Enquiry Officer has rejected the request of the Petitioner on the ground that he was the defence representative of the Petitioner. But he has not stated under what provision of Standing Order or under any rule that defence representative cannot be a witness for the delinquent. Similarly Mr. Veerakumar, who was examined in the domestic enquiry as management witness namely MW3 who was working as Mines Manager and Disciplinary Authority in the domestic enquiry, when he has given the evidence against the Petitioner in domestic enquiry, I think, it is not fair on his part to pass final order in this case, because he was already prejudiced by the alleged act of the Petitioner. Under such circumstances, by not giving the enquiry report and calling for reply or representation from the Petitioner with regard to enquiry report, a great prejudice was caused to the Petitioner by the non-supply of enquiry report. Under such circumstances, I find there is not fairness in the domestic enquiry held against the Petitioner. In this case, learned counsel for the Petitioner alleged that only because 67 employees were suspended by the Respondent/Management, the Petitioner who was the office bearer of the union has represented their cause to the management. But enraged by the action taken by the Petitioner, the Respondent/Management not only suspended the Petitioner, but also conducted a farce of enquiry and dismissed him from service and therefore, it is a fit case to set aside the dismissal order passed by the Respondent/Management and to reinstate him into service with all consequential benefits.

13. As I have already stated since no opportunity was given to the Petitioner for giving his representation after the 2nd show cause notice with regard to the findings of the Enquiry Officer, I find a great prejudice was caused to the Petitioner and by not giving the basic documents and by not permitting the Petitioner to examine his witness, the enquiry held against the Petitioner is not fair and proper. Therefore, I find the order of termination of the Petitioner from service is not just, proper and legal.

Point No. 3:

The next point to be decided in this case is to what relief the Petitioner is entitled?

14. In view of my foregoing findings that the order of termination issued against the Petitioner is not just, proper and legal, I find the Petitioner is entitled to the relief of reinstatement, but in the circumstances of the case without any back wages. Therefore, I direct the Respondent/Management to reinstate the Petitioner into service with continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. No costs.

15. Thus, the reference is answered accordingly.

(Dictated to the P. A., transcribed and typed by him, corrected and pronounced by me in the open court on this day the 5th June, 2006)

K. JAYARAMAN, Presiding Officer

Witnesses Examined :—

On either side : None

Document Marked

For the I Party/Petitioner:—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
W1	16-3-94	Xerox copy of the Charge Sheet issued to Petitioner
W2	18-3-94	Xerox copy of the explanation submitted by Petitioner.
W3	18-4-94	Xerox copy of the 2nd show cause notice issued to Petitioner
W4	Nil	Xerox copy of the explanation submitted by Petitioner
W5	20-6-94	Xerox copy of the order of dismissal issued to Petitioner
W6	4-7-94	Xerox copy of the appeal preferred by Petitioner
W7	9-7-94	Xerox copy of the order passed by Appellate Authority
W8	14-7-94	Xerox copy of the 2A petition filed by Petitioner
W9	Nil	Xerox copy of the reply to counter
W10	Nil	Xerox copy of the failure of conciliation report

For the Respondent/Management:—

Ex. No.	Date	Description
M1	21-3-94	Xerox copy of the enquiry proceedings
M2	14-4-94	Xerox copy of the enquiry report

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2858.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार बैलादिला आइरन ओर प्रोजेक्ट डिपोजिट नं. 14 के प्रबंधन के संबंध में निर्यातकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, जबलपुर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या सी जी आई टी/एलसी/आर/220/94) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-29015/8/1994-आईआर(विधि)]

एन. एस. बोरा, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2858.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. CGIT/LC/R/220/94) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Jabalpur now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Bailadila Iron Ore Project Deposit No. 14 and their workmen, which was received by the Central Government on 6-9-07.

[No. L-29015/8/1994-IR (Vividh)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT,
JABALPURNo. CGIT/LC/R/220/94
Presiding Officer : Shri C.M. SinghSecretary,
Bastar Khadan Mazdoor Sangh, (HMS),
21 B, Kirandul,
Distt. Bastar (MP)-494 556 Union/workmen*Versus*The General Manager,
B.O.P. Deposit-14,
Kirandul,
Distt : Bastar (MP) 494 556 Management

AWARD

Passed on this 31st day of July-2207

1. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour vide its Notification No. L-29015/8/94/IR (Vividh) dated 1-12-94 has referred the following dispute for adjudication by this tribunal:—

“Whether the action of the management of Bailadila Iron Ore Project Deposit No. 14, Kirandul, in withholding the promotion of Shri K. George to the post of Junior Officer (Personnel) is justified? If not, to what relief the workman is entitled?”

2. Vide order dated 03-01-2007 of this Tribunal, the reference proceeded ex-parte against the workman/union.

3. The workman/union filed Statement of Claim. The case of workman Sh. K. George, in brief, is that he was due for promotion and was within the zone of consideration to be promoted as Junior Officer (Personnel), juniors to him Sh. Kayasan and others were promoted. The service record of the workman was clean and unblemished. The action of management in depriving him promotion to the post of Junior Officer (Personnel) is bad in law.

4. The management filed their Written Statement. Their case, in brief, is that the D.P.C. observed that a C.B.I. case was pending against the workman Sh. George in the court of Special Magistrate, C.B.I., Jabalpur and hence the D.P.C. recommended for promotion of Sh. George subject to clearance of C.B.I. case pending against. While the aforesaid case was pending, the case of promotion of the workman was reviewed as per guidelines of Government of India and he was promoted by order dated 10-9-1992 to the post Jr. Officer (Pers.)

5. The management in order to prove their case filed affidavit of their witness Shri M.S. Pooja Panda, then working as Assistant Manager (P) in Bailadila Iron Ore Project, NMDC, Kirandul.

6. I have heard Shri A.K. Shashi, Advocate for management. I have very carefully gone through the entire evidence on record.

7. As the case proceeded ex parte against the workman/union, no evidence has been adduced for proving the case of workman/union. Against the above, the case of management is fully proved by the uncontroverted and unchallenged affidavit of their witness Shri M.S. Pooja Panda. The reference, therefore, deserves to be decided in favour of management and against the workman/union. Considering the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the parties should be directed to bear their own costs of the reference.

8. In view of the above the reference is decided in favour of the management and against the workman/union, holding that the action of the management of Bailadila Iron Ore Project Deposit No. 14, Kirandul, in withholding the promotion of Shri K. George to the post of Junior Officer (Personnel) was justified and consequently the workman is not entitled to any relief. The parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.

9. Let the copies of this award be sent to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment, New Delhi as per rules.

C.M. SINGH, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2859.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार इंडियन रेयर अर्थ लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय, ईर्नाकुलम के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या आई.डी. -1/2006) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 6-9-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-29012/18/2005-आईआर(एम)]

एन.एस. बोरा, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2859.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. I.D.- 1/2006) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Ernakulam now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Indian Rare Earths Ltd. and their workmen, received by the Central Government on 6-9-2007.

[No. L-29012/18/2005-IR(M)]

N. S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE
IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, ERNAKULAM

PRESENT:

Shri P.L. Norbert, B.A., L.L.B., Presiding Officer

(Thursday the 23rd day of August, 2007)

I.D. 1/2006

Wokmen

Jamaluddeen Kunju
Tachayil Veedu
Vadakkumthala
Karunagappally
Kollam.

Adv. Shri C. Anil Kumar

Management

1. The Ex. Engineer
Indian Rare Earths Ltd.,
Karithura, Chavara
Kollam-691 583.

Adv. M/s. Menon & Pai

2. The Secretary
Neendakara Post Workers' Society
Neendakara
Kollam.

Adv. M/s. Menon & Pai

3. The Secretary
IRE Shipping Contract Workers'
Welfare Forum, C/o IREL, Karithura
Chavara, Kollam.

Advocate absent.

AWARD

1. This is a reference made by Central Government under Section 10(1)(d) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication. The reference is:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by Sh. Jamaluddeen Kunju against the management of Indian Rare Earths Ltd. over alleged denial of employment justified? If so, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled?"

2. The facts of the case in brief are as follows:—

The worker, Shri Jamaluddeen Kunju was working in the Indian Rare Earths Limited, Chavara since 1975. According to him his work was loading of minerals to the barge for shipment. Due to the nature of the work he was affected by skin allergy and for one month (1995) he could not attend the work. After recovery when he returned for work he was denied employment. Thereafter he has been out of service. No notice of termination or

compensation was given to him. The action of the management is illegal and he is liable to be reinstated with effect from 1-9-1995.

3. According to the management the worker was never engaged by the 1st management company. The loading work of minerals was entrusted to contractors from time to time. The workers are engaged by contractors. The worker in this case was also engaged by a contractor. The wages to head load workers were paid by the contractors. In the year 2000 two welfare forums were formed for the betterment of the service conditions of contract workers. Thereafter workers were engaged by the contractors only through the forums. Those who were on the rolls of contractors as on 1-8-1999 were registered as members of the forums. The forums were registered under Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act. In 2001 the shipping operations were shifted to Cochin Port from Neendakara Port. Thus 1261 contract workers became surplus. Hence a severance package was formulated on the basis of discussion between workers, management and State Government. 732 members of the forum accepted the package and relinquished membership in the forum. But the benefit of the package was available only to those members of the forum who were on the rolls of the forum as on 1-6-2002. The worker was not a member of the forum since he was not a worker of the contractor at the relevant time. Hence he is not eligible to get compensation. In 1995 he abandoned the employment under the contractor and went abroad for better prospects. He raised the dispute regarding denial of employment only in the year 2002 and that too before the High Court. The management has not denied employment to the worker and there is no question of reinstatement. Therefore he is not entitled for any relief.

4. In the light of the above contentions the following points arise for consideration:

- (1) Whether there is denial of employment by the 1st management?
- (2) If so, is it illegal?

The evidence consists of the oral testimony of WW1 and documentary evidence of Exts. W1 & 2 on the side of workman and MW1 and Exts. M1 & M1 (a) on the side of management.

5. Points No. (1) & (2)

The fact that Shri Jamaluddeen Kunju was a Headload worker at Neendakara Port is not denied by the managements. He was engaged for loading minerals into barge. He worked there from 1975 to September, 1995. But the management deny that he was employed by the Company, Indian Rare Earths. According to them he was only a contract worker as the work of loading minerals to the barge and from the barge to the ship was entrusted to

contractors from time to time. The worker was examined as WW1. He admits that at the time he was taken for the work, the loading and unloading work was entrusted to contractors by the Company. He also admits that in September, 1995 he fell sick and for a month he could not attend work. Thereafter he was denied work and till date since September, 1995 he has not worked there. Though he says that he was given appointment order, no such order is produced. There is no record of having employed him by the Company. No Attendance Register is summoned. No payment vouchers or Acquittance Roll too are called for. There is no record to show that he had applied for leave to the Company and it was either granted or rejected at any time by the Company. He has not tendered any evidence to show this supervision and control of the work of loading and unloading was done by the officers of the Company. The documents produced by the worker are Exts. W1 series Annual Statement of the Account of PF contribution and Ext. W2 reply statement of management Company submitted to the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central). Ext. W1 series (three in number) are not doubt prepared by the Company. It is the statutory duty of the Company to submit Statement of Account of PF to the statutory authority. MW1 has stated that the contract workers' PF contribution is remitted by the contractors to the Company, who prepares the statement and in turn remit it to the PF account. Ext. W1 series therefore will not go to show that the worker was employed by the Company. Ext. W2 statement of Company before ALC is in tune with the averments in the written statement. In Ext. W2 the 1st management Company does not admit that the worker was employed by the Company. On the other hand their contention is that he was engaged by the contractor. Therefore the 2nd document also will not come to the help of the worker. There is absolutely no evidence to prove the case of the worker that he was employed by the 1st management Company and not by the contractor.

6. Ext. M1 is copy of Certificate of Registration of IRE Shipping Contract Workers' Welfare Forum. It was registered on 2-3-2000. Ext. M1 (a) is the Memorandum of Association of the forum. It is registered under Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act. Clause 5.1 of the Memorandum of Association says that those who were in the approved list of shipping workers as on 1-8-1999 alone shall be eligible to become members of the forum. The object of the forum is social and cultural improvements of contract workers engaged in the shipping operations of minerals in IRE (unloading, barge loading and stevedores workers) (Clause 4.1). As per Clause 5.5, any member of the forum who absents from work for one shipping season continuously will lose his membership in the forum. According to MW1, since the workman was not working as on 1-8-1999 under any contractor he was not made a member of the forum. In 2001 the shipping operations in Neendakara Port was

stopped and it was shifted to Cochin Port. Hence there was surplusage of contract workers. In order to alleviate the difficulties of such contract workers the Government and the Company together thought of giving some compensation to such workers who would lose their job under contractors. Thus a severance package was made and 732 members of the forum accepted the package and relinquished membership in the forum. But the eligibility for package was available only to those members who were on the rolls of the forum as on 1-6-2002. The worker was neither a member of the forum in 1999 nor working under contractors as on 1-6-2002 in order to become eligible to get compensation under the package. Though he was working for a very long time under the contractor the 1st management Company is not responsible or liable for any violation of employment conditions or denial of work by the contractor. Since the 1st management Company has not appointed or employed the worker they are not answerable for denial of work. If at all there is any remedy it is against the concerned contractor. The worker was not able to show that though he was engaged by the contractor the Company was the real employer and the Company was controlling and supervising the work, making payment and regulating service conditions of the worker. In the absence of such evidence he cannot be treated either as a casual worker or a permanent worker of 1st management company. Therefore I find that there is no denial of employment by the 1st management company. Consequently there is no question of illegality in the matter of denial of employment. He is not even eligible to be considered under severance package given to contract workers as he was not a member the forum at the relevant time. Hence he is not entitled for any relief.

7. In the result, an award is passed finding that the dispute raised by Jamaluddeen Kunju against the management of Indian Rare Earths Ltd. over alleged denial of employment, is unjustified. The parties will suffer their respective costs. The award will take effect one month after its publication in the official Gazette.

Dictated to the Personal Assistant, transcribed and typed by her, corrected and passed by me on this the 23rd day of August, 2007.

P. L. NORBERT, Presiding Officer

APPENDIX

Witness for the Workman:

WW1 - Shri Jamaluddeen Kunju - 16-7-2007.

Witness for the Management:

MW1 - Shri A. Jeyapalan

Exhibits for the Workman:

W1 series- Photostat copies of Annual Statement of Account of PF for the years ending 31st March, 1986, 1987 & 1988. (3 Nos.)

W2 - Written statement filed by the management before ALC(C) on 21-2-2005.

Exhibits for the Management :

M1 - Photostat copies of certificate issued by the Registrar of coop. Society dated 2-3-2000.

M1(a) - Photostat copy of Memorandum of Association of IRE Shipping Contract Workers' Welfare Forum.

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2860.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार मै. भान्जा मिनरल (प्रा.) लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय भुवनेश्वर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या आई.डी. केस सं. -47/2004) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 06-9-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-27011/1/2004-आईआर(एम)]

एन.एस. बोरा, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2860.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. I.D. Case No. 47/2004) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of M/s. Bhanja Minerals (P) Ltd. and their workman, which was received by the Central Government on 06-9-2007.

[No. L-27011/1/2004-IR (M)]

N.S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

**CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL
TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT
BHUBANESWAR**

PRESENT

Shri N.K.R. Mohapatra,
Presiding Officer, C.G.I.T.-cum-Labour Court,
Bhubaneswar

Industrial Dispute Case No. 47/2004

Date of Passing Award-14th August 2007

BETWEEN

The Management of Managing Director,
M/s. Bhanja Minerals (P) Ltd., Inganijharan Iron &
Minerals Mines, At. Park Street, P.O., Keonjhar,
Orissa, Keonjhar.

—1st Party-Management.

(And)

Their Workmen, represented through
The General Secretary, North Orissa Workers Union,
P.O., Barbil, Keonjhar.

—2nd Party-Union.

APPEARANCES

Shri S.K. Mohapatra —For 1st Party-
Authorised Representative. Management.

Shri B.S. Pati, —For 2nd Party-Union
General Secretary

AWARD

The Government of India in the Ministry of Labour, in exercise of Powers conferred by Clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) have referred the following dispute for adjudication vide their Order No. L-27011/1/2004 (IR (M), dated 28-07-2004.

“Whether the demand of the North Orissa Workers Union At./Po. Barbil, Dist. Keonjhar demanding payment of Bonus @ 20% of the accounting year 2002-2003 to all workers under the Management of M/s. Bhanja Minerals (P) Ltd., at Inganijharan Iron & Manganese Mines is justified? If so what relief the workmen are entitled to?”

2. While the case was pending for filing of written statement by the 1st Party-Management both parties contended to have compromised the case and accordingly filed a joint petition of compromise, according to which the Management of M/s. Bhanja Minerals (P) Ltd., has already agreed to pay 15% bonus for the financial year 2002-2003 to all the category of employees by end of August 2007 subject to adjustment of 10% of bonus already paid to them earlier.

3. Accordingly in terms of above settlement the reference is answered.

N.K.R. MOHAPATRA, Presiding Officer

नई दिल्ली, 6 सितम्बर, 2007

का.आ. 2861.—औद्योगिक विवाद अधिनियम, 1947 (1947 का 14) की धारा 17 के अनुसरण में, केन्द्रीय सरकार ह्यूट्टी गोल्ड माईन्स कम्पनी लिमिटेड के प्रबंधन के संबंध में नियोजकों और उनके कर्मचारों के बीच, अनुबंध में निर्दिष्ट औद्योगिक विवाद में केन्द्रीय सरकार औद्योगिक अधिकरण/श्रम न्यायालय बंगलौर के पंचाट (संदर्भ संख्या सी.आर. सं. 22/2005) को प्रकाशित करती है, जो केन्द्रीय सरकार को 06-9-2007 को प्राप्त हुआ था।

[सं. एल-43012/2/2005-आईआर(एम)]

एन.एस. बोरा, डेस्क अधिकारी

New Delhi, the 6th September, 2007

S.O. 2861.—In pursuance of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby publishes the Award (Ref. No. C.R. No. 22/2005) of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, Bangalore now as shown in the Annexure in the Industrial Dispute between the employers in relation to the management of Hutti Gold Mines Co. Ltd. and their workmen, which was received by the Central Government on 06-9-2007.

[No. L-43012/2/2005-IR (M)]

N.S. BORA, Desk Officer

ANNEXURE

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL-CUM-LABOUR COURT, BANGALORE

Dated 22nd August, 2007

Present

SHRI A.R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer

C.R. No. 22/2005

I Party

Shir Sharanappa,
Ex. Mill T.No. 343,
C/o Shri Wale Babu,
Near Basaveshawar Talkies,
Raichur Road, Behind Saw Mill,
Hutti (V&P), Lingusugar Taluk,
Raichur
Karnataka State

II Party

The Executive Director,
Hutti Gold Mines Co. Ltd,
Hutti P.O.,
Raichur,
Karnataka State

AWARD

The Central Government but exercising the powers conferred by clause (d) of sub-section 2A of the Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has referred this dispute vide order No. L-43012/2/2005-IR(M) dated 3rd May 2005 for adjudication on the following schedule.

SCHEDULE

“Whether the action of the management of M/s. Hutti Gold Mines Co. Ltd., in dismissing the services of Shri Sharanappa, Ex. Mill T.No. 343 is justified? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled?”

2. The case made out by the first party workman on merits (pleadings with regard to enquiry proceedings omitted, there being a separate finding on the Domestic Enquiry issue) in the Claim Statement, is that having received the charge sheets dated 06-06-2001, 20-09-2002, 12-02-2003, 29-03-2003 and 03-04-2003 with regard to the misconduct of absenteeism from duty, unauthorisedly, he submitted the detailed explanations to those charge sheets denying the charges leveled against him and the management not being satisfied with his explanations, conducted DE and on the basis of the enquiry findings he has been dismissed from service. He contended that he never admitted the misconduct alleged against him at any point of time but admitted a particular fact such as absence

from duties on the dates mentioned in the charge sheets on the ground that he availed the leave on medical grounds and therefore, it cannot be said that admission of such a fact amounts to pleading guilty to the charges of misconduct leveled against him. He contended that the charge of misconduct has not been proved against him by any oral or documentary evidence and that the findings of the enquiry officer holding him guilty of the charges assuming that he admitted the guilt are perverse and are liable to be set aside. He contended that even if it is taken granted for a moment that he admitted the guilt or he found to be guilty on the basis of the findings of the enquiry officer, the punishment imposed upon him is very much disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged misconduct and therefore, is liable to be modified under Section 11A of the ID Act, under which the court has got powers to do so. Therefore, he requested the court to set aside the dismissal order and to reinstate him in service with backwages and other consequential benefits.

3. The management by its Counter Statement, however, contended that on the first two charge sheets when the enquiry was taken up, the first party participated in the enquiry and while the enquiry was in progress he once again remained absent, unauthorisedly, from duty for the period from 02-01-2003 to 31-03-2003, thereby, compelling the management to issue additional charge sheets dated 12-02-2003, 29-03-2003 and 03-04-2003. The management contended that when the enquiry was taken up once again on 09-06-2003, the first party participated in the enquiry and admitted the charges leveled against him and therefore, enquiry was concluded and findings were submitted holding him guilty of the charges; that the first party was furnished with the findings of the enquiry officer and after having given opportunity to the first party to submit his explanation and thereafter considering his explanation as unsatisfactory he was dismissed from service keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct committed by him. The management contended that earlier to case on hand the first party was ‘warned’ and ‘Suspended’ four times for remaining absent from duty unauthorisedly and he was not qualified for annual increments for about a period of 14 years.’ However, the first party did not improve himself showing any improvement in his attendance and therefore, there being no extenuating circumstances or mitigating factors for reduction of quantum of the punishment, the management was constrained to implement the order of dismissal. Therefore, the management requested this tribunal to reject the reference.

4. Having regard to the pleadings of the parties on the question of validity and fairness or otherwise of the enquiry proceedings, this tribunal on 10-03-2006 framed the following Preliminary Issue:

“Whether the DE conducted against the first party by the second party is fair and proper?”

During the course of trial of the said issue, the enquiry officer was examined and documents at Ex. M1 to M6 were marked. The first party did not choose to give his evidence as a rebuttal to the evidence of the enquiry officer. On 2-11-2006 when the matter was taken up for arguments on

the said issue, learned counsel representing the first party remained absent so also learned counsel representing the management and therefore, arguments were taken heard and by order dated 21-11-2006 said issue was answered in favour of the management holding that the enquiry conducted against the first party by the second party was fair and proper. Thereupon, I have heard the learned counsels on merits and posted the matter this day for award.

5. Learned counsel for the management, vehemently, argued that the fact of unauthorized absence from duty by the first party has been very much proved during the course of enquiry and the learned enquiry officer has given his considered findings holding the workman guilty of the charges as per the report at Ex. M4. He contended that not only the fact that the first party pleaded guilty to the charges has been taken into consideration but also the other facts and circumstances of the case have been very much discussed and taken into account by the enquiry officer in holding the workman guilty of the charges and therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that enquiry findings suffered from any perversity. He contended that the two medical certificates which have been relied upon by the first party in order to prove his defence that he was not keeping well suffering from certain diseases and therefore, his absence was not unauthorised absence but was against the leave to be granted to him, are not at all worth credence firstly, for the reason that they had been produced by the first party along with the explanation he gave to the charge sheets on two different occasions not accompanied by any letter of leave or accompanied by his duty report and therefore, they were rightly rejected by the enquiry officer. He submitted that keeping in view the continuous absence of the first party from duty unauthorisedly for a period of about more than 287 days and having regard to his past history of remaining absent from duty resulting into suspension order against him on four occasions with a penalty of 'Warning', the first party deserves no sympathy from the hands of this tribunal and therefore, having regard to the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, punishment imposed upon him removing him from service is quite legal and perfect.

6. Whereas, learned counsel for the first party Shri MVS for Shri KVS with equal vehemence argued that the period of unauthorised absence in question is only of 287 days and for this period of absence the first party had produced the medical certificates which could not have been ignored by the enquiry officer or by the Disciplinary Authority at least while passing the impugned punishment order. He also contended that the findings of the enquiry officer cannot be acted upon as no oral or documentary evidence was pressed into service proving the charges of misconduct against the first party but he was held guilty of the charges only on the alleged plea of guilt made by him during the course of enquiry and by way of explanation he submitted to the charge sheets. Therefore, he submitted that charges as such are not proved as plea of guilty is not proved and in the result findings suffered from perversity and therefore, the impugned punishment order based on such findings cannot be sustained in the eye of law. However,

in the last he submitted that even if, the first party held guilty for the charges of unauthorised absence, he may be given one more opportunity to reform himself and he undertakes not to repeat such a misconduct in future.

7. After having gone through the records including the enquiry proceedings, the enquiry report and the material such as the explanations given by the first party to the charge sheets, his aforesaid two medical certificates, I do not find substance in the arguments advanced for the first party as far as proof of misconduct is concerned. From the perusal of the enquiry proceedings held on 09-06-2003 marked before this tribunal at Ex. M5, it can be very well revealed that the enquiry officer had put certain questions to the first party by way of preliminary enquiry and had made him understand the charges of misconduct of unauthorised absence committed by him. The first party in very clear words has admitted the fact of unauthorised absence and made further an undertaking that he won't repeat such misconduct in future. Proceedings recorded on page 2 are very clear on the point. The first party when was asked by the enquiry officer whether he wanted any assistance from any co-worker to defend his case, he replied in the negative. To question No.9, when he was asked whether he admitted the charges leveled against him, he answered in the affirmative and once again to question No.10 when he was specifically asked his unauthorised absence was for a period of 287 days, he again admitted the fact of his unauthorised absence giving an undertaking that he will not repeat the same in future. Therefore, the enquiry officer appears to have concluded the enquiry proceedings and thereupon, submitted his findings based upon the plea of guilt made by the 'first party and also taking into consideration the other factors namely, medical certificates submitted by the first party and the explanation given by him to the charge sheet. In the result, the arguments now advanced for the first party that enquiry findings suffered from perversity as the first party did not plead guilty to the charges during the enquiry or by way of explanation to the charge sheets and that the plea of guilt as such is not proved, must fail. As noted above, the proceedings of enquiry would make it abundantly clear that the first party pleaded guilty to the charges in giving answers not only to one question but against the three questions put to him referred to supra. The explanation given by the first party to the first charge sheet dated 6-6-2001 recorded on the reverse of the said charge sheet reads to the effect that he remained absent from duty on account of suffering from certain diseases and he requested the management to excuse him for the same giving him an opportunity to correct himself in future. The explanation given by him to the charge sheet dated 20-09-2002 marked before this tribunal at Ex. M6 is to the effect that suffering from ill health he had taken the treatment for about a period of 5 months at Govt. hospital Lingasugur and thereafter at Government hospital, Raichur. Therefore, the fact that he remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for the period in question has not been disputed by the first party at any point of time. He admitted the same by way of his explanation to the charge sheets and also in his claim statement before this tribunal as noted above. His only contention was that because of his ill

health he was forced to remain absent from duty and in order to prove that he suffered from illness he had given the two medical certificates, one marked before this tribunal at Ex.M6(a) and the other marked at Ex.M6(b). As per Ex.M6 (a) he is said to have been suffered from disease called Hepatitis and the certificate reads to the effect that he having suffered from the said disease, his absence from duty w.e.f. 11-05-2002 to 24-09-2002 is absolutely necessary for the restoration of his health. The other certificate is to the effect that he was suffering from some Backache and his absence from duty was necessary from 05-01-2003 to 28-03-2003. It is to be noted that in both the certificates there is nothing to say that the first party was undergoing treatment under the Doctors who issued those certificates and was advised rest for the purpose of treatment. The Doctors opinion is that his absence from duty is necessary for the recovery of those diseases that means to say that he was able to move about. There is no mention in those certificates, that he was admitted in the hospital to be under the treatment of the doctors who issued those certificates. Moreover, these are the two certificates consisting of the fitness certificates also. In the first certificate which also consists of fitness certificate in one paper, he is declared fit for duty from 25-09-2002 and in the other certificate he is shown fit for duty on 29-03-2003. It is not understandable as to how the doctors could have given the fitness certificates on the very date they have given the certificate to the effect that the first party was suffering from certain diseases. What appears is that the first party obtained these certificates on 25-09-02 and 29-03-2003 itself, and that he did not obtain those certificates showing him suffering from disease having undergone the treatment by the doctors concerned. Moreover, the first party was supposed to approach company doctor when he needed medical treatment. Therefore, the enquiry officer was justified in not considering those certificates so as to hold that the first party's absence was on medical grounds. Moreover, it is not in dispute that these were not the certificates tendered by the first party to the management while resuming duty or along with the leave letters, as he sent these certificates to the management along with his explanation to the charge sheets. He takes no pains to attend the duty or to attend the office while submitting his explanation along with the medical certificates though he was very much moving about as he was not suffering from any serious diseases to be confined to be in bed. In any case the first party undisputedly did not proceed on leave submitting any leave letter much less getting the leave sanctioned and therefore, even if he submitted the medical certificates at a subsequent stage that too after he received the charge sheets will not give him any right to claim the leave for the period mentioned in the charge sheet. In the result, it is to be held that the enquiry findings suffered from no perversity and that the charges of misconduct as levelled against the first party stand proved beyond any shadow of doubt.

8. Now, coming to the question of punishment. Learned counsel for the first party has submitted a decision

reported in AIR 1989 SC 149 wherein, though the delinquent concerned was held to be guilty for the major misconduct committed by him on three different occasions, he was reinstated in service giving him an opportunity to reform himself and to prove to be loyal and disciplined employee in future along with payment of 70 per cent of the back wages. He also relied upon a decision reported in 2002 II LLJ SC page 775 wherein, the delinquent concerned was given the relief of reinstatement though was denied the relief of back wages. He took support of an unreported judgment of Hon'ble High Court dated 09-06-2003 in Writ Appeal No. 5573/2000 wherein the workman concerned was charged with the misconduct of unauthorised absence and the first party has given the relief of reinstatement without back wages.

9. Taking support of the aforesaid decisions, learned counsel for the first party wanted that having regard to the charge of misconduct in the present case and the fact that the first party remained absent from duty unauthorisedly only for a period of 287 days and that there was no such misconduct committed by him in the past, he requested this tribunal to give him an appropriate relief of reinstatement with some back wages. Learned counsel for the management on the other hand contended that the first party in the past also was punished with penalty of 'Warning' and was suspended on four occasions being denied annual increments for a period of 14 years and therefore, there be no purpose to be served, once again taking him back in service as it is a case of habitual offender not mending himself despite, reasonable opportunity given to him to reform himself.

10. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, the nature of misconduct committed by the first party and in the light of the fact that his past misconduct has not been established before this tribunal, it appears to me that ends of justice will be met if the first party once again is given one more opportunity to reform himself to be regular to his duties without any lame excuse by way of reinstatement without back wages and without continuity of service from the date of his dismissal order till the date of his reinstatement withholding his three future annual increments. Hence the following award:

AWARD

The management is directed to reinstate the first party workman into its services without any back wages, without continuity of service and without any attendant benefits for the period from the date of impugned punishment order till the date of his reinstatement. He shall not be entitled to annual increment for a period of 3 years accrued to him from the date of reinstatement. The first party shall give an undertaking to the management to the effect that he shall not repeat such a misconduct in future and shall prove to be loyal to the management as a disciplined employee in future without giving room to any complaint. No costs.

(Dictated to PA transcribed by her corrected and signed by me on 22nd August, 2007)

A.R. SIDDIQUI, Presiding Officer